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Abstract
This dissertation is a case study in nationalism. It examines the theoretical writings on 
the subject and concludes that nationalism is the sense of identity shared by a group of 
people who are linked by either a civic-territorial or by a linguistic-ethnic bond and by 
the belief that their corporate interests can best be protected by control of their own 
state.
The central theme of the dissertation revolves around two basic questions;
1. Is there a Baloch nationality with a sufficiently developed national conscious­
ness and distinctive characteristics shared by the members of this nationality/
2. If so, is the national consciousness of the Baloch, their determination to main­
tain their national identity, and their desire for political self-government, 
strong enough to say that there is a Baloch national movement.
The dissertation serves several purposes. It fills a gap in our knowledge of Baloch na­
tionalism in Pakistan and Iran and explores in detail its development in the 1920-80 
period. By adopting a comparative approach it contributes to a better understanding of 
sub-national movements in both countries. The main approach to the study is histori­
cal; using primary and secondary sources, it describes and analyses the foundations, 
evolution, dynamics and implications of Baloch nationalism.
A Note About Transliteration and Calendar
The transliteration of Balochi, Urdu, Arabic and Fasi names and subject matters in 
this dissertation had been in accordance with both scholarly systems and pronuncia­
tion. In the main, I have attempted to preserve consistency in pronunciation.
Prior to 1990 the transliteration of the ethnonym “Baloch” was spelled a myr­
iad of ways -  “Baluch”, “Baloch”, “Belooch”, “Biloch” -  the most common being 
“Baluch” into English. In 1990 the provincial government of Pakistani Balochistan 
decreed that the official English spelling was to be “Baloch”, and this has become the 
accepted standard in Pakistan. I have therefore opted for this spelling. All occurrence 
of the term in this thesis, except when used as a personal name, in the title of a book, 
or in a direct quotation, have been so standardised.
The dates that appear next to the Christian dates in the footnotes and bibliog­
raphy are for the books published in Iran and Afghanistan, which correspond to a 
civil solar calendar. The books published in Arab countries are dated on the basis of 
an Islamic lunar calendar, but in this thesis only the Christian equivalent date has 
been used.
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FOREWORD
The Baloch people have awakened to a sense of nationhood rather belatedly, 
and in this lies their tragedy and that of the people among whom they live. They now 
seek to wrest what they regard as their divided homeland from the Punjabis, the Af­
ghans, and the Persians -  a difficult and dangerous undertaking. The Balochi envi­
ronment, which has moulded the character of the Baloch as individuals, has also 
shaped their destiny as a people. Separated by impassable mountain barriers, divided 
by linguistic and sectarian differences, rent by narrow tribal loyalties, and split up by 
international frontiers, they now yearn to be what other more fortunate peoples are -  a 
nation-state.
The Baloch occupy an extremely important region at the heart of the world’s 
oil route. Despite the failure of numerous Baloch rebellions over the past decades in 
Pakistan and Iran, Baloch nationalism continues to be a source of deep concern to the 
governments of these countries. Aroused by the success of surrounding nationalisms -  
the Indian, the Persian, and the Turkish -  and goaded into desperation by its own fail­
ures, Baloch nationalism has in the sixties and seventies become increasingly radical 
and uncompromising. For these reasons, the Baloch have come to play an increasingly 
significant role in Southwest Asian affairs. Their behaviour is one of the important 
factors in the future stability and security not only of the Baloch-inhabited countries 
but also of the entire region. Thus, it is important to know the Baloch and to under­
stand their aims, their political orientation, and the course they are likely to pursue.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Baloch nationalists advocated the 
idea of the "Greater Balochistan" covering an area equivalent to present-day Paki­
stan.1 But no leader of any major movement since the Second World War has seri­
ously considered this. Social developments, inter-ethnic exchange, submission to dif­
ferent historical situations, Persian domination in Iran, and Punjabi rule in Pakistan 
have created very different sets of conditions. Though Baloch nationalist movements 
have existed in Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty as well as under the Islamic Republic, 
the centre for the development of Baloch political and cultural identity has been situ­
ated mainly in what is now known as Pakistani Balochistan.
The Eastern Balochistan (Pakistani Balochistan), with an area of more than 
135,000 square miles not only comprises more than 40 percent of the land mass of
1 The Islamic Republic of Pakistan: 310403 sq. miles.
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Pakistan as a whole, but demographically also the bulk of the Baloch population are 
dwelling there. More important, however, is the historical context and the political 
environment in which the Baloch nationalism is rooted and evolved in that pail of the 
country. Eastern Balochistan was the centre of the Rind-Lashari tribal Confederacy in 
the late 15th century, and later the Khanate of Kalat, which ruled over the whole Ba­
loch country, included the Iranian Balochistan since the 17th century up to the British 
advent in mid-19th century.2 The thrust of this analysis is to understand the historical 
determinant of the Baloch question. Thus, the main focus of this study will be on the 
Baloch nationalism on the Eastern Balochistan (Pakistani), rather than the Western 
(Iranian).
It should be added that since its emergence in the 1920s, the Baloch national­
ism in Pakistan in terms of organisation and development has achieved much greater 
importance than that of Iranian Balochistan. As will be discussed in the following 
chapters, its political and military strength in the 1960s and 1970s makes the Baloch 
nationalism in Pakistan the unchallenged leader and spokesman of the Baloch nation­
alism as a whole.
While the modes and scale of oppression have varied in time and by place, the 
conditions of the Baloch share some important features. First the Baloch areas overlap 
nation-state borders; they thus acquire significance for “national security” and are 
vulnerable for interference and manipulation by regional and international powers. 
Second, the Baloch regions of these countries are usually the poorest, least developed 
areas, systematically marginalized by the centres of the economic power. A third 
shared feature is that the dynamic of assimilation, repression and the Baloch resis­
tance in each countries have affected the direction and outcome of the Baloch strug­
gles in the neighbouring countries.
My interest to this study dates from 1970s. As a young man I learned about the 
sacrifices of the Baloch people for the cause of the liberation of Balochistan. Since 
1978,1 took part in political activities against the Shah’s regime, when I was a student 
of political science. Being present on the scene of Iranian revolution in 1979, I per­
sonally witnessed at first hand an unprecedented upsurge of nationalist activities 
among various Iranian nationalities including the Baloch. The open political environ­
ment, which then prevailed in Iran in the immediate aftermath of the victoiy of the 
Islamic revolution, made it possible.
2 Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan, vol. 4, pp. 88-92.
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Much of the material upon which this dissertation is based was gathered in 
Pakistan, Sweden and England during 1996 and 1997. At that time I was able to use 
the library facilities of the British Library, the India Office Library Records, the Pub­
lic Record Office, the School of Oriental and African Studies of London University, 
and the University of London Library (Senate House). Additional information was 
later gathered in Sweden, particularly at the Library of the Stockholm University, 
Kungllia Biblioteket (the Royal Library), Vitterhetsakademiens Bibliotek and Uppsala 
Univesitetsbibliotek (Library of the Uppsala University). In addition, I started collect­
ing documents on Baloch nationalism from Baloch political workers and politicians. 
They not only provided me with their personal records, old newspapers, and records 
of political parties but answered sensitive questions. My affiliation with the Baloch 
National Movement (Baloch Raji Zrombesh-Iran) was a decisive factor in gaining 
their confidence.
A survey of the existing literature on the subject indicates that early informa­
tion on Baloch history is scattered in the works of the medieval Muslim historians (of 
both Arabic and Persian origin). The most important sources on the early history of 
the Baloch are the works of the Arabi chroniclers al-Baladhuri (died AD 892), al- 
Tabari (died AD 932), al-Mas’udi (died AD 943), al-Istakhri (died AD 951) and ibn 
Hauqal (died AD 977). An extensive range of studies produced by British scholar's, 
explorers, and officials during the colonial era follow these.
The beginning of formal study of Balochistan by the British can be tied to the 
unavoidable competition between Russia and England over parts of Asia. Thus, the 
early works about the Baloch belong to the British spies sent to the region. In this re­
spect, Henry Pottinger’s book, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde. (1816) is the most 
important work, which was published in the West. He wrote in detail about the geog­
raphy, history, and the politics of Balochistan in the early 19th century. Equally impor­
tant, however, are the historical information collected by the two other British spies, 
N. P. Grant (1809) and Hajee Abun-Nabee of Kabul (1844) respectively. The works 
of Pottinger, Grant, and Abun-Nabee not only give us a picture of Balochs5 socio­
political life before the British advent, but also their political relations to their 
neighbour, the Persians, the Afghans, and the Indians.
3 For more information See, M. Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race, p. 29 and N. Frye, Remaks on
Baluchi History, p. 46.
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Considering the issue of philology as the basis of Orientalism in general and 
Indology in particular, it should be recalled that the notion of language was important 
in the European evolution of nationalism. The Indo-Iranian languages as the philolo­
gists classified them, became the basis of study of the region’s history and other broad 
topics in a national context as well. The philologist, Longworth Dames, in his The Ba­
loch Race (1904) and Popular' Poetry of the Baloches (1907) classified Balochi as an 
Iranian language, which later became an important ground for discussion on the Ba­
loch ethnic origin and history by many scholars. Charles Masson’s Narrative of Vari­
ous Journeys in Balochistan. Afghanistan, the Paniab. (1844); Hughes The Country of 
Balochistan (1877); G. P. Tate, Frontiers of Baluchistan (1909); R. E Dyer The Raid­
ers of the Sarhad, (1921) also provide important information about the history and 
politics of Balochistan in the early 20th century.
Moreover, the memoirs of the British officials who served in the region as 
members of the (Imperial Indian) Foreign and Political Service continue to appear* in 
the form of books, essays and luncheon speeches. Conrad Corfield, The Princely India 
I Knew; From Reading to Mountbatten (1975) and Edward Wakefield, Past Impera­
tive: Mv Life in India 1927-1947 (1966), for example, contain chapters on Balochis­
tan and the Khanate of Kalat, where some of them served as Agents to the Governor- 
General and Political Agents, etc. Though in general they have ignored detailed dis­
cussion of the Baloch nationalism, nevertheless they provide basic material for an un­
derstanding of British “indirect rule” in the region.
The above-mentioned contributions, which are the first systematic studies of 
their kind, include historical, geo-political, anthropological, linguistic, and archaeo­
logical studies on the subject. Beside these important published books, there are im­
portant unpublished records available in the India Office Library, the Public Record 
Office, and the British Records Library. Among the unpublished records, which are 
valuable in understanding Baloch nationalism under British period, the files, IOR: 
L/P+S/l 3/1846-47, L/P-S/l2/3174, and R/3/1/155+166 are important for understand­
ing the reform and constitutional status of Balochistan. In the Foreign Office Records, 
the memoranda on Balochistan and Afghanistan written by Sandeman and Ramsay 
provide information concerning the late 19th and 20th centuries.
Among the Baloch sources, Gul Khan Nasir’s Tarikh-e Balochistan 
1952/1954, (the history of Balochistan), in two volumes, is seemingly the best and the 
most authentic account of the events, activities and personalities related to the Baloch
history, nationalism and national movement. Nasir was among the top leaders of the 
Baloch national movement. He was also, during the 1930’s, one of the few indigenous 
deputy ministers in the Khanate Cabinet before he resigned and joined the national 
movement. In 1971, he became the Minister of Education of the short-lived autono­
mous Balochistan within the Federation of Pakistan. At the same time, he was an 
elected member of the provincial legislature dominated by the Baloch movement un­
der the rubric of the National Awami Party.
M. Sardar Khan Baluch’s Baluch a Nation, (1947), and History of Baloch 
Race and Baluchistan. (1958), and of Mir Khuda Bakhsh Marri’s Searchlight on Ba- 
loches and Balochistan. (1974) are two important works. Sardar Khan Baluch, who 
had a Master’s degree from Aligarh University, was among the ideologues of Baloch 
nationalism during the 1930s and 1940s. He was also close to the Khan’s Darbar 
(Court) as Minister of Education of the Khanate for a short period. The preparation of 
the first map of a Greater Balochistan showing all the traditional Baloch regions is 
ascribed to Sardar Khan and Abdul Aziz Kurd simultaneously. It seems to have been a 
joint work which is still in use in different ways. Khuda Bakhsh Marri (Bar-at-Law) 
was a Pakistan High Court judge. He belongs to the most rebellious and the largest 
Baloch (Marri) tribe. Like Sardar Khan’s book, Marri’s work suffers from imposed 
political limitations. In Mir Ahmad Yar Khan’s political autobiography, Inside Balu­
chistan (1975) his naive insistence to justify his demand for a sovereign Balochistan 
and his goodwill for Jinnah’s Islamic Pakistan at the same time, give a senile colour to 
his work. However, with all their shortcomings, these works provide useful back­
ground material and some clues to alert and curious readers.
In the West, on the Balochi language, history and nationalism some authentic 
researches have been undertaken specially after the 1960s. This includes PhD. disser­
tations, books, and journalists investigative reports. Brian Spooner (1989) and Rec- 
cardo Redaelli (1997) have contributed two major works on understanding the Baloch 
question, in the early 20th century. Dealing with the emergence of Kalat State, Nina 
Swidler has completed her doctorate thesis, The Political Structure of a Tribal Federa­
tion in 1969. The Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan by Janmahmad 
(1989), Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance by Syed Iqbal Ahmad (1992), and The 
Baluchis and Pathans by Robert Wirsing (1987), are also some important publications 
in this respect.
Moreover, a few available past issues of the People’s Front (occasionally with 
some material in Balochi), London, and Qadir Bakhsh Nizamani’s “Memoirs” in 
monthly Neda-e-Baluchistan (The Voice of Balochistan, in Balochi and Urdu) Lon­
don, have proved more basic than the other sources for my research. Having joined 
the Baloch national movement in the 1940s, Nizamani accompanied the rebellious 
prince Agha Abdul Karim, who led the rebellion against Pakistan’s occupation of Ba­
lochistan in 1948. He is seemingly the only participant who is openly critical of the 
un-preparedness and unscientific operations of the Baloch national movement.
Two pioneering secondary works on the subject of Baloch nationalism are by 
the Soviet scholars, Yu. V. Gankovsky (1971), and M. G. Pikulin (1959). Gankovsky 
(1971) proceeding in terms of an orthodox Marxist standpoint on the national question 
argues that during the British period capitalism began to transform the feudal nation­
alities of Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province and Balochistan. In the 
post-independence Pakistan, besides Bengalis and Punjabis, who formed bourgeois 
nations, the Sindhis and Pakhtuns (people of North West Frontier Province) were 
more advanced than the Baloch in the process of becoming nations. Gankovsky’s 
work on Pakistan, however, covers more fully the period before independence. Simi­
larly in his book Baloch (1959), Pikulin analyses the socio-economic conditions of the 
Baloch, mainly in Iranian Balochistan which led to several Baloch uprising under 
Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941).
It would be impossible not to mention here the two most intriguing scholars of 
the Baloch political history and nationalism, Inayatullah Baloch and Selig S. Harrison. 
Through painstaking studies and credible scholarship, both have maintained the na­
tionalist methodology -  Baloch in nationalist history and Harrison in modern Baloch 
nationalism. Baloch with his several works on the political history of the Baloch and 
Balochistan is the most authentic and well-informed scholar. Being educated in Ger­
many, Baloch received his academic inspiration from European sources in the field of 
politics and history. He has introduced the Western methodology and models to ap­
proach the Baloch history and historiography. His contribution to the consolidation of 
nationalist beliefs in Balochistan was central to his works. In his The Problem of 
Greater Baluchistan (1987), Baloch analyses the Baloch national movement from a 
historical standpoint. He argues that the Baloch movement up to the partition of sub­
continent into Pakistan and India was directed toward the demand for independence 
and the Greater Balochistan.
Selig S. Harrison, as mentioned above, is another person of prominence on the 
topic. Having close contact with the Baloch national movement leaders in 1970s, and 
access to rare and invaluable documents, relating to histoiy and politics of Balochis­
tan, Harrison has produced the most significant work about the Baloch national 
movements and nationalism. In his work, In Afghanistan’s Shadow (1981), Harrison 
analyses the Baloch nationalist movement of the 1970s, which led to armed conflict 
during 1973-77, between the Bhutto government and the Baloch guerrillas as the re­
sult of the failure of the Baloch to win autonomy for them from the Bhutto regime.
It may be of great interest to note that on the nationalist account, the forced 
merger of Balochistan into Iran (1928) and Pakistan (1948) raised the question of the 
right of self-determination for the Baloch.4 On the other hand, however, most of the 
Pakistani and the Iranian scholars by denying the very existence of Baloch national­
ism in practice reject such a right for the Baloch. For example, in Feroz Ahmed (ed.) 
Focus on Baluchistan and Pukhtun Question (1975), and Ethnicity and Politics in 
Pakistan (1998), there is no abstract theoiy of Baloch nationalism. He argues that it is 
difficult to define what comprises the Baloch nation. “On the one hand”, Feroz 
Ahmad points out, “the people of African origin, because of exclusive emphasis on 
paternal heritage, are considered Baloch... On the other hand”, he adds, “any person 
of the Baloch ‘race’ who may have culturally, economically and politically assimi­
lated into Sindhis or Punjabis, is still regarded as Baloch and expected to support Ba­
loch nationalism.”5
Moreover, Ahmed argues that the various Baloch and Brahui tribes are in­
cluded among the Baloch are not integrated into a larger social or economic structure, 
and lack a sense of unity beyond the tribal identity. In short, Ahmed rejects any com­
mon historical, linguistic, geographical and ethnic bases for the Baloch nationalism. 
Ahmed stresses the social and economic aspects of the Baloch question. Notwith­
standing, the above factors attach considerable importance to the development of na­
tionalism, but what lies at the root of the Baloch nationalism, is largely political and 
psychological in nature. Feroz Ahmed’s analysis took its cue from the official Paki­
stan version of events contained in the White Paper on the Crisis in Balochistan.
Similarly, rejecting the ethnic characteristics of the Baloch nation, the Iranian 
nationalist scholar, Hamid Alunadi, in his book, Oaumiwat wa Oaumgarai dar Iran:
4 Baloch, Inayatullah, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baluch Nationalism. Stuttgart:
Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1987, p. 9.
Az Afsaneh ta Waqiwat (Ethnicity and Nationalism in Iran: From myth to reality), 
(1999), emphasises that the Baloch are a part of the Iranian nation. Quoting from Fer- 
dowsi’s Shahnama, Ahmadi argues that the Baloch are of Iranian origin.6 He holds the 
British, the Sardars and Reza Shall (the first Pahlavi) responsible for the creation of 
the present Baloch national feeling in Iranian Balochistan. According to him, the 
Western orientalists especially the British propagated the idea of nationalism in early 
20th century to divide Iran. The reactionary Sardars, when resisting the modern state 
of Reza Shah Pahlavi exploited this idea (nationalism) as a weapon to protect their 
own interest.7 Thus, as a resulted of co-existence and co-operation of these three fac­
tors (the British, the Sardars and the modem Iranian state), Ahmadi opines, the Ba-
o
loch nationalism was created.
Ignoring the salient features (namely historical experiences, common ethnic 
bond, common language, religious beliefs, distinct territory, socio-economic structure, 
and psychological make-up) of the Baloch nation, these Iranian and the Pakistani 
writers blame the external factors such as the propagation of the doctrine of national­
ism by the orientalists, the opposition of sardars to modernisation process and the 
elite competition as the main causes for the emergence of Baloch nationalism,9 De­
fending their own nationalisms (Iranian and Pakistani) the common concern of these 
intellectuals is to protect the territorial integrity of their countries, and to combat any 
tendencies for separation.10 Probably, it was due to this fact that in 1979, Richard Cot- 
tam pointed out, most of the liberal-minded ‘Iranians’, meaning here Persians, fa­
voured the banning of non-Persian publications.11
However, both, Ahmed (1975), and Ahmadi (1999) condemn the brutal poli­
cies of their central governments, and acknowledge the fact that the Baloch are being 
neglected economically and politically, but at the same time, by rejecting the Balochs’ 
nationhood, they disregard the right of self determination for them. In Ahmed’s view, 
the economic backwardness of the region and the misrule of the governments are re­
sponsible for the emergence of the Baloch question.12 Nevertheless, the above­
5 Feroz Ahmad, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 180.
6 Hamid Ahmadi, Qaumiyyat wa Oaumgarai dar Iran: Az Afsaneh ta Waqiwat (Ethnicity and Nation­
alism in Iran: From myth to reality), Tehran, 1378/1999, pp. 112-113.
7 Ibid., pp. 182-85.
8 Ibid., p. 375.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 375.
11 W. Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 32.
12 See Feroz Ahmad, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998.
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mentioned factors have their effects to set free the process of Baloch nationalism, but 
undoubtedly the essence of the question as it will be discussed in the following chap­
ters is rooted to the Baloch ethnicity, with its historical, cultural, territorial, and psy­
chological background.
Several articles are devoted to the analysis of the ethnicity and change in Post- 
Colonial Balochistan (ed.) Paul Titus (1996). The articles in the volume bring together 
the work of many leading European, American, and Pakistani scholars working on 
Balochistan and make up for the serious shortage of scholarly work on the Baloch. 
They deal with various aspects of Baloch social life in which ethnicity is salient, and 
examine how Baloch identity is being transformed by the presence of such factors as 
markets, roads and institutions of state.
With a few exceptions such as M. G. Pikulin, Selig Harrison and to some ex­
tent Inayatullah Baloch, most of these works’ focus of analysis is geared more toward 
Baloch nationalism in Pakistan than in Iran. Works which mostly deal the Baloch na­
tionalism in Western Balochistan are, “Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch 
Nationalism” by M. H. Hosseinbor (1984), and Pozhuheshi Par Tarikh-e Ma’aser-e 
Balochistan: Maiera-e Dad Shah (A Research about the Contemporary Histoiy of Ba­
lochistan: Dad Shah’s Story), by Azim Shahbakhsh (1373/1995). However, as noted 
earlier, Hamid Ahmadi’s (1999) work is of considerable importance. Hosseinbor’s 
work is primarily a historical description of Baloch nationalism in Iran. Shahbakhsh 
also describes the revolt of Dad Shall Baloch, its socio-economic milieu and its im­
pact on the Baloch national movement in western Balochistan during the 1950s. 
Hence, both of these works can be described as a political history of Baloch national­
ism in Iranian Balochistan.
There are also several general works written by Iranian authors in Farsi (Per­
sian) dealing specifically with the general socio-economic conditions of the Baloch in 
Western Balochistan. These include the works of General Amanullah Jahanbani 
(1957-1959), General Hossein Ali Razm-Ara (1940), S. M. Seyed-Sajjadi 
(1374/1996) and Iraj Afahar (Sistani) (1371/1993). These works, however, do not deal 
directly with the issues of the Baloch nationalism, and, as such, they are not reviewed 
here. However, they will be extensively used in the second and third chapters dealing 
with the bases of the Baloch nationalism particularly in its historical background in 
chapter three.
XV
The empirical investigations in this thesis are organised in terms of a historical 
and comparative analysis of the rise and development of Baloch nationalism in Iran 
and Pakistan. Special attention is given to the impact of British colonialism on the ex­
isting political map in the region. The socio-economic and political factors influenc­
ing Baloch nationalism are identified, and circumstances under which Baloch nation­
alism developed in British Balochistan, the Khanate and western Balochistan (Iranian 
Balochistan) are analysed. Considering that during the struggle against British coloni­
alism fairly large communities (Pashtim, Baloch, etc.) with different interpretations of 
history, levels of socio-economic development, and cultural and religious traditions 
were subsumed under the notion of Iranian or Pakistani nation, their struggles today to 
claim the right to self-determination may be indicative of some genuine need to adjust 
or alter fundamentally the political framework in which they find themselves. Making 
sense out of such struggles in terms of a right to self-determination is a major concern 
of my investigation.
As the title of this dissertation states, in covering the events, I have chosen not 
to go beyond 1980. By this time, the last remnant of the Baloch struggle inside Ba­
lochistan for self-autonomy was crushed by the regime of Ayatullahs. The real crack­
down, however, came during the power struggle between the former president, Bani- 
Sadr and his clerical opponents during the 1981. Similarly after several unsuccessful 
meetings with General Zia ul-Haq in 1977 and 1978, the two prominent leaders of the 
Baloch national movement, Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Nawab Khair Bakhsh Mam, 
went into self imposed political exile in early 1980, having despaired of General Zia’s 
intentions with the political impasse in Pakistan. By the early 1980s, the inspired fer­
vour of Baloch nationalism of the 1970s had dissipated in Balochistan.
As will be seen in this dissertation, up until the eve of 1980s, the central gov­
ernments both in Pakistan and in Iran succeeded in putting down the Baloch move­
ments through their use of overwhelming military force. It was aided, however, by the 
continuing rivalries within and among the Baloch tribes and parties. The Bugtis and 
some other tribes did not cooperate with the nationalist forces in the 1973-77 uprising. 
Similarly, in Iranian Balochistan, some tribal chiefs supported Khomeini’s regime in 
the 1979 revolution. Islamabad and Tehran had considerable success in finding Ba­
loch tribes, who were willing to cooperate with them against the Baloch nationalist 
forces in return for their governments’ recognition and treasure.
xvi
While the notion of a Baloch nation or an autonomous Baloch area continues 
to live in the nationalist pronouncements published abroad, the struggle within Paki­
stan and Iran has degenerated since the early 1980s. The Baloch have been unable to 
discover the centres of gravity in Pakistan and Iran, and they do not appear to have the 
capability to attack those centres if they do. For the immediate future, the Baloch na­
tionalism has again been defeated in both Pakistan and Iran. It should be remembered 
that, having largely cut off the Baloch from external patronage, Tehran and Islamabad 
have reinforced the inter-Baloch division along the Iran-Pakistan border in an attempt 
at divide and rule, through various agreements and transit control since the establish­
ment of the Islamic republic in Iran.
This study was intended to fill in a void in the literature pertaining to the Ba­
loch by presenting as complete a picture of the Baloch problem as possible in the pre­
sent condition of research. Moreover, this is also an original contribution to the state 
of comparative political science because it is the first time that any one has applied 
existing nationalism theory to the Baloch. Former studies of this subject have pro­
vided many valuable insights into various aspects of the problem. However, so far no 
attempt has been made to deal with the whole problem in a detailed manner including 
its historical development. Thus, by examining much hitherto unexplored evidence 
that traces the roots of Baloch nationalism to the colonial era, this dissertation has 
tried to push the frontier of enquiry in this subject beyond its familiar- limits.
The importance of the Baloch as a case study is twofold. First, the Baloch rep­
resent more than ten million people dispersed throughout Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan 
and Gulf States. Baloch nationalist aspirations are a direct challenge to the sover­
eignty of these countries. An understanding of this phenomenon can lead to insights 
into potential elements of regional instability. Second, nationalist movements are 
again on the rise throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Findings 
from a study of the Baloch could have applicability to these other peoples.
This dissertation is organised into seven chapters, which are preceded by the 
present foreword. The problem being investigated has been introduced in the present 
section. This is followed by a conceptual discussion in chapter one. Chapter two de­
scribes the Baloch by nomenclature, demographics geographical location, linguistic 
characteristics, religious affiliation, social organisation, cultural expression, and eco­
nomical position. In order to place the question in its proper historical context the his­
torical developments of the Baloch nationalism are treated separately, in chapter three.
xvii
The political factors affecting the Baloch are the subject of the chapters four to six. 
The last chapter or chapter seven contains the concluding remarks of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER ONE
Theories of nationalism
Introduction
Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote: “It would be better, before examining the act by 
which a people give itself to a king, to examine that by which it has become a people; 
for this act, being necessarily prior to the other, is the true foundation of society.”1 
Using the Baloch as a case study, this dissertation will follow Rousseau’s advice and 
examine what makes the Baloch a group, and why this group makes its claim for its 
own state.
Nationalism, for the puiposes of this dissertation, is the feeling of a group of 
people linked by either ethnicity or territorial bond, and the belief that the corporate 
interests of that group can best be protected by control of their own state. However, 
the sociologists and political scientists who have studied nationalism are divided on 
the question of what unifies the group: some arguing that an ideological affinity based 
on a common histoiy or belief in a political group unites them, while others argue for 
the primacy of ethnic markers such as common ancestry, language, colour, etc.2 Re­
gardless, the social scientists agree that once an in-group is created, and that group is 
different from others who lack the unifying characteristic, then that in-group acquires 
corporate interests that need to be defended. The group is often referred to as a nation. 
The intelligentsia in that “nation”, whose upward mobility has been stymied by mem­
bers of the competing “nation” that controls the mechanisms of the state, then mobi­
lises the nascent polity’s group sentiment. The intelligentsia has the goal of establish­
ing a separate nation-state to protect the group’s corporate interests in a hostile world. 
This would also give the intelligentsia the upward mobility it had been denied.3
The first examples of modern nationalism have been identified variously as 
appearing in the tensions that led to the English Civil War (Greenfeld 1992), in Latin 
American independence movements (Anderson 1983), in the French Revolution (Best 
1988), and in German reaction and Romanticism (Kedourie 1994). It is difficult to 
settle these differences empirically. They reflect slightly varying definitions. For our
1 Jean Jacques Rousseau in: Robert Maynard Hutchins (ed.), Great Book of the Western World. Chi­
cago: Encyclopaedia Brittannica, Inc., 1982, vol. 38: Montesquieu, Rousseau, p. 391.
2 A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 22-31.
3 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and nationality: Theory and Practice. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991, 
pp. 23-26.
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purpose, it suffices to indicate that by the end of the eighteenth century, in the French 
Revolution and its wake, the discursive formation was fully in play. In post-industrial 
mass consumption societies, the theories of ethnicity suggested interaction between 
cultural groups, vertically structured with their own ranking systems, as a more reli­
able measure of social behaviour than social class.4 In the post-Cold War period, 
ethno-nationalism has assumed prominence because some new countries were consti­
tuted on the basis of ethnicity and this raised the expectations of many ethnic groups 
to be able to achieve their cherished goal of establishing a new country on the basis of 
ethnicity and nationalism.
Nationalism is the hegemonic principle of political order in the world today. 
Its central claim, which is that political legitimacy derives from the demands of the 
national community, informs the majority of all political action and reaction. It should 
be remembered that legitimacy is the key to whether a state will successfully rule. The 
primary sources of legitimacy in the Middle East, and the sources of loyalty for the 
population to groups larger than a family unit, are traditional religions and national­
ism.5 This is a study of one of the sources of legitimacy, nationalism.
Having persistently denied their right for self-rule, the Punjabi and Persian 
dominated states of Pakistan and Iran have always claimed that the Baloch are not a 
nation, but a tribal society with traditional tribal characteristics, thus lacking legiti­
macy for the right to self-rule and self-determination.6 The Baloch nationalists, on the 
contrary, reject these claims, and argue that they constitute a national community, in 
the fullest sense of the word, and occupy a relatively well-defined territory (which is 
the strongest argument anyone has to the right to self-determination).7 Apart from 
common ethnic bond and common historical experiences, the Balochs’ common cul­
tural heritage includes language, religion, and all other manifestations like food, dress 
and perhaps their entire way of life. From the 17th centuiy until 1928 and 1948 respec­
tively, Balochistan preserved its independent status. The Baloch country maintained 
diplomatic relations with Mughal India, Ottoman Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Oman,
4 Paul R. Rrass, “Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identity Formation”, in: John Hutchinson & Anthony D. 
Smith (ed.), Ethnicity. Oxford University Press 1996, pp. 85-86.
5 G. Hossein Razi, “Legitimacy, Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East”, in: American Political 
Science Review. 84, no. 1 (March 1990), p. 75.
6 Selig S. Harrison, “Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan: The Baluch Case”, in: John Hutchinson, & 
Anthony D. Smith, (ed.), Ethnicity. New York: Oxford University Press 1996, 298.
7 Inayatullah Baloch, “Resistance and National Liberation in Baluchi Poetry”, Paper presented at Ba­
lochi Symposium at the University o f Uppsala on 17-20'1' August 2000, Uppsala, Sweden.
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and British India.8 Its occupation by the modern armies of Iran in 1928, and Pakistan 
in March 1948, led to the birth of the Baloch liberation movement.9
Since the early 20th century, the Baloch nationalist movements have been try­
ing to establish their legitimacy by appeals to nationalism throughout Balochistan. 
Balochistan comprises the Pakistani province of Balochistan, the Iranian province of 
Sistan-wa-Balochistan (Sistan and Balochistan), and the contiguous areas of southern 
Afghanistan. This dissertation will examine how nationalism has affected the ability 
of that people to obtain self-government. In order to place the question in its proper 
conceptual context, this chapter deals at first with a conceptual discussion on ethnic­
ity, nation, and nationalism, followed by a discussion on the right of “self- 
determination”.
The emphasis in this chapter is on the assertion that the nationalism theory of 
Anthony D. Smith is best suited to providing an adequate analysis of numerous issues 
which pertain to the notion of nationalism in the context of the Baloch. As will be dis­
cussed in the following sections, Smith’s theory offers a forceful response to the veiy 
concepts on which nationalism at least in the Baloch case relies.
Ethnicity
It has been generally observed that human beings act individually or in groups 
in the pursuit of their goals and interests. Thus loyalty to one’s own group is certainly 
of ancient origins. It is this dimension of nationalism that has the clearest claim to be 
primordial, to have existed since before memoiy, before human history was recorded. 
But groups and group loyalty can take many forms and hardly constitute or explain 
nationalism by themselves. According to Max Weber in modern industrial society, 
social consciousness based on ties of affection would be supplanted by ‘rational’ af­
finities. He argues that nation replaces primordial identity.10
In modem research, groups bound together by consciousness of common an­
cestry, religion, language, territory or historical traditions -  striving for the specific 
interests of their members — are conceptualised as ethnic entities. Ethnicity not only 
comprises a potential force of mobilisation in a democracy, but it has become the
8 Ibid., and see also, Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baluch 
Nationalism. Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1987, pp. 164-65.
9 For more detail see, Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan. Emergence 
Dimensions Reoercurssions. Quetta: Gosha - e -Adab, 1989 (Chapter Four).
10 Max Weber, “The Origin of Ethnic Groups”, in: John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith (ed.), 
Ethnicity, New York: Oxford University Press 1996, pp. 35-36.
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most significant manifestation of seeking identity through shared descent in the late 
20th century. The term ethnicity first appeared in the 1950s in the English language.11 
The word “ethnic”, however, is much older. It is derived from the Greek ethnos.
Michael Banton describes ethnicity as a variety of nationalism, in which the 
leaders “seek to make their fellow constituents conscious of a shared attribute” and to 
persuade those constituents that the attribute is more important than the group mem­
bers previously realised.12 This shared attribute, according to Banton is physical and 
cultural, and ethnicity is created because of this attribute. What kind of physical or 
cultural attribute the groups needs, Banton does not specify. He, however, argues that 
once the group has settled on the attribute, it has a self-identity and it reacts negatively 
to other groups which lack the same attribute.13
For Raymond Hall the differences between ethnicity and nationalism are 
merely matters of timing. He writes that before the impact of European organisation 
on non-European people, they were ethnic minorities. Those groups, which remained 
autonomous from the newer, larger political states, were transformed to “national mi­
norities”.14 Thus, according to Half s analysis, the European colonialists created the 
“nations” of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, etc, out of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The 
groups that did not achieve their independence at that time continued to remain na­
tional minorities. The difference between ethnicity and nationality in this analysis 
therefore appears to be the date when Western imperialism reached a foreign shore -  
hardly a theoretical difference.
Generally, two major schools of thought concerning the origins of ethnicity 
are developed; those emphasising primordiality and those laying stress on situational 
and contextual factors. The primordialists consider the ethnic identity as a given. Be­
cause of primordial affinities deriving from race, skin colour, tribe, caste language, 
religion and other such factors, each ethnic group has a different historical experience. 
The primordialists argue that human beings have always been grouped together on the 
basis of given primordial characteristics.15 Other writers, who can be called instru­
!1 Thomas H. Eriksen, “Ethnicity, Race, Class and Nation”, in: Ibid., p. 28.
12 Michael Banton, “Ethnic Bargaining”, in: Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronen (ed.), Ethnicity. Poli­
tics. and Development. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986, p. 14.
13 Ibid.
14 Hall, Raymond L., “Introduction”, in Hall, Raymond L. (ed.), Ethnic Autonomy -  Comparative Dy­
namics: The Americas. Europe and the Developing World. New York, 1979, p. xix.
15 Clifford Geertz, “The integrative revolution: Primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new 
states”, in: C. Geertz (ed.) Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa. 
New York: Free Press, pp. 110-11.
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mentalists, point out the situational nature of the ethnic identity. Identity is multi­
dimensional containing often more than one objective marker: skin colour, facial 
structure, tribe, language, religion and so on. This enables a rather flexible adjustment 
to concrete situations.
Anthony D. Smith provides us with the most succinct definition of commu­
nity. He describes community as a shared experience of temporal progression.16 The 
community is a unit of population, which is conscious of its collective movement
1 n
from a past of shared memories and myths , through a present of shared experi­
ences18, to a future of shared destiny.19 According to Smith, the ethnie (ethnic com­
munity) has six attributes: a collective distinctive name; a myth of common ancestry; 
shared historical memories; shared culture; an association with a specific homeland; 
and a sense of ethnic solidarity.20 The complex of myth, values, memories and sym­
bols (ethnic mythomoteur) constitute the ethos of ethnic communities. They have 
played a decisive role in preserving the ethnic identities from the immemorial past 
until the introduction of modernity. Under the influence of modernity and its con­
comitant triple revolutions in the spheres of culture, economy and administration, the 
old ethnic communities transformed into modem nations. National identities have pre­
served the ethos of the old ethnic identities; however, they have added to it the princi- 
21pie of citizenship.
Thus, national identities are based on two elements: an ethnic element, which 
stems from cultural-historical legacies and a civic-territorial element, which stems 
from modernity. In spite of tensions between these two principles both of them are 
necessary for the shaping of a fully-fledged national identity. In order to be a nation, 
an ethnic community must establish a civil society based on political citizenship. And
a territorial nation relies on myth of descent and historical memories for distinguish-
00ing itself from its neighbours.
For Smith the factors that produce the sense of community are the shared 
memories, myths, and symbols and, above all, ethnic history. Every modem commu-
16 A. D. Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, p. 58.
17 Ibid., p. 58.
18 Ibid., p. 68.
19 Ibid., p. 58.
20 A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 22-31.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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nity is framed, he writes, by its pre-modern heritage.23 In pre-modernity, the commu­
nity finds a reservoir of shared traditions and experiences that create a sense of com­
mon descent which lends a unifying framework to the increasingly disaggregated na­
ture of modern life. It is perhaps Nina Swidler who best captures the significance of 
ethnic markers in the context of Baloch nationalism. She writes that the common 
memories and myths, and the shared historical experiences form the cohesive basis of 
the Baloch nationalism.24 With this in mind, Smith’s conception of ethnicity meets 
best this study’s definition of nationalism.
Nation, Nationalism and State
The question “What is a nation?” was most seminally asked by Ernest Renan 
in a paper of the same title, written in 1882.25 Giving an inspiring definition of nation, 
Renan wrote:
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are 
but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past,
one is in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy 
of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live to­
gether.26
Thus, nation is defined as a subject of history. It is for Renan a body of people who 
have moved through the same historical events together. Shared religion, geography
or language may have been conducive to this historical sharing. It is in this sharing
that the essential matter of the nation is to be found.
Smith defines nation as “a large, vertically integrated and territorially mobile 
group featuring common citizenship rights and collective sentiment together with one 
(or more common characteristics) which differentiate its members from those of simi­
lar groups with whom they stand in relations of alliance or conflict.”27 The ethnic 
roots of modern nations, according to Smith, are to be traced back into their collective 
memories and myths. The historically derived ethnic identity serves as the basis of 
nation-formation in movement of revolutionary change. Therefore nations can more 
appropriately be considered ethnic groups politicised during modernisation.28
23 A. D. Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity” in: International Affairs 68. no.l, 
1992, p. 62.
24 N. Swidler, “Beyond Parody”, p. 169.
25 Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” in: Bhabha, Homi (ed.), Nations and Narration. London: Rout- 
ledge, 1990, pp. 8-22.
26 Ibid., p. 19.
27 A. D. Smith, Theories o f Nationalism, p. 175,
28 Ibid., see, chapter 7.
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According to Smith nations are modern phenomena, but their cultural stuff 
(myths, values, memories and symbols) are ancient.29 He argues that, nations originate 
from ancient ethnic communities and their corresponding ideology of "ethnicism" 
without being identical with them. Smith argues that nationalism, as ideology and 
movement, dates only from the later eighteenth century, but believes that the ‘ethnic 
origin of nation’ is much older. Smith focuses on ethnies -  ethnic communities with 
their myths and symbols — and shows that these exist in both modern and pre-modern 
times, and with substantial continuity through history. He writes:
[Because] ethnicity is largely ‘mythic’ and ‘symbolic’ in character, and 
because myth, symbols, memories and values are ‘carried’ in and by 
forms and genres of artefacts and activities which change only slowly, so 
ethnie, once formed, tend to be exceptionably durable under ‘normal’ vi­
cissitudes, and to persist over many generations, even centuries, forming 
‘moulds’ within which all kinds of social and cultural processes can un­
fold and upon which all kinds of circumstances and pressures can exert an
* mimpact.
Some cultural anthropologists, however, postulate a five-tiered hierarchy of such 
groups beginning with the family. A number of families constitute a band, several of 
whom ultimately join to form a clan. Clans, in turn, unite to form a tribe, and tribes 
over time join together to form a nation.31
For Brass32 when objectively distinct groups (i.e. those sharing common ethnic 
characteristics) become aware subjectively of their separate identity and organise 
themselves politically for the attainment of autonomy or independent statehood they 
become a nationality or nation. He emphasises the role of elite competition as the ba­
sis for ethnic group developing subjective consciousness and making political de- 
mands.
Anderson emphasises the novelty of the nation. He describes a nation as an 
“imagined community”.34 Such a community comes into being as a result of the vast 
extension and expansion in communication. He considers the nation to be “an imag­
29 A. D. Smith, National Identity. London: Penguin Books, 1991; See also, A, D. Smith, The Ethnic 
Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
30 Ibid., p. 16.
31 See Roger Pearson, Introduction to Anthropology, New York, 1974, pp. 175-90.
32 Paul R. Brass, Language. Religion and Politics in North India. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1974, pp. 8-9.
33 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and nationality: Theory and Practice. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991, 
pp. 23-26.
3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1983, pp. 5-7.
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ined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”.35 It 
is limited because it borders on other nations. It is sovereign in the sense that the na­
tion derives legitimacy horn the people not from God. It is imagined in the sense that 
most of the members of nation do not, or will not, ever know each other. Moreover, 
the idea of nation implies a horizontal comradeship between its members and conceals 
the real exploitative relations. In the nationalist imagination, Anderson says, the na­
tion is assumed to be ancient. And this antiquity is related to future generations. This 
continuity provides an ontological security against death, fatality and contingency un­
der the conditions of the decline of religion ”.36
Anderson argues that the decline of sacred languages, which claimed a mo­
nopoly over access to truth, the decline of loyalties to divine authority and the separa­
tion of history from cosmology, created an empty space for the emergence of nation­
alism. He emphasises the role played by the print revolution and capitalism in forming 
the modern nation. The literate middle classes according to Anderson became the 
bearers of national consciousness centred upon the vernacular languages rather than 
Latin, which was cultivated by the priestly and aristocratic classes. In Anderson’s 
view people who live in remote places far from each other feel themselves contempo­
rary with others through reading the same books and newspapers. This kind of ab­
stract communication (as opposed to the face-to-face communication people experi­
ence in small communities) based on the circulation of the printed word, laid the 
groimd for the imagining of abstract communities like nations.37 Printed languages 
contributed to the shaping of nationalism in three ways. Firstly, they created unified 
forms of exchange and communication. Secondly, print capitalism gave a new perma­
nence to language, which was instrumental for the imagining of antiquity of a nation 
and thirdly, it led to the creation of centralised languages of power, different from 
previous local dialects, and languages. While these processes were gradual in Europe, 
in the rest of the world they were replicated consciously in the creation of nations. Be­
sides the printed word, censuses, maps and museums were other elements, which con­
tributed to the discourse of imagining nations.38
35 Ibid., p. 6.
36 Ibid, p. 36.
37 Ibid, pp. 37-46.
38 For more detail see Ibid, Chapter 10 (pp. 163-85).
Scholars like Karl Deutsch39 lay emphasis on communications as the chief fac­
tor in the modernisation process. Smaller units of society, which are fed with a stan­
dardised code of communication, particularly language, become a people. When a 
people is organised for political action to acquire a measure of effective control over 
its members it becomes a nationality. A nationality graduates to a nation when it ac­
quires the power to back its aspirations. The consummation to full nationhood accord­
ing to Karl Deutsch occurs when it achieves sovereign status in a state of its own.40
Put in its starkest terms, Deutsch's contention is that the nation is that group of 
people for whom it is easier to communicate amongst themselves than with others 
outside the group. This he refers to as "communicative complementarity," on which 
he elaborates as follows:
The test o f complementarity of any set of communications . . .  is 
communicative effectiveness. How fast and how accurately do mes­
sages get through? How complex and voluminous is the information 
that can be so transmitted? How effectively are operations on one part 
o f the net transmitted to another?41
What are the salient features of a nation? In the west the word “nation” ini­
tially was used to form the sovereign states of Europe, as we know them today. But 
the word is also used today by ethnic groups within these sovereign states, in their 
demands for autonomy, self-rule, and secession. Stalin, Lenin’s approved spokesman 
on the national question and later Lenin’s Chairman of the Commissariat for Nation­
alities, elaborated that a nation is a historically evolved, stable community of people, 
formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, psychological 
make-up manifested in a common culture.42 A nation is neither tribal nor is it racial. 
Most of the modem nations are formed from different tribes and races; the American 
nation is formed from British, Africans, Spanish, and Indians etc. The same holds true 
for other nations.
Marxism-Leninism emphasises the importance of all the above factors, al­
though the economic cohesion and the collective character or the cultural- 
psychological aspect of national awareness, are more stressed. There can be people 
living in the same territory who don't have a common language, common culture,
39 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966, pp. 86- 
106.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 96.
42 Stalin, Marxism And The National Question. Moscow: F.L.P.H., 1947, p. 15.
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strong economic bond etc. There can be people speaking the same language who don't 
have the same culture, strong economic bond or even inhabit different territories, etc. 
There can be people having strong economic bond who don't speak the same language 
etc. Therefore, all the characteristics must be present for any and all communities to 
be called nations. However, there are times when all the above-mentioned characteris­
tics may not be found equally magnified. One or two of the characteristics may be 
more prominent than others, but all the factors must be there.
Most centrally, the orthodox Marxists stress common language as an essential 
pillar for the nation. Incidentally, the growth in the number of languages has been a 
continuous, unending phenomenon. European culture, civilisation and science have 
since the 18th centuries been dominated by three languages—English, French and 
German—but this has not prevented the growth of standard languages in Europe from 
16 in 1800 to 30 in 1900 and 53 in 1937.43 A claim to a national status for a new lan­
guage may lead to the formation of a new ethnic group and demand for recognition of 
its independent identity. The government, thus, may oppose such a demand leading to 
confrontation between the two. At times, the agitation for recognition of a new lan­
guage as a national language may become violent and attract the attention of the in­
ternational community. In fact, many independent sovereign countries and units of a 
country differ from each other only because their people speak different languages. In 
India, many states were constituted because of different spoken languages.
Stalin was right to point out that a nation is a historically evolved community 
of people and direct attention to the influence of the material conditions of existence 
of a people on the growth of their group identity. But, in placing objective characteris­
tics such as language, territory and economic life on the same footing as the subjective 
characteristic of 'psychological makeup' he effectively objectified the latter as well - 
and ended with a static definition, which ignored the dynamic interplay between the 
objective and subjective. He dismissed the 'ideal' as 'something mystical, intangible 
and supernatural'. He failed to recognise that the ideal and the material go together - 
and neither has primacy.
Stalin's 1913 article was written to refute the view that the Jews were a nation. 
Forty-five years later, the Jewish nation did establish the Jewish state of Israel. The 
subjective determination and will of the Jewish people, rooted in an ancient heritage
43 For more information see, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1983, (chap­
ter five).
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and consolidated by suffering led to a growing togetherness, a renaissance in the He­
brew language and eventually, to the promised land. In the end, Theodor Herzl, and 
not Stalin, was proved right. In 1882, Herzl pointed out:
We are one people - our enemies have made us one. Distress binds us 
together, and, thus united, we suddenly discover our strength. Yes, we 
are strong enough to form a state and a model state. We possess all 
human and material resources for the purpose.44
Nationalism in turn builds on the nation’s hopes and fears, arousing popular 
support by appeals to national pride and patriotism, not uncommonly couched in a 
promise of a new golden age, often resurrecting a popular view of some historical or 
even near mythical episode in the nations struggle to achieve independence. Smith 
defines nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining auton­
omy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to 
constitute an actual or potential “nation”.45 According to Smith the central proposi­
tions of this ideology or its “core doctrine” are four: 1- the world is divided into na­
tions, each with its own individuality, history and destiny. 2- the nation is the source 
of all political and social powers, and loyalty to the nation overrides all other alle­
giances. 3- Human beings must identify with a nation if they want to be free and real­
ise themselves. 4- Nation must be free and secure if peace and justice are to prevail in 
the world 46 Smith asserts that nationalism cannot be understood in isolation from the 
historically rooted, cultural constitution of the nation: "[Nationalism] is dependent 
upon earlier motifs, visions and ideals. For what we call nationalism operates on many 
levels and may be regarded as a form of culture as much as a species of political ide­
ology."47
The analysis of the nation offered by Max Weber is remarkably similar to that 
of Smith. And like Smith he asserts, "above all, national identity may be linked to 
memories of a common political destiny." Weber, however, is more specific in out­
lining the character of the nation's historical progression. The nation exists therefore
44 Theodor Herzel, “The Jewish State", quoted in: Wittamayer Baron, Modern Nationalism and Relig­
ion. New York 1947.
45 A. D. Smith, National Identity, p. 73.
46 Ibid., p. 74
47 Ibid., p. 71.
48 Max Weber, "The Nation." In: H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (ed.) From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology. London: Routledge, 1991, pp 173.
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as a culturally distinct body of people who share a sense of the prestige associated 
with their culture and the consequent need to ensure its preservation,49
It should be noted that in the modernist approach of the nation, it is national­
ism that creates the national identity and not the other way round. Ernest Gellner50as- 
serts: ‘Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and 
national unit should be congruent.’ The term originated during modernization and in­
dustrialization and was not to be found in pre-modern societies. Gellner puts the mat­
ter succinctly when he declares, “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self- 
consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist — but it does need some pre­
existing differentiating marks to work on, even if, indicated, these are purely nega­
tive...”51 In the same vein Kedourie argues that nationalism itself is a “invented doc­
trine”: “Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nine­
teenth century.52 How shall we understand such ‘invention’? In what sense does na­
tionalism invent or create nations ‘where they do not exist?
According to John Breuilly it is misleading to think of nationalism in cultural 
terms. Nationalism ‘is above all and beyond all else, about politics, and that politics is 
about power. Power in the modern world is primarily about control of the state’.53 
Reinhard Bendix describes how the intelligentsia obtains this nationalist spirit:
In comparison with some or all advanced countries, the educated mi­
nority or intelligentsia sees its own country as backward. This is a 
troubled perception, for it identifies strength if not goodness with alien 
forces and sees weakness if  not evil in the land of one’s birth. In this 
setting, ideas are used to locate and mobilize forces which will be ca­
pable o f effecting change and thus redressing this psychologically 
unfavourable accounting.54 
Agreeing with Bendix’s analysis, Smith believes that the Third World intelli­
gentsia undergoes a process of dual legitimisation; both in the traditional cultural set­
ting in which they are born and in the modem culture in which they are educated. 
When the intelligentsia tries to harmonise these two competing cultures, they have 
three potential strategies: assimilate into the modern culture, attempt to blend the 
modern and traditional cultures, or reject modernization for traditional values. Ethnic
49 Ibid., p. 176.
50 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1983, p. 1.
51 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change. London: Weidenfeld Sc Nicolson, 1964, p. 168.
52 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism. 4th edn. Oxford: Blackwell (first published 1960), 1994, p. 1.
53 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982, pp. 1-2.
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nationalism is bom as a result of this third strategy: “Nationalism is bom among the 
intelligentsia when the messianic ‘assimilationists5 try to realize their former vision by 
adopting the ethnicity solution of the defensive reforming ‘revivalists.5”55
The Soviet Union had long claimed to represent a special kind of internation­
alism and to bring an end to nationalism and the historical conflict of nations in the 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Writing in the state publisher Novosti’s series 
on ‘The Soviet Experience5, for example, Nenarokov and Proskurin claimed that: “as 
social antagonisms disappeared under socialism, so did national strife and racial ine­
quality and oppression in every form... The socialist multinational culture has been 
enriched through an intensive exchange of cultural and intellectual values. The social­
ist nations that have emerged in the USSR have formed a new historical community 
of people- the Soviet people... Today it would be no exaggeration to say that a feeling 
of being members of one family prevails among Soviet people55.56 The post-1989 
wave of nationalist movements in the former Soviet Union revealed the falsity of such 
claims- though we should not ignore the fact that ethnic and nationalist strife was 
greatly reduced under communist rule.
Soviet scholars discussed nationalism in the Third World as a contradiction 
arising out of the colonial legacy. Unfortunately, neither Marx nor Engels wrote ex­
tensively about the national question. It was therefore left to Lenin and Stalin to de­
velop a theoretical framework to deal with the complexities of the national question. 
Concepts such as nation, nationality and national group - developed originally by Sta­
lin - were employed to distinguish the different levels of economic and cultural devel- 
opment attained by different social configurations.
Stalin came to theorise the nation in the context of its significance for commu­
nist internationalism. His Marxism and the National Question, written in 1913, was an 
important contribution to the debate as to the appropriate attitude to be taken by 
communism (with its aspiration towards a proletarian solidarity beyond national bor­
ders) towards nationalist movements, which seemed patently in many cases to be 
pleading for the rights of proletarians, albeit within national borders.58
54 Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule, Berkeley: University of Califor­
nia, 1978, p. 271.
55 A. D. Smith, Theories o f Nationalism, p. 255.
56 Albert Nenarokov and Alexander Proskurin, How the Soviet Union Solved the Nationalities Ques­
tion. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1983, p. 44.
57 For more detail see, Stalin, Marxism And The National Question. Moscow: F.L.P.H., 1947.
58 Ibid.
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The Marxist/neo-Marxist theories, while emphasising the primacy of class, 
point out that distinct and differentiated exploitation of communities marked by race, 
religion, or other factors is integral to the capitalist system. Group consciousness 
therefore may not be an ideological distortion, but the boundary along which class 
oppression may manifest itself in a given situation.59 The Marxist concept views na­
tionalism as a historical phenomenon whose appearance coincides with the epoch of 
capitalism. This school divides nations into two categories of “oppressed 
nationalities” and “oppressor nationalities”; a division supposed to disappear only 
with the disappearance of capitalism when replaced by socialism.
It may be of some interest to note that in the 1960s, and 1970s, influenced by 
the Stalin’s Marxist doctrine of oppressor and oppressed nationalities, the Baloch na­
tionalists as well as many of the Punjabi and Urdu-speaking leftists, considered the 
Marxist definition of nationality as the cornerstone for understanding the national 
question in Pakistan. The Punjabis and the Urdu speaking muhajirs, who dominated 
the state apparatus, were considered as the oppressor, while the Bengalis, Sindhis, 
Pashtuns, and the Baloch formed the oppressed nationalities. This was the dominant 
view in the multi-ethnic National Awami Party (NAP) as well as in the other national­
ist organizations in Pakistan.60
The political order required by the doctrine of nationalism is that of nation­
state. The nation, to recall Renan’s definition, consists in the desire to live together; 
the nation-state is the institutional framework, which facilitates, or should facilitate, 
this. It is a near-inescapable corollary of the nation's wish to live together that this 
same nation does not wish to live together in the midst of other nations or their mem­
bers. Smith asserts that nations exist as of human nature, so therefore state ought to 
exist to accommodate them. He identifies this need for nations to capture the state as 
one of the components of the modernization process.61
Enshrining the importance of the state, Hegel wrote, “In the history of the 
World, only those peoples can come under our notice which form a state... The State 
is the Divine Idea as it exist on Earth.” The Baloch form a nation, but since 1948, 
they do not possess a state. There is, however, a difference between the nation and
59 J. M. Blaut, The National Question. London: Zed Books Ltd., 1987.
60 Cf., Feroz Ahmed, “Ethnicity, Class and State in Pakistan” in: Sangat, March 1997.
61 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 157.
62 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, tr., by J Sibree, London: G. 
Bell & Sons, p. 40., as quoted by Kohn, Nationalism, pp. 110-111.
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the state. The nation, we have seen, is a group of people; a state is a political structure. 
Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner write that "the state implies a sovereign authority, a 
sovereignty based upon both consent and coercion...associated with a particular' 
bounded territory over which it exercises a monopoly of coercive authority.”63
Walker Connor describes a state as a “legal concept describing a social group 
that occupies a defined territory and is organized under common political institutions 
and an effective government,”64 while a nation is a "social group which shares a 
common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity.”65 
Connor writes that this "nation" can be part of a state, be coterminous with a state, or 
extend into more than one state. While Connor defines both entities as social groups, 
the emphasis of the state is clearly on legality, political institutions, and government. 
The nation, however, does not need any of these things to exist.
Why has the state become important? In Joseph Rothschild’ s view, the state is 
a forum in which different pluralist forces compete for the distribution of scarce re­
sources. He writes:
To protect and articulate their social, cultural, and economic interests, 
grievances, claims, anxieties, and aspirations, ethnic groups must enter 
the political arena...This means, in effect, that they (ethnic groups) 
must bid for exclusive or participant political control over and/or in a 
state... And if an ethnic group’s bid for an adequate share of political 
power and control within an extant multiethnic state proves unproduc­
tive, is repudiated as nonnegotiable, or the like, it may then well make 
a secessionist bid for a state of its own.66 
Thus, whichever, ethnic group can capture the state apparatus reaps the bene­
fits; those ethnic groups who are unable to obtain access to the output of state machin­
ery need to construct their own state structure. Explaining this point furthermore, Mil­
ton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinnovich write, “The institutional framework for the 
promotion and defence of ethnic group interests in the Middle East, as elsewhere in 
the modern world is the territorial state,”67
63 Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (ed.), The State. Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran 
and Pakistan, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986, p. 7.
64 Walker Connor, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?”, in: World Politics 24 (April 1972): 333.
65 Ibid.
66 Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1981, p. 232.
67 Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich, “The Study of Ethnic Politics in the Middle East”, In: Mil­
ton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (ed.), Ethnicity. Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 3.
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As will be discussed in the following chapters, Punjabi rule in Pakistan and 
Persian domination in Iran led to the emergence of Baloch national movements. Hav­
ing studied Baloch nationalism, both in Iran and Pakistan, Harrison in his book, In 
Afghanistan’s Shadow (1981), argues that the Baloch, in search of self-defence from 
the dominant majority, seek to dismantle these states and create their own one. Ex­
panding on this analysis, Harrison, wrote:
It is no accident that the smallest o f the minorities [in Pakistan], the 
Baloch, who see no hope for achieving significant power in Pakistani 
politics even under a democratic dispensation as a result o f their nu­
merical weakness, is the most alienated from Islamabad and the most 
responsive to secessionist appeals.68 
The Baloch and the Concept of Ethnie and Nation
In the early 1980, Harrison wrote that Islamabad and Tehran ignore the emer­
gence of Baloch nationalism. He considered that “they tend to think of Baloch society 
solely in terms of its traditional tribal character and organisational patterns.”69 Do the 
Baloch bear the characteristics of a nation as defined by the scholar's of nationalism? 
A Nation as described above, is a group of people from the same region of origin who 
share a common history. They may share a common culture, tradition and language 
and all of this is true of the Baloch. It should be noted that, the Baloch had their own 
state, the “Khanate of Kalat” until 1948.
Smith presents nationalism as a link in an unbroken chain, both logical and 
historical, which binds it inextricably to the nation and to cultural history. Cultural 
history - that is, memories, myths, symbols, customs, etc. - exists as both a facilitating 
and constraining condition on the emergence of the nation. It facilitates the nation in­
sofar as it provides the resources from which the national bond of cultural similarity 
and community is made. Rooted in myths and legends the common ethnic bond forms 
the most important component of the Baloch nation. With the antiquity of creation 
myths, the early history of Baloch makes its start. It was against this background that 
Richard Slimbach wrote that myths and memories have formed the cohesive bases of 
the Baloch resistance for the last 150 years to the colonial and post-colonial rulers.70
68 Selig S. Harrison, "Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan: The Baiuch Case”, in: John Hutchinson, & 
Anthony D. Smith, (ed.), Ethnicity. New York: Oxford University Press 1996, p. 295.
69 Harrison, Selig S., “Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan: The Baiuch Case”, p. 298.
70 Richard A. Slimbach, "Ethnic Binds and Pedagogies of Resistance: Baloch Nationalism and 
Educational Innovation in Karachi”, in: Paul Titus, (ed.), Mareinalitv and Modernity: Ethnicity and 
Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 140.
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Having studied the Baloch question, Harrison concludes that in order to assess 
the potential of Baloch nationalism, it is first necessary to understand how the Baloch 
view the large panorama of their embattled earlier history.71 The Baloch have devel-
nooped a sense of common identity over the past 2,000 years. Apart from their com­
mon myths and legends, the common historical experiences of the last millennium 
have a great impact on the emergence of the Baloch nation. Since the 12th century the 
Baloch formed powerful tribal unions. The confederacy of forty-four tribes under Mir
i L
Jalal Khan in the 12 century, the Rind-Lashari confederacy of the fifteenth century, 
the Maliks, the Dodais, the Boleidais, and the Gichkis of Makkoran, and the Khanate 
of Balochistan in the 17th century, united and merged all the Baloch tribes at different 
times. Moreover, the invasions of the Mughals and the Tatars, the wars and the mass 
migrations of the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries, and the cross tribal alliances 
and marriages, contributed to the shaping of the Baloch identity.73
Nationalism is also the voicing of personal views and expression of hopes and 
dreams of the nation with which they are associated. The music based on songs and 
dances of homeland has always been one of the most popular sources of inspiration 
for patriotism and nationalism. The homogeneous Balochi music and the dances of the 
Baloch form another significant common character of the Baloch nation.74 Music, as 
observed by Dr. S. Badalkhan has always had a high place in the Baloch society. It is 
not only played as an accompaniment to singing, and to provide rhythm for dancing, 
but also for curing illnesses related to psychosomatic disorders.75 Music, dances and 
songs are not only cultural vehicles for expressing Baloch romance, heroism, and the 
love of independence, but also potent forms of what Fanon called a “literature of 
combat”.76
The ethnic communities usually ‘possess' a recognised territoiy, with which 
they are habitually associated. Ethnic groups also often display a jealous and deep- 
rooted attachment to particular areas or regions within one or more plural states. “A
71 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 5,
72 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baiuch, History o f Baiuch Race and Baluchistan. Quetta: Kliair - un -Nisa, 
Nisa Traders, Third Edition 1984, p. 26.
73 For more detail, see Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 89-125.
74 Sabir Badalkhan, “Balochi Songs Genres, Balochi Dances, Instrumental Musicians, Singer, Musical 
Instruments”, in: A. Arnold (ed.), The Garland Encyclopaedia of Worlds Music, in 10 vol., vol. 5, 
(South Asia: The Indian Subcontinent), New York, London, 2000, p. 773.
75 Ibid.
76 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, 1963, p. 240.
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nation without its homeland is almost unthinkable”.77 Thus, nation has a strong at­
tachment to territory, seeking to exercise absolute control over tracts of country re­
garded as vital living space. The territory usually has a prominent place in the nation’s 
iconography, with the homeland personified as the ‘fatherland’ or ‘motherland’ and 
attachment to it expressed in poetry and song, with the surrender of any of it regarded 
as unacceptable. Thus because man has a strong feeling of territoriality in his make­
up, the territorial dimension is the most powerful element in national iconography, 
reflected in such mental image as die Heimat for Germans, Matka Rossiya for the 
Russians or the Balochs’ Mulk Balochi
Language, as indicated above, plays a significant role amongst many cultural 
markers that differentiate one ethnic group from another,78 For Smith, “One of nation­
alism’s abiding myths is the identification of nationality with language”,79 He traces 
this myth to the 18th century notions of the emotional power of language developed in 
France and Germany. The Balochi language despite policies of assimilation and hin­
dering of the growth of Balochi culture, and despite the lack of modem publications 
and their meagre circulation and the great intercourse between the Baloch and their 
neighbours, has preserved a striking and admiring purity and the Balochi vocabulary 
is still in daily circulation. This purity is especially evident in the speech of the illiter­
ate who form the majority of the people.
It is patently clear that a common language is of pivotal importance for a na­
tion. Karl Deutsch (see above) who defines the nation in terms of social communica­
tion does not restrict his conception of communication to the verbal-linguistic. In as­
serting the role of "learned memories, symbols [and] habits" we see him refer to the 
broader cultural phenomena prioritised by Smith.80 People speaking Brahui at home in 
Balochistan are integrated in every respect, including clan organization, with those 
speaking Balochi alone, and have considered them nothing but Baloch. Thus, in this 
case, it is the common memories and habits which are prioritised rather than the lan­
guage. Probably with this in mind, Tariq Rahman opined that, “it is the myth of com­
mon origin”, which constitutes the central symbol of Baloch nationalism and not lan-
o 1
guage.
77 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p, 63.
78 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, p, 145.
79 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival, p. 45.
80 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and social Communication, p. 96.
81 Tariq Rahman, “The Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan”, p. 88.
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Equally important is the role of religion in the development of nationhood. 
The role of religion has not only been in forming values and aspirations but also in 
moulding group identity through frictions between different beliefs. Frictions within 
the Christian ethos in Europe have been a powerful contributor to the groupings under 
the national banners. Similarly the major division of Islam into Shiite and Sunni left a 
deep impress on nationalism of the Shiite Persian and the Sunni Baloch. Ever since 
the Safavid Empire imposed Shiism as the Persian state religion in the 16th century, 
Shiites have been gradually expanding at the expense of Sunnis, including Baloches. 
Thus, faced with the ever-growing presence of Shiite Persian overlords, many Baloch, 
who belong to the orthodox Sunni sect of Islam, had turned to their Sunni faith to re­
inforce their sense of Baloch identity.82
However, the orthodox Marxists reject common religion or ethnic origin as the 
sole basis of nation, while common economy is stressed.83 By contrast, other scholars 
attach no importance to the attribute of a common economy, but as mentioned above, 
regard the ethnicity and religion as two important components in nation formation. 
Although, it must be born in mind that Pakistan tested Islam as a legitimating ideol­
ogy from 1947 to 1971. Yet in its third war with India, Muslim East Bengal estab­
lished the independent state of Bangladesh. Thus confirming the Marxist view, relig­
ion did not prove a sufficiently strong legitimating factor to overcome other pressures 
pressing toward separation.
By adding the subjective criteria of spiritual culture and ethnic consciousness 
to the objective criteria required of a nationality, Gankovsky elaborated the Marxist 
theory of nationality further. In his view the Baloch had developed as a feudal nation­
ality by the time of the British conquest. Gankovsky wrote, “It seems to me that the 
formation of the Baiuch feudal nationality began in the thirteenth and fifteenth centu-
Rd.ries.” Thus, the Baloch are not merely a “national minority”, scattered here and 
there, but constitute a nation, in the fullest sense of the word.85 They are a stable 
community occupying a relatively well-defined territory (despite arbitrary frontier di­
visions) in southwest Asia, speaking a common language (the majority speak Ba­
lochi), and possessing the basis for a single national economy.86 The Baloch economy
82 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 71.
83 Stalin, Marxism And The National Question. Moscow: F.L.P.H., 1947, p. 15.
84 Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History. U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. 
Institute o f Oriental Studies, p. 147,
85 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem o f Greater Baluchistan, pp. 200-201.
86 Ibid., pp. 19-20, and 59-50.
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is arbitrarily prevented from functioning naturally. The artificial political frontiers, 
which divide Balochistan into different regions, have hindered the development of 
trade and economic ties. However, the basis of a common economy is evident. When­
ever possible, the Baloch completely disregard the “frontiers” and engage in unoffi­
cial trade, which provides the population with a constant source of income; indeed, 
the livelihood of thousands depends on the two way traffic in trade across the “fron­
tiers”, and that is in spite of severe restrictions. Thus some kind of economic ties are 
already established between the different regions of Balochistan.
Walker Connor a scholar of ethno-nationalism emphasises the collective char­
acter of the nation. For Connor the essence of nation is psychological, a vivid sense of 
sameness or oneness of kind, which, from the perspective of the group, sets it off from 
all other groups in a most vital way. Connor believes that this sense or consciousness 
of kind is derived from a myth of common descent. Members of a nation feel or intui­
tively sense that they are related to one another. Giving importance to the psychologi­
cal aspect of the nation, Connor wrote:
Although the defining characteristic of the nation is psychological, a 
matter of group self-perception, any nation necessarily has its tangible 
characteristics. Any human grouping can be described in terms of a 
certain set o f overt traits: vital statistics, population distribution, reli­
gious and linguistic composition, and so forth. But such characteristics 
are relevant to the notion of the nation only to the degree to which 
they contribute to the intuitive sense of kinship as well as to the sense 
of vital uniqueness from non-members.87 
Let it not remain unsaid, however, that there are social scientists who reject or give 
little importance to the role of “national character” in generating common national
o o
feelings and coherence among the members of the nation.
Like the six other salient features of nationhood, namely historical experi­
ences, common ethnic bond, common language, religious beliefs, distinct territory, 
and socio-economic structure, the Baloch collective character plays a significant role 
in distinguishing the Baloch from their neighbouring nations. Residing for more then 
2000 years, as a dominant people, in a country with a formidable geography and harsh 
climate, have influenced their way of life in one way or another. Similarly, the 
devastating waves of alien armies, the migrations and internal tribal wars left their
87 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1994, p. 145.
88 Roy E, H. Mellor, Nation. State, and Territory. London and New York: Routledge, 1989, pp. 19-20
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tating waves of alien armies, the migrations and internal tribal wars left their marks on 
all aspects of the Baloch society.
Obviously, in all the varieties of the interaction of people and land, the envi­
ronment itself powerfully shapes the history, mores, and character of the nation and 
the life patterns of its individual members. Influencing its culture, socio-economic 
structure, institutions and its political psychology, the Baloch environment and cir­
cumstances shaped the Baloch own peculiar collective character or psychological 
make-up in the course of time.89 Manifested in the Balochmayar (the Baloch code of 
honour), traditions, and habits, the Baloch collective character differentiates them 
from their neighbours significantly, and thus forms another salient feature of the Ba­
loch nation.
There are no nations with pure racial origins. It would be truer to say that the 
concept of pure race is fictitious.90 Thus, too, is the Baloch. “For it shows that”, An­
derson argues, “from the start the nation was conceived in language, not in blood, and 
that one could be ‘invited into’ the imagined community.”91 The Baloch embraced 
and assimilated other minor groups to extend their strength. The present-day Baloch 
are not a single race, but are a people of different origins, whose language belong to 
the Iranian family of languages. They are mixed with Arabs in the South, Indians in 
the East, and with Turkmen and other Altaic groups in the North West. The Baloch 
along the coastal area (Makkoran) are a mixture of Iranian, Assyrian and Negro 
stock.92 The attitude of the Baloch towards the integration of strangers into their cul­
ture was a positive step in the development of nationalism.
By quantifying Smith’s insights (see above), Bernard Nietschmann discusses 
nations as geographically bounded territories of a common people, defined on the ba­
sis of common ancestry, history, society, institutions, ideology, language, territory, or 
(often) religion. He estimates there are between 3,000 and 5,000 of these nations. A 
state, by contrast, is "a centralized political system, recognized by other states, that 
uses a civilian and military bureaucracy to enforce one set of institutions, laws, and 
sometimes language and religion within its claimed boundaries. This is done regard­
less of the presence of nations that may have pre-existing and different laws and insti­
89 Henry Field, An Anthropological Reconnaissance in West Pakistan. 1955. p. 17; see also Selig S. 
Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp. 7-8.
90 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, p, 145.
91 Ibid.
92 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 41.
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tutions. States commonly claim many nations that may not consent to being governed 
and absorbed by an imposed central government in the hands of a different people.”93 
If one accepts Nietschmann’s definition that ethnic criteria define nationality, groups 
containing their own nationalisms exist within most countries of the world. In Iran, 
this reality was recognized under the monarchy by giving the ruler the title Shahan­
shah, literally "King of Kings." The title recognises that the ruler in Teheran was 
overlord of more than one people, each with their own sovereign. The Baloch are one 
such people.
Modern nations as argued by Smith, often have historical roots in old ethnic 
identities.94 The Baloch nationalists manipulate the powerful historical symbolism of 
tortuous struggle for survival stretching back to more than two thousand years. But 
nationalism is a different way of thinking about collective identity from ethnicity, and 
ethnicity itself is only an aspect of the way most collective identities were organized 
in the past. Nationalism can be regarded as the most essential characteristic, which 
provides the nation with its true identity and inspiring will.
The Kurdish nationalist scholar, Omar Sheikhmous, giving as example the 
Kurdish case in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, argues that national appeal or ethnicity never 
depends on affinities such as modernity.95 Cultural and national differences will per­
sist in spite of inter-ethnic contacts and dependence. In India, the Sikh religious mi­
nority’s linguistic and cultural differences with the other Indian people are insignifi­
cant, but many of them are still expressing emotive solidarity with their own group. 
The Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey are not altogether a community segregated from 
their non-Kurdish neighbours, but this has never proved strong enough for them to 
renounce their claim for separate nationhood. Similarly the majority of the Baloch 
have been parts of Pakistan and Iran for several decades. Despite being influenced by 
the Pakistani and Iranian “national cultures”, the Balochs’ sense of nationalism and 
their demand for national self-rule is overwhelming.
The common struggle against the alien invaders, while strengthening the 
common bonds, develops national feelings. According to Peter Kloos, for reasons that 
are still very unclear, people confronted with powerful forces that lie beyond their ho­
rizon, and certainly beyond their control, tend to turn to purportedly primordial cate-
93 Bernard Nietschmann, “The Third World War”, in: Cultural Survival Quarterly. 11, No. 3, 1987, p. 1
94 See A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, see, chapter 7
95 Omar Sheikhmous, Kurdernas kamp fdr sialvstyre: i serien Varldspolitikens Dagfr&gor. Stockholm; 
Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1991, p. 12.
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gories, turning to the familiarity of their own ethnic background. In the process they 
try to gain an identity of their own by going back to the fundamentals of their religion, 
to a language unspoken for generations, to the comfort of a homeland that may have 
been theirs in the past. In doing so they construct a new identity. This new identity is 
indeed a construct that often only flimsily resembles what is believed was past reality. 
The new identity is cast in terms of primordial attachments, but it is a thoroughly 
modem phenomenon. It needs only a small group of people to to n  these feelings into 
an ethnic movement.96
Having observed the imposition of One-Unit system (1955-69) of Islamabad 
and the Pashtun threat of early 1990s against the Baloch, the chairman of “Balochis­
tan National Movement” (BNM), and the member of Pakistan Senate (1994-99), Dr. 
Abdul Hayee Baloch opines that despite the internal polarisation, the Baloch always 
unite when confronted with the external challenge.97 As discussed in chapter 6, the 
fundamental tension between the Punjabi dominated centre and regional interests was 
at the root of the discontent that led to the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. This 
tension was also the ultimate cause for the development of the Baloch national 
movement in the 1970s, the uprising in Sindh in the 1980s, and the emergence of 
“Muhajir Qoumi Movement” (MQM) in the 1990s.
Just as the oppressive policies of the classical colonialism provoked the early 
Third World nationalisms, so has internal colonialism given rise to the nationalism of 
subordinate nationalities. Referring to the internal colonialism within multi-national 
Third World states as “poor peoples’ colonialism”, Ismet Sheriff Vanly had described 
its effect upon subordinate nationalities, such as the Kurds, as follows:
Within the artificial frontiers inherited from imperialism, many Third 
World states practice a “poor peoples’ colonialism”. It is directed 
against often sizeable minorities, and is both more ferocious and more 
harmflil than the classical type. The effect o f economic exploitation 
are aggravated by an almost total absence of local development and by 
a level o f national oppression fuelled by chauvinism and unrestrained 
by the democratic traditions which in the past usually limited the more 
extreme form o f injustice under the old colonialism.98
96 See Peter KIoos, “Secessionism in Europe in the Second Half o f the 20th Century” in: Tahir, Nadeem 
Ahmad (ed.), The Politics o f Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe and South Asia. Karachi, 1998.
97 Dr. Abdul Hayee, quoted in: The Herald, March 1992, p. 64.
98 Ismet Sheriff Vanly, “Kurdistan in Iraq”, in: Gerard Chaliand (ed.), People Without A Country: The 
Kurds and Kurdistan. London: Zed Press 1980. pp. 204-205.
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Very often nationalism derives from some real or felt sense of deprivation and 
denial." It is a matter of common observation that, the more oppressive a state system 
toward its nationalities, the more ardent will become the desire for separation among 
them and vice-versa. During the war against the British, the Baloch national con­
sciousness grew stronger under the impact.100 Since its inception, the oppressive state 
of Pakistan has been responsible for several successive armed rebellions against the 
Baloch, including the brutal conflict of 1973-77. Similarly, the Baloch nationalism in 
western Balochistan (Iran) steadily developed as a response to the aggressive Persian 
nationalism. The Shah of Iran followed a policy of destruction of all national identi­
ties other than the Persians. Such is also the case between Iran, Iraq, and Turkey with 
their respective Kurdish minorities.
For the Marxists, nationalism is related primarily to the economic base.101 
When capitalist relations of production and exchange become the dominant mode of 
production, less advanced nationalities move on to become nations. Rejecting this 
Marxist view, other scholar's believe that nationalism can never be attributed only to 
the level of economy. There are instances when such movements started among a 
people who were well off economically. The Basques and Catalans enjoy higher liv­
ing standards than Castilians; Chinese (within Malaysia) higher than Malays, and also 
Croats and Slovenes in Yugoslavia had higher living standards than Serbs.102 As 
Walker Connor has demonstrated, there appeal's to be no correlation between degrees
T /\^
of ethno-nationalism and economic factors of any kind.
In contrast to the psychological characteristics of the nation, Connor underes­
timates the economic factors. For Connor, ethnie with its psychological make-up 
forms the most coercive basis for nationalism. It should be noted that ethnic national­
ism is not a new phenomenon. In his essay on representative government, John Stuart 
Mill reached the conclusion that “it is in general a necessary condition of free institu­
tions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with nationali­
ties.”104 Connor, however, accepts that economic considerations may be an irritant 
that reinforces ethnic consciousness. But economic factors are likely to come in a
99 E. Cashmore, Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations. London: Routledge, 1988, pp. 97-102.
500 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem o f Greater Baluchistan, pp. 126-145.
101 Stalin, Marxism And The National Question, Moscow: F.L.P.H., 1947, p. 15.
102 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, p. 148.
103 Walker Connor, “Eco — or enthno-nationalism?”, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 7 . No. 3, 1984, pp. 
342-59.
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poor second when competing with the emotionalism of ethnic nationalism.105 Material 
wants and their realisation may not appear to have any obvious impact in arousing 
feelings of nationalism, but most people, especially the subjugated people living in a 
territorial state dominated by the majority, feel a strong resentment against what they 
regard as denial of their economic rights. Such thinking usually leads to national sen­
timents.106
While prioritising the historical and cultural dimensions of nationalism, Smith 
also attaches lesser importance to the role played by modern and socio-economic fac­
tors. He writes: "My claim is not that [such] factors play little part in the genesis and 
course of . . . nationalisms. Clearly, they do, if only in the form of catalysts."107 In 
Pakistan one of the main contributing elements to Baloch nationalism is the exploita­
tion of their resources by the dominant Punjabis. Despite its essential feudal character, 
Punjab is more urbanized, has an elaborate irrigation system and some industrial ac­
tivity, apart from being over-represented in the army and bureaucracy. Balochistan, on 
the other hand, is the least developed of the component regions of Pakistan.
In spite of its rich natural resources, after annexation in 1948 Balochistan re­
mained on the whole extremely deprived. Natural gas deposits for example were 
found in 1952 in the Sui area and were brought into use in other provinces of Pakistan 
from October 1955. The Balochistan coast also provided Pakistan with new port pos­
sibilities and the harbour of Gwadar was developed in the 1960s. The benefits to the 
Baloch from these projects, however, were negligible, and as their consciousness de­
veloped, they began to sense the nature of the exploitation they were forced to suffer. 
This economic exploitation expanded the Baloch national feeling in the 1960s and 
1970s.10S
As indicated above, for Anderson the nation is an imagined community. Ac­
cording to him, what makes possible the imagination of nation is modernity, particu­
larly “print capitalism”. “Nothing perhaps more precipitated this search, nor made it 
more fruitful, than print-capitalism”, wrote Anderson, “which made it possible for 
rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate them­
104John Stuart Mill, Representative Government. London: J.M. Deut and Sons, 1910, p. 362 as quoted 
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106 E. Cashmore, Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations. London: Routledge, 1988, pp. 97-102.
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selves, in profoundly new ways”,109 In comparison to British India, Balochistan was 
far behind in cultural developments. The print industry during the British rule was 
equal to nothing in Balochistan, However, in the course of time a Baloch intelligent­
sia, even though limited made its appearance, The opening of Westem-style schools 
in the early 20th century, which reached a total number of 24 by 1902, served as an­
other channel of new awareness.110 By the mid-20th century a Baloch intellectual class 
was formed.111 “Despite the problems”, Nek Buzdar wrote, “the 1960s saw for the 
first time a relatively large number of the Baloch receiving high school and university 
education and becoming involved in pioneering Baloch literary and nationalist activi­
ties.”112
For Antonio Gramsci, every social group, which emerges into history out of 
the preceding economic structure, has found intellectuals already in existence. These 
are, according to Gramsci, the “traditional” intellectuals, who consider themselves to 
be independent and standing above all class conflicts. He calls the intellectuals in in­
dustrial societies the “organic” intellectuals who are bound to the class, which is re­
sponsible for the industrial development, directing it because the class owns the 
means of production. These organic intellectuals give the capitalist-class homogeneity 
and an awareness of its own function not merely in the economic but also in the po­
litical and cultural fields.113 His theory is connected with the much wider concept of 
“hegemony” that Gramsci fully developed. To establish the hegemony, the intellectu­
als have a role to play.
Gramsci's theory of intellectuals, though formulated to reflect the conditions in 
Italy, is equally applicable to the intellectuals of the Third World. The process of 
dominance/subordination between the Punjabi elite and the Baloch elite, which had 
slowed down when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (from Sindh) was the country's chief execu­
tive between 1971-1977, greatly intensified after General Zia's coup d'etat. During the 
period after the coup d'etat, in the words of Gramsci:
[...]the government operated as a 'party'. It set itself over and above 
the parties not so as to harmonize their interests and activities within
109 Ibid.
H0 Moulai Shaidai, “Educatiion During British Rule in Balochistan”, in: Ouman. Karachi, August 
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the permanent framework of the life and interests o f the nation and 
state, but so as to disintegrate them, to detach them from the broad 
masses and obtain 'a force of non-party men linked to the government 
by paternalistic ties of a Bonapartist-Caesarist type.114
Emphasising the role of elite competition as the basis for ethnic group devel­
oping subjective consciousness, Brass, for example, believes that the group’s keeper 
of identity, the elite, transmits ethnic consciousness and makes political demands.115 
In Hamid Ahmadi’s view, the Baloch nationalism is the invention of the Baloch 
elite.116 Ahmadi, whose study is mainly based on the Iranian Baloch, argues that the 
Baloch elite, when deprived from their privileges and power by Reza Shah after 1928,
117organised the Baloch people on ethnic lines, although he attaches no importance to 
the role played by the historical and cultural factors in the emergence of Baloch na­
tionalism.118
Obviously, the intelligentsia from a constituent group of a state ruled by a sec­
ond group, because of their dual-track socialization, feels uncomfortable in the tradi­
tional society in which they were raised. This group contains a group conscious­
ness.119 Despite the progress the constituent group intelligentsia may make in acade­
mia, government, or business, its membership in that group limits the intelligentsia’s 
upward mobility because of the group’s subservient position. To compensate, the in­
telligentsia mobilizes the group sentiments with the goal of establishing a separate 
state in which their upward mobility is not checked, by convincing the members of the 
group that their corporate interest will be protected from the hostile intent of the larger
1 9 0society.
As it will be seen in the following chapters, this fits the description of the Ba­
loch. The Baloch have a group identity, but have an inferior position relative to the 
Punjabis and Persians who control the central governments of Pakistan and Iran. The 
Baloch intelligentsia are prevented from achieving their goals because of their Baloch
114 Ibid., p. 224.
1,5 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and nationality: Theory and Practice' New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991, 
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backgrounds. They therefore organise resistance to the central government, by con­
vincing the populace that only by supporting their movement can Baloch corporate 
interests be protected.
Giving importance to the elite’s role, Smith argues that contemporary ethnic 
conflicts are not caused only by the elite competition for power but also from the 
competition between different mythomoteurs. Smith explains the durability and preva­
lence of ethnic and national identities in terms of general human nostalgia for the past 
in order to combat mortality. Smith says the association of the present with the im­
memorial past through myth and memories establishes a kind of posterity and thereby 
a relation with coming generations in the future. By remembering our ancestors we 
sustain a tradition through which we will be remembered by our descendants and thus
191will be saved from oblivion. As observed by Erwin Orywal, it is the ethnic marker,
“Baloch”, which unites the Baloch community, thus confirming Smith’s view in this 
122respect more or less.
Nationalism and the Globalists
According to the critics of nationalism, the globalists, nationalism is a dying 
phenomenon. Enhanced cultural plurality and complexity within the territories of na­
tion-states are a result of the processes of globalisation. Globalisation and its con­
comitant cultural complexity make the very existence of national cultures and nation 
states problematic.123 It has been argued that trans-national forces (multi-national cor­
porations, global telecommunication and transport systems, and international migra­
tion), which profoundly challenge the previous notions of national- political and cul­
tural boundaries, are conterminous with the coming of a new phase in history, a “post 
industrial society.”124 The technological basis for this new phase is the information 
revolution. They give the example of the European union as an example of develop­
ment in this direction. However, it should be noted that no trans-European national 
identity has as yet emerged.
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Having noted the increase both in trans-national activity as well as in the den­
sity of global telecommunication networks, Smith asserts, “the question is whether 
there is anything new in such boundary-transcending activities and processes, and 
whether they serve to unite distinctive populations in more than superficial respects... 
Can there be a truly cosmopolitan culture, one that is genuinely 'post-national'?”125 
Obviously, the advantage for secessionist movements is that due to modern means of 
communication they can dodge government forces that oppose them. And if they can­
not, then independence may be the way out in order to join the trans-national regime 
(EU). In this way the Scottish movement for independence justifies its moves: if'Lon­
don' does not defend Scottish interests in 'Brussels', then the only solution for the 
Scots is to go to Brussels themselves - but this presupposes independence. Thus, in 
this direct way a trans-national regime can elicit secessionism.
It has also been argued that in the age of scientific and cultural closeness 
communality and categorical ethnic distinctions may give way to an affinity of socio­
cultural traits, which will ultimately prove to be a check on extreme national urges 
among the nations or groups within a territorial state. To the contrary, however, the 
new global survey illustrates that ethnic consciousness is definitely in the ascendancy 
as a political force, and that the state borders, as presently delimited, are being in­
creasingly challenged by this trend. For Connor126 the modernisation and advances in 
communication and transportation tend also to increase the cultural awareness of the 
minorities by making their members more aware of the distinctions between them­
selves and others. “I f 5, Connor says, “the process that comprise modernization led to 
a lessening of ethnic consciousness in favour of identification with state, then the 
number of states troubled by ethnic disharmony would be on the decrease55.127 But, 
contrary to this, ethnic conflicts are intensifying around the world. Richard Mans- 
bach128 listed a total of 53 regional ethnic conflicts in 1994.
The digital revolution is accelerating the process not only of globalisation but 
also of localisation and helping to forge anew the cultural and economic togetherness 
of a people - even where they are divided between different states. Moreover, the na­
tionalist movements use modern electronic communication to counter one-sided in­
125 Anthony D. Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity” in: International Affairs 68. 
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formation of the government they oppose. Many movements, like the Basque ETA, 
have discovered the possibilities the internet offers to spread news that cannot to be 
censored. Thus, it is not accidental that the commander of the Chiapas guerrillas in 
Mexico, Dr. Marcus, in an interview said, “I like my computer more than my Kalash- 
nikov.”129
Today, not only the Baloch from different parts of Balochistan, but also from 
Turkmenistan to East Africa are becoming closer with each other by their daily con­
tact through the internet. Thus, state boundaries are becoming increasingly porous, not 
only to the market but also to information and human rights -  and deep-rooted kinship 
ties are finding fresh avenues for expression. In the present era of electronic media, 
ethnic minority groups in any country may try to magnify their cause by raising the 
issue of violation of human rights in the place of their residence. Contrary to the 
claims of the critics of nationalism, the Baloch nationalism, as observed by Selig Har­
rison, has been steadily advancing in the resent decades as compared to its past. Harri­
son wrote: “In mid-1980,1 found a pervasive mood of expectancy among the Baluch, 
a widespread desire to vindicate Baluch martial honour, and a readiness to renew the 
struggle when and if circumstances appear to be favourable”.130
Thus, it is difficult to believe that the information revolution as argued by the 
opponents of nationalism, leads to a lessening of nationalism or at least of ethnic na­
tionalism. On the 50th anniversary of the digital revolution (December 23, 1997), Wal­
ter Isaacson, a journalist, described this revolution as a decentralising power, rather 
than a centralising force.131 According to Isaacson, as the transistor was invented, 
George Orwell, in his book 1984, was making one of the worst predictions in a cen­
tury filled with them: technology would be a centralising, totalitarian influence. In­
stead technology became a force for democracy and individual empowerment. The 
internet allows anyone to be publisher or pundit, e-mail subverts rigid hierarchies, and 
the tumult of digital innovation rewards wildcats that risk battle with monolithic 
phone companies. “The symbol of atomic age, which tended to centralize power”, ar­
gues Isaacson, “was nucleus with electrons held in tight orbit; the symbol of the digi­
tal age is Web, with countless centres of power all equally networked.”132
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It seems that the more frequent one’s direct contact with different cultures, the 
more aware one becomes of one’s own cultural identity. Probably it was against this 
background that Peter Kloos came to the conclusion that the late 20th century separa­
tist movements are in a complicated way related to the rise of globalisation.133 In his 
view, the rise of trans-national forces in two ways related to the rise of regional, sub­
national identities that provide the basis of secessionist movements. In the first place, 
there is the rising influence of trans-national forces on the daily life of people. The 
awareness of people that this is so means that people feel more and more that they 
loose their grip on what governs their daily life. Their life is more and more being de­
termined by forces beyond the state. In his view, in the past secessionist movements 
had to do the job all alone. Nowadays they may seek support outside the boundaries 
of the state they wish to leave, and here the second relation between nationalist 
movement and trans-national forces comes in.134 Thus, contrary to the globalist argu­
ment, the late 20th century globalisation and the growing importance of trans-national 
forces have weakened the authority of the multi-national states, and strengthened lo­
calized solidarities in the context of nationalism.
A Critique of Existing Theories of Nationalism
As discussed in this chapter, one of the major debates in the literature on na­
tionalism is between those who see it as simply an extension of ancient ethnic identi­
ties and those who see it distinctively modern. The primordialist theory falls short be­
cause it assumes timelessness in nationalism which does not exist - nationalism did 
not appear* until the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The modernization theo­
rists, although they accurately explain the origins of nations, also have their shortcom­
ings because they insist that nations will eventually decline in importance. The Marx­
ist school assumes that nationalism is caused by discrepancies in the development of 
capitalism between countries. The Marxists fail to explain why all underdeveloped 
states do not have violent nationalist movements and why many well-developed states 
do. Although the Marxist analysis of oppressed nationalities was originally developed 
with a view to colonised peoples, it can still be helpful in understanding the present 
day subordinate ethnic nations as well.
As far as the general theories of nationalism and their relevance to the study of 
the Third World ethnic nationalities are concerned, most of those suffer from two ma-
133 Peter Kloos, “Secessionism in Europe in the Second Half of the 20th Century” in: Nadeem Ahmad 
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31
jor shortcomings. First most of these theories are primarily based on the manifesta­
tions of the phenomenon of nationalism as experienced initially in the West. Academ­
ics such as Kedourie, Gellner, Connor, and A. D. Smith have provided various theo­
ries as discussed earlier. Their explanations as to ethnic movements in Europe are 
based on the weaknesses of the industrial society, and the centralised political state. 
These analyses are not necessarily relevant to Balochistan.
Secondly, they are state-centred in the sense that they are geared more often to 
civic nationalism as contrasted with the nationalism of ethnic nationalities, while con­
ceptually nationalism is an attribute of nation, a politico-cultural entity identifiable by 
its ‘character’ and collective rights, and not of state, a politico-juridical entity identifi­
able by its sovereign right over a territory. However, their analysis of the various 
strategies used by the ethnic movements in Europe, is extremely relevant. These writ­
ers have attempted to outline the various strategies used by the European ethnic 
groups to obtain power. They point out that modem ethnic nationalisms have had to 
ground their aspirations in arguments appealing to general principles like popular sov­
ereignty, inalienable rights and cultural diversity. Thus, concepts, themes, and the 
methodologies developed by these theories are, with some conceptual adjustments, 
useful to the study of ethnic nationalism in southwest Asia.
The Right of Self-determination
With the British occupation (1839) and the forced merger (Iran-1928, and 
Pakistan-1948) of the Baloch land, the question of the right of self-determination is 
raised. What is the right of self-determination? As defined by the scholars of national­
ism, it means that each nationality has the right to decide for itself, how it shall be
ITSgoverned and by whom. The self-determination movement has been a legitimate 
demand to liberate a country from the yoke of a colonial ruler. In fact, it “served well 
those who sought to dissolve empires”.136 The principle of self-determination has now 
often been propagated to acquire a sovereign independent nation state for an ethnic 
group in a multi-ethnic state.
The principle of self-determination has been widely accepted since the appear­
ance of democratic ideologies in the American and French Revolutions of the late
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eighteenth century. The term 'self-determination' was popularised by Woodrow Wil­
son, President of the USA from 1913-1921 and head of the League of Nations. The 
League of Nations was in existence from 1919 - 1946 and was the basis for the later 
United Nations Organisation. The idea of “self-determination” was first expounded in 
the League of Nations, and was taken up by the UN. It is included in the UN Declara­
tion of Human Rights, which says that all peoples are entitled to self-determination. 
Therefore the key question is who are the 'people'. The UN subsequently was obliged 
to provide a definition. It defined the 'people entitled to 'self-determination' as those 
living under colonial rule.137
Thus, people in sovereign states which were democratically ruled, were not 
entitled to further 'self determination'. This decision was taken in two General Assem­
bly rulings. These are: "UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Inde­
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960) and the UN General Assembly 
Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly relations among 
States" (1970).138 These declarations affirmed the territorial unity of sovereign states. 
The 'self-determination' principle should not be interpreted in such a manner as to 
dismember the territory or political unity of sovereign states, which were conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights, and had a government 
which represented the whole people with no distinction as to race, creed or colour.139
Returning to the concept of the right of self-determination, while nations may 
have ideologies of common descent and shared kinship, they are organised primarily 
as categories of individual members, identified on the basis of various cultural attrib­
utes -  common language, religion, customs, names, etc. Nations axe, moreover, com­
monly understood as being individuals -  both in the literal sense of being indivisible, 
and metaphorically as singular beings that move through history as ordinary people 
move through their biographical life course. Yet, they, too, are prone to fission. A na­
tion’s rights in the international community are compared to those of individuals in 
the society. If individuals have a right to autonomy, then by analogy nations have the 
right to self-determination.140 Nationalists commonly claim that the individuals of a 
population cannot realise their personal freedom unless the population is ‘free’ in the
137 Per Ahlin, och Pal Wrange, Folkens Sialvbest&mmanderatt, (Right of Self-determination of People), 
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sense of political self-determination, and simultaneously demand that the members of 
a putative nation adhere to some common standard of culture and behaviour.141
Individualism is important not just metaphorically, but as the basis for the cen­
tral notion that individuals are directly members of the nation, that it gives each of 
them an intrinsic identity and that they commune with it immediately and as a whole. 
In the discourse of nationalism, one is simply Chinese, French or Eritrean. The indi­
vidual does not require the mediations of family, community, region, or class to be a 
member of the nation. Nationality is understood precisely as an attribute of the indi­
vidual, not of the intermediate associations. This way of thinking reinforces the idea 
of nationality as a sort of trump card in the game of identity. While it does not pre­
clude other self-understandings, within most nationalist ideologies it is held to over­
ride them at least in time of national crisis and need. In Michel Foucault’s sense, 
therefore, nationality is understood as inscribed in the very body of the modern indi­
vidual.142 A person without a country must therefore be understood to lack not only a 
place in the external world but a proper self.143
The expression of the right of self-determination based on the fact of language 
and sectarian divisions within Christianity entered in European political thought, to­
wards the end of the feudal epoch.144 The 1688 Revolution in England and the French 
Revolution did away with the feudal order in Europe. German nationalism found its 
first forcefiil expression under Bismarck. Later, National Socialism emerged as an 
awesome form of militarism, expansionism and racism. Thus German nationalism, 
which originated as a defensive reflex against French hegemony, instead turned later 
into a veritable militarist doctrine of expansion and conquest.
It must be borne in mind that there are still differences among scholars on the 
time and the place of the emergence of the nation. According to Elie Kedourie, the 
doctrine of nation was invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth cen­
tury.145 On the other hand, Benedict Anderson argues that the modern nation based on
141 Friedrich Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State. Priceton: Princeton University, 1970, 
pp. 89.
142 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews ans Other Writings, 1972-1977. New 
York: Pantheon, 1977, cited in, Craig Calhoun, Nationalism. Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1997, p. 46.
143 William Bloom, Personal Identity. National Identity and International Relations. Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press, 1990, cited in, Craig Calhoun, Nationalism. Buckingham: Open University 
Press, 1997, p. 46.
144 G. H. Sabine and T. L Thorson, A History of Political Theory. Hinsdale: Dryden Press, 1973, pp. 
271-346.
145 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism. 4th edn. Oxford: Blackwell (first published 1960), 1994, p. 1.
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the notion of equal rights of all citizens and democracy appeared as a political project 
first in Latin America and not in Europe as is commonly believed.146 About Ander­
son’s remark that Latin American nationalist leaders proclaimed equal rights of all 
citizens it can be said that the practical significance of such declaration was the aboli­
tion of slavery; a revolutionary act as such. In Karl Renner’s opinion, “The birthday 
of the political idea of the nation and the birth-year of this new consciousness is 1789, 
the year of the French Revolution”.147 In 1862 Lord Acton, in an essay on “national­
ity”, opined that before the French revolution the right of self-determination and 
autonomy of nationalities were not recognised, the interest of ruling classes determin-
1 dRing the frontiers of states instead of the nationalities of nations.
In Europe, nationalism expressed as the demand for self-determination be­
longs to the period from the latter half of the nineteenth century onwards. The Italians 
Mazzini and Garibaldi presented nationalism in terms of humanitarian liberalism and 
as revolutionary patriotism respectively, as an integral element of democracy and so­
cial justice enshrined in the notion of self-rule. It followed logically from such theo­
rising that the highest level of self-rule was the possession of sovereign power. In 
short, the hallmark of nationhood was the achievement of statehood. However, these 
liberal theorists who supported the idea of national self-determination had in mind a 
threshold in terms of size when they supported or opposed the right of self- 
determination. A large nationality, which could sustain a big state and ensure devel­
opment, was entitled to separate statehood, but not smaller groups, which were 
thought to play a divisive and negative role. Thus Mazzini was opposed to Irish, Sicil­
ian, and Welsh petty nationalisms.149
Nationalism as a political doctrine of self-determination was put to use exten­
sively in Europe rather late in history: in the late nineteenth century and early twenti­
eth century. As earlier mentioned, in the early 20th century, W. Wilson and V.I. Lenin 
came out forcefully in support of the right of national self-determination for linguistic 
and colonised peoples.150 The First World War resulted in the dismemberment of the 
Austro-Hungarian, Czarist, German and Ottoman empires. By the year 1922, many
146 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 52-65.
147 Karl Renner, Staat und Nation. Vienna 1899, p. 89.
148 Lord Acton, Essay on Freedom and Power. London, 1965, pp. 144-146.
149 E. J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992, p. 31.
150 V. I. Lenin, The National Liberation Movement in the East. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974, pp. 
233-37; G. E. Fasnacht, Acton’s Political Philosophy. An Analysis. London, 1952, pp. 126-139.
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independent states came into being in central Eastern Europe. In place of the Congress 
of Berlin came the League of Nations, from which non-Europeans were not excluded. 
After the Second World War, the process of decolonisation began in earnest. Between 
1945 and 1960, much of Asia and Africa secured their freedom by various peaceful 
and violent means. Since then, the number of independent states grew by nearly 50 
percent, from approximately 120 to 190 in the mid-1990s.151
Colonial movements, according to Hobsbawm, picked up the language of 
European nationalism. He stated:
The leaders and ideologies of colonial and semi-colonial liberation 
movements sincerely spoke the language of European nationalism, 
which they had so often learned from the west, even when it did not 
suit their situation. And as the radicalism of the Russian Revolution 
took over from that of the French Revolution as the main ideology of 
global emancipation, the right to self-determination, now embodied in 
Stalin's texts, reached those who had been beyond the range of Mazz­
ini. Liberation in the Third World was now seen everywhere as 'na­
tional liberation' or among the Marxists, 'national and social libera­
tion'.152
Turning specifically to the Islamic countries, Seyyed Hossein Nasr notes that 
from the time that the West conquered the Islamic World (which finally impinged on 
Muslim consciousness with Napoleon's capture Of Egypt in 1798), that the Islamic
world saw in the West a model which was accepted wholeheartedly by many leaders.
As a result, as they achieved independence, Islamic countries organized themselves 
along the model of European states, i.e., attempting to use nationalism as a legitimat­
ing force.153 Thus, the National Liberation Front fought for the liberation of Algeria, 
not for the liberation of the Maghrib. Similarly, the Palestine Liberation Front seeks 
an independent Palestine, having specifically rejected Pan-Arabist or Pan-Syrian 
models for legitimacy. Of course, older ideologies such as Pan-Arabism or Pan-Islam 
have survived among various peoples in the Middle East.
Despite being pan-nationalists (Pan-Arabists and Pan-Islamists), Muslim writ­
ers like al-Husri, an early supporter of Arab nationalism, and Syed Jamal al-Din Af­
ghani (1838-1897, also known as Asadabadi) wrote that the basis for a nationality is
151 Greerups Forlag AB, Gleerups Skolatlas, Uppsala: Gleerups, 1993.
152 E. J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992, p. 136.
153 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World. New York: Methuen Inc., 1987, p. 
82.
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language. Al-Husri went so far as to postulate that nationalities existed before they 
obtained a national identity154 and that criteria other than “general will” were respon­
sible for the establishment of a nation. “Every Arabic-speaking people is an Arab peo­
ple. Every individual belonging to one of these Arabic-speaking peoples is an Arab... 
under no circumstances should we say: ‘He is not an Arab as long as he does not wish 
to be one, and does not accept his Arabness.’ He is an Arab whether he wishes to be 
one or not.”155
Al-Husri’s nationalism became a basis of Pan-Arabism; an irredentist national­
ist movement, which advocated the political union of all whose native tongue was 
Arabic. The pan-Arab identity generated in some Arab leaders during the First World 
War hopes of a Greater Arabia arising from the ruins of Ottoman Empire. However, 
the diversity of the Arab people and their regional interests failed to provide a firm 
enough common bond and they were subsumed mostly into territories under British, 
French, or Italian control, besides a few independent states. Once more al-Husri’s phi­
losophy was tested in 1959-1961, when Egypt and Syria joined as the United Arab 
Republic. This experiments ultimately also failed, however, when the Syrians real­
ized they had become a province of Egypt rather than co-equals in an Arab partner­
ship. Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi, another Muslim scholar, took a more positive stand 
with regard to nationalism in Muslim countries. Supporting the right of self- 
determination of divided nationalities, Sindhi openly favoured the right of the Pashtun 
of British India to join Afghanistan.156 Adopting the Western concept of nationalism, 
Sindhi wrote:
The denial o f nationality and nationalism is a denial o f human nature.
It is also wrong to consider the division of Muslims into nationalities 
as opposed to the unity of the universal Muslim community. To estab­
lish a harmonious combination o f nationalism and internationalism 
and to keep the balance between the two is not only useful for the na­
tion, but is also beneficial for the entire mankind.157
In contrast to Sindhi and other modernist Muslim scholars, the fundamentalist 
Abu Ala Maududi and Ayatullah Khomeini followed a strict pan-Islamist line in their
154 Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1981, p. 118.
155 Sati’ al-Husri as quoted in Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry. Translated by Mar­
ion Farouk Sluglett and Petter Sluglett, New York: St. Martins Press, 1990, p. 189.
156 Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi, quoted in Inayatullah Baloch, “Islam, the state and nationality prob­
lems: a study of ethnic rights in the Middle East, in: Gudmundur Alfredsson and Peter Macalister- 
Smith (ed.), The living Law of Nations. Strasbourg: N. P. Engel Publisher, 1996, p. 238.
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political thought. In his work, Tarikh-e Azadi-e Hind aur Musliman (The History of 
Indian liberation and the Muslims), Maududi wrote, “Any Muslim who pledged him­
self to the devil of nationalism has been divorced from the angel of Islam”.158 Simi­
larly, Ayatullah Khomeini definitely denies the existence of nationalities. In an inter­
view at the moment of the Shah’s Downfall and the eve of creation of an Islamic Re­
public, in 1979, Khomeini opined, “there are no nationalities in Islam”.159
Autonomy is central to the concept of nationalism and its affirmation of na­
tional cultural specificity. Baloch are a social group, which shares objective elements 
such as a common language and which has acquired a subjective political conscious­
ness of oneness, by its life within a relatively well-defined territory, and by its strug­
gle against alien domination. Before the advent of the British in 1839, Balochistan 
was an independent state ruled by the Khans of Kalat. The borders of Balochistan 
were demarcated in the late 19th century, without consultation of the Baloch people, 
who objected and revolted against the colonial decisions (see chapter 3). In 1928 the 
western Balochistan was occupied by the Iranian armed forces. With the lapse of pa- 
ramountcy in 1947, the Khanate of Balochistan (eastern Balochistan) became an inde­
pendent state, recognizes by Pakistan, until 1948 (see chapter 4). On March 1948, 
Pakistan managed the accession of the country, without the popular consent of the Ba­
loch people.
Nationalism may have developed in Western Europe in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, but it has become a worldwide movement in the twentieth. To­
day nationalism is “the world’s major ideological legitimator and delegitimator of 
states, regimes, and governments”.160 During the early 20th century, the Baloch began 
to consider the concept of nationalism, a notion introduced by the British amid the 
division of the Baloch country among themselves and their neighbouring countries 
(Iran and Afghanistan). Since then the Baloch nationalist movements have been trying 
to establish their legitimacy by appeals to nationalism and the right of self- 
determination throughout Balochistan. Generally, however, the sovereign state is the 
main vehicle through which the claims to national self-determination are realised. 
Therefore, the nationalist principle of national self-determination asserts the right of
157 ibid.
158 Abu Ala Maududi, Tarikh-e Azadi-e Hind aur Musliman (the Inian liberation History and the 
Muslims), Lahore, 1968, Vol. 1, p. 332.
159 Talal Salman, “Interview with Khomeini at Movement of Shah’s Downfall and Eve of Creation of 
Islamic Republic”, in: Al-Safir (in Arabic), 18-19 January 1979.
160 Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, p. 14.
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every nation to consolidate itself within the structures of a state -  eveiy nation should
have a state.161
Summation
The idea of community and a sense of belonging to a human group are in­
grained in the human condition it is difficult to say if these are naturally inborn or so­
cially acquired characteristics. In a way, the distinction between the natural and the 
social is largely artificial in that human beings are generally gregarious and this qual­
ity compels them to associate with others. The ability to communicate through shared 
symbols and signs has been a precondition for the various forms of societal organisa­
tions, which human beings have devised in order to live together. Most centrally 
through language, but also various other cultural means, communication has advanced 
among human beings. The propensity to associate with those that one identifies with 
has simultaneously involved the exclusion of exogenous groups and people. Such 
identification and classification has been practised in all human societies whatever 
their level of development, structuration and stratification. Such practices would not 
have been of much consequence were it not to serve also as a way of laying claims to 
territory, property and other possessions and privileges in opposition to the claims of 
the other groups. Group identity and claim to a specific territory can be described as 
the essence of the nationalist movement. Its echo can be heard throughout the ages 
and in almost all stable societies the world over.
By a nation is meant a relatively large group of people sufficiently coherent in 
terms of cultural orientation, historical experience, and association with a particular 
geographical area, usually but not always the one where it resides. Such a group is 
either aspiring to or exercising self-rule. Nationalism may be defined in one of two 
ways - by ethnic or civic criteria. While ethnic nationalism is based on the conscious­
ness of a shared identity, culture, belief in common ancestors and history, civic na­
tionalism is encompassed within a geographically defined territory.
Nationalism, which defines the group on the civic or the territorial base, is 
known as civic nationalism. An alternative school defines the group as an ethnos, i.e., 
based on immutable, ascriptive characteristics. This is known as ethno-nationalism. 
Civic or territorial nationalism does not deny the existence of ethnic characteristics 
such as kinship ties, common language, or territoriality; it acknowledges that some­
161 Per Ahlin, och Pal Wrange, Folkens Sialvbestammanderatt, (Right of Self-determination o f People), 
i serien "Varldspolitikens Dagffagor", Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institute^ 1990, p. 5.
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times these characteristics may play a part in the creation of a group identity. But for 
civic or territorial nationalism, none of these characteristics are necessary for group 
identification: a group’s volonte generate unites it. Theories of ethnic nationalism, by 
contrast, acknowledge the possible existence of a general will, but deny its importance 
in favour of ethnic characteristics. Various authors differ on which characteristics de­
fine a particular ethnic group, but all in the ethno-nationalism camp agree that it is the 
possession of these characteristics, which defines the group.
Possession of group identity, however, is not sufficient to create nationalism, 
even if we give the group the title of “nation”. The nation’s intelligentsia must mobi­
lise group sentiment. The intelligentsia will often play this role because the members 
of an outside group, which control the state, block its upward mobility. The intelli­
gentsia wants a separate nation-state to protect the group’s corporate interests, and 
give it the upward mobility it has been previously denied.
While much has been written about the both versions of nationalism, ethno- 
nationalism is empirically flawed because the ethnic markers that are crucial to group 
identity are either inconstant or lack sufficient boundaries to make the concept mean­
ingful. Despite the empirical flaws, however, both types of nationalism have travelled 
to South West Asia (Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan).
Because the Pakistani state assumed the mantle of two-nation theory (Is­
lam/Hinduism) based on Islam for its legitimacy, as a countermovement one can ex­
pect most Baloch to rely on ethno-nationalism. The problem with this is that once ties 
of kinship or tribal affiliation become the recipient of terminal loyalty, the group re­
ceiving the loyalty changes as the definition of the kinship group varies over time and 
circumstances. Thus at one moment and individual could identify himself as a Baloch, 
at another as a member of the Marri tribe, or at a third moment as a merely a member 
of the Bijjarani clan. At each level of hierarchical organisation, the member of com­
peting groups with equally strong “group feelings” increases, and each of these groups 
must pursue their own group interests even if this pursuit harms the interest of the na­
tion as a whole. The Baloch nationalist claims must either overcome the fissiparous 
tendencies of ethno-nationalism, or attempt to superimpose a civic-territorial national­
ism to unite the various tribes and clans. This study examines the interplay of these 
two competing strategies.
Nationalism, as demonstrated by Anthony Smith, may not be responsible for 
the many instances of reform and democratisation of tyrannical regimes, but it is a
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frequent accompanying motive, a source of pride for downtrodden peoples and the 
recognised mode for joining and rejoining ‘democracy’ and civilisation’. It also pro­
vides the sole vision and rationale of political solidarity today, one that commands 
popular assent and elicits popular enthusiasm. All other visions, all other rationales, 
according to Smith, appeal* wan and shadowy by comparison. They offer no sense of 
election, no unique histoiy, no special destiny. These are the promises, which nation­
alism for the most part fulfils, and the real reasons why so many people continue to 
identify with the nation. Until these needs are fulfilled through other kinds of identifi­
cation, the nation with its nationalism, denied or recognized, oppressed 01* free, each 
cultivating its own distinctive history, its golden ages and sacred landscapes, will con­
tinue to provide humanity with its fundamental cultural and political identities well 
into the years to come.
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CHAPTER TWO
Cohesive Bases of Baloch Nationalism 
Introduction
The Baloch are an ancient people. Residing in a region whose histoiy is marked 
by the invasions and political designs of outside empire-builders, the origin and his­
toiy of the Baloch realistically could not be other than diverse. Nonetheless, and de­
spite some regional variation, a distinctive Baloch culture and Balochi language 
emerged from the 12th century on. Indeed, Baloch self-consciousness about their cul­
tural, linguistic, and historical distinctiveness informs the expression of their national­
ism in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, the countries, in which they are significant mi­
norities. Being an amorphous people, their economic position throughout histoiy, their 
geographic position, even their language changes accordingly to circumstances.
As discussed in chapter one, in all the varieties of the interaction of people and 
land, it is obvious that the environment itself powerfully shapes the histoiy, mores, 
and character of the nation and the life patterns of its individual members. Thus being 
predominantly mountainous the land has had a strong impact on the Baloch separate­
ness from their neighbours. The formidable geography and the harsh climate of Ba­
lochistan has left its marks on all aspects of Baloch society, influencing its culture, 
history, socio-economic structure, and institutions and its political psychology and has 
led to the creation of its own psychological make-up or national character.1
Living across one of the important crossroads in southwest Asia, the Baloch 
do not actually come from a single stock, but their myths and legends affirm to their 
satisfaction, if not the scholar’s, their essential ethnic purity.2 The Baloch belief in a 
common descent, their myths and shajras (genealogical tables) which connected them 
with the Qurish, the tribe of Prophet Mohammad, and their assertion to be the descen­
dants of the ancient Babylonian king, Balus or Nimrud, their segmentary tribal or­
ganisation, language, code of values, and pool of distinctive cultural attributes had for 
centuries given them a sense of being different and special.3 In combination with a 
histoiy as the dominant ethnic group in Balochistan, these attributes fostered an ethnic
1 Henry Field, An Anthropological Reconnaissance in West Pakistan. 1955. p. 17; see also Selig S. 
Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp. 7-8.
2 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 41, 77-78.
3 Hittu Ram, Tarikh-e Balochistan. Quetta, 1997, p. 30; Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of 
Baluch Race and Baluchistan, pp. 23-24.
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pride and self-confidence, which often gave way to chauvinism. “Whatever be the 
merit of their claim”, the nationalist historian Muhammad Sardar Khan asserts, “we 
have to admit and acknowledge that the Baluch people have kept their blood purity 
and distinction of character to the best of their means and efforts”.4 One need only 
look at the Baloch proverbs to see the premium they placed on their unique identity 
and the demanding code of personal conduct to which they insisted one had to con­
form in order to retain his honour as a Baloch.
The Names “Baloch” and “Balochistan”
The most inclusive Baloch ethnic identity is evident in the use of the eth­
nonym Baloch. The central marker that unites the Baloch community, as a whole is a 
more or less well-articulated conception of all Baloch as descended from a common 
ancestor, thus constituting a qcium (nation). Since at least the mid-seventh century the 
name Baloch has been applied to the people living in the southern Kerman Mountains, 
Sistan and Makkoran.5 It appears that the word “Baloch” is the corrupted form of Me- 
lukhkha, Meluccha or Mleccha, which was the designation of the modern eastern 
Makkoran during the third and the second millennia B.C., according to the Mesopo­
tamian texts.6 Dr. Munir Ahmad Gechki, a history professor in Balochistan Univer­
sity, however, relates it to “Gedrosia” or “Bedrozia” the name of the Baloch country 
in the time of Alexander the Great (356-323 BC)”.7 Muhammad Sardar Khan theo­
rised that the term Baloch is a derivative of Belus, the title of Babylonian or Chaldian 
Kings. Nimrud, the son of Kush or Cush or Kooth, was called Nimrud the Belus.8 The 
followers of Nimrud were known as Belusis. Among the Arabs Belusis were pro­
nounced Balos.9 Thus the word Baloch has come from Belusis or Balos, Sardar Khan 
and Marri argue. According to G. P. Tate10, however, the name has historically meant 
“nomads”. It would therefore be a synonym for “bedouin”.
4 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch. p. 79.
5 Erwin Orywal, “Periphery and Identity: Process of Detribalization Among the Baloch of 
Afghanistan”, in: Paul Titus (ed.), Marginalitv and Modernity. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996, 
p. 79; E. Mockler, “Origin o f the Baloch”, in: Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Calcutta, 1895, 
p. 36; Ibrahim Bashmi, Oaus al-Khalii al-Mashdood. Bahrain, 1998, p. 348-349.
6 J. Hansman, “A Periplus of Magan and Melukha”, in BSOAS. London, 1973, p. 555; H. W. Bailey, 
“Mleccha, Baloc, and Gadrosia”, in: BSOAS. No. 36, London, 1973, pp. 584-87. Also see, Cf. K. Kart- 
tunen, India in Early Greek Literature. Studia Orientalia, no. 65, Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 
1989, pp. 13-14.
7 Interview with Munir Ahmad Gichki.
8 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History o f Baluch Race and Baluchistan, pp. 14-16.
9 Mir Kliuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan. pp. 9-10.
10 G. P. Tate, Seistan: A Memoir on the History. Tonography, Ruins, and People of the Country, (in 
Four Parts, Part IV, The People of Seistan), Calcutta, 1912, p. 365.
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The name Balochistan quite simply means “the land of the Baloch”, which 
bears in itself a significant national connotation identifying the country with the Ba­
loch.11 Gankovsky, a Soviet scholar on the subject, has attributed the appearance of 
the name to the “formation of Baloch feudal nationality” and the spread of the Baloch 
over the territory bearing their name to this day during the period between the 12th and 
the 15th century.12 Confirming more or less the above notion, Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, 
the most prominent authority on the subject, believes that the country of the Baloch 
has been known as Balochistan since the founding of the first Baloch confederacy in 
the 12the century.13
Under the Arab rule (from the early 8th century to the end of 10th century) the 
Baloch country was divided into three separate political and administrative regions, 
namely Makkoran, Turan (Kalat highlands in central Balochistan) and Sajistan or 
Drangia (Sistan including Khar an). It appears that this division prevailed until 15 cen­
tury.14 As it will be discussed in chapter 3, the successive Mughal invasions from the 
late 13th century on, led to mass exodus of the Baloch population eastwards, mainly to 
Sindh and Punjab. Probably it was during this mass movement that the entire Baloch 
region became known as “Balochistan” or the land of Baloch for its surrounding peo­
ples. It should be noted that terms like “Balochistan” and mulk Balochi (countiy of the 
Baloch) are frequently encountered in Balochi classic poetry of the 15th and 16th cen­
turies.15 Moreover, a Turkish admiral, Sidi Ali Reis who visited coastal Makkoran in 
1554, also affirms the use of this name, calling “Balochistani” the inhabitants of 
coastal Makkoran.16 The word “Balochistan” is also mentioned in the commentaries
17of the Mughal emperor Babar (1526-1530), the Tuzak-e Babari , and by the emperor
11 That is also the case with other similar names such as Kurdistan (the Kurdish homeland), Arabistan 
(the Arab homeland), Uzbakistan, etc. In these names, the Persian affix “istan” meaning land or terri­
tory is added to the name o f its ethnic inhabitants.
12 Yu. V. Gankovsky, The People of Pakistan: An ethnic history, pp. 147-8.
13 Inayatullah Baloch, “Resistance and National Liberation in Baluchi Poetry”, Paper presented at Ba­
lochi Symposium at the University of Uppsala on 17-20th August 2000, Uppsala, Sweden.
14 MirNaseer Khan Ahmadzai, Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan. vol. 1, pp. 5-6.
15 Sabir Badalkhan, “A Study of Balochi Oral Poetry: Problems and Prospects”, in: Newsletter of Ba­
lochistan Studies. No. 8, Naples, 1991, pp. 15, 24-25.
16 Sidi Ali Reis, The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral in India. Afghanistan. Central 
Asia, and Persia, during the Years 1553-1556. translated from the Turkish, with notes by A. Vambery, 
London: Luzac and Co., 1899, p. 16.
17 Zahirudin Babar, Tuzak-e Babari. (Trans, Urdu, Rasheed Akhtar Nadvi), p. 268, cited in: Mir Naseer 
Khan Ahmadzai, Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan. vol, III, Quetta: Balochi Academy, 1988, pp. 532- 
533. It should be noted that this book (Tuzak-e Babari) originally written in Turki (Turkish), was trans­
lated in the middle of Akbar’s reign, by Addu-r Raheem, Khan Khanan. It (the Persian translation) was 
presented to the emperor Akbar in the thirty-fourth year of his reign (998/1590). For more detail, see 
John Dowson (ed.), History o f India: As Told by its own Historians, London, 1872, p. 218.
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Akbar’s (1556-1605) biography, the “A’in-i Akbari”. which was completed in 1596-7 
AD.18
Henry Pottinger, howeyer, coincides the birth of the designation to the rule of 
Nasir Khan the Great in the mid-18th century.19 After the death of the Persian King, 
Nadir Shah Afshar in 1747, the region adjoining the subcontinent, including the Ba­
loch country, became the dominions of Nasir Khan. Thus a vast country, which lay 
between the Helmand valley and the sea, and stretching from Kerman on the west to 
Sindh on the east, was carved out as Balochistan.
Giving the Baloch country a worldwide recognition, Nasir Khan the Great used 
the designation “Balochistan” in official contact with its neighbours in the mid-18th 
century.21 Defining its borders, Nasir Khan believed wherever the Baloch race is liv­
ing, there is Balochistan.22 For the Baloch nationalists, it means the eastern region of 
Persian Province of Kerman to the western bank of Indus River; the whole region in 
between is the Baloch country. It is mainly resided by the Baloch.23 However, since 
the Nasir Khan’s era, the term “Balochistan” has meant more than just geography. It 
also refers to Baloch culture and is therefore a social and political concept as well. It 
must be borne in mind that there is a general agreement among scholars of Baloch 
studies in identifying the land as the cradle of the Baloch ethno-linguistic identity.24
iS Abul Fazl Allami, A ’in-e Akbari. translated into English by H. Blochmann (2nd Edition), Calcutta: 
Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1927, p. 388.
19 Henry Pottinger, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde, London, 1816, pp. 250. It is believed that about 
6000 Baloch served in Nadir Shah’s army (Iraj Afshar (Sistani), Balochistan wa Tamaddon-e Dirineh-e 
An. p. 133), Of these the most influential and powerful commander was Mohammad Khan Baloch. In
1142/1730, he was appointed as the Wali (governor-general) o f Koh-Kiloyeh by Nadir Shah. Two 
years later supported by the Arab tribes of Khozistan, Mohammad Khan Baloch revolted against Nadir
Shah to overthrow him. He occupied Shiraz and the whole south-western Persia. He proclaimed 
himself the “Shah of Persia” and appointed his allies Abul-Fath Khan (in Shuster), Sheikh-e Fares (in 
Koh-Kiloyeh) and Syed Reza (in Khoezeh) as the governors of these provinces (Ahmad Kasrawi, 
Tarikh Pansad Saleh-e Khozistan. Tehran, 1373/1995, p. 108). Nadir, fearful o f Mohammad Khan 
Baloch’s movement, requested him to surrender. Rejecting Nadir Shah’s offer, Mohammad Khan wrote 
to him: “In the beginning you were no one and very poor among your friends. When you with two to 
three hundred of your family can make a claim of kingdom and dynasty... so why I who that can
command 80,000 Baloch family from seaside towns to Indian border, shouldn’t make the same claim 
(see, Mohammad Kazim Marvi-Wazir, Alam Ara-e Naderi, Tehran, 1364/1986, p. 342). However, in 
1145/1733, Mohammad Khan Baloch was defeated and killed by Nadir.
20 A. W. Hughes, The Country of Balochistan. its geography, topography, ethnography and history, pp. 
26-27.
21 Shah Mohammad Marri, Baloch Qaurn (The Baloch Nation), Lahore: Takhliqat, 2000, p. 142.
22 For more detail see, Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 20.
23 Interview with Abdur-Rahman Kurd.
24 Parviz Natel Khanlari, Zaban-shonasi va Zaban-e Farsi. Tehran: Intesharat-e Bonyad-e Farhang-e 
Iran, Third edition, 1347/1969, p. 76; Yu. V. Gankovsky, The People o f Pakistan, pp. 47-48.
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Location and Climate
The Balochs’ separate consciousness is territorially rooted to their homeland 
Balochistan. Geographically, Balochistan does not fall within the territorial limits of 
India. On the north, it is separated from India by the massive barrier of the southern 
buttresses of the Sulaiman Mountains. On the south, there is the long extension from 
Kalat of the inconceivably wild highland country, which faces the desert of Sindh, the 
foot of which forms the Indian frontier. While it lacks boundaries in the modern sense 
of the term, Balochistan’s core region has never been in doubt. The Baloch country, 
which is at present divided politically between three different countries, is physically 
a compact unit.25 The Goldsmid line, drawn in 1871 and demarcated in 1896, gave 
western Balochistan to Persia, while retaining the larger eastern part for the British. 
The Durand Line, drawn also by the British in 1894, further divided Balochistan be­
tween British Balochistan and Afghanistan, assigning to the latter a small portion of 
northern Balochistan. As a British colonial legacy, these borders were inherited by 
Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan and have served to divide the country ever since.
Today eastern Balochistan (British Balochistan and the Balochistan states) con­
stitutes the Pakistani Province of Balochistan covering an area of 134,050 square 
miles or 347,188 square kilometres with its capital at Quetta. The major tribes of 
Eastern Balochistan are: Marri, Bugti, Brahui, Kurd, Jamaldini, Rakhshani, Bizenjo, 
Boleidai, Bangulzai, Umrani, Jamali, Qaisarani, Khetran, Lashari, Rind, Hout, 
Laghari, Mazari, Mengal, Kkoso, Gishkori, Mohammad Hassani, Mohammad Shahi, 
Raisani, Rend, Shahwani, Zehri, Lehri, Ghorchani, Qambrani, Kalmati, Lasi, Korai,
9 AKolanchi, Magasi, Rais, Sanjarani, and Nusherwani. The agrarian economy has pre­
vailed mainly in southern Balochistan, while tribalism and pastoral economy have 
dominated the northern part of the country. In many parts, however, the dual economy 
of settled agriculture and pastoralism are practised side-by-side, engaging both the 
nomads and the peasants.
Western Balochistan (Iranian Balochistan) is administratively divided into three 
parts of which the largest is known as the province of “Sistan wa Balochistan” with its 
capital at Zahedan. It is bounded by the Lut desert and the Iranian province of 
Khorasan in the North, by the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea stretching from the 
entrance to the Strait of Hurmuz to the port of Gwatr on the South and Northwest, by
25 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 19.
26 Ibid., p. 46-47.
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the province of Kerman on the West, and by the Goldsmid Line separating Pakistani 
and Afghani Balochistan on the East. Ethno-geographically, it comprises the Jaz 
Murian agricultural basin in the Centre and Northwest, the Sarhadd highlands in the 
North, the Mashkel lowlands and the Sarawan agricultural oasis on the East, the 
Coastal region of Makkoran in the South, and the Westernmost districts of Geyawan 
(Byaban) and Bashkard. To this one can add the Helmand depression inhabited by a 
mixed ethnic population of Baloch and Sistani people.27
Economically, like eastern Balochistan, the region is divided into pastoralism in 
Sarhadd and agriculture in the central and southern areas. Fishing combined with 
some cultivation predominates in the coastal area. In the north where nomadism has 
been the prevailing basis of the economy until recently, the social organisation was 
tribal. Some of the major tribes in this area are the Rigi, Yarahmadzai, Narui, Gorgej, 
Ismailzai, Mir Balochzai, and Gamshadzai.28 The natural boundaries, however, have 
always formed major barriers and strong defence lines against foreign invaders, even 
though they have not stopped the major invasions, such as the disastrous march of 
Alexander the Great and his armies through Gedrosia or devastating waves of Turkish 
and Mughal invasions from the 10th to the 15th centuries, from taking place.
From the 15th century on, Balochistan and the Mulk Balochi are frequently being 
admired in the Balochi poetry. Adoring the Mulk Balochi (the Baloch country), the 
Baloch nationalists in their Qaumi Tarana (National Anthem) in the early days of in­
dependence in 1947 sang, “We have conquered all the area which is now our home­
land. It is real and true Balochistan. If we are separated and demarcated, then so what, 
this is a temporary division, our soul is one. We will destroy these walls. We are like a 
rain and a storm” 29 For the Baloch nationalists, the whole region from the east of 
Bandar Abbas - Kerman to the west of the Indus River, and from the Sulaiman moun­
tains in the northeast, to the Dasht-Lut in northwest, is known as Balochistan.
The Mulk Balochi has a great impact on Baloch national feeling. It is praised 
by the Baloch poets and singers as the bahesht-e ru-e zameen (the paradise on the 
earth) or the gul-e zameen (the flower of the world), and its necessity for the Baloch is
27 Great Britain. Admiralty. Naval Intellegence Division. Persia (Geographical Handbook series, B.R. 
525), Oxford: Stationary office at the University Press, 1945, p. 389-399.
28 Two of these tribes were renamed by Reza Shah; the Yarahmadzai tribe is nowadays also known as 
Shahnawazi, and the Ismailzai are called Shahbakhsh.
29 Weekly Bolan. Karachi, April 8,1947.
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compared to that of the body’s to the soul30, or according to an old Baloch saying, 
tou-e mai zend o hamm mai gour (the place from which we came and to which in 
death we will return). According to legend, Beebagr, a folk hero, while carrying away 
the daughter of one of the Afghan notables from Kandahar, very proudly mentions the 
Mulk Balochi (Baloch land), “Biroun Hamuda he Mulk Balochien ” (lets go there, the
n 1
country is Balochi), Beebagr says to Granaz. This deep-rooted sense of attachment 
and affection to the Mulk Balochi in turn has given the Baloch the sense of identity 
and national consciousness. It is, closely linked with a strong sense of awareness of 
and admiration for the natural features of the land as is best manifested in an ancient 
Baloch saying that, “wa-e watan o hoshkin dar”, (I will always love my land, even if 
it is void and barren). The watan (country), or the Mulk Balochi, is often incorporated 
in patriotic songs chanted at nationalist gatherings.
The Mulk Balochi not only characterises the Baloch history and culture, but 
also their christening. The main source of the Balochi christening is the natural world 
of Balochistan. The Baloch borrow their names mainly from animals, trees, plants, 
colours and even parts of the body. Most of the names, however, are of a compound 
of Balochi and other neighbouring languages mainly Arabic and Farsi (Persian), like 
“Gul Mohammad”, “Gul Khan”, “Del Poll”, “Gul Bibi”, etc. There are also names, 
which are derived from the name of weekdays, like Shanbeh (Saturday) Doshanbeh 
(Monday), and Saishanbeh (Tuesday) etc. Almost all the Baloch tribal names, even of 
those who are living in Sindh and Punjab are rooted from the natural features of Ba­
lochistan. The semi-mythical heroes of 15th and 16th centuries like Kammbar, Ham- 
mal, Jiand, Hani, Kiyya, Sado, etc. form another important source for baptism.
Located on the southeastern Iranian plateau, with an approximately 340,000 sq. 
miles, Balochistan is larger than several European states. It is an austere land of 
steppe and desert intersected by numerous mountain chains. Naturally, the climate of 
such a vast territory has extraordinary varieties.33 In the northern and interior high­
lands, the temperature often drops to 40° F in winter, while the summers are temper­
ate. The coastal region is extremely hot with temperature soaring between 100° to
30 Ismail Amiri, “Maulavi Abdullah-e Shaeri-e Raji Pahnat”, in Taptan. No. 3, Karachi, March 1989, p. 
13.
31 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, A Literary I-Iistorv of the Baluchis, p. 13.
32 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan. 1987, pp. 19-23; See also Janmahmad, Es­
says on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 427.
33 For a good description of the natural climate of Western Balochistan see Naser Askari, Mogha- 
damahi Bar Shenakht-e Sistan wa Balochistan, Tehran: Donya-e Danesh, 1357/1979 pp. 3-14.
130° F in summers. While winters provide a more favourable climate. In spite of its 
position on the direction of southwest monsoon winds from Indian Ocean, Balochis­
tan seldom receives more than 5 to 12 inches of rainfall per year due to the low alti­
tude of Makkoran’s coastal ranges.34 The ecological factors have, however, been re­
sponsible for the fragmentation of agricultural centres and pasturelands, thus shaping 
the formation of the traditional tribal economy and its corresponding socio-political 
institutions.
The harsh climate and mountainous terrain breeds a self-reliant people used to 
hardship; the same conditions, however, result in isolation and difficulties in commu­
nication. While the geography has protected he Baloch from most outside influences, 
it also has divided the Baloch among themselves into competing communities (tribes).
It is important to note that beside the compact Balochi areas, the Pakistani 
provinces of Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab, the Iranian provinces of Balochistan-wa- 
Sistan, Khorasan,35 Ostan-e-Hurmuzgan, Kerman, and Nimruz-Valayat in Afghani­
stan, Baloch communities extend into neighbouring areas in each country: Gonbad, 
Semnan and Gorgan in north Iran, Farah, Herat, Badgis, Faryab, Juzjan in Afghani­
stan. They also extend into neighbouring countries, - Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, India,
iz i
the countries of the Persian Gulf, Oman, Kenya, and Tanzania (especially Zanzibar).
34 Ibid., p. 9
35 Since 1933, several maps o f United Balochistan have been published, which include eastern Khora­
san. Khorasan is a multi-national area, consisting of Baloch, Turkmen and several other ethnic groups.
36 Among the Gulf states, the Sultanate of Oman, has more than fifty percent Baloch population, most 
of them in Muscat since the 18th century (Janmahmad, Essavs on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan: 
and also M. Ismail Dashti, Al-Balosh: Tarikh wa Harazat-e Arabiah. Al-Ain, 1997, p. 35). According to 
the Arab writer, Ibrahim Bashmi Oaus al-Khalij al-Mashdood. p. 349, the Baloch migration to Oman 
traces back as far as the early Arab occupation o f Makkoran in the reign of Caliph Al-Waleed ibn Ab­
dul Malik (705-715). The Baloch migration, according to Muhammad Kamal Khan, a professor of 
Shanzu Teachers College in Mombasa, Kenya, intensified in the mid 17th century to Oman and East 
Africa. Around 1650 AD, one Seif bin Sultan, the ruler of Oman, visited the Makkoran coast where 
were situated the ports of Chabahar and Gwadar that had close trade links with the port o f Muscat. He 
entered into an agreement with a Baloch “Amir” (ruler), Amir Shah Dad Chotah who gave him a force 
of Baloch mercenaries to send to East Africa. In 1664, Amir Shah Dad Chotah was the Commander-in- 
Chief of an Omani expeditionary force consisting of the Baloch mainly of Jadgal tribe, which attacked 
East African ports occupied by Portuguese colonialists. The Baloch forces under Amir Shah Dad Cho­
tah, captured Malindi, Mombasa and Port Jesus. Since then many Baloch families migrated from east­
ern and western Balochistan and settled in Oman and east African coast. The mass Baloch settlement in 
the Sultanate can be traced to the point when one of the Muscat princes took refuge in Gwadar during 
the reins o f Mir Nasir Khan I, who had given Gwadar to the ‘guest prince’. Baloch relations with Mus­
cat prospered when the rebellious prince later took up the reins of government after the death of his 
father. In early 1980 some 5,000 Baloch were said to be serving in the army of Oman. See Washington 
Post. February 9, 1980.
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There are pockets of Baloch settlement in Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Af­
ter the Iranian revolution in 1979, hundreds of Baloch migrated to Europe (especially 
Sweden and United Kingdom) and America.
Very little has been published about these diasporas communities. But several 
of the people interviewed point out that they very much tend to be encouraged to de­
velop their ethnic identity.38 “As far as I feel”, Nawaz Khan Baloch, the Baloch Com­
munity secretary (Mombassa, Kenya) stated, “we are Baloch and Balochistan is our 
mother land, both in Iran and Pakistan, we only love the land of Balochistan.”39 
Similarly, Abdulkadir Noormohamed also from Mombassa, believes, “The use of Ba­
lochi names, and the continuous narration of our history has kept the awareness of our 
roots still fresh in our minds, and our yearning for self-preservation is still very much 
alive.”40 According to him an impressive impetus of self-awareness is developing 
among the younger Baloch population of east Africa. The Balochi language, which 
was slowly fading away from the society, is gradually finding its way back with new 
awakened interest.41
Most of the Baloch in the Persian Gulf except Oman migrated in the last dec­
ades in pursuit of employment and better living conditions due to the oil-boom in 
these states. The Baloch in Turkmenistan came from Sistan, some from the Afghan 
and some from the Iranian side of the border.42 There were three main waves of mi­
gration. It is believed the first Baloch arrived in the mid 19th century, when the Per­
sian occupied Sistan in 1865; the second wave between 1917 and 1920; and the last 
and largest between 1923 and 1928. In the Soviet census of 1979, their population 
was 20,000.43 They live in the Mari (Marv) region, and are Sunni Muslims, Despite 
the influence of the years and the erosion of time, they have maintained their separate 
identity including their language and culture from the rest of people. They have also 
managed to maintain strong social cohesion amongst themselves 44
37 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan. Royal Book 
company, Karachi, third edition, 1985, p. 4.
38 Mohammad Sher-Del (Turkmenistan), Ismail Mumtaz (Oman), Abdu-Samad Amiri (United Arab 
Emirate) and Abdur-Rahim Kalati (Kenya).
39 Monthly, Balochi Labzank, Hub (Balochistan), August-September 1999, p. 33.
40 Abdulkadir Noormohamed, "Balochs in East Africa”, in: Monthly, Balochi Labzank. Hub (Balochis­
tan), August-September 1999.
41 Ibid.
42 Interview with Mohammad Sher-Del.
43 Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire, pp. 120-121.
44 Yar Jan Badini, "Turkmenistan: Panjah Hazar Balochani Watan” (Turkmenistan: The Country of 50 
thousands Baloch), in: Monthly Balochi Labzank, Hab, June-July 1998.
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Demographics
With demography being one of the most powerful forces in politics, the Ba­
loch nationalists claim that the Pakistani and Iranian authorities have deliberately un­
derestimated their population. There is a great discrepancy between the nationalists’
*
estimates and the official census of the Baloch population. The former range from 30 
million, by the last ruler of Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch (1975), to 15 million by 
Mir Khuda Bakhsh Marri Baloch (1985). By contrast, the official Pakistani census of 
1981 only showed a total Baloch population of 3.5 million. Thus, it is difficult to es­
timate the total number of the Baloch population, partly because official statistics of­
ten ignore ethnic affiliation and mother tongue, since it is generally not in the interest 
of the governments in the countries where Balochi is spoken to focus on the ethnic 
differences that exist within their borders.45
It should be noted that the census issue in Pakistan is a politicised one, given 
the dynamics of ethnic politics in that country. Khuda Bakhsh Marri, a former Chief 
Justice of Balochistan, while criticising the 1961 census, discusses in detail the incon­
sistencies in the census figures and maintains that the Baloch population in Sindh by 
1961 was over three million. He considers that most probably the Baloch and Brahuis 
were jumbled together with the general Sindhi-speaking people without making 
proper inquiries about their language or community. He estimates that the Baloch 
population in Punjab stood at around six million out of a total population of thirty mil­
lion, according to the 1972 census figures. He calculates the total Baloch population 
in the three countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, at between fifteen to sixteen 
million people 46 Speaking with Selig Harrison, the defence minister in the Zia re­
gime, Mir Ali Ahmed Talpur criticised Marri’s figure for Sindh and said that it might 
well be too low. However, he distinguished between 1.4 million Baloch who spoke 
Balochi, more than half of them in Karachi, and some 2 million more who were Ba­
loch by ethnic origin but no longer spoke the language. He supported his estimates by 
pointing to the fact that thirteen of the twenty-seven members elected to the Sindh 
Provincial Assembly in 1970 were Baloch 47
45 For a careful calculation of the number of Balochi speakers in the different countries where the lan­
guage is spoken, see Carina Jahani, Standardization and Orthography, pp. 91-3.
Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on the Baloches and Balochistan. pp. 15-25.
47 Mir Ali Ahmed Talpur, quoted in: Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 177.
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The percentage of Baloch population in Sindh, that is “Sindhi Baloch”, is 
sometimes put as high as 50 percent48, and there is evidence to support this. For ex­
ample, the 1961 census reported that Balochi was spoken by only 34 percent of the 
population of Jacobabad district, one of four Sindhi districts adjoining Balochistan, 
but acknowledged that the Baloch constituted 60 percent of the population 49 The 
situation of Punjab is similar to Sindh. For instance, it was reported in the 1961 cen­
sus that in Dera Ghazi Khan, a district of Punjab bordering directly on Balochistan, 
Balochi was spoken by less than 6 percent of the population. But the same census re­
port acknowledged that the inhabitants of the district, which includes a large sepa­
rately administered tribal belt where presumably no census was taken, were "pre­
dominantly" Baloch.50
In 1980, the Baloch population of Afghanistan was estimated at around 
300,000.51 The Baloch nationalists in Afghanistan, however, like the Eastern and 
Western Baloch nationalists claim that their population is much higher than officially 
acknowledged. In early 1980, according to the exiled Baloch nationalist leader, Syed 
Mohammad Shiranzai, the total population of the Baloch in Afghanistan was ap­
proximately 500,000.52 The main settlement area of the Baloch is Valayat-e Nimruz 
(Nimruz province). Other Baloch groups of some numerical significance live in the 
neighbouring Helmand province and in the western Afghan provinces of Herat and 
Badghiz; scattered groups are also found in other provinces, namely Farah, Faiyab, 
Samangan, Takhar, Kunduz, Badakhshan, Jauzjan, and Kandahar, as well as in the 
capital Kabul. In Badghiz and Herat the Baloch population in 1975 were 30,000- 
40,000 people.53 According to official statistics the population of Valayat-e Nimruz, 
the majority Baloch populated province, was 122,000 in 1975. There are also scat­
tered Baloch tribes and settlement along Afghanistan’s border with Iran extending 
from south to north where the boundaries of Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan 
meet. Like Iran and Afghanistan, there is no official figure about the Baloch popula­
tion in the Arabian Peninsula (mainly in Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Ku­
48 Interview with Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani.
49 See Government of Pakistan, Office of the Census Commissioner, Population Census of Pakistan. 
1961: District Census Report (Jacobabad). Karachi, 1962, p. I /ll .
50 Ibid., p. 1/16.
51 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 62.
52 Syed Mohammad Shiranzai, “Baloch-ha-e Afghanistan”, Australia, September 1999.
53 Erwin Orywal, “Periphery and Identity: Process of Detribalization Among the Baloch of 
Afghanistan”, In: Paul Titus, Marginalitv and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial 
Balochistan. Karachi. Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 85.
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wait). However, Elfenbein refers to “various estimates from 1979” and estimates a 
figure of 500.000.54
In 1981, Selig Harrison estimated the total population of the Baloch speakers 
in the three countries of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan at around five million.55 This 
figure, however, excludes the Brahuis who are ethnically Baloch, but speak Brahui. If 
his estimation was based on ethnie, rather than language, it could conceivably double 
or triple the number, as Mir Khuda Bakhsh Marri Baloch did. In Pakistan’s population 
census of 1981, Balochi was given as the mother tongue of 379,148 households in 
Pakistan, a figure that was 3% of the total. Brahui was given as the mother tongue of 
an additional 151,958 households (1.2%). Together the Balochi -  and Brahui speaking 
groups thus accounted for approximately 4.2% of Pakistan’s households. Extrapolat­
ing from that figure, Pakistan with a 1981 population officially placed at 84.3 million 
had a Baloch population of 3.5 million.56 In the early 1981, an estimate of the number 
of the Iranian Baloch was 750,OOO.57 Meanwhile, according to the Iranian official cen­
sus, provided in 1976, the population of Sistan wa Balochistan was 659,297. These 
figures also include the non-Baloch population of the province as well, and exclude 
the Baloch population outside the province. Harrison’s estimate leaves us with a fig­
ure of about 5 million Balochi-speakers in 1981. As indicated earlier, there was also a 
similar figure of Baloch who spoke languages other than Balochi, mainly in Sindh and 
Punjab in 1981. Thus a total Baloch population of 10 million for 1981, in all the three 
countries of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, looks more reasonable to the author. 
Language and religion
“I am proud to address you in Baluchi today”, declared the Khan, Ahmad Yar 
Khan, on 15th August 1947, the day of Independence. “Insha Allah, whenever I will 
address you in future, it will be in Baluchi because it is the language of the Baluch 
nation”, he continued.58 The Balochs’ consciousness of their common language and 
cultural heritage constitutes another significant foundation of their nationalism. As 
manifested in a set of shared social norms, value systems, traditions, and folklore, the 
Balochi cultural values, together with their cultural environment, is the focus of the
54 E. Yarshater, Encyclopaedia Iranica. Ill, p. 635.
55 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 178
56 See, Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organisation, 1981 Population Census of Pakistan. 
Islamabad, 1984.
57 William E. Griffith, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Pahlavi Era”, in: George Lenczowski (ed.), Iran 
Under the Pahlavis, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 383.
58 Malik Allah-Bakhsh (ed.), Tarikh-e Khawanin-e Baloch, pp. 407-413.
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nationalist appeals for broader popular support for their overall demands of which cul­
tural autonomy is only one. The Baloch see themselves as the heirs to an ancient cul­
ture, which has served as a strong unifying force, giving them the sense of a distinc­
tive identity and enabling them to counter the ever-present threat of absorption and 
assimilation into the surrounding cultures. So they have successfully preserved their 
cultural traditions throughout recorded history. "To a great extent", Selig Harrison 
wrote, "it is the vitality of this ancient cultural heritage that explains the tenacity of 
the present demand for the political recognition of Baloch identity".59
Language, culture, and perception are intimately intertwined. It is thus not sur­
prising that language has been a key element contributing to a sense of national 
identity. Spooner points to the importance of the Balochi language as a unifying factor 
between the numerous groups nowadays identifying themselves as “Baloch”. He 
wrote, “Baluch identity in Baluchistan has been closely tied to the use of the Baluchi 
language in inter-tribal relations”.60 In spite of almost half a century of brutal assimi­
lation policy, both in Iran and Pakistan, the Baloch people have managed to retain 
their culture and their oral tradition of story telling. The harsh oppression of the Ira­
nian and Pakistani states has strengthened the Balochs’ will to pass on their heritage 
to coming generations. Language plays a powerful role in the struggle of Baloch peo­
ple for their right to self-determination. The Balochi language is both proof and sym­
bol of the separate identity of the Baloch, and impressive efforts are made to preserve 
and develop it.61 Thus, having realized the significance of the language (Balochi) as 
the most determinant factor for the Baloch identity, the Persian and Punjabi domi­
nated states of Iran and Pakistan have sought to “assimilate” the Baloch by all possi­
ble means.62
The Balochi is generally classified as a northwestern Iranian language. It can 
be divided into two major dialect groups, namely Eastern Balochi and Western Ba­
lochi.63 Eastern Balochi is spoken mainly in the northeastern areas of the province of 
Balochistan in Pakistan and in neighbouring areas of the province of Punjab and 
Sindh. Western Balochi is spoken in the western and southern areas of the Pakistani 
province of Balochistan as well as in Karachi and other parts of Sindh, the Arabian
59 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, op cit., p. 11
60 Brian Spooner, Baluchistan: Geography. History, and Ethographv p. 599.
61 Carina Jahani, “Poetry and Politics: Nationalism and Language Standardization in the Balochi Liter­
ary Movement”, p. 110.
62 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp. 95-96.
63 Mussa Mahmudzai, “Moqayeseh-e Zaban-e Balochi Ba Zabanha-e Irani-Bastan”, p. 59,
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Gulf States, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan. There are an estimated six to seven 
million speakers of Balochi, most of whom speak Western Balochi, which is also the 
dialect that has been mostly used in Balochi literature. Since there are fewer speakers 
of Eastern Balochi than of Western Balochi, Josef Elfenbein64 has suggested that the 
eastern dialect speakers “form a very small and isolated group”. Calculations based on 
figures from the 1981 census of Pakistan suggest, however, that about one-third of all 
Balochi speakers use Eastern Balochi.65 Furthermore, to the socio-economic division 
of Iranian Balochistan into a northern versus a central and southern part corresponds 
the main dialect division within western Balochistan, namely between the northern 
(Rakhshani) versus the southern (Makkorani). There are however, as noted both by 
Elfenbein66 and Spooner,67 some dialects that have their own very distinct features 
and do not readily fit into one of the two groups mentioned above. One such dialect is 
that of Sarawani.
As discussed in chapter 3, in the course of histoiy, the Baloch country has 
been attacked, occupied and populated from West and North by, Persians, Greeks, 
Parthian, Arabs, Turks and Mughals. They had their own languages but the Balochi 
language and culture was so rich and deep rooted that it absorbed all the languages 
and cultures of invaders and developed itself into a unique language and culture. The 
Balochi language has its own grammar, and it is rich in vocabulary and contains many 
words for different objects like different words for domestic animals according to 
their age and condition, which cannot be alternatively used. Balochi is also rich in idi­
oms, idiomatic phrases, lullabies, folk stories, folk songs, and folk literature.68
However, the Brahui Baloch, and many other Baloches in Sindh and Punjab 
speak languages other than Balochi. Emphasizing on the common cultural heritage 
(except language), the former defence minister of Pakistan, Mir Hazar Khan, pointed 
out in an interview with author, that except their language, they (the Sindhi speaking 
Baloch) have fully maintained their Balochi customs, traditions and culture. He said, 
“We have different ceremonies regarding marriage, we sing Balochi songs in our mar­
riages about our forefathers, songs of Chakar and Gwahram, Shaih Morid and Hani,
64 Josef Elfenbein, “The Baluchi Language: A Dialectology with Texts”, in: The Roval Asiatic Society. 
London 1966, p 10.
65 Carina Jahani, Standardization and Orthography, pp. 93-6.
66 Josef Elfenbein, “The Baluchi Language: A Dialectology with Texts”, pp. 19-20, 23.
67 Brian Spooner, “Note on the Baluchi Spoken in Persian Baluchistan”, pp. 51-71, in: Iran. Journal of 
the British Institute of Persian Stadies, 5 (1967) pp. 51-76.
68 Sabir Badalkhan, “A Brief Note on Balochi Folktale and Folktale Studies”, pp. 83-85.
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Duda and Balach and many other such traditional songs are common among us. We 
still have our own traditional clothes, which is called Balochi Douch. We have many 
things which really separate us from other Sindhis”.69
The Baloch have many interesting characteristics in their culture. They have a 
different perception about religion than other nations in Middle East. They are not 
fundamentalist and do not believe in mixing religion with politics.70 The overwhelm­
ing majority of the Baloch adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam of the Hanafite rite. It 
is important to note that before succumbing to Islam the Baloch were mostly Zoroas- 
trians. The remnants of some Zoroastrian tradition are still evident among some Ba­
loch tribes.71 The conversion of the Baloch to Islam had a sterilising effect on their 
sense of nationhood.
However, the Islamic laws (Sharia), institutions, and culture play a very sig­
nificant role in the daily lives of the people as well as the overall aspect of their soci­
ety. In the early 19th century, Henry Pottinger wrote, “With regard to religion, they 
are, with a very few exceptions to the westward, Soonee [Sunni] Moosulmans [Mus­
lims], and inveterate in their hatred and enmity against the Sheeas [Shiites], under 
which persuation, I am convinced, it would be more dangerous to appear in Be-
noloochistan [Balochistan], than even as a Christian”. According to the Sinni-Baloch 
the Shiites abuse three of the four Caliphs who followed the Prophet Mohammad and 
who are held in great veneration by Sunni Muslims. It should be noted that the an­
tagonism between the Sunnis and the Shiites, for example, sometimes manifesting it­
self in violent clashes between the two sects, is about thirteen-and-a-half centuries 
old. Moreover, in western Balochistan Sunnism has taken on a political significance 
as well in the sense that it has always served as a major rallying point against the rul­
ing Persians whose overwhelming majority follows Shiism.73
While most Baloch are Sunni Muslims, there are two non-Hanafite communi­
ties among them. The Bameri community centred on Dalgan west of Bampur are Shi­
ite, and a relatively large community in Makkoran who called themselves “Zigri” 
(Zikri). The exact figures of this breakdown are not available, as the countries in
69 Interview with Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani,
70 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 75.
71 See Ibid., p. 70; The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran, p. 113; M. A. Shaheen Qaisarani, 
Balochistan. Tarikli wa Mazhab. p. 259; Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan. 
Emergence Dimensions Repercurssions. p. 5.
72 Henry Pottinger, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde. London, 1816, p. 61.
73 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 110.
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which Balochistan is located either do not classify individuals by religious community 
in their censuses, or they do not classify the Baloch separately.
When the Bameris became Shiite in Iranian Balochistan, it is not known. Sir 
Henry Pottinger records how some of the Baloch tribes living in the central Perso- 
Baloch border regions in Kerman were converted by Persian authorities to Shiism and 
settled there during the first decade of the 19th century.74 Writing in 1872, Henry 
Bellew also testifies that the ruling clan of the Narui tribe in Sistan was converted to 
Shiism after the region fell to Persia in 1865.75 In a conversation on this subject with 
Dr. Danish Narui, the former Governor of Balochistan, he also himself from Sistan, he 
said that there are a few Narui Baloch in Sistan who are Shiite”.76
It should be noted that Shiite communities can be found among the Baloch in 
Sindh and Punjab. How might this have happened? It is still a matter of discussion 
among the scholars.77 Most probably it was in Sindh that the Baloch were converted 
to Shiism. As the Baloch tribes were settled in Sindh in 15th century, the country was 
already a centre for Shiite activities.78 Historically the Shiite influence in Sindh started 
with the arrival of Ismaili missionaries during the 10th century. Since then the Ismailis 
(Shiites) dominated religious development in the country until the late 15th century.79 
As observed by Khuda Bakhsh Marri, Mir Shahdad, son of legendary Baloch hero, 
Mir Chakar Rind is said to have introduced Shiism among the Baloch during the first 
half of the 16th century.80 However, the Balochi ballads from 12th century, claim that 
Baloch were followers of Caliph Ali.81
Discussing on the role of Sunni Islam in the Iranian Balochistan, Dr. Inyatul- 
lah Baloch states, “Sunni Islam forms an important factor in preserving Baloch iden­
tity against Iranian nationalism, which is expressly Shia and Persian”.82 By contrast, 
however, in Pakistani Balochistan, the Baloch face no such threat from Shiites and, as 
a result, secular forces have historically dominated the Baloch national movement in
74 Henry Pottinger, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde. p. 199.
75 Henry Bellew, From Indus to Tigris, a Narrative of Journey Through the Countries of Baluchistan. 
Afghanistan. Khorasan. and Iran (18741. Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1976, p. 205.
76 Interview with Dr. Danish Narui former Governor Sistan-wa-Balochistan.
77 Sarah F. D. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 
16-17.
78 Sarah F. D. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power, pp. 16-17.
79 Ibid.
80 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan. p. 256.
81 M. Longworth Dames, Popular Poetry o f the Baloches. vol. I, p. 3.
82 Inayatullah Baloch, “Islam, The State, and Identity: The Zikris of Balochistan”, in: Titus, Paul (ed.), 
Marginalitv and Modernity. Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan, Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 1996, p. 240.
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that country. Thus, in Pakistan, as observed by Nina Swidler, “religion does not dis-
0 -5
tinguish Baloch identity.
Contemporary to the rise of Shiism in Persia, a new religion, Zikriism, 
emerged in Balochistan in the mid 15th century. As the Safavid rulers of Persia 
adopted Shiism, so the Boleidai rulers of Makkoran adopted Zikriism as their state 
religion.84 Under Zigri (Zikri) rule, according to Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, the Balochi 
culture flourished due to the patronage of the ruling elite. The Zigri rites of worship 
are mostly conducted in Balochi.85 Consequently, Zigri poets and religious scholars 
have enriched Balochi literature. In fact, because they attach religious significance to 
sites there, the Zigri have developed a special reverence for the land of Balochistan. 
For them Balochistan, and especially Turbat, was the “Gul-e-Zamin” (Flower of the 
earth). This patriotic attitude on the part of the Zigri Baloch according to Dr. Baloch is 
the forerunner of modem Baloch nationalism.
Historically, it is believed that the Zigris are the followers of Syed Mohammad 
(c. 1442-1505 AD) originally from Jaunpur, India, who is considered to be the Mehdi. 
According to Zigri tradition, he came to Makkoran and took abode at “Koh-e-Morad” 
a holy place in the suburb of Turbat, preached his doctrine, converted the whole of 
Makkoran, and then disappeared. Zigri doctrine deviates from orthodox Muslim be­
lief, but Zigris consider themselves to be true Muslims. Despite their doctrinal differ­
ences there are many Sunni influences on Zigri religious beliefs and practices, and on 
their socio-political life. Both sects regard the Koran as their holy book and as the fi­
nal wahy (revelation) and actual kalam (words) of Allah. In addition, the day-to-day 
life of Zigris, their names and their culture are a part and parcel of Baloch Sunni tradi­
tion. As estimated by Selig Harrison, in 1980 the Zigri Baloch population was esti­
mated at 500,000 to 700,000, living in the coastal Makkoran area and in Karachi.87 
Moreover Harrison believes that the Zigris of Balochistan are allied with the Baloch
QO
national cause.
While many countries have attempted to use religion to legitimate their rule 
(e.g., Divine Right of Kings in medieval France and Spain, Valayat-e Faqih in Iran),
83 Nina Swidler, “Beyound Parody: Ethnology Engages Nationalist Discourse”, in: Titus, Paul (ed.), 
Marginalitv and Modernity, p. 169.
84 Inayatullah Baloch, “Islam, the State, and Identity: The Zikris o f Balochistan”, p. 230.
85 Interview with Rahim Bakhsh Azad.
86 Inayatullah Baloch, “Islam, the State, and Identity: The Zikris of Balochistan”, p. 229.
87 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 187.
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forms of worship in Balochistan are so diverse that a nationalist leader or movement 
cannot use religion as a unifying factor, despite the renewal of the importance of relig­
ion in Baloch self-identification (especially in Iranian Balochistan). In addition to the 
Sunni-Zigri split and the small minority of Shiites, there are also smaller minorities of 
Hindus, Khojas (Ismailis), and Sikhs in Balochistan.89 
Cultural Development
The Baloch possess a rich body of folklore, which is apparent in Balochi prov­
erbs, common sayings, puzzles, songs and stories. The striking feature of the whole of 
the Baloch folklore is its strong national sentiment, its frequent references to the Ba­
loch and Balochistan. Thus with its rich oral folklore, songs, and folk poetiy, the Ba­
lochi literature constitutes one important source of inspiration for nationalist feelings 
and emotions. Describing the common characteristics of the Balochi literature, the 
Swedish scholar, Carina Jahani wrote:
Much of the literature that has been produced in Balochi is explicitly na­
tionalist in content. Common themes are the glorification of the deserts 
and mountains of Balochistan and the bravery, pride, and honour of the 
Baloch people, often exemplified by semi-mythic heroes such as Mir 
Chakar and Mir Hammal.90 
Throughout the centuries, the Balochi oral literature has been an important ve­
hicle for transmitting Balochi language, culture and national feelings. Occupying an 
important place in their life, the Baloch managed to safeguard their cultural heritage. 
As observed by Dr. Badalkhan, the Baloch tribes have maintained and developed nu­
merous legends, proverbs, poems and songs. They are also keen on riddles, animal 
tales, and satirical and historical tales. In addition to these genres, there is a more so­
phisticated oral form of literature, which consists of long recitations that include both 
prose and verse. Badalkhan explains that this form of expression is part of the com­
mon Baloch cultural heritage.91
Giving the inspiration of Balochness to the Baloch youth, the best-known folk 
tale in Balochistan is that of “Shaih Moreed and Hani”. This is a love story, originated
89 On the Sikhs population in Iranian Balochistan, see, I. Afshar (Sistani), Balochistan wa Tamaddon-e 
Dirineh-e An. p. 369; On the Hindus population in Balochistan, see, Fred Scholz, “Trabal Structure and 
Religious Tolerance: Hindus in Pakistani Balochistan”, pp. 195-196.
90 Carina Jahani, “Poetry and Politics: Nationalism and Language Standardization in the Balochi 
Literaiy Movement” in: Titus, Paul (ed.), Marginalitv and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post- 
Colonial Balochistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 114.
91 Sabir Badalkhan, “A Brief Note on Balochi Folktale and Folktale Studies”, in: K. Maeda (ed.), The 
Studies of the Etno-Religious Images in Jhalawan and Las Bela Provinces in Balochistan. University of 
Wako, 1999, pp. 83-85.
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from the early centuries of the last millennium, whose hero, Shaih Moreed, and hero­
ine, Hani, have become in Balochistan symbols of pure and tragic love, like Romeo 
and Juliet. It is created with great simplicity, but at the same time with great depth and 
power, mirroring the national life of the Baloch, their emotions and philosophical 
ideas (God, evil, predestination).
One of the most important mediums that have been very effective in preserv­
ing and transmitting the Balochi language and culture over generations is music.92 
Music has always been a cultural link and a means of expression to the Baloch. His­
tory, poetiy, etc. were all transmitted through music and songs. Songs are transmitted 
from one generation to another without altering the lyrics. Yet, the rhythm might vary 
from one region to another. Among the well-known Balochi musical genres are epic 
songs and political ones, which are directly linked to nationalism. Epic songs transmit 
the Balochi history, talk about Baloch customs and traditions, and remind people of 
the values, such as courage and honor, that a warrior should have in order to become a 
hero.93
Dating of written Balochi literature is suspect, however, as the Baloch have a 
penchant to grant a greater antiquity to their tradition than they warrant. As an exam­
ple, Kamalan Gicliki, who lived in mid-19th century, supposedly authored the Balochi 
epic Labz-e Baloch.94 Since 1948, as Balochistan became a part of Pakistan, a more 
favourable environment led to the growth of such cultural institutions as the Balochi 
Literary Society and the Balochi Language Association which have successfully func­
tioned ever since.95 These and the Balochi Academy in Quetta have made a significant 
contribution to Balochi publishing and other literary and cultural activities. Thus, the 
Baloch became increasingly concerned with the development of the their language. In 
1951 the first monthly periodical, Ouman in Balochi, appeared. The Baloch Educa­
tional Society (BES) published this in Karachi.96 Ouman ceased publication in 1962
07due to pressure from the Shah. The magazine, according to its editor Moalavi Khair 
Mohammad Nadvi, supported Dad Shah’s revolt in Iranian Balochistan and was a
92 Sabir Badalkhan, “Balochi Songs Genres, Balochi Dances, Instrumental Musicians, Singer, Musical 
Instruments”, in: A. Arnold (ed.), The Garland Encyclopaedia of Worlds Music, in 10 vol., vol. 5, 
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93 Ibid.
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95 Dictionary of Oriental Literatures, vol. 2, London, 1974, pp. 56-58.
96 Carina Jahani, Standardization and Orthography in the Balochi Language, p. 25.
97 Interview with Maulana Khair Mohammad Nadavi.
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tribune for the Baloch nationalists in the region.98 The BES was formed in Karachi in 
1948 to promote Balochi language and culture and also to voice Baloch political and 
social grievances. Apart from publishing Ouman. the BES started a school in Liari, 
which was later upgraded, to high school standard.
Being the capital city and the major Baloch residence in Pakistan, in the early 
fifties Karachi became the focus of intellectual activities in Balochi. The Liari Adabi 
Board, the Balochi Academy and the Fazol Academy were all established in Karachi 
after 1947." Prior to the 1950s there was little literary work done in the Balochi lan­
guage or on behalf of the Baloch cause. Several Baloch publishing academies first 
appeared in Liari (Karachi) in the early 1950s and served as the vanguard of Balochi 
literary activity.100
Efforts to create an officially backed Balochi Academy started in 1958, and it 
was established in 1961 in Quetta.101 Radio Pakistan started its broadcasts in Balochi 
on 25th December 1949, from Karachi, and on 17th October 1956, from Quetta. When 
the radio station in Quetta was established, the Balochi programmes were transferred 
there. In 1959, Radio Iran also started relaying programmes in Balochi from Za- 
hedan.102 It is interesting to note that in the radio of both Pakistan and Iran, western 
Balochi was the dominant language. This had a great effect towards homogenising the 
Baloch. Broadcasts in Balochi, according to Bashir Ahmad Baloch, “served as a great 
boon to the Baluchi language and the development of its literature”.103
From the late fifties onwards, more publications came to be centred in Quetta. 
By this time it was indeed Quetta rather than Karachi, which had become the centre of 
Balochi language activities. The Baloch identity and national consciousness had, after 
all, better chances of being preserved now than before.104 As far as Ayub Khan’s gov­
ernment, it too had cause for satisfaction. By partial patronage of linguistic and liter­
acy activities, the bureaucracy could mollify the Baloch intelligentsia and control it. 
Thus it could prevent the intelligentsia from becoming as alienated from the Centre as
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100 Interview with Morad Saher.
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the militant nationalists were. By contrast, no such institutions have ever been allowed 
to function in Iranian Baluchistan.
In this respect, the Shah's educational programmes, however, are worth men­
tioning. In the beginning the educational policy of the Iranian authorities in Balochis­
tan, first and foremost, was not to give the necessary education to the Baloch children, 
but was based on de-Balochisation and the creation of Persian speaking citizens.105 In 
the view of the Iranian authorities, as observed by Zabihullah Naseh, every Baloch 
child who went to school should mean the creation of a new Persian-speaking citizen 
and decreasing of one Baloch linguistically. To prevent them speaking Balochi in 
the schools with Baloch children, the few Baloch teachers were compelled to work in 
the other provinces of Iran. In their place non-Baloch and Persian teachers were en­
couraged to teach in Balochistan. This policy, according to Baloch nationalists, com­
plicated the teaching process and minimised the educational standard in Balochistan
107compared with Persian speaking provinces.
Since the Shah’s White Revolution in 1962, each year, the percentage of the 
population, which was literate, increased throughout Balochistan. In 1971-72, the total 
number of the literate population of 7 years and over was listed at 73,300 for the prov­
ince.108 By comparison in 1978-79, the numbers of students of all ages enrolled in dif­
ferent provincial schools at various levels alone totalled 128,274, which by itself ex­
ceeded the previous figure given for the total literate.109 Still more impressive was the 
growth in the field of higher education in the 1970s as compared to the 1960s. As ob­
served by the Iranian writer, Naser Askari, up to 1955, no single Baloch student was 
enrolled in any institution of higher education throughout Iran.110 Between 1965 and 
1967 only 12 Baloch students were admitted.111 A series of developments, however, 
changed this situation during the last decade of Shah’s regime.
The mounting guerrilla activities of Baloch nationalists in Iranian Balochistan, 
and their connection with Iraq and other radical Arab forces were a major cause of 
concern to the Shah. This concern was further exacerbated by the break up of Pakistan
105 Zabihullah Naseh, Balochistan. p. 196.
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and the subsequent rise of Baloch nationalists to power in eastern Balochistan in 
1972. Fearful of this situation, the Shah’s government in addition to military pressure 
to suppress the nationalists initiated a series of economic and educational programmes 
to win over the Baloch population in the early 1970s.112
Moreover, in the 1970s, the Shall came under the influence of several West­
ern-educated technocrats, especially Jamshid Amouzegar, who persuaded him that his 
long-term goals would be served by a more positive approach to the Baloch, placing 
emphasis on economic and educational developments. His liberal policy was followed 
by the rising oil prices simultaneously. This made available more development funds 
for the neglected minority provinces. Amouzegar also won authority to recruit “reli­
able Baloch” for key posts in the government bureaucracy and the Rastakhiz party in 
Sistan-wa-Balochistan.113
Consequently, the 1970s saw the establishment of the first institutions of 
higher education in the province, namely the Teacher Training College of Zahedan 
and the University of Balochistan in 1972, and 1973, respectively. The inauguration 
of these institutions brought a simultaneous sharp increase in the number of Baloch 
students enrolled at the college level. For instance, in the academic year of 1972-73, 
there were 198 students enrolled in the Teacher Training College.114 By 1978, the 
University of Balochistan had a student body of 450. Although the overwhelming ma­
jority of the student body in the two institutions was comprised of Persian immigrants, 
the total number of Baloch students has been estimated between 60 to 100 during the 
period from 1972 to 1979.115 This figure for the 1970s is much higher than the similar 
estimates for the previous decades.116
In spite of this progress in provincial educational programmes, the illiteracy 
rate in the province remained much higher than the national average indicating a gap 
similar to the economic one mentioned earlier. In 1965-66, the literacy rate in the
1,1 Ibid.
112 Interview with Abul Samad Amiri.
113 Interview with Gholam Reza Hosseinbor.
114 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 102; see also, Iran Yearbook 1977, p. 548.
115 Ibid., pp. 101-102.
116 After the Iranian revolution (1979), however, the number of the higher institutions and their students 
in Balochistan increased several times. In 1987, there were 4882 students in the higher educational in­
stitutions in Sistan-wa-Balochistan (For more detail see, Hamid Ahmadi Qaumiwat wa Oaumearai dar 
Iran. 1378/1999, p. 265). The number increased manifold furthermore to 30,331 in 1999, o f which 
8693 were students in “Danishgah-e Azad-e Island” (see Government of Iran, Salnameh Amari 
Keshwar. 1375. Tehran: Markaz-e Amar-e Iran, 1377/1998, p. 555-56). As estimated by Azim Sha- 
hbakhsh, a lecturer at Sistan wa Balochistan University, there existed more than 4000 thousand Baloch 
students in different Iranian universities in 1999 (Interview with Azim Shahbakhsh).
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117province's population of 7 years of age and over was 16 percent as compared with 
the national literacy average of 29.4 percent.118 By 1972, the national literacy average 
for the same age group rose to 36.9 percent119 as compared with the estimated provin­
cial average of 21 percent.
It should be noted that as in the early 1960s, transistor radios became com­
monplace, more and more Baloch began listening to Balochi broadcasts on Radio Ka­
bul, All-India Radio, and Radio Quetta, in addition to the ninety-minute daily broad­
casts in Balochi over Radio Zahedan.120 Like Ayub Khan’s regime in Pakistan, the 
Shah’s regime also, confronted with a populace that could no longer be insulated from 
outside political ideas, hastily attempted to guide this burgeoning Baloch political 
awareness into safe channels by stepping up its own Balochi-language radio pro­
gramming and, at the same time, embarking on a crash programme to expand educa­
tional facilities.121 With the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, however, tremendous cul­
tural developments took place. Despite being short-lived, this period gave birth to
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numerous Balochi publications in Iran.
The bulk of the Baloch literature is poetry, which is transmitted orally.123 The 
legendary history of the Baloch race and their migrations, wars, religion, and creed 
form its significant themes. A great number of them are about rule of Rind-Lashari 
confederacy in 151,1 and 16th centuries. Stories about the wars against the Persians, Af­
ghans, Indians, Turks, and Europeans also form the salient features of the Baloch po­
etry of later centuries. Among the Baloch, the memory of poets such as Gul Khan Na- 
sir, Syed Zahur Shah Hashomi and Atta Shad arouses deep feeling. They depict the 
Baloch as a free, autonomous people resisting Iranian, Afghan, Indian (i.e. Mughal), 
and Pakistani domination. The work of such poets as Mubarak Qazi, G. R. Mulla and 
Maulavi Abdullah Rawanbod reaches people through recitals held at public marriage 
ceremonies, at the meetings of community associations (anjumans), and as entertain­
ment in private homes. These public recitals often seek to strengthen nationalistic sen­
timents and cultural pride, both in Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan.
117 Source: Plan and Budget Organization as Quoted in: Akhardad Baloch. Siasat Par Balochistan. 
1361/1983, p- 59.
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After the fall of the Khanate, Gul Khan Nasir, Syed Hashomi, Morad Saher, 
G. R. Molla, and many other poets gave a new meaning and form to Balochi poetry. 
Gul Khan Nasir’s (1914-1983) poetry is the greatest manifestation and the most pro­
found expression of the Baloch political and social approach since the early thirties. 
His exhortation to the Baloch to uphold their traditions is a clear sign of the deep- 
rooted hatred felt towards the new rulers and strong disapproval of the new political 
dispensation. His poems soon turned to popular slogans and were the subject of dis­
cussion by the elite. Gul Khan Nasir comments: “Come, oh Baloch, come oh Baloch, 
I will tell [you] something today. Come, oh homeless Baloch, You have lost your 
way. A gang of robbers have attacked your land. They have set fire to your houses. 
They carried away your possessions, but you are not aware. A heavy sleep upon you, 
has made you unaware, hand and tongue have ceased to function, it has fettered the 
manly lion.”124
With Nauruz Khan’s rebellion in the late 1950s, the nationalist feeling became 
deeper and was expressed more clearly in the Balochi literature. The myth of Nauruz 
Khan and his comrades was spread far beyond the provincial border and was felt 
among the Baloch population in Sindh and Punjab. It is said, after the execution of his 
supporters, the authorities sadistically requested the aged warrior to identify the bod­
ies. In his memoir, the Baloch leader, Sher Baz Khan Mazari, describes the modern 
legend that has evolved around this episode as such:
‘Is this one your son? An army officer cold-heartedly asked Nauroze 
Khan as he pointed to the body of the elderly warrior’s son. Nauroze 
Khan stared at the soldier for a moment then replied quietly, ‘All these 
brave young men are my sons.’ Then looking at the faces of his dead sup­
porters, he noticed that the moustache of one of them had drooped in
death. He went over to the body and tenderly curled the moustache up­
wards while gently admonishing, ‘Even in death, my son, one should not 
allow the enemy to think, even for one moment, that you have de­
spaired’.125
Similarly, in the 1970s, as the conflict escalated between the Baloch and the 
Pakistani State, those who lost their lives are depicted in the Balochi poetry as na­
tional heroes. The most notable hero was Mir Luang Khan, the elder brother of Gul
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Khan Nasir, who fought the army instead of submitting to search. However, the tri­
124 Gul Khan Nasir, Gulbang. Quetta, 1952,
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umvirate -  Khair Bakhsh Marri, Ataullah Mengal and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo -  also 
emerged as nationalist heroes.
Admiring his motherland, the nationalist Maulavi, Abdullah Rawanbod, 
probably was the most famous poet in Iranian Balochistan in the 1970s. Rawanbod 
comments: “Oh my beloved ancestral land. The countiy of the brave Baloch. Rival 
and the envy of Yemen... I adore you so much. I need you as the body needs the 
breath.”127 In the same way, the Baloch in Afghanistan were even more isolated and 
kept backward socially and culturally, but they have glorified their legends with vari­
ous songs. Legends like Ghazi Sher Jan who fought against British hegemony in Nim- 
ruz and Helmand (Sistan) are as famous as Dad Shah in Iranian Balochistan.128 Since 
the very beginning of Balochi programmes from Radio Kabul, the heroic songs about 
Ghazi Sher Jan, composed and sung by Ghulam Sakhi, a nationalist singer, are being 
broadcast.129
As indicated, the Baloch of Afghanistan remained largely isolated from the 
events of Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan and from attempts by the Afghan govern­
ments to exert administrative control over them. Compared with Pakistani and Iranian 
Baloch, they are mostly backward. Even though the first school was inaugurated in 
the country during the reign of Amanullah Khan in 1922, there was too little devel­
opment in the educational field. In 1979, there were only 20 persons who had univer­
sity education.130 Consequently, unlike their brethren in Iran and Pakistan, they had 
not mobilised to demand cultural and political autonomy as late as the 1970s. In fact, 
as stated by the Baloch writer, Syed Mohammad Shiranzai from Nimruz, the process 
of politicising of the Afghan Baloch started in 1964, when Afghanistan adopted a new 
constitution, changing the country from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. 
However, when Mohammad Daud overthrew King Zahir Shah and abolished its tradi­
tional Shura (parliament), the process gained further momentum. The competition for 
parliamentary seats under the new republic of Afghanistan united the Baloch tribes for 
the first time. It was from this period, Shiranzai believes, that “nationalism became a
1 o |
mobilising factor in the Baloch society in Afghanistan ”
127 Ismail Amiri, “Maulavi Abdullah-e Shaeri-e Raji Pahnat”, in Taptan. No. 3, Karachi, March 1989, 
p. 13.
Gholam Mohammad Lalzad, “Baloch Kist” (Who are the Baloch?), in: Baloch Komitte, Tran: Bo- 
liten Mobahesat, No 5. Stockholm June 1999, pp. 32-33.
129 Ibid., p. 34.
130 Syed Mohammad Shiranzai, “Baloch-ha-e Afghaistan”, Unpublished, August 1999.
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During the 1970s, however, the pro-Soviet coup of 1978 brought a dramatic 
change at least in formal cultural policy in Afghanistan. In contrast with Iran, where 
in 1979 the Islamic revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeini rejected constitu­
tional recognition both of ethnic minorities and of the Sunni religion, the new Democ­
ratic Republic of Afghanistan, adopted an unusually accommodative ’’nationalities 
model” akin to that of the Soviet Union.132 In autumn 1978, only months after the 
April coup, Balochi and three other languages (Uzbek, Turkmen and Nuristani) were 
singled out for recognition in addition to Pashtu and Dari as official languages of Af­
ghanistan. Facilities for propagation were pledged, and steps were taken to implement 
the new policy in four areas - participation in government, education, publication of 
periodicals, and cultural expression. Soub, a Balochi-language weekly, began publica­
tion in September 1978. Beginning in September 1979, Balochi-speaking first graders 
were able to attend classes in their own language, if they so chose. And there were 
plans, according to Naby, a Harvard specialist on Central Asia, to provide complete 
Balochi-language schools in Baluchi-majority areas.133 However, the military conflict 
that followed the Afghan revolution in 1980s disrupted the social and ethnic situation 
in Nimruz province. Fighting led to an exodus of the Baloch from the area. Many of 
them settled near related tribes in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran.
Baloch social organisation
James Bill wrote that in the Middle East “the politics of development and mod­
ernization are profoundly influenced by the patterns and process that mark group and 
class relationships.”134 But another way, even in the late 19th century as modernisation 
and urbanisation reduced the importance of tribes and tribal organisations, the influ­
ence of tribal patterns is not destroyed.135 These already existent tribal patterns and 
processes influence how development and modernisation takes place in rural parts of 
the Middle East. In Balochistan, the informal, paternalistic patterns of control through 
family networks (the tribes) continue to have relevance -  particularly since tribal sup­
132 It is important to note that like the National Awami Party in Pakistan, the People’s Democratic Party 
of Afghanistan Government of Afghanistan (PDPA) followed a policy of equal rights and autonomy 
toward national minorities o f the country. See, Government of Afghanistan, Qanoon-e Asasi-e 
Jamhuri-e Afghanistan (Constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan), Kabul, 1366/1987, p. 36.
133 Eden Naby, “The Iranian Frontier Nationalies: The Kurds, the Assyrians, the Baluchis, and the 
Turkmens”, in: William O. McCagg, Jr., and Brian D. Silver (ed.), Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers. New 
York: Perganom, 1979, p. 102-103.
134 James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East. (3rd Edition) Glenview, Illinois: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1990, p. 86.
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port or lack of support has been crucial to the success or failure of nationalist move­
ments.
Dr. Nek Buzdar, a specialist on international economic development has written 
that the Baloch society, ‘by and large, adheres to traditional ways of life’. He believes 
that despite the emergence of political parties in Balochistan, tribal organisation and 
political leadership still play a dominant role in local and provincial administration.136 
Tribes in Balochistan are divided into shahri (sedentary) and nomadic units. The 
shahris were the backbone of the feudal order, which was predominant in central, and 
southern Balochistan (Makkoran), while the nomads were the cornerstones of the 
tribal order prevailing mainly in the northern tribal areas. Both groups, however, were 
bound together by a set of historically evolved relationships based on economic, so­
cial, political, military, and lingual interactions.137 Possibly, this separation of the 
tribes between the nomad (warrior nobility) and the sedentary shahris (peasants) had 
led many to conclude that the sedentary population may have been the original inhabi­
tants who were conquered by later-arriving nomads.
The Baloch tribal system is segmentary. Describing this system, Salzman wrote, 
“By ‘segmentary system’ we mean a set of equal lineages allied relatively and contin­
gently for political action, decisions being made by assemblies and councils, with no 
offices and hierarchy of authority, and thus no top.” Thus centralised authority is 
absent in such a system. They are constituted from a number of kindred groups. It has 
many sub-divisions or clans who claim to have blood relations with one another 
through common ancestors. Kinship, which has its characteristic form in clan and 
family structure, provides the basic ordering mechanism for society. Thus it is a major 
factor in regulating and systemising individual behaviour, which in turn influences the 
formation and sustenance of the socio-political organisation of the entire tribe.
While the colonial government exercised control over the Baloch tribes, the 
British themselves were light on the ground, and in return for the chieftains’ loyalty 
gave them a free hand to keep the tribal way of life largely unchanged. But the posi­
tion began to change in the last decades of Raj, change accelerated with the creation
135 An excellent collection of studies on the interaction between tribes and newly-centralising “modern” 
governments is Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, ed. By Philip S. Khoury and Joseph 
Kostiner, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
136 Nek Buzdar, “Social Organization, Resource use, and Economic Development in Balochistan” in: 
Monthly Balochi Labzank. Hub (Balochistan), March-April 2000, p. 82.
137 Nina Swidler, “Beyond Parody”, in: Paul Titus, (ed.), Marginalitv and Modernity, pp. 176-77.
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of Pakistan and annexation of Balochistan to Iran. Furthermore, the growth of educa­
tion, market forces, and electoral politics has drawn the Baloch into regional and na­
tional networks both in Iran and Pakistan. However, the tribal power structure is still 
very important in Baloch rural society. Selig Harrison in 1981 counted seventeen ma­
jor tribal groupings in Balochistan. Each of them was headed by a Sardar (chieftain), 
selected usually from the male lineage of the ruling clan in each tribe. Harrison men­
tions some 400 tribal sub-grouping headed by lesser sardars.139
Probably the most widely known and generally loathed features of Baloch so­
ciety are the Sardari and Jirga institutions of tribal organisation and leadership. Under 
the traditional administrative set up of Baloch tribes, every tribe had its separate Jirga 
(council of the elders), which acted as a court of law.140 Then this system presented 
itself at all the administrative tiers of the tribe. Jirga at the tribe’s level operated under 
the leadership of Sardar. All other personalities of the tribe’s administration like Mu- 
qaddam, Wadera and Motaber were its members. Besides, at all the administrative 
tiers of the tribe, Jirga also functioned over the head of the tribe. Jirga at this level 
dealt with important matters concerning the tribes and disputes arising among them, 
the election of a new Khan or the eventual external threats. The head of Confederacy 
himself was the head of this Jirga}*1
Providing the Baloch society a historical, social and political structure, the 
Jirga remained intact for a long period and helped the Baloch deal with the situation 
of anarchy, chaos and emergency.142 However, under the British rule in 19th century, 
the traditional pattern of the Baloch Jirga began to change. Having masterminded the 
political set up of the Baloch country, Sir Robert Sandeman introduced a new kind of 
Jirga, the “Shahi-Jirga ” (Grand Council or the Council of the main tribal Sardars) 
where only Sardars and aristocrats could sit.143 The Shahi Jirga was held at Quetta, 
Sibi and Fort Munro once or twice a year. The new Jirga could impose taxes in prop­
erty and labour; only the Political Agent could review the decisions.144 As described 
by Janmahmad, the Shahi-Jirga was a shrewd mechanism of indirect rule with powers
138 Philip C. Salzman, “Why Tribes have Chiefs: A Case from Baluchistan”, in Richard Tapper (ed.), 
The Conflict o f Tribe and State in Iran, and Afghanistan, London, 1983, pp. 267.
139 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 9.
140 Mohammad Usman Hassan, Balochistan: Mazi. Hal aur Mustaqbel (Balochistan: Past, Present and 
Future), Karachi: Indus Publications, 1976, pp. 174-176.
141 Ibid., and see also IOR. R/l/34/52.
142 Syed Abdul Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan. pp. 85-86.
143 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 164.
144 M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History o f Balochistan. p. 260.
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vested in a few carefully selected tribal elders loyal to the British and ready to act 
against their own people.145
The other well-established and widely known institution in the Baloch society 
is the Sardari system. This system appears to have had its origins in the Mughal pe­
riod of Indian history, but it is believed to have assumed its present shape rather late, 
during the period of British colonial rule. In contrast to the marked egalitarianism that 
pervades tribal organisation among the neighbouring Pathans, the sardari system is 
highly centralised and hierarchical.146 At the apex of the system is the sardar, the he­
reditary central chief from whom power flows downward to wader as, the section 
chiefs, and beyond them to the subordinate clan and sub-clan leaders of the lesser 
tribal units. The Sardar's extraordinary authority within this structure probably stems 
from the essentially military character of early Baloch tribal society.147 This authority 
may also have originated in the requirements of the Baloch pastoral economy. The 
tribesmen's seasonal migrations and isolation in scattered small camps would seem to 
have justified the emergence of a powerful and respected central figure who could ob­
tain pasture lands and water, arrange safe passage through hostile territory for herds­
men and their flocks, and in other ways provide a shield against an unusually harsh 
environment.
Modernization has changed much of the tribal system. It was first challenged 
by the setting of international boundaries at the end of the 19th century. The new fron­
tiers partitioned Balochistan between three states, dividing some of the large tribes 
between countries and prohibiting the traditional summer and winter migrations of 
nomads and semi-nomads. The Naruis, the Sanjaranis, the Rikis and the Brahuis were 
divided among Iran, Afghanistan and British Balochistan. The second challenge oc­
curred between the world wars, when the British and Persians largely pacified Ba­
lochistan. From 1928, Tehran used its army to forcibly subdue the Baloch, often ex-
* 1 4-Rterminating whole tribes m process.
The termination of the traditional nomadic economic system devastated the 
tribes. In the case of Iranian Balochistan, to force sedentarization, Reza Shah intro­
duced land registration. Land which had previously been considered the property of
145 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 164,
146 Fredrik Barth, “Pathan Identity and its Maintenance”, in: Fredrik Barth, (ed.), Ethnic Group and 
Boundaries. Boston, 1969, pp. 117-34.
147 Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan: its Strategic Importance, p. 41.
148 Philip Carl Salzman, “Why Tribes have Chiefs: A Case from Baluchistan”, p.281.
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the tribe as a whole, became the sole property of the tribal chief in whose name the 
land was registered. The chiefs, with income from rents, could now move into cities 
and towns. This increased their distance from the tribe. The sedentary farmers, tied to 
the land through debts and contracts, could no longer align themselves with rival 
chieftains. This increased the landlord’s control over the peasant, but the peasant’s 
loyalty to the landlord decreased as monetary ties replaced ties of sanguinity or of mu­
tual self-interest. Baloch society lost its cohesiveness, and both landlord and rentier 
turned to the central government for protection of their “rights”.
Parallel to the decline and disintegration of tribalism in Iranian Balochistan, 
the Sardars have also lost their base of power and influence there. This has been the 
case particularly during the 1960s and the 1970s, as the rapid growth in urbanization, 
expansion of modern means of communications, spread of modern education, and 
economic modernization in the province began to drastically undermine the tribal so­
cioeconomic structure. These changes in turn brought with them a new Baloch elite 
identified with the middle-class. It must be borne in mind that the cooperation of the 
Sardars with the Shah's regime representing "Shiite Gajars", also served to undermine 
their traditional legitimacy among their peasant and nomadic followers politically.
Over the course of time, therefore, the traditional social organisation of the 
Baloch to a great extent has changed. There is now a widespread Baloch national con­
sciousness that cuts across tribal divisions.149 Islamabad and Tehran, however, ignor­
ing this emergence of nationalism, tend to think of Baloch society solely in terms of 
its traditional tribal character and organisational patterns. Most Sardars have at­
tempted to safeguard their privileges by avoiding direct identification with the nation­
alist movement, while keeping the door open for supporting the nationalist cause in 
time of confrontation between the Baloch and the central government, as in the case 
of the 1973-7 insurgency.150 Similarly, the Iranian revolution of 1979 inflicted the 
most significant blow to the influence of Sardars in Western Balochistan.
However, in a traditional, tribal society a political ideology such as Baloch na­
tionalism would be unable to gain support, because loyalties of tribal members do not 
extend to entities rather than individual tribes. The failure of the tribes to unite in the 
cause of Baloch nationalism is a replay of tribal behaviour in both the Pakistani and 
Iranian Baloch revolts. Within the tribes, an individual’s identity is based on his be­
149 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp. 21-22.
150 Interview with Dawood Khan Ahmadzai.
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longing to a larger group. This larger group is not the nation but the tribe. However, 
the importance of the rise of a non-tribal movement over more tribal structures should 
not be underestimated. In this respect the Baloch movements of the 1920s, 1930s, and 
1940s provide us a good example.
In the post-colonial period a visible change in the Baloch society, as discussed 
in this chapter, was the rise of the urban population mainly due to detribalisation and 
to some extent land reforms under Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The differen­
tiation and specialization in urban economies introduced new social strata. A small 
Baloch working class formed in the mine industry, construction, and a few factories. 
Small workshops required auto mechanics, electricians, mechanics, plumbers and 
painters, while services and transport employed many others. A modern bourgeoisie 
emerged, comprising mainly professionals rather than entrepreneurs- doctors, nurses, 
engineers, teachers, bank managers, lawyers and journalists. Migrant labour travelled 
as far as Gulf States.
Thus, with the appearance of the Baloch middle class, even though small, and 
the decrease of the traditional role of the sardars, the modern Baloch intelligentsia 
seems to be more eager to assume a political role of its own. Highlighting the new 
changes in Baloch society, in 1993, Mahmud Ali, an specialist on South Asian poli­
tics, wrote, “In the absence of traditional leaders, the dynamic of socio-economic 
change has precipitated a new kind of leader -  younger men of ‘common’, i.e., non- 
sardari, descent”.151 The Baloch have devised a nationalist ideology, but realise that 
tribal support remains a crucial ingredient to any potential success of a national 
movement. By accepting the support of the tribes, the nationalists fall vulnerable to 
tribal rivalries.
Economic development
In 1892, Lord Curzon stated that by the greater part of Balochistan, the Baloch 
were sedentary and pastoral.152 Despite the passage of almost one hundred years and 
the increase in urbanisation, Curzon’s view is still fairly accurate (although there are 
more farmers and fewer shepherds). Describing the Baloch economy in early 1980s, a 
prominent authority on the subject of Baloch nationalism, Selig S. Harrison wrote,
151 Mahmud Ali S., The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal war in south Asia, London, 1993, p. 
153.
152 George N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, pp. 260-61.
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“Instead of relying solely on either nomadic pastoralism or on settled agriculture, 
most Baloch practise a mixture of the two in order to survive”.153
The economic grievances of the Baloch are dated from the British era. As the 
British developed industries and agriculture in Sindh, Punjab, and NWFP, they ig­
nored Balochistan. Thus there is a widely held view that the British rulers neglected 
the economic development of Balochistan.154 Perhaps it was not merely a case of ne­
glect, but what might be called purposeful sidetracking, even suppression.155 Of 
course the British had their own imperial interests to protect. As argued by Aijaz 
Ahmad, a Pakistani Marxist writer, the British imperialist interest in Balochistan was 
not primarily economic; rather it was of a military and geopolitical nature.156 What 
happened in Kabul and Kandahar and beyond in Central Asia was of greater impor­
tance to them in their Great Game with the Tsars and later with the Bolsheviks. Ba­
lochistan controlled some of the more important routes to Afghanistan and Central 
Asia. According to a military expert, Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan was the chess-
1 57board on which the Great Game was played. The British rulers probably thought 
that an economically and politically enervated Balochistan would lend itself to be 
used more easily. On the other hand a prosperous and united Balochistan could be­
come recalcitrant and forge relations with undependable principalities in the 
neighbourhood.158 Speaking of Sandeman, Aijaz Ahmad wrote, “He kept Balochistan 
backward, for it served the aim of the British Empire”.159
Despite this neglect, in the course of time, the British rule brought about some 
changes in Balochistan. Balochistan was connected with British India, Iran, and Af­
ghanistan. At the beginning of the 20th centuiy, the total length of the railways was 
481 miles. In 1903, the total mileage of roads and paths was 1,128.160 Thus, it encour­
aged commerce and trade and the administration had created an abundance of new 
professions with social status and influence. The new education system required 
teachers, the new medicine required physicians. All this gave rise to a middle class.
153 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 8.
154 Dawn. Delhi, February 1, 1946, p. 4.
155 Interview with Baloch leaders, Nawab Akbar Bugti, Dr Abdul Hayee Baloch, Dr. Abdul Malik Ba­
loch, and Mohammad Akram Baloch.
156 Aijaz Ahmad, “The National Question In Baluchistan”, in: Feroz Ahmed (ed.), Focus on Baluchis­
tan and Pushtoon Question, p 20.
157 Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan: its Strategic Importance. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992, pp. 
70-85.
158 Nicholas Mansergh, The Transfer of Power 1942-7. VoI.XII., (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1982) No. 317, August 2, 1947, p. 480.
159 Aijaz Ahmad, “The National Question in Balochistan”, pp. 21.23.
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The introduction of railways facilitated easy and quick movement and the introduction 
of modern postal and telegraph services shortened distances and helped in exchange 
of ideas. All these gradual developments led finally to the rise of Baloch national con­
sciousness and nationalism in eastern Balochistan in the 1920s.161
However, with the annexation (1948), Balochistan remained on the whole ex­
tremely deprived. Since the early 1950s, the Pashtuns took control of most of the 
commercial life previously controlled by Sindhi Hindus. Then the Punjabis moved in 
and bought some of the best arable land, for example, in the Pat Feeder area near 
Kalat where land was distributed among military and civil bureaucrats under Ayub 
Khan. Provincial administration was predominantly Punjabi and few of the higher 
civil servants were Baloch. Similarly, the majority of the entrepreneurial class was 
non-Baloch, except for a few sectors like marble quarrying and ship breaking. Ac­
cording to preliminary surveys, underground water as well as mineral resources were 
available in large quantities in Balochistan.162 But the underdeveloped infrastructure 
of the province made them difficult to exploit.
The census of 1901 included only six towns, and Balochistan’s total urban 
population was 40,000 or 5% of the total population. The town of Quetta was the 
largest with a population of 25,000; the other towns had populations ranging between
2,000 and 4,500. During the next 80 years, the urban population rose to 670,000 (16% 
of the population). The number of large towns had increased to 16 by 1981, ranging in 
population from 8,000 to 285,000.163 However, the bulk (43 %) of the total urban 
population of 1981 was still found in Quetta (285,000); Loralai (11,000), Fort Sande- 
man (Zhob) (33,000), Turbat (52,000), Pasni (18,000), Mustang (17.000), Gwadar 
(17,000), Chaman (30,000) and Sibi (23,000).
According to the census (1981), Balochistan has experienced a total popula­
tion increase of 431 % over 1901. As indicated in the demographic section, in 1970s 
Balochistan had a population increase of 77.23%. Its main cities, i.e. Quetta, Turbat 
and Hub, have doubled their population in the last decade. However, despite this spec­
tacular urban growth, the majority of the population continues to reside in the coun­
tryside (84%). The enumerated population in 1981 was 4.3 million.164 The general
160 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 23.
161 Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, pp. 203-208.
162 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan^ Shadow, pp. 162-66.
163 Government o f Pakistan, 50 Years of Pakistan in Statistics. Vol. Ill (1972-82), Karachi, 1997, p. 6.
164 Government of Baluchistan, Development Statistics of Baluchistan. Vol. 1, No. 10, Quetta, 1980-81.
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increase has been caused by many factors, but an important one is simply better cov­
erage of the area and more accurate enumeration. By comparison in 1978 the urban 
population in Iranian Balochistan was 26 percent165 out of the total population of 
659,297.
Compared to the other three provinces of Punjab, Sindh and NWFP, in the 
1970s Balochistan was the most neglected and impoverished province in Pakistan. In 
1976, the annual per capita income was 54 dollars as compared with the 80 dollars for 
Punjab, 78 dollars for Sindh, and 60 dollars for NWFP.166 In 1977 the life expectancy 
in rural Balochistan was 42 years as compared with the national average of 60 
years.167 Similarly, the national literacy average was 16 per cent, while that of Ba­
lochistan was 6 to 9 per cent.168 To the Baloch such an economic gap can hardly be 
justified in the light of Balochistan’s rich maritime resources along the several hun­
dred miles of coast as well as its land-based mineral resources including coal, natural 
gas, copper, uranium, marble, etc.169 Apart from minerals and gas and prospects of 
huge oil reserves which are still to be tapped, Balochistan produced more than 70,000 
metric tons of marine fish annually, saving foreign exchange to the tune of 500 mil­
lion dollars. The Federal government had an income of more than 10,426 million ru­
pees from gas in 1976-1977.170
Among the other grievances, the Baloch contended that they had not benefited 
from the mineral resources of their homeland that have been exploited so far. The 
most significant focus of controversy was the national gas. It was discovered in Ba­
lochistan in 1952, and was piped to industrial belts in Sindh and Punjab leaving the
171Baloch to “burn wood trucked in from Sindh”. Similarly, when another gas field 
with reserves half as big as those at Sui was discovered at nearby Pirkoh in 1977, 
Pakistani officials promptly announced plans for piping it to already developed indus­
trial centres in the Punjab and the Sindh, ignoring Balochistan altogether. Further­
more, another Rs 10,000 million was saved from minerals, and also Gaddani Ship
165 Government of Iran, Shonasai-e Mokhatasar-e Ostan Sistan wa Balochistan. Zahedan, 1358/1980, p. 
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Breaking Yard saved Rs 400 million in foreign exchange in 1975.172 In 1977 the 
BPLF alleged that Pakistan considered the Baloch country ”a vast estate for plunder, 
an arid desert floating in oil and minerals. A large part of their political strategies are 
dictated by the desire to extract this treasure for the benefit of the Pakistani bureau­
cratic bourgeoisie and foreign imperialist interests. The Pakistani oligarchy needed 
Balochistan’s oil and minerals to overcome the economic crisis gripping the whole
173country.
According to the Baloch nationalists, the people of Balochistan were not the 
beneficiaries of the huge resources and income the province provided to the Federal 
exchequer. Balochistan has been getting only a nominal royalty from the Sui Gas pro­
duction. During 1979-1980 Balochistan received only 1.23 million dollars. Khuda 
Bakhsh Marri, a former Chief Justice and Governor of Balochistan wrote:
Can anybody honestly say that Balochistan is economically backward and 
incapable of sustaining its meagre population of nearly 4.5 million peo­
ple. About one million metric tons of coal annually is produced by Ba­
lochistan. If its selling-price be estimated as 600 to 700 rupees per ton, the 
total amount will be 600 to 700 million rupees annually. Such funds are 
generated also by production and export of marble, and other minerals, 
from different parts of Balochistan. Even it land revenue is sufficient to 
support the population of Balochistan.174 
On 12th December 1947, while rejecting the accession proposal, the National 
Party leader in the assembly, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo argued, “We have minerals, we 
have petroleum, we have ports. We should not be made slaves on the pretext of eco­
nomic viability.”175 Balochistan, as claimed by the Baloch nationalists, has the richest 
resources in South-west Asia. “The per capita income of Balochistan”, Janmahmad 
argues, “if it were to have at its disposal its entire resources and income, would be one 
of the highest in the world.” There is much to be considered in these claims. Apart 
from its natural resources, seaports and fisheries, Balochistan possesses many fertile 
valleys and plains, which have been the centre of towns and villages for the bulk of its 
settled population throughout history. Agricultural life is centred in the fertile valleys 
of Makkoran in the south, the rich plains of Las Bela and Kacchi in the southeast, the
172 Dawn. (Karachi) 25* April 1975.
173 Jabal July 1977, p. 6.
174 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, A Judge May Speak. Lahore: Ferozsons LTD, 1990, p. 
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175 Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo quoted in: Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan. 
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B ampur region irrigated by a river of the same name in the northwest, and numerous 
other agricultural oases scattered throughout the country. In the late 1970s, Selig S. 
Harrison, has estimated that out of a total acreage of some 85 million in Pakistani Ba­
lochistan, only 3.3 million acres are cultivated of which only 800,000 are irrigated.177
The Baloch grievances drives from numerous factors and are deeply rooted in 
their psyche. Among the main grievances, the Baloch have taken up the issue of lin­
guistic redemarcation of provincial boundaries that would reduce the Pashtun influ­
ence in Balchistan and give the Baloch a clear majority. When the NAP came into 
power in 1972, the chief minister, Ataullah Mengal, suggested that the northern Pash­
tun areas of Balochistan should be transferred to the NWFP whereas Baloch areas in 
Sindh and Punjab (i.e. Dera Ghazi Khan and Jacobabad) should be attached to Ba­
lochistan.178
Another principal grievance voiced by Baloch nationalists is that even in the 
few local mines and industries, outsiders got the best jobs. Jabal, the organ of the Ba­
loch People’s Liberation Front alleged that of forty employees at Goonga barite mine 
near Khuzdar in 1975, fifteen non-Baloch workers received wages three times higher
t HQ
than the Baloch workers there. The higher posts of engineer and other technical 
staff went to people from Punjab or Karachi. Qualified Baloch engineers and techni­
cians have not any ghost of a chance in these cartels of mine owners.180 There was 
general agreement that the Baloch are grossly underrepresented in civil service jobs 
and thus have little or no say in the governmental decisions that shaped their eco­
nomic lives. According to Selig Harrison, Pakistan and Iran in most spheres of eco­
nomic development pursued broadly similar economic policies toward Balochistan, 
neglecting many critical areas, such as water development, while giving dispropor­
tionate attention to others, notably road construction, for military reasons.181 Equally 
alarming to the Baloch was also the growing number of settlers from other provinces 
and their cultivation of Balochistan’s limited arable lands such as in Kacchi and Las
176 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 273.
177 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 9.
178 Ibid., pp. 190-91; and see also, Sardar Ataullah Mengal’s statement in the daily Dawn. Karachi, 30th 
June 1972.
179 Jabal. November 1977, p.3.
180 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, A Judge May Speak, p. 167.
181 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 167.
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Bela.182 As a result, many Baloch were forced on to more arid and less suitable agri­
cultural fields, a factor which severely damaged the Baloch economy as a whole.
The continued negligence has deepened the sense of deprivation and feeling of 
hatred against Islamabad, among the Baloch. In 1997, Dr. Abdul Hayee, senator and 
the head of Balochistan National Movement (BNM) complained that Balochistan 
shares around 43 percent of the total road length of Pakistan, but its share in the 
budget allocated for building of roads is less than 5 percent.183 The Baloch had voiced 
strong grievances about their lack of proportional representation in the Pakistani bu­
reaucracy and aimed forces or in the provincial administration of Balochistan. Ac­
cording to the census of 1981, the provincial quota for recruitment to the civil posts 
under Federal Government was determined, 5.2% of the total vacancies in Pakistan. 
This was obviously on the basis of the population of the province, which was
4,305,000 forming 5.2% of the total population of the country. Although, according to 
the former provincial minister for coastal development, Kachkool Ali Baloch, this was 
not implemented and remained only on paper.184 In 1997, Kachkool Ali Baloch com­
plained that despite having 750-kilometers coast out of total 1100 kilometers in Paki­
stan, not a single seaman in the Navy belongs to Balochistan.185
The grievances of the Baloch are due to the dominance of Punjabis in the ad­
ministration. The Baloch leaders held very few key positions in the central govern­
ment through which to exercise influence on the course of policy. For example, ac­
cording to a study, of the 179 persons who were named to central cabinets in Pakistan 
from 1947 to 1977, only four (2.2) percent were Baloch from Balochistan, and only 
one of them was named prior to the 1970s.186 Even decisions taken within the region 
during these years were more than likely to have been made by non-Baloch. Accord­
ing to the New York Times of 15 February 1980, of the roughly 40,000 civil employ­
ees of all kinds in Balochistan in 1972, at the outset of the NAP period, only about 
2000 (5 percent) were Baloch. And according to the same source, they generally held
I nn
inferior posts. The only time the Baloch were able to take over the decision-making
182 Ibid., p. 9.
183 Interview with Dr. Abdul Hayee.
184 Monthly, Balochi Labzank, Hub (Balochistan), September 1997, p. 6.
185 Ibid.
186 Mozaffar Shaheen, The Politics o f Cabinet Formation in Pakistan: A Study of Recruitment to the 
Central Cabinets. 1947-1977. Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University, Ohio, 1980.
187 New York Times. February 15, 1980; Wall Street Journal. February 15, 1980, p. 1; Salamat Ali, 
“Balochistan: An Upheaval is forecast”, in: Far Eastern Economic Review. October 19, 1979, pp. 40-
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positions in the province was during the short period of self-rule in 1972, as described 
earlier. However, in this respect, the Pakistani record is better than that of Iran, where 
the Baloch so far have held no Cabinet position.
Having launched his “White Revolution” in 1962, the Shah started a series of 
reforms, intended for the general economic and social transformation of the country. 
By the end of the 1960s, according to Salzman, a variety of development programmes 
were underway in Sistan-wa-Balochistan, and plans had been laid for improved roads, 
marketing of handicrafts, irrigation projects, as well as additional education, health
■ 1RRand veterinary services. In the early 1970s the construction of a huge air and naval 
base at Chabahar on the Balochistan coast begun. By establishing the “Sazeman-e 
Tause’e Balochistan” (Balochistan Development organisation) in 1973, the Shall gov­
ernment sharply increased the province’s development allocations and laid plans for 
building its economic infrastructure for the first time.189
As observed by Harrison, in 1972, the government expenditures for the devel­
opment of the province were $750,000 per year, while the following year* saw talk of 
increasing that figure to $100 million for the ensuing five years coinciding with the 5th 
Development Plan (1973-1978).190 In 1972, the Shah’s Court Minister, Asadollah 
Alam, wrote in his Diary, that the Shah was keen to obtain American credit for the 
development of Balochistan’s seaport (Chabahar), which was crucial for the control of 
the Indian Ocean and for economic progress in Balochistan.191
Obviously, it was not earlier than the late 1970s that the province became to 
some extent integrated into the country’s system of communication, of trade and 
ideas. Since then the Shall’s regime increased development allocations, expanded 
educational facilities, introduced the first institutions of higher education such as the 
University of Balochistan, and constructed the first network of asphalted roads. The 
downfall of the Shah's regime in 1979, however, left most of those programmes in­
complete.
The following indicators are good examples of the Shah’s economic policies 
toward the Baloch. In 1972, the estimated annual per capita income in the province
42; Robert G. Wirsing, “South Asia: The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan”, in: Robert G. Wirsing (ed.), 
Protection of Ethnic Minorities, Comparative Perspective. New York: Pergamon, 1981, p. 293.
188 Philip C. Salzman, “National Integration of the Tribes in Modern Iran”, in: Middle East Journal. 25, 
No. 3 (Summer 1971), pp. 332-33.
189 Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I. p. 229.
190 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 99.
191 Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I. p. 229
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was $975 as compared to $2,200 national average for the rural areas and less than 
one-fifth if compared with the overall national average as demonstrated by Selig Har-
1 O') «rison. Again, during the same period (1971/72), the average monthly household ex­
penditure for the province was 5012 Rials as compared for instance, with 8711 Rials 
for East Azerbaijan and 8329 for Gilan, two of the northern provinces.193 Another in­
dex of economic development is the literacy rate. Here, as indicated in the section on 
cultural development, Balochistan lags far behind the Iranian national average under 
the Pahlavi regime. The Shall’s economics and social programmes tended to increase 
regional inequalities. For example, in 1975 the literacy rate was 62 percent in Tehran, 
but only 26 percent in Sistan-wa-Balochistan. The percentage of children in school 
was 74 in Tehran, but as low as 40 in Sistan-wa-Balochistan. Similarly, Tehran had 
one doctor per 974 people, one dentist per 5, 626 people, and one nurse per 1,820 
people. On the other hand, Sistan-wa-Balochistan had one doctor per 5,311 people, 
one dentist per 51,663 people, and one nurse per 27,064 people.194
Moreover, the number of people living in urban areas tells a similar story. Ac­
cording to the first nation-wide census of Iran, which was taken in 1956, only 8.7 per 
cent of the population in Sistan-wa-Balochistan were urbanised.195 One decade later, 
in the 1966 census, the ratio of urban to rural population in the province was 15.9 to 
83.196 In 1976, those figures changed to 26 and 74 respectively, thus indicating a 9 
percent increase in the urban population.197 By comparison, in 1977-78, the national 
average for the urban and rural segment of the population was given as 47.1 and 52.9 
percent respectively. This comparison indicates that one-fourth of the population in 
the province was urban as compared with close to one-half of the population of the
10R ♦country as a whole. In each successive year, the percentage of population living in 
cities grew -  but at a slower rate than urbanisation took place in the rest of Iran.199
192 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 99.
193 M. H. Pesaran, “Income Distribution and Its Major Determinants in Iran”, Paper presented at Aspen- 
Persepolis Symposium, September 15-19, 1975, in Persepolis.
194 Ervand Arahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 449.
195 Djamchid A. Momeni, “The Population of Iran: A Dynamic Analysis”, PhD Dissertation, The 
University of Texas at Austin, August 1970, p. 50,
196 Ibid., p. 52.
197 Government of Iran, Shonasae-i Mokhatasar-e Ostan Sistan-wa-Baluchistan. p. 1.
198 Iran Yearbook 1977. p. 29. However, in 1986 the urban ratio of the population o f the province in­
creased to 41 pro cent (Hamid Alimadi, Oaumiwat wa Oaumgarai dar Iran: Az Afsaneh ta Waqivvat. 
pp. 265).
99 In 1999, however, about the half o f the province was living in the urban centres. See, Iran Statistical 
Yearbook: 1377 rMarch-1998-19991. Tehran, 2000, p. 62.
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These statistics invite the question of whether this underdevelopment was inten­
tional or coincidental. A closer look at the Iranian government statistics shows that the 
under development of the Baloch economy was systematic. The poverty of the area, 
and the reliance on undeveloped agriculture or nomadic pastoralism for employment 
in a “modernising” oil state indicates intentional discrimination against the Baloch by 
the Pahlavi regime. In the late 1970s, as estimated by the Baloch nationalist writer 
Mohammad Hassan Hosseinbor the number of Baloch in the provincial administration 
was hardly more than 5% of total civil servants.200 According to Hosseinbor, even the 
limited development programmes were “geared toward the Persian bureaucrats and 
immigrants, serving and living in the province because they were the ones whose 
opinions and voices were heard in Tehran.”201 The Pahlavis neglected Balochistan in 
all fields. It received a minimal share of Iranian oil revenues, had no large scale indus­
tries, no rail roads other than a rail link between Pakistan and Iran, built by the British 
during the First World War, and only a single asphalt road built for military purposes 
during the last years of the Pahlavi regime.
Like the Baloch in eastern Balochistan, the economical grievances of the Ira­
nian Baloch are deep rooted. It appeal's that their backwardness was a result of the 
patterns of early Iranian modernisation, as established by Reza Shah Pahlavi in the 
1920s and 1930s. Industrialisation and infrastructure were concentrated on the ethni­
cally Persian-occupied Iranian Central plateau. Mohammad Reza’s later industrialisa­
tion in the 1960s and 1970s maintained this bias. In the early 1960s, an Italian concern 
known as Italconsul directed by the Iranian government revealed that the province 
was for the most part fertile, formed of volcanic layers and that there were substantial 
underground water reserves, as well as it was rich in minerals, including krumit, oil, 
manganese coal, marble, iron ore, and copper.202 In spite of these positive results no 
step was taken for the development of these resources. As concluded by Selig Harri­
son, “the Shah did little to develop copper, uranium, or other mineral resources in 
Baluchistan, fearing that to do so would only whet the Baluch appetite for independ-
200 M. H. Hosseinbor, “Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism”, p. 153.
201 Ibid.
202 Italconsul, Plan Organization of Iran Socio-Economic Development Plan For the South-Eastern Re­
gion: Preliminary Report (Agricultural Survey), Rome, 1959. See also, Government of Iran, Shonasai-e 
Mokhtasar-e Ostan Sistan wa Balochistan. Zahedan, 1358/1980, pp. 21- 23.
203 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 174.
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Summation
In 1981, the Baloch consisted of approximately 10 million individuals whose 
ancestors have lived in southern Kerman, Makkoran and Sistan for at least 2 millen­
nia. Despite differences form region to region, and from tribe to tribe, Baloch society 
developed it own distinctive culture. They are Sunni Muslims, although a minority of 
Baloches in Makkoran are “Zikris” (Zigris) and also a small minority in Dalgan (Ira­
nian Balochistan) are Shiite. In fact religion plays only a minor role in creating the 
feeling of Baloch distinctiveness, although religious adherence may reflect loyalty to 
different villages and tribes.
Before the emergence of the Islamic fundamentalism in the region, Baloch 
were not religiously devout as compared to their neighbours, the Persians and Pash- 
tuns. Their primary loyalties were to their tribal leaders. An agricultural people origi­
nally organised on tribal lines, the importance of the tribe has begun to decline as the 
population migrates to cities. The urbanisation of the Baloch has not eliminated tribal 
loyalties, however, possibly because the Baloch have not experienced the economic 
benefits that urbanisation has produced in other provinces of Pakistan and Iran.
While the Baloch country lacks boundaries in the modern sense of term, it is 
generally understood by the Baloch and their neighbours to comprise an area of over 
half a million square kilometres in the southern part of the Iranian plateau, south of 
the central deserts and the Helmand river, and the coastal lowlands between the Ira­
nian plateau and the Gulf of Oman, Its boundaries are vague and not consistent with 
modern geo-political boundaries.
However, on the basis of a common history, culture and language Balochistan is 
demarcated by the Indus and Hub rivers and the mountain of Kirthar, which form a 
natural border between it and the Indian subcontinent in the east; in the North-east, the 
Sulaiman mountains and the river Gomal separate the Baloch country from the Pash- 
tuns of Pakistan, while Western Balochistan is separated by Dasht-e-Lut and Dasht-e- 
Kavir from the main bulk of Persian speaking Iran; in the south, the Gulf of Oman and 
the Persian Gulf divide the Arabs and the Baloch; in the North-west, desert (Registan) 
and the mountains are the natural boundary between the Afghans and the Baloch. This 
vast tract of land covers a coastline of 1,000 miles stretching from the Strait of Hur- 
muz to the west of Karachi port on the Arabian Sea.
The extreme natural contrasts alternating between massive ranges of barren 
mountains, rocky plains, deserts, and fertile valleys, form the striking feature of the
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land. Makkoran’s massive coastal ranges in the south, the Bashakard mountains in the 
north-west, the Taftan (Daptan) volcano and Bazman ranges which are the extension 
of Iran’s central and north-eastern mountains into the Sarhadd region of northern Ba­
lochistan, the snow-covered ranges of the central Kalat highlands, and the massive 
ranges of the Sulaiman mountains as the extension of the Hindukush mountains into 
the north-east and the east, have given the land a predominantly mountainous charac­
ter. These mountains, stretching sometimes for a hundred miles in parallel, have al­
ways formed major barriers to easy communication within the country. At the same 
time they have served as natural harbours, sheltering the Baloch in cases of war and 
foreign invasion.
Tribal system, which has its characteristic form in clan and family structure, 
plays an important role in the Baloch society. It is a major factor in regulating and 
systemising individual behaviour, which in turn influences the formation and suste­
nance of the socio-political organisation of the entire tribe. The social organisation of 
the Baloch tribes is based on the principle of patrilineal descent. Originating from an 
eponymous ancestor, a segmentary structure of descent groups in the form of clans 
and lineage emerges. Through the seniority principle, a hierarchy of superior and sub­
ordinate units arises due to the respective genealogical proximity of segments to the 
focal ancestor. In social reality this manifests itself in the form of a tribal society 
stratified into nobles and commoners and this stratification, legitimised through de­
scent.
Tribal ties, however, are of little significance in southern Balochistan (both 
Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan), Makkoran, which was originally a stratified soci­
ety, with a class of nominally Baloch landowners controlling the agricultural re­
sources. Neither can the Kacchi plains in the east, nor Las Bela in the southernmost 
part of Balochistan be characterised as tribal. In contrast, tribal social structure is im­
portant in Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Barkan; in Kalat and Khuzdar districts in central 
Pakistani Balochistan, northern Iranian Balochistan, Sarhadd, southern Afghanistan, 
Nimruz, and even to some extent in the rural areas of Sindh and Punjab.
The Baloch mostly speak Balochi, but many of them also speak Brahui, Sindhi 
and Seraiki, so Balochi cultural development emphasised oral rather than written tra­
ditions. The first Baloch publications emerged in mid-20th century in eastern Ba­
lochistan, but except for a brief period, publications in Balochi have been forbidden in
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Iranian Balochistan. The official policy of the Iranian government was to encourage 
acculturation of the Baloch into the dominant Persian culture.
Economically, however, basic economic transformation has occurred in all 
three parts of Balochistan (Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan) regardless of the regimes 
in power, although some leaders, such as Iran’s Mohammad Reza Shah, Pakistan’s 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, or the Marxists who came to power in Afghanistan in 1978, have 
shown more determination than others to accelerate the process. Thus, the Baloch na­
tionalism is mainly based on ethnic, cultural, historical and territorial claims. It was 
accelerated by the modern socio-economic changes of 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, 
language and religion also play an important role in Baloch nationalism. Being an 
amorphous people, Baloch nationalism is based on both ethnic claims and on a will­
ingness of the people to identify freely with the Baloch nationalist cause.
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CHAPTER THREE
Historical Development 
Introduction
History, according to Nina Swidler, is the heart of recent Baloch nationalist 
scholarship. Arguing the importance of the historical basis of the Baloch nationalism, 
Swidler points out, “in part because other conventional sources of national identity are 
problematic and in part because the failed insurgency of the 1970s highlighted paral­
lels between the colonial and post-colonial situation of the Baloch”.1 The Baloch na­
tionalists largely emphasise their common histoiy and cultural bonds, even more than 
their common ethnic origin.2 It is because Baloch origins are obscure; legends suggest 
that heterogeneous groups of people migrated at different times to the territory to 
which they gave their name. According to G. P. Tate, “Whatever ethnological signifi­
cance may have been attached at one time to the term Baluch disappeared and the 
name at last came to mean merely nomads of mixed blood.”3 Brian Spooner also sug­
gests that the ‘Baloch’ may have been a generic term referring to all nomadic groups 
beyond the reach of settled authority.4
Religion and language are also problematic markers of an inclusive Baloch 
identity. The vast majority of Baloch are Sunni Muslims, as are most Pakistanis; thus 
religion does not distinguish Baloch identity in Pakistan. However, the case in Iranian 
Balochistan is different, hi Iranian Balochistan, the Baloch are Sunni but most Irani­
ans are Shiite Muslims. There are a substantial number of Brahui speakers in northern 
Balochistan who are culturally very similar’ to the Baloch, and the Baloch, who inhabit 
the Indus Plains, Punjab and Sindh retain their ethnic identity though they now speak 
Sindhi or Seraiki. Although Brahui and Balochi are unrelated languages, multi­
lingualism is common among the Brahui speaking. “The Balochi and Brahvi lan­
guages”, Tariq Rahman believes, “are symbols of the Baloch identity, which is a nec­
essary part of Baloch nationalism.”5 While Baloch scholars acknowledge past ethnic 
and tribal divisions, they are reluctant to acknowledge them in the present. They argue
1 Nina Swidler, “Beyond Parody”, in: Paul Titus (ed.), Marginalitv and Modernity, p. 169.
2 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 34-43.
3 G. P Tate, Seistan: A Memoir on the History. Topography. Ruins, and People of the Country, p. 365.
4 Brian Spooner, “Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography” (pp. 598-632), In: Ehsan 
Yarshater, (ed.), Encvclopadia Iranica. (Vol. Ill) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988.
87
that the cultural similarities between Baloch and Brahui far outweigh the differences, 
and they suspect the government of supporting ethnic distinctions in order to under­
mine a national identity.6
The use of histoiy is central for modern nation building.7 Relying on their Sha- 
jaras (genealogies) and traditions the Baloch claim that they came from Aleppo, pre­
sent Syria, through Iran to Balochistan, in the early year's of Islamic calendar.8 Despite 
the lack of an early written literature, the Shairs (poets), and Loris (professional min­
strels) have handed down to the present day the stories of the their resistance against 
the invasions of the Turks and Mugals in the 13th and 14th centuries. Similarly the 
myths of wars with the Persians, the Afghans, and other foreign invaders in the later 
period, the mass migration into Sindh and Punjab, as well as the memories of the glo­
rious days of their power during the reign of Mir Jalal Han (12th century), and Mir 
Chakar Rind (1485-1512), all have been maintained by their war’ ballads from genera­
tion to generation. Inspired by their myths and legends, genealogy and traditions, the 
Baloch claim to have a long and heroic history with endless resistance movements. 
Thus for them to be a Baloch is source of honour'.
Describing the Balochs’ perception of their history, Selig Harrison a promi­
nent authority on the subject of Baloch nationalism wrote in 1981, “Reliving their past 
endlessly in books, magazines, and folk ballads, the Baluch accentuate the positive”. 
“They revel in gory details of ancient battles against Persians, Turks, Arabs, Tartars, 
Hindus, and other adversaries, focusing on how valiantly their generals fought rather 
than on whether the Baluch won or lost. They point to the heroes who struggled to 
throw off the yoke of more powerful oppressors and minimize the role of the quislings 
who sold out the Baluchi cause”.9 
The Early History
Evidence of civilisation in Balochistan has been found from as far back as the 
third millennium BC.10 Archaeologists believe that the people of the area had become 
familial* with agriculture and the use of wild animals, and that they lived in clay-brick
5 Tariq Rahman, “The Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan”, in: Journal of South Asian 
and Middle East Studies Vol. XIX, No.3, Spring 1996, p. 88.
6 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 260.
7 A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 191-199.
8 M. Longworth Dames, Popular Poetry o f the Baloches. vol. 1, pp. 1-3.
9 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 12.
10 Beatrice de Cardi, Excavation at Bampur: A Thud Millennium Settlement in Persian Baluchistan. 
1966, Volume 51: Part 3, Anthropological papers of the American Museum of Natural History, New
houses. Stone-made ornaments and jewellery of precious stone were also found. In 
this period, Balochistan according to archaeological evidence served as an intermedi­
ary link between the cultures of South Asia and Middle East.11
There is a marked cultural similarity between the settlements in Balochistan 
and those of the Indus Valley civilization. The material remains found in Nal, Quetta
19and Mehrgar support this assertion. The Indus Valley civilization, which reached its 
zenith around 2000 BC, is presumed to have been founded by Proto-Australoid people 
maintaining regular contact with Mediterranean culture and mixing with its peoples.13 
Trade and cultural links between the Indus Valley civilization and the contemporary 
Sumerian civilization were well established. The Sumerian and Akkadian records, 
dating from 3000 and 2000 B.C., mention such trade relations between the Tigris- 
Euphrates valley and places called Magan and Melukhkha, identified with the present- 
day Makkoran.14 Migration to this region from other parts of the world began early in 
prehistoric times. Among the early arrivals were the Dravidian peoples. The Aryan 
tribes that began pouring into the Iranian plateau between 1500 and 1000 BC followed 
the Dravidians.15 They gradually established their hold over the whole Iranian plateau 
and the western and northern pails of the Indian sub-continent. From about 1000 BC 
the Indo-Aiyans had vanquished all significant opposition and become the dominant 
and most numerous group in these areas.16
The Baloch form the core ethnie of the Baloch nation. Their history begins in 
the antiquity of creation myths. These myths of their origin also supported by the tra­
ditions and genealogy, tell us about their Arab origin. While such myths do not reflect 
much light on the historical roots of a people, they nevertheless demonstrate a peo­
ple’s belief in the antiquity of their origins. Myths like that of Daptar are widely be­
lieved and thus politically important today.17 The historical record itself is vague on
York: 1970, pp. 258-269; see also Gergoiy L. Possehl, Kulli: An Exploration of Ancient Civilization in 
Asia. Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina 1986, pp. 1-7.
11 Gergoiy L. Possehl, Kulli: An Exploration of Ancient Civilization in Asia, pp. 58-61.
12 Ibid.
13 For more detail see S. Wolpert, A New Histoy o f India. New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1982.
14 J. Hansman, “A Periplus of Magan and Melukha”, in BSOAS. London, 1973, p. 555.
15 The Aiyan migration has been steady and taken place in successive waves. The first to arrive on the 
Iranian plateau, around the middle o f second millennium BC, are termed Indo-Iranians. They moved 
from the region o f the Oxus and Laxartes rivers. The Indo-Iranian appear to have lived in settled com­
munities and spoken an Indo-European tongue (for more information see, Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peo­
ple of Pakistan, p. 146).
16 Ibid.
17 The concept of myth and legend in political discourse is one, which is frequently used but rarely de­
fined. It has become a convenient conceptual receptacle for all that is perceived to be irrational or
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whether the Baloch were native to their land, or whether they arrived during one of 
the many waves of migration that swept the ancient Middle East. It must be borne in 
mind that various Islamic peoples in the region have pretended to an Arab descent and 
proudly displayed Arab genealogy -  a fact no doubt due to the religious prestige 
which attaches to Arab descent among these peoples.
The Baloch Semitic origin has been questioned, not only by the non-Baloch 
scholars, but as well by the Baloch. Living in the vicinity of the Persians and Indians 
for millennia, having a close linguistic affinity with both of them, the Balochs’ preten­
sion to an Arab descent, probably rooted in the consistent suspicion and distrust be­
tween them and their Persian and Indian powerful neighbours. The Baloch inclination 
to their Arab neighbours as far as we know it has always been more or less politically 
motivated.18 For Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, “the belief of the majority of the Baluch that 
they are of Semitic or Arab descent, and are thus a non-Iranian and non-Indian race, 
justifies to themselves their status as a separate nation on the basis of a different back­
ground in Pakistan and Iran”.19
There are two competing theories on the historical origin of the Baloch: the 
first states that the Baloch are a native people who have been described as the Oritans, 
the Jatts, the Medes, etc. in ancient records; the second states that the Baloch migrated 
into the area some 2000 years ago.
The native theory is based on the argument that the indigenous people of 
Makkoran form the bulk of the Baloch nation. Probably, the word “Baloch” is a cor­
rupted form of Melukhkha, Meluccha 01* Mleccha, which was the designation of Mak-
judged false in political ideas. This view is essentially a product of the 18th century Enlightenment 
which sought to remove myth and legend through the use of reason and philosophy. Myth and legend 
as a concept, nevertheless enjoys substantial intellectual pedigree compared not always unfavourably 
with the study of history. Indeed Aristotle rejected histoiy in favour of myth, arguing that while history 
dealt with the particular and provided no valuable lessons for mankind, myth in contrast dealt with uni­
versal truths, which could be applied to the human condition. Myth and legend therefore enjoyed a util­
ity that history did not. The competition between classical “historians” and poets was such that Poly­
bius conceded that some historians succumbed to the writing of what he termed “tragic history”. The 
use of myth and legend as history, and indeed the porous nature of the boundary dividing them was not 
confined to the Western world as the Balochi “Daptar-e Shair” testifies, but while the West developed 
a discipline o f histoiy antagonistic to myth and legend, the close relationship between the two remained 
in the East. For more information see, Aristotle, Poetics. London: Penguin 1996, chapter 9.
18 With the invasion of the Arab Muslims in Iran in 651 AD, the Baloch commander of Iranian Army 
Siah Sawar Baloch supported the Arabs, who according to the Iranian national poet and historian, Ba- 
har, was responsible to the Iranian defeat (form more detail see Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of 
Greater Baluchistan, p. 93). It was also mainly due to the Persian fear that Nasir the Great established 
good relations with the Arab o f Oman. In the last one hundred years many tribal chiefs and nationalist 
leaders, tided to get support from their Arab neighbours to free themselves from the Persian domina­
tion.
19 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 41.
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koran dming the third and the second millennia B.C., as shown by the Mesopotamian 
texts.20 The Baloch, according to the native theory, are considered to be the descen- 
dent of the Med, a nomadic people of the Median Empire (900-500 BC) and the Jatt. 
It appears that the Med are the early Aryan tribes who came to the region (c. 500 
BC).21 The Jatt are presumed to be a people of Dravidian origin who migrated to 
Makkoran from the east before the Med 22 Col. Mockler, who served as a political of­
ficer in the region, argues that the mass of the Baloch people are the remnants of the 
ancient people of Makkoran.
Emphasing the native theory of Baloch origin, Dr. Sabir Badalkhan, a special­
ist on Balochi oral poetiy points out, “.. .it seems more likely that the majority of the 
Balochi speakers, living in the present-day Balochistan, had not come from outside as 
a result of a mass migration as it is generally believed by some writers basing their 
hypotheses on some poetic fragments most probably composed during the late 16th 
century”. Similarly, Munir Ahmad Gichki, a history professor in Balochistan Uni­
versity, strongly criticises the Baloch migration theoiy from northern Iran in late first 
millennium AD. Being outsiders and invaders, according to Gichki, the British con­
ceptualised a histoiy about the Baloch for their own perspectives and political views. 
They historicised the Baloch like themselves, as conquerors from foreign lands. The 
British, according to Gichki, created this concept because they wanted to paint the Ba­
loch as an emigrant people in their own land, Balochistan.25
According to the orientalist version of Baloch history, the Baloch came to the 
present Balochistan as immigrants in the 11th century26 or according to some sources, 
even much later, in the 14th century.27 This theoiy, as earlier mentioned, locates the 
Baloch migration into Balochistan just a few centuries before the British arrival in the 
region. Consequently, according to this interpretation of histoiy, Gichki argues, “both
20 J. Hansman, “A Periplus of Magan and Melukha”, in BSOAS. London, 1973, p. 555; H. W. Bailey, 
"Mleccha, Baloc, and Gadrosia”, in: BSOAS, No. 36, London, 1973, pp. 584-87. Also see, Cf. K. Kart- 
tunen, India in Early Greek Literature. Studia Orientalia, no. 65, Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 
1989, pp. 13-14.
21 Ibrahim Bashmi, Oaus al-Khalii al-Mashdood, Bahrain, 1998, p. 344; Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, 
Tavikh-e Baloch waBalochistan. Vol. l ,p .  11.
22 The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran. p. 95.
23 E. Mockler, "Origin of the Baloch”, in: Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Culcutta, 1895, p. 
36.
24 Dr. Sabir Badalkhan, “A Brief Note of Balochistan”, unpublished. This ariticle was submitted to the 
Garland Encyclopedia of World Folklore, New York-London, (in 13 vols): vol. 5, South Asia, edited 
by Margaret Mills,
25 Interview with Munir Ahmad Gichki.
26 Brian Spooner, Baluchistan: Geography. History, and Ethnography, p. 599.
27 M. Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race, pp. 35-36.
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the Baloch and the British should have the same status regarding their right over the 
country”. Professor Munir Ahmad Gichki is of the strong opinion that the Baloch his­
toiy in Balochistan is as old as the Persians5 and the Afghan histoiy in the region.28
Like Gichki, the Iranian writer, Iraj Afshar (Sistani) in his book Negahi be Sis- 
tan wa Balochistan (A Glimpse to Sistan and Balochistan, 1985) argues that the Ba­
loch since the ancient time have been living in their present homeland, Balochistan. 
Their histoiy, according to Afshar is as old as the written Iranian histoiy. He believes 
that the Baloch like the Persians, the Tajiks and the Kurds are an Aryan or Iranian
9Qrace. It should be noted that when the Arabs conquered the area during the reign of 
Caliph Waleed bin Abdul Malik (705-715), the Baloch were already living in Mak­
koran, southern Balochistan.30 Those who believe the Baloch are natives, however, 
trace the habitation of modern Balochistan by the same people, referred to by histori­
ans by different names.
Some scholars, however, challenge the view that the Baloch are the original 
people in the area. Based on linguistic evidence, they believe that the formation of the 
Baloch ethno-linguistic community is associated with the migration into Kerman and 
Makkoran of the principal ethnic group of today's Balochistan, the Baloch. Arguing 
largely on linguistic basis, these scholars believe that the Baloch were living along the 
southern shore of the Caspian at the time of Christ. They argue that the Balochi lan­
guage originated in a lost language linked with the Parthian or Median civilisations, 
which flourished in the Caspian and adjacent areas in the pre-Christian era.31 Why and 
when this migration occurred is not clear. It is possible that it was brought about by 
Khusrow I Anushirwan’s campaigns against the Baloch, the tribes inhabiting the terri­
tory of present-day Gilan and northern Khorasan, or by the incursion of the Ephtalites 
into Northern Iran.32 “If the latter is the case55, believes Gankovsky, “the south­
eastward migration of these tribes who account for the ethnogenesis of the Baloch na­
tion took place approximately in the fifth and the early sixth centuries AD5’33
The above-mentioned two theories, however, are not totally antithetical. It is 
possible that a group of people who are native to the land lived in the area for thou­
28 Interview with Munir Ahmad Gichki.
29 Iraj Afshar (Sistani), Negahi be Sistan wa Balochistan. pp. 225-26.
30 Ibrahim Bashmi, Oaus al-Khalii al-Mashdood. p. 349.
31 Josef Elfenbein, “The Baluchi Language: A Dialectology with Texts”, in: The Roval Asiatic Society. 
London, 1966, pp. 41-45; Frye, R. W, “Remarks on Baluchi Histoiy”. In: Central Asiatic Journal Vol. 6, 
1961, p. 49.
32 M. Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race, p. 29.
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sands of years speaking a dialect, which is related to the modem Brahui language. 
With the arrival of an Iranian-origin people from the region around Caspian Sea in the 
5th or 6th centuries AD., as observed by Gankovsky, the original population may have 
abandoned their former tongue and accepted the language of the new arrivals. The 
dispute is likely to keep ancient historians busy for some times. Whether an indige­
nous people or migratory, the Baloch have lived in the area of Balochistan since the 
start of the Christian era, and their language is primarily related to the northern Iranian 
languages.34
The Baloch, according to Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, are descendants of
or
Chaldeans or Babylonians. The great Chaldeans of ancient histoiy, according to 
Sardar Khan Baloch, “hereafter, passing from turmoil and transition were no more 
heard by the same name but in intermittent periods of history in alien lands under 
alien rule were addressed as ‘Balus’ or ‘Baloch’ after the name of their patron deity 
and patent cult, the god Belus of temple Belus.” Sardar Khan developed a theory 
originally from G. Rawlinson, a professor of ancient history at Oxford University, 
that the word Baloch derived from “Balus” -  the King of Babylon, who is identified 
with Nimrod or Nebrodes, the son of Kush, of the Holy Writ, and was the founder of
o o
the Chaldean dynasty. In 538 BC, Cyrus the Great, Achaemenian ruler and founder 
of the Persian Empire, defeated the last Chaldean ruler, Beshazzar. Thus the Chaldean 
Empire came to an end. After the fall of Babylon, according to Sardar Khan Baluch, 
the ancestors of the Baloch (Chaldeans or Babylonians), were forced by the Achaem­
enian (Persian) ruler to migrate to the shores of the Caspian Sea, and the area called 
today Armenia and Kurdistan.39 However, relying on Ferdowsi’s Shahnamah. Baloch 
were living in the northern regions of the Iranian plateau much earlier than Cyrus’s 
expeditions to Babylon. Shahnamah mentions the Baloch as the resident of Gilan and 
Khorasan in the Median era, that means before the time of Cyrus, the Persian con­
queror who defeated the Meds and established the Persian Empire.40 Thus, it directly 
contradicts to what Sadar Khan claims.
33Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 144.
34 Iraj Afshar (Sistani), Negahi be Sistan wa Balochistan. pp. 225-26.
35 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, Histoiy of Baluch Race and Baluchistan. Quetta: Khair - un -Nisa, 
Nisa Traders, Third Edition 1984, p. 16.
36 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, Histoiy of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, p. 16.
37 G. Rawlinson, Five Great Monarchies o f the Ancient Eastern World, London, 1862.
38 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, Histoiy of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, pp. 16-26.
39 Ibid., p. 26.
40 Ferdowsi, Shahnamah: Matn Inteqadi. vol. 4, p. 28.
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Returning back to the second and the first millennia BC., mighty empires such 
as the Assyrians, the Medians, the Persians held sway in that “cradle of civilisation” 
which stretched from the shore of the Mediterranean to the hinterland beyond the Per­
sian Gulf. According to Shahnamah. the legendary king of Media (Madistan), Kai 
Kawos, expanded his empire up to the Balochistan coast.41 Defeated by the Persians, 
the Median Empire came to its end in 549 BC. The mightiest Persian King, Darius 
(522-485), subjugated Balochistan at around 540 B.C. He declared the Baloch country 
as one of his walaycit (province) and appointed a satrap (governor) to i t 42 Probably it 
was during the Madian rule and the later Persian domination that the Baloch tribes 
were gradually Aryanised, and their national characteristics formed. If that is the case, 
the formation of the Baloch ethno-linguistic identity should be traced back to the early 
centuries of the first millennium BC.
The earliest extant source, “Shahristaniha-e Eran-shahr”, a Pahlavi text written 
in the 8th century, though probably representing a pre-Islamic compilation43, lists the 
Baloch as one of the seven autonomous mountain communities. The Arab writers in 
the 9th and 10th centuries44 mentioned them, usually as Balus, who were living in the 
area between Kerman, Khorasan, Sistan and Makkoran. The Baloch appear to have 
had a separate district of Kerman, but they also lived in two districts of Sistan and ap­
peared in a tract some distance to the east of the Fahraj (the eastern border of Ker­
man), probably Khar an or Chaghai45
The Baloch, as mentioned earlier, are generally considered to have arrived in 
Kerman from the north 46 The evidence for this assumption depends on two argu­
ments: the classification of Balochi as a “Northwest Iranian” language”47 and the fact 
that in Ferdowsi’s Shahnamah. one of the oldest documents in this regal'd, they are 
mentioned in conjunction with Gilan and Khorasan.48 Referring to the Shahnamah. an 
Iranian linguist, Dr. Khanlari, further specifies the Baloch residence as to the north-
41 Ibid.
421. Afshar (Sistani), Balochistan wa Tamaddon-e Dirineh-e An. pp. 89-90.
43 Henrik Samuel Nyberg, A Manual of Pahlavi. Part II: Glossary, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 
1974, p. 43.
44 Especially Ebn Kordadbeh, Mas’udi, Estakri and Moqaddasi about Baloch or Balus in their works.
45 S. M. Seyed-Sajjadi, Bastan-shonasi wa Tarikh-e-Balochistan. pp. 293-314.
46 M. Longworth Daines, The Baloch Race, pp. 29-30.
47 Mussa Malnnudzai, “Moqayeseh-e Zaban-e Balochi ba Zabanha-e Irani-Bastan”, p. 8.
48 Shahnamah composed at the beginning o f the 10th century on the basis o f the earlier works particu­
larly Khwadav Namag. Khwadav Namag. a mythical royal account o f history compiled at the end of 
Sanian times and translated from Middle Persian into Arabic by Ibn Muqaffa (d. 757) -  is believed to 
have provided major sources that Ferdowsi (d. c. 1020) used for his 50,000 or 60,000 verse epic poetry. 
For more detail see, Mostafa Vaziri, Iran as Imagined Nation, pp. 119-120.
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east and the east of the Caspian sea and the north of present-day Khorasan, before 
they moved to Kerman, Sistan and Balochistan.49
The Baloch are mentioned both in mythological and historical parts of the 
Shahnamah. In the mythological part of the Shahnamah the Baloch make their ap­
pearance as gallant warriors forming a part of the army of Kai Kawos, also known as 
“Kai Khosrow”. The King’s son known as Siawosh in Shahnamah commanded this 
army. Siawosh was directed to wage a war against Afrasiab, the king of Turan, who 
was an enemy of Iran.50 The army formations, composed of different tribes, were pre­
sented to Kai Kawos for inspection; and each contingent acted under its own leader. 
The Shahnamah comments: “After the Gustham came Ashkesh. His army was from 
the wanderers of the “Koch51 and Baloch”, intent on war with exalted “cock-combs”, 
whose back none in the world ever saw, nor was one of their fingers bare of armour. 
His banner (i.e. the banner of the Baloch contingent under Ashkesh) bore the figure of 
a tiger”.52 Shahnamah tells us about Kai Kawos’s expeditions both to central Ba­
lochistan (Turan), and Southern Balochistan (Makkoran). In the Makkoran expedition, 
according to Shahnamah the King of Makkoran was killed and his country was occu­
pied. Ferdowsi also mentions that the King Kai Kawos ordered his Baloch forces, 
headed by General Ashkesh, to remain in Makkoran. The Shahnamah says: “Be Ash­
kesh be farmood ta ba sepah. Be Makran be bashad yeki chand gah ” (He [Kai Ka­
wos] ordered Ashkesh [his Baloch commander] to remain in Makkoran for some­
time).53
49 Parviz Natel Khanlari, Zaban-shonasi wa Zaban-e Farsi. Tehran: Intesharat-e Banyad-e Farhang-e 
Iran, Chap-e Sayum, 1347/1969, p. 154.
50 It is important to note that when the Iranian philological classifications were being formed in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries Turan, due to perhaps phonetic similarity, was interpreted as the 
Turkish population o f Central Asia, who did not speak either the Indo-Iranian or any other Aryan lan­
guages. Based on this tradition, it we assume that Turan did not belong to the Iranian plateau, we face a 
geo-political as well as philological paradox. Moreover, There is convincing geographical evidence 
that, during the Ferdowsi’s time (tenth to eleventh centuries) and possibly prior to that, Turan was a 
well-known country that included the Balochistan region with its capital in central Balochistan Quzdar. 
Furthermore, during the period of Ferdowsi and of the Ghaznavid dynasty of the eleventh century, 
Turan and its principal city, Quzdar, recognised only the authority of the caliph of Baghdad. For this 
reason Sultan Mahmud had launched attacks against Turan. For more detail see, W. Barthold, A His­
torical Geography o f Iran. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 75. It is certainly possible 
that Ferdowsi had used Turan as the enemy in metaphorical sense in his construct o f epic trough poetry, 
and had used as the enemy of the rightful sovereign the opponent o f Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna who 
was his patron.
51 Koch of Shahnamah are interpreted as the Brahui, see Gul Khan Nasir Koch wa Baloch. Karachi, 
1969.
52 Ferdowsi, Shahnamah: Matn Inteqadi. vol. 4, p. 28.
53 Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 346-349.
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Why did the king, Kai Kawos order his Baloch forces, to stay in Makkoran? 
Even though the probability of an accidental event cannot be discarded, it is more 
plausible that Makkoran was already a Baloch populated region. In such a case, no 
doubt, a Baloch force might have been more effective to establish peace in a Baloch- 
inhabited, far-flung county. Azim Shahbakhsh, a histoiy lecturer in Balochistan Uni­
versity, believes that the Baloch commander, Ashkesh played a key role in the pacify­
ing of Makkoran after its occupation by Kai Khosrow.54 However, relying on the 
Shahnamah. the first Baloch contact into central Balochistan and Makkoran, was es­
tablished during the reign of Kai Khosrow, in the early 6th century BC.
It should be added that, apart from its mythological part, the Shahnamah in­
forms us about the Baloch in its historical part, during the Sasanid dynasty. The Sa- 
sanid kings Ardashir and Khusrow I Anushervan fought the Baloch and that the Ba­
loch fought against several others Sasanid kings.55 A 17th century historian, Akhund 
Saleh, in his book Kurd-Gal-Namak, cites the massacre of the Mazdakis (a Zoroas- 
trian sect) in the reign of Anushervan, the anti-Mazdaki King of Sasanid dynasty. Ac­
cording to Akhund, among the massacred followers of Mazdak, two hundred thousand 
were Baloches. The survivors of this massacre, as mentioned by Akhund fled to Turan 
(Balochistan) and Sindh.56 It has also been argued that the Baloch left traces of their 
language in the oases of the central deserts of the Iranian plateau as they migrated 
south. There is no other evidence that could be used either to date or to confirm the 
theory of a southward migration by the Baloch. It is important to note, however, that 
there are still Baloch living in eastern Kerman province.
When and why did the Baloch migrate eastward? Evidence about this migra­
tion is also limited. The main sources of our information are of two major types: the 
corpus of traditional Balochi poetry, known as Daptar-e Shair58. and the later Mughal 
histories. According to the written records, up to the late 10th century AD the Baloch 
or Koch-o-Baloch inhabited the western and northern areas of Kerman, Sistan and 
Makkoran.59 Their migration eastward may have been the result of pressure, first from
54 Azim Shahbakhsh, “The Baloch Race and Migrations”, Paper presented at Balochi Symposium at the 
University of Uppsala on 17-20*11 August 2000, Uppsala, Sweden.
55 Ferdowsi, Shahnamah: Matn Inteqadi. vol. 8, pp. 74-75.
56 Akhund Saleh, Kurd-Gal-Namak. p. 152.
57 N. Fiye, “Remarks on Baluchi Histoiy”, pp. 44-50.
58 M. Longworth Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches. volume 2, London, 1907, pp. 1-2.
59 Khaje Nezam al-Molk, Sivasat-Nameh. also known as Siyar al-Muluk, 11th Century A.D. Texts, Te­
hran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Ketabha-e Jibi, 1364/1986., pp. 75-80; see also, E. Mockler, “Origin of the 
Baloch”, in: Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Culcutta, 1895, p. 36.
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Muslim rulers, then from the Seljuk invasion in the 11th century and the devastating 
inroads later by Genghis Khan.60 By the 14th century, the Baloch were settled in cen­
tral Balochistan up to the Jhalawan hills. Their further migration to the Indus valley 
took place at a later date. In the early 13 th century, the Baloch formed the bulk of the 
population in the region north of Herat in the 13th and 14th centuries and were friendly 
with the Kurt ruler of the area.61
The oldest and most important ballad, the Daptar. probably from the 12th cen­
tury,62 states that the Baloch and the Kurd were kindred branches of a tribe that mi­
grated eastward from Aleppo (Syria). But in this ballad, the cause of migration is 
stated to be their fight with Yazid, as the Baloch by their own account were the fol­
lowers of Caliph Ali, father of Imam Hossein. After the martyrdom of Imam Hossein 
at Kerbala in 680 AD, the Baloch for fear of being persecuted by the army of Yazid, 
had to migrate eastward. The Daptar tells of the arrival of the Baloch in Sistan and of 
the hospitality of a king named Shams-al-Din.63 After a time, another ruler called 
Badr-al-Din, persecuted them and drove them away. Furthermore, the Daptar. informs 
us about the forced migration of 44 Baloch tribes southward from Sistan to Makkoran, 
under the leadership of Mir Jalal Han.64 Relying on Daptar. Longworth Dames be­
lieves that the lifetime of the legendary ancestor of the Baloch, Mir Jalal Han, falls in 
the eleventh and the twelfth centuries.65
The belief, however, prevails among all the Baloch tribes that they came from 
Aleppo, through Iran to Makkoran, whence they again moved eastward and extended 
along the Indus valley in Kalat. “The Baluch”, states Inayatullah Baloch, “differ from 
their neighbours not only in their language, literature, religion, and feelings, but also 
in their traditions and habits”.66 The Baloch, he says, presents a strong contrast to his 
Afghan neighbour. His build is shorter and he is more spare and wiry. He has bold 
bearing, frank manners, and is fairly truthful. He looks on courage as the highest vir- 
tue, and on hospitality as a sacred duty. Unlike the Afghan he is seldom a religious 
bigot and, as Sir Denzil Ibbetson, in mid-19th century described the Baloch, “he has
60 Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 146.
61 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch. Quetta 1965, pp.40-42.
62 M. Longworth Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches. vol. 1, pp. 1-3.
63 A ruler by that name claiming descent from the Saffarids hi known to have died in 1164, A.D. For 
more information see Azim Shahbakhsh, “Barrasi-e Hemasah-Sarai Dar Zaban-e Balochi”, p. 66.
64 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 95.
65M. Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race, pp. 35-36,
66 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem o f Greater Baluchistan, p. 77.
67 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch. pp. 83- 100.
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less of God in his head, and less of the devil in his nature”68 Dr. Jehanzeb Jamaldini a 
physician, is of the strong opinion that the Baloch are genetically different from the 
Punjabis and the Persians. He believes “the Baloch not only physically, but also bio­
logically and mentally are unique.” Furthermore, Dr Jehanzeb points, “the Baloch 
have their own sets of values, which are quite different to rest of nations living in the
m  69region .
The Balochs have their own national code of honour, which separates them 
from their neighbours. Inayatullah Baloch points to the importance of the Baloch na­
tional code of honour as a factor, which gives the Baloch a separate national identity. 
He points out that the most important part of the Baloch unwritten constitution is 
known as the “Balochmayar” (code of honour), which guides the Baloch national life. 
In many ways, the “Balochmayar” influences the life of the individuals and deter­
mines the future of Baloch society. These traditions are completely different from the 
traditions of the Muslims of the Indo-Pak subcontinent and from those of the Persians 
of Iran. Each person from his youth knows the Baloch traditions. The Baloch code of 
honour, as stated by Inayatullah Baloch, “is opposed to and contradicts state laws of 
Iran and Pakistan.”70
Linguistically, beside the Baloch, the second important group in Balochistan 
are the Brahui. Brahui traditions and war ballads regal'd the word Brahui as derived 
from the eponym of one of their forefathers, Braho, which is not an uncommon modi-
71fication of the name of Brahim or Ibrahim. According to The Imperial Gazetteer of
India, the origin of the Brahui is as much an enigma to the ethnologist as their lan­
guage has been to the philologist.72 Different views are expressed about the origin of 
Brahuis. Khuda Bakhsh Mani holds the view:
The Brohis were, it seems, one of the many early tribes of Baloches; and 
to this day, the Brohi-speaking tribes in Balochistan claim to be Baloches.
Most of them are bi-lingual, speaking both Balochi and Brohi. A close
68 Sir Denzil Ibbeston, The races, castes and tribes of the people in the report on the Census of Punjab. 
published in 1883, cited in: Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch. pp. 83-100, It is im­
portant to note that the Baloch way of life influenced the way in which Islam was adopted. Up to tenth 
century as observed by the Arab historian Al-Muqaddasi the Baloch were Muslim only by name (Al- 
Muqaddasi, Ahsanul Thaqasim, quoted in Dost Muhammad Dost, The Languages and Races of Af­
ghanistan, Kabul, 1975, p. 363.) Similarly, Marco Polo, at the end of the thirteenth century, remarls that 
some of people are idolators but the most part are Saracens (The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran. p. 
113).
69 Interview with Dr. Jehanzeb Jamaldini.
70 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem o f Greater Balochistan. pp. 80-88.
71 The Imperial Gazetteer o f India: Baluchistan, pp. 80-90.
72 Ibid.
98
study o f the Brohi language goes to show that about 75% or more words 
have been borrowed from Balochi. The remaining words must be o f the 
language spoken since the ancient Dravidian rule of South Balochistan, 
which extended up to Moinjodaro in Sind.73 
In Henry Pottinger’s opinion the Brahuis are of Tatar 01* Mughal origin.74 Mir 
Ahmad Yar Khan, the last Khan of Kalat argues that they are of Baloch stock.75 Based 
on linguistic evidence, however, a small group of scholars is of the view that the Bra­
huis belong to the Dravidian stock. Denys Bray considers that the Brahuis are of Dra­
vidian origin. He perceived that the language spoken by the Brahuis is similar to the 
Dravidian language.76
The Brahui are considered by some to be a stumbling block to Baloch nation­
alism because of their different language. The Pakistani governments, as the British 
before them, classified the Brahui as a separate ethnic group in order to thus weaken 
Baloch nationalism.77 But recent linguistic and anthropological researches have chal­
lenged this claim. According to linguist Carina Jahani, of Uppsala University, ethnic 
affiliation is not as quickly changed as language; there is 110 necessary correspondence 
between regarding oneself as Baloch and using the Balochi language. Balochi gives 
way to Indian languages in the east and Persian in west, and some groups in those ar­
eas no longer speak Balochi though they maintain their Balochi identity. “Brahui 
tribes, in central Balochistan”, Jahani argues, “belong to this categoiy which are bilin-
HQ
gual in Brahui and Balochi.” Similarly, Walker Connor even believes that cultural 
assimilation need not mean psychological assimilation.79
Nina Swidler, an anthropologist who studied the Brahuis, stressed “many simi­
larities in culture, traditions, and political organisation”.80 She did not discover any 
difference between the Baloch arid the Brahuis, apart from the language.81 Selig Har­
rison writes, “in terms of vocabulary ... Brahui is merely a variant of Balochi”. In fact 
the existence of a few Dravidian words in Brahui cannot be made a reliable basis to 
advance the theory that the Brahuis are Dravidian. Possibly, during the Mauryan rule
73 Mir Khuda Baklsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchligh on Baloches and Balochistan, p. 110.
74 Henry Pottinger, Travels ill Beloochistan and Sinde. p. 71.
75 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Mukhtaser Tarikh-e Baloch aur Khwanin-e Baloch. pp. 29-32.
76Denys Bray, The Life-History of a Brahui. Karachi, 1977 (Repr.).
77 Interview with Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai.
78 Carina Jahani, Standardization and Orthography in the Balochi Language, p. 106.
79 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1994, p. 46.
80 Swidler, N., “Brahui Political Organization and the National State”, in: Ainslee T. Embree (ed.), 
Pakistan’s Western Borderlands. N. Delhi, 1977, p. 86.
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of Chandragputa (ca.323-297 B.C.) the Brahuis, who already occupied the Kalat pla­
teau, had assimilated some words of the Dravidian language spoken in the adjoining 
areas of what is now Sindh and Punjab.
Since Brahui is categorised as a Dravidian language, a linguistic distinction is 
necessary. "However”, writes Harrison, “there is a continuing controversy over 
whether Brahui enthusiasts emphasise its special characteristics, while Baloch nation­
alists point out the fact that Brahui and Balochi are mutually intelligible and that Bra­
hui has become increasingly indistinguishable from Baloch as a result of borrow­
ings”.82 Another interesting element, which strengthens the cause of Baloch national- 
ism, is the bilingualism of the Brahuis. The majority of the Brahuis regarded Balochi 
as their second language. The royal family of Kalat, the Bizenjo-Sardar family and 
Bizenjos of Makkoran speak Balochi as their first language. Moreover, almost all the 
Brahui tribes in Iranian Balochistan speak only Balochi.84 It is interesting to note that 
many founders and prominent members of the Baloch national movement, like Mir 
Abdul Aziz Kurd, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, and Agha Abdul Karim, are of Brahui 
origin. However, arguing on linguistic basis, Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, be­
lieves that the Brahuis are of Dravidian origin.5,5 In spite, of his belief in the Dravidian 
origin of the Brahuis, Sardar Khan accepts that most of the Brahui population, as es­
timated by him in 1958, “less than quarter a million”, was racially Baloch.86
The theory of the Indian or Dravidian origin of the Brahuis, according to Agha 
Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, was a British fabricated theory. To justify their occupation 
and legitimise their rule over Balochistan the British attempted to prove that the Bra­
hui are racially and culturally Indians. If the Brahui proved to be Dravidian, they
• 07would culturally form a paid of British India. However, Ahmadzai does not provide 
evidence to support his viewpoint. Similarly, the Vice Chancellor of Balochistan Uni­
versity, Professor Bahadur Khan Rodini, also rejected the Dravidian theoiy of the 
Brahuis. To control and govern the Baloch country, according to Professor Rodini, the
81 Ibid, p. 112.
82 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 185.
83 Government of Pakistan, Office o f the Census Commissioner, Census of Pakistan. Karachi: Manager 
of Publications, 1951, pp. 50-51.
84 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 17.
85 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, p. 267.
86 Ibid.
87 Interview with Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai.
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British introduced the Brahuis as an Indian ethnic group. “Generating such theories 
was a part of the British divide and rule policy”, argued Professor Rodini.88
As mentioned above, many dispute the Dravidian origin of the Brahuis. Mir 
Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, the last Khan of Kalat, calls the Baloch and the Brahuis two 
groups of the same nation. According to him the Brahui group, which was originally 
called “Ibrahimi Baluches” is now pronounced as “Brahvi Baluches”.89 Khuda 
Bakhsh Marri, as mentioned above, asserts that the Brahuis are one of the many early 
tribes of the Baloch, and that many of them, including the ruling family of Kalat, use 
Baloch with their names.90 However, he believes that there is some Dravidian blood in 
them.91 Similarly, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the most popular politician in the 1970s, 
believes, “The Baloch and the Brahui are not two separate peoples; they are one and 
the same. The only difference is of language. There are absolutely no differences in 
social practices and the structure of their society. They follow the same customs from
■ 09birth to death, happiness and sorrow.” According to Bizenjo, the Baloch came to 
Balochistan in three major groups. The first waves settled in Sistan and were called 
Narui (Naroi), followed by Brahui who settled in Turan, which is now-a-days called
Qn
Jhalawan. The last wave, believes Bizenjo was of Rind.
For Kurd-Gal-Namak, a book written in 1659 by Akhund Saleh, a minister in 
the court of Mir Ahmad Khan I, the Khan of Kalat, the Brahuis have the same origin 
as the Baloch and Kurds. The word “Brahui”, according to the source is a Kurdish 
word, called “Brakhui” in Kurdish.94 The racial origin of the Brahuis is still contro­
versial. It is said that they are descendants of the ancient Oritans of Alexander’s time. 
According to P.H.L. Eggermont they were of Iranian origin95, viz. the same origin as 
the Baloch. Gul Khan Nasir, in his book Koch wa Baloch argues that the Brahuis are 
the “Koch” of Ferdowsi’s Shahnama.96 The term Brahui, G. P. Tate believes, in the
88 Interview with Professor Bahador Khan Rodini, the Vice Chancellor of Balochistan University.
89 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan. Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1975, p. 56.
90 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan. Karachi: Royal 
Book company, 1974, p. lo l .
91 Ibid., p. 230.
92 Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, “Introduction”, in: Janmahmad, The Baloch Cultural Heritage. Karachi: 
Royal Book Company, 1982, p. xxi.
93 Ibid.
94 Akhund Saleh, Kurd-Gal-Namak, Quetta: Balochi Academy, 1991, see introduction, pp. 2-8.
95 P. H. L. Eggermont, Alexander’s Campaigns in Sind and Baluchistan and the siege of the Brahmin 
tow of Harmatelia. Leuven University Press 1975, pp. 61-63.
96 For more detail see Gul Khan Nasir, Koch wa Baloch. (First Edition 1969), Karachi, 1983, pp. 1-41.
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course of time has lost any ethnological significance that may originally have attached
0 7itself to that term.
Whatever their ethnic origin may be, the Oritans of Alexander’s time, the 
Kinds of Kurd-Gal-Namak or the Koch of Shahnamah98, the Brahui regard them­
selves as part and parcel of the Baloch nation, sharing a common culture, religion, his­
torical experiences and unifying symbols with the Baloch, and above all, as discussed 
in this section, there is a strong desire among them to emphasise on a common origin 
with the Baloch, and that is politically very important.
The Expansion of Baloch Ethno-Iinguistic community
The Baloch ethno-linguistic identity took shape through a lengthy process. As 
mentioned earlier the Baloch fought with many mighty Persian kings in the fifth and 
sixth centuries before Christ. The Shahnamah tells us about their genocide by the 
most powerful Sasanian king, Anushirwan (531-578 AD) around 531 AD.99 During 
the reign of Caliph Walid bin Abul Malik (705-715), the Arabs captured Balochistan.
With the emergence of Arab rule over the region in the early 8th century, the 
Baloch gradually accepted Islam.100 The Arab rule brought some tremendous socio­
economic changes in the region. Dealing with the province of Makkoran and its capi­
tal city Panjgur of the 10th century, Le Strange quotes the literary geographer al- 
Muqaddasi as his authority, and states:
Bannajbur (Panjgur) according to Muqaddasi had a clay built fortress pro­
tected by a ditch and town was surrounded by palm-groves. There were 
tow gates o f the city, Bab-Tiz opening south west on road to Tiz and Bab- 
Turan north east on the road to the district o f that name of which the capi­
tal was Kuzdar [Khuzdar]. There was a stream to water the city and Fri­
day mosque stood in the market square, though there were really only 
Moslem in name being savage Balusis (Baluchis) whose language was a 
Jargon.101
97 G. P. Tate, Seistan: A memory on the History. Topography. Ruins, and People of the Country, p. 
363.
98Ibid., and Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan, vol. 1, pp. 11-12, and by the same author, Koch wa 
Baloch. Chapter 1.
99 Ferdowsi, Shahnamah: Matn Inteqadi. vol. 4, pp. 346-349.
100 Before the advent o f Islam, a mixture of Buddhism, Hinduism, Mazdaki, and Zoroastrian dominated 
religion in Balochistan. Inayatullah Baloch, however, believes that in the pre-Islamic era the majority 
of Baloch were Mazdaki and Zoroastrians (see The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran, p. 113; 
Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem o f Greater Baluchistan, p. 70; M. A. Shaheen Qaisarani, Balochistan, 
Tarikh wa Mazhab, p. 259; Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan. Emergence 
Dimensions Repercurssions. p. 5).
101 G. Le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate. Cambridge, 1905, p. 329.
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The British historian Thomas Holdich, also discussed the economic prosperity 
of Makkoran under the Arab rule. He states that in Makkoran the Arabs shaped out for 
themselves overland routes to India, establishing big trade centres in flourishing 
towns, cultivating their national fruit, the date, in Makkoran valleys, and surrounding 
themselves with the wealth and beauty of irrigated agriculture.102 Thus, the emergence 
of new cities and commercial centres in Makkoran and central Balochistan (Tiz or 
Tis, Panjgur, Khuzdar, etc.) benefited the material growth of the people. Their re­
cruitment to the Arab armies improved their warfare skills and the tribal might. These 
developments enabled the Baloch to form their own polity with the fall of the Caliph­
ate in the end of 10th century.103 It must be borne in mind that since the 13th century, 
the Baloch population has constantly moved along a roughly, west-east direction. The 
Mughal invasion in the mid-13th century followed by Timur’s forays into the country 
in the next century resulted in the decline of agriculture and breakdown of irrigation 
systems forcing large scale tribal migration from Makkoran further north and north 
east where they entered Sindh and Punjab in the 14th and 15th centuries.
The largest Baloch migrations eastward, however, occurred in the early 16th 
century. At this period the Baloch tribes of Rind and Lashari fought several memora­
ble wars among themselves.104 Their hostilities continued for 30 years, between 1490 
A.D. and 1520 A.D. in and around Sivi, modern Sibi, and Kacchi with its capital at 
Gandawa. Consequently, this led to a massive wave of migration towards Punjab and 
Sindh. The Rinds who migrated from Sibi to Punjab spread up the valleys of the 
Chenab, Ravi, and Satlej rivers. It should be noted that the first record of the Baloch 
movement into Sindh is from 13th and 14th centuries. Simultaneously two other Ba­
loch tribes, the Dudai and the Hout moved up the Indus and Jhelam in the same period 
from Makkoran. About 1470, Multan’s ruler, Shah Hossein Langah (1467-1502) allot­
ted lands on the western bank of the Indus for the settlement of the Baloch. Since the 
fifteenth century, they started to put down proper roots in Sindh.105 In the year 1770, 
the Baloch overthrew the Kalhora Dynasty and became the rulers of Sindh. The 
Talpur Mir, a Baloch clan formed the new Mir dynasty (1770-1843).106 According to
102 Thomas Holdich, The Gate of India: Being an Historical Narrative. London, 1910, p. 193.
103 Yu. V. Gankovsky, The People of Pakistan: An ethnic history. U.S.S.R, Academy of Sciences, 
Institute o f Oriental Studies, Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, Central Department of Oriental 
literature, 1971, p. 145.
104 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, A Literary Histoiy o f Baluchis, p.80.
105 Sarah F. D. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power. Cambridge University Press 1992, p. 27.
106 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan. p. 189.
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the census of 1901, some twenty-three per cent of Sindhi Muslims were Baloch.107 It 
is interesting to note that the Sindh Muhammadan Association, a landlord organisa­
tion, petitioned Lord Montagu on his trip to India in 1917 that they wanted a separate
1 ORprovince composed of Sindh and Balochistan. This reflected the significant number 
of the Baloch tribes in Sindh and the prominence of their leaders, the mirs, in the early 
20th century.
Why did the Baloch disperse over the vast territory between Kerman and the 
Indus? The main reason according to Gankovsky was the slow but steady develop­
ment of the productive forces.109 As a result, the Baloch clan organisation was disin­
tegrating and feudal relations taking shape among them. As population grew, the graz­
ing grounds were not enough to go round, the Baloch were compelled to take in new 
lands. Inter-tribal wars and clashes became frequent, and the defeated tribes either had 
to submit before the victor or had to abandon their lands and look for new lands. War- 
craft, which bulked large in the life of the Baloch as early as the tenth and eleventh 
centuries, rapidly gained in prestige.110
Under the reign of Shah Abbas Safavi (1585-1628), some Kurdish tribes mi­
grated into Balochistan.111 Their number increased in the time of Nadir Shah (1730- 
1747). Simultaneously, several Jadgal tribes took refuge in Bahu and Dashtiari, west­
ern Balochistan. Their migration possibly took place in the end of the 16th century
110during the Malik rule in Makkoran. A vast assimilation process continued for many 
centuries. As observed by Spooner, it continued up to the 18th and the 19th centuries. 
He had credited, partly the success of Nasir Khan’s policies, and partly the later Brit­
ish administrative classification, for the later integration and consolidation of Baloch
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national identity. Confirming the assimilation of non-Baloch tribes into the Baloch 
society, Feroz Ahmed argues, “Some of these tribes retained their languages, but got 
so thoroughly assimilated into Balochi ethnicity that there is no differences between
107 Government o f India, Gazetteer of Province of Sind. Culcutta, 1907, p. 154.
108 “Addresses Presented in India to His Excellency the Viceroy and the Right Honourable the Secre­
tary o f State for India”, in: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers. 1918. xviii (Cmd 9178), London, p. 
553.
109 Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 147.
110 Kliaje Nizam al-Molk, Siasat Namah. pp. 68.
111 Mahmud Zandmoqaddam, Heka’vat-e-Baloch. vol. II, Karoon, 1370/1992, pp. 473-475. See also 
same book vol. I.
112 Karim Baklish Saeedi, cited in: Mahmud Zandmoqaddam, Heka’vat-e-Baloch. vol. I, pp. 262-267; 
interview with Gholam Mohammd Khanzai. However, according to the British sources, the Jadgal set­
tlement in Makkoran can be traced as early as the first centuries of the Mohammadan era (The Gazet­
teer of Baluchistan: Makran. pp. 94-95).
U3Brian Spooner, Baluchistan: Geography. History, and Ethography. p. 600.
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them and other Baloch people of today.”114 However, according to Fredrik Barth a 
Norwegian anthropologist, large parts of some Baloch tribes acknowledge Pathan ori­
gin.115
As mentioned in earlier sections, over the course of centuries, the language 
and the culture of the Baloch have come to predominate throughout most of the coun­
try, so that the majority of the population may be characterised as Baloch. “See to our 
graveyards”, Dawood Khan Ahmadzai, son of the last Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar 
Khan pointed, “our forefathers are engraved in their gravestones as the Baloch.” He 
continued, “We follow the same customs from the cradle to the grave.”116 Even many 
of these early immigrants have changed their tribal names, for example Kinds to Mir- 
Balochzai and Saddazi (Jadgal) to Sardarzai, Interviewing people with different back­
ground (the Brahui, the Jadgal, the Kurd) I realised that all of them eagerly emphasise 
on their Baloch ethnic origin. Speaking with Ghulam Mohammad Khanzai, a Baloch 
intellectual with Jadgal background, he told the author, “We come from Sindh, but we 
are originally Baloch. It is why we migrated to Balochistan, we returned back to our 
original homeland”. He continued, “For example look to our tribal names, I am a Mir, 
all the Mirs speak Sindhi in Sindh”.117 According to writer and former vice chancellor 
of Sindh University, Dr. Nabi Bakhsh Baloch, only the Baloch tribes are known as 
Mir in Sindh.118
In certain parts of the Baloch country, however, such as Kalat, the Brahui lan­
guage is predominant. Along the border areas of Sindh, Afghanistan and Iran, there 
are some minor ethnic groups, which settled, in the 19th century or early 20th century. 
For example, Jamot of Lasbela, Pashtuns of Quetta, Jatts of Kacchi, Sibi and Derajat, 
Persian-Speaking Tajiks and Dehwars of Sistan and Mastung are among such minor­
ity ethnic groups in Balochistan.119 
Rise of the Baloch Rule
When did the first Baloch tribal unions arise? The early political history of the 
Baloch is obscure. It appears to have began with the process of the decline of the cen­
tral rule of the Caliphate, in the region and the subsequent rise of the Baloch in Mak-
114 Feroz Ahmed (ed.), Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtoon Question, p. 16.
115 Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Difference. Oslo, 
Johansen & Nielsen Boktrykkeri, 1970, p. 124.
116 Interview with Davood Khan Ahmadzai.
117 Inteview with Gholam Mohammad Khanzai
118 Monthly, Balochi Labzank. June-July 1999, p. 27.
119 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle, pp. 25-26.
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koran in the early years of the 11th century.120 The Umawid general Mohammad bin 
Qasim captured Makkoran in 707 AD. He also became the governor of Makkoran in 
the same year. Thereafter, Arab governors ruled the country at least until the late 10th 
century when the central rule of the Abbasid Caliphate began to decline.
The period of direct Arab rule over Makkoran lasted about three centuries. By 
gradually accepting Islam, the scattered Baloch tribes over vast area (from Indus in 
the east, to Kerman in the west), acquired a new common identity, the Islamic. Thus 
Islam gave them added cohesion.121 The Arab rule also relieved them from the con­
stant political and military pressure from Persia in the north. Moreover, as mentioned 
earlier, they benefited materially from the growth of trade and commerce which flour­
ished in the towns and ports under the Arabs, reviving the old sea and land-based 
trade routes that linked India to Persia and Arabia through western Makkoran. These 
developments appear to have played a significant role in enabling the Baloch to form 
large- scale tribal federations that led to their gradual political and military supremacy
in the territories now forming Balochistan during the period of 11th to 13th centu- 
122lies.
With the decline of the central rule of the Islamic Caliphate in the 10th century, 
local rulers and trial chieftains began, once again, to reassert their power and influ­
ence. It is precisely dining this period that the Muslim chroniclers took note of the 
accounts of the Baloch in connection with their conflicts with the rising local Iranian 
and Turkish dynasties in Kirman, Khurasan, and Sistan. The Baloch are reported to 
have been dealt a devastating blow in Kirman by the Dailami ruler Azdu-al Doula 
(949-982 AD) and his uncle Muizzu-Doula in second half of the 10th century.123 They 
were also defeated around Khabis by the troops of Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmud and his 
son Masud, at the beginning of the 11th century.124
It is generally believed that the traditional era of the Baloch begins from Mir 
Jalal Han.125 The Baloch oral history states that in the 12th century forty-four Baloch
120 M. H. Hosseinbor, “Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism”, pp. 45-46.
121 The Imperial Gazetteer o f India, vol. VI, Oxford: Calaredon Press, 1908, p. 275.
122 Thomas Holdich, The Gate of India: Being an Historical Narrative. London, 1910, pp. 297-301. See 
also Dr. Sabir Badalkhan, “A Brief Note of Balochistan”, unpublished, 1998. This ariticle was submit­
ted to the Garland Encyclopedia of World Folklore. New York-London, (in 13 vols): vol. 5, South 
Asia, edited by Margaret Mills.
123 M. Longwoith Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches. p. 32.
124 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan. p. 118-119.
125 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch: The Life and Times of Ameer Chakar Rind 
1454-1551 A.D.. Quetta, 1965, p 48.
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Bolaks (tribes) headed by Mir Jalal Han were forced by the early Turkish raids126 or as 
the historian Dr. Inayatullah Baloch believes, “by the Persians”, to migrate from Ker­
man and Sistan into Makkoran.127 Relying on the corpus of traditional poetiy, the 
Daptar, Mir Jalal Han founded a large tribal union in Makkoran with its capital at 
Bampur. The union was based on an egalitarian system. The Baloch under Mir Jalal 
Han recognised their military organisation by dividing the forty-four Bolaks into five 
military divisions. These divisions according to Dr. Baloch later became the basis of 
the five major tribes, namely Rind, Lashari, Korai, Hout, and Jatoi.128 Gankovsky 
confirms this notion by asserting that it is evidently during this period that the major 
tribal unions, which formed the nucleus of the Balochi feudal nationality in the sequel, 
arose. He adds that “several small feudal states” also flourished there including Turan 
with its capital Khuzdar in eastern Balochistan, Kanabil, present day Gandava, Kech 
in Makkoran and others.129
The early Balochi epic poetiy, which dates from the 12th century, refers to Mir
t ■I A
Jalal Han as the ruler of all the Baloch. However, there is considerable confusion 
surrounding the whole reign of Mir Jalal Han. Apart from the Baloch traditions and 
the writings of the Baloch nationalist writers, there is not sufficient historical record. 
The war ballads do not give much detail about his further rule and his administration. 
It is, however, opined that after his death, Mir Jalal Han’s kingdom was divided 
among his five divisional military chiefs. According to Longworth Dames, however, 
four of them, namely Rind, Lashari, Korai, and Hout were his sons, and the fifth one,
l o t
Jato Bibi was his daughter. The Baloch nationalist writers and poets have paid Mir 
Jalal Han great tribute. They consider him as the “founding father of the Baloch na­
tion” and the founder of the first “Baloch confederacy” in Balochistan.132
At the beginning of the 13th century, Balochistan was attacked over and over
t oo
again by the Mughals. They destroyed the Baloch polity. The economic system was 
damaged and oases were reduced to deserts. However, the Baloch ethnic stock, that 
successfully withstood the onslaughts of the Mughals, founded the Sultanate of Mak-
126 M. Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race, p 29.
127 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem o f Greater Baluchistan, p. 95.
128 Inayatullah Baloch, “Resistance and National Liberation in Baluchi Poetry”, Paper presented at Ba­
lochi Symposium at the University of Uppsala on 17-20,h August 2000, Uppsala, Sweden.
129 Yu, V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 146.
130 M. Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race, p. 36.
131 Ibid.
132 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem o f Greater Baluchistan, p. 95.
133 Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, pp. 146-147.
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koran, with Kech as its capital city possibly in the late thirteenth century. Marco Polo, 
who sailed along the Makkoran coast on his way home in 1290, describes, “Kesma- 
coran [Makkoran and its capital Kech] is a kingdom having a king of its own and a 
peculiar language”. He further records that the people “live by merchandize and in­
dustry, for they are professed traders, and cany on much traffic by sea and land in all 
directions”.134
Consequently, resistance against alien inroads over long periods of time in­
stilled among the Baloch tribes feelings of cohesion. Headed by Mir Chakar Rind, a 
tribal confederacy, referred by historians as the “Rind-Lashari union”,135 emerged in 
1485. The Rind-Lashari confederacy was one of the largest Baloch tribal confedera­
cies stretching from Kirman in the west to the Indus River Valley in the east, thus for 
the first time uniting all Baloch areas in the late 15th century. The confederacy as indi­
cated, was mainly centred around the two most powerful tribes of Rind and Lasharis, 
each in turn, and constituted a loosely organised federation of several lesser tribes. In 
1487, Mir Chakar Rind transferred the confederacy’s capital from Kech, Makkoran to 
Sivi (Sibi), eastern Balochistan.136 Having consolidated his power in eastern Balochis­
tan, Mir Chakar also advanced into Punjab, taking Multan and southern parts of Pun­
jab in the early 16th centmy.
In spite of being short-lived, this confederacy in many ways marks the begin­
ning of modern history for Balochistan. It was now that the Balochi language and cul­
ture were diffused over a vast area. This period also is known as the classical era of 
the Balochi epic or heroic ballads and romantic poetry. Apparently most of the Ba­
lochi ballads are rooted in this period, describing the events, exploits, personalities, 
and the names of tribes and localities, which collaborated with the Baloch histoiy of 
the 15th and 16th centuries.137 Parallel to the expansion of the confederacy’s hegemony 
in the country, Balochi language and oral literature also blossomed, thus strengthening 
and spreading a relatively homogeneous Balochi culture and value system throughout 
the country. The Rind-Lashari hegemony as observed by Janmahmad was the first Ba­
loch principality with a pseudo-state machinery reminiscent of similar tribal monar­
134 Sir Henry Yule (ed.), The Book of Ser Marco Polo. The Venetian Concerning the Kingdoms and
Marvels of the East, translated and edited with notes, maps and illustrations in two volumes by Sir
Henry Yule, London, 1903, p. 401.
135 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, pp. 157-163.
136 Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan: its Strategic Importance, p. 42.
137 M. Longworth Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches. vol. I, xxi-xxiv.
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chies in central Asia.138 However, like the other tribal confederacies of that time in the
11Qregion, the court language of Mir Chakar was Farsi (Persian).
Being depicted as the greatest hero of the Baloch history, Mir Chakar Rind re­
ceives highest tributes. It is believed that he was bom in Kolwa, headquarter of Mak­
koran in the middle of the 15th century. He is regarded as the direct descendant of the 
founding father of the Baloch nation, Mir Jala Han. Describing his genealogy, Sardar 
Khan writes:
Chakar came of a cultured and princely stock and such is his pedigree:
Chakar ibn Ameer Shaihak ibn Amir Ishaq ibn Ameer Kalo ibn Ameer 
Bizan ibn Ameer Baluch Khan ibn Ameer Rind ibn Ameer Jala Khan 
[Han], who lived almost between 1100-1185 A.D., and died in Barapur in 
Persian Baluchistan.140
In 1487, Mir Chakar annexed Kharan, Kalat, and Las Bela to his domain. His military 
victory over the tribes of Kalat resulted in a unified Baloch state with its capital at 
Sivi (Sibi) in about 1487 AD.141 By the early 16th century the Baloch confederacy un­
der Mir Chakar had established itself firmly in Makkoran, Kalat highlands and the 
fertile districts of Kachi and Sibi in Eastern Balochistan.142
It appears that the threat of Shiite Iran in the early years of 16th century would 
be one of the decisive factors for farther tribal cohesion and enlargement of the Ba­
loch union. Probably, Shah Ismail’s success in 1501 in establishing a Shiite dynasty in 
Iran, and his desire to spread Shiism, forced the Sunni Baloch tribes to leave their ri­
valry aside and strengthen the union and enlarge the Baloch confederacy’s realm. In a 
conversation with Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch on this subject, he strongly argued that 
the threat of the Shiite Safavids was one of the decisive factors for the Baloch unity in 
the Chakarian period. According to Maulana, the Safavids’ repeated raids were not 
aimed only to occupy Balochistan, but to compel the Baloch to accept Shiism by 
force.143 In 1613 A.D. the powerful Safavid King, Shah Abbas, sent an expedition un­
der the then governor of Kerman Ganj Ali Khan to attack Balochistan. Subsequently,
138 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 158.
139 Shah Mohammad Marri, Baloch Qaum. p. 100.
140 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch. pp. 117-118.
141 Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, pp. 88-90.
142 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan. P. 137.
143 Interview with Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch.
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the Baloch ruler of Makkoran, Malik Shams-ud-Din was defeated in Bampur, western 
Balochistan.144
The 16th century saw not only the rise of Safavid power in Iran, but also the 
Mughal power in India, and the arrival of European ships in the Sea of Oman and the 
Persian Gulf. Towards the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese found 
their way to the region and captured several places along the Makkoran coast. In 1510 
AD, they occupied the port of Gwatr, east of Chabahar, in western Balochistan.145 
Later, they also occupied two other important ports of Pasni and Gwadar, and burnt 
them. Thus, the conflict of interest of these three outside powers (the Safavids, the 
Mughals and the Portuguese) could not fail to affect the internal politics of the Baloch 
and other communities that lay between them.
Although the Baloch confederacy did not survive more than three decades 
(1485-1512), it brought far-reaching cultural and ethnic changes to the region. It rein­
144 Probably with the disintegration o f the first Baloch confederacy, headed by Mir Jalal Han, between 
11th and late 12th century, the Malik dynasty was established in Makkoran. Malik Hasan laid its founda­
tion, most probably in 12th century. It is believed that Malik Hasan was a descendant of Mir Hout, one 
of the sons of Mir Jalal Han, the legendary Baloch chief. Dr Nabi Bakhsh Baloch, however, believes 
that Malik Hasan was a Sayyid (N. A. Baloch, “The Baloch People: Their Early Migrations to Subcon­
tinent and their Principalities”, in: Monthly, Balochi Labzank. Hub, Balochistan, August 1995, p. 85)). It 
should be noted that in the old war ballads many Hout chiefs are called Malik, The famous Hout chief, 
Sohrab Khan Dudai, who headed the migration of the Dudais, a Hout sub-tribe eastward, from Mak­
koran to Derajat in 15th century, and there he founded the Baloch state of Derajat, was also known as 
“Malik” Sohrab Dudai. With its capital at Kej (Kech), this new State of Makkoran comprised the two 
former kingdoms o f Qusdar and Makkran. It was mainly inhabited by Baloch population, which had 
been using Mukri (the Baloch dialect of Makkoran) as their lingua franca since 10th century AD. The 
strong Baloch ethnic stock of the country enabled the State to successfully repulse the frequent on­
slaughts of the Guzz hordes from the northeast.
Obviously, with the establishment of the Rind-Lashari confederacy in the middle of 15th century, the 
dynasty last its independence and became a part of the new confederation. According to the Baloch 
tradition, Mir Chakar Rind divided his kingdom into several administrative units, including Makkoran. 
Possibly he appointed the Hout chief, Malik Saeed Dorrakzai, a descendant of Malik Hasan, as their 
governor in Makkoran. When in the early 16th century, the Rind-Lashari confederacy weakened and 
finally dissolved by the internal tribal conflicts, the regional governors such as Malik Saeed in Mak­
koran became independent as a result. Historian Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, however, believes that Malik 
Saeed established his authority in Makkoran, in the same time as the Rinds shifted their power centre 
into Sibi and Kacchi in eastern Balochistan in 1487. Malik Saeed also according to Ahmadzai, was not 
the chief o f “Hout” but the “Jat”. Whatever might be his tribal background, Malik Saeed re-established 
the “the Malik dynasty” in Makkoran with its capital in Kech, in the early 16th century. It is believed 
that Makkoran during the Malik period was “a united independent country” forming constitutionally a 
single state, but divided into several governments or provinces...The provinces, indeed, composed a 
Baloch ‘federation’, united under on supreme authority -  always the ruler of the province of Kej, who 
received homage and tribute from the rest” (See A. T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf: An Historical Sketch 
from the earliest Times to the Beginning of the Twelfth Century. London, 1928, pp. 75-76). The Malik 
rule continued for more than one century. The last Malik, Malik Mirza (1617-1623) was killed by the 
Boleidais in 1623. They, in turn established their own dynasty in 1623, the Boleidai dynasty (see Mir 
Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan. vol. 4, pp. 109, and 275). However, (The 
Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran. (repr. 1986), p. 46) relate the Malik dynasty of Makkoran with the 
Saffarids Malik of Sistan. It, however, admit that it is impossible to establish the identity of the Malik 
of Makkoran with certainty.
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forced the existing Baloch settlements, which accepted this fresh influx without any 
opposition. Administratively, the area divided: Sivi with Rind, and Kach-Gandhava 
with the Lashari, while a Rind representative ruled Turan.146 Soon after the creation of 
a unified Baloch state, rivalry began between the powerful factions of the confeder­
acy, the Rind and Lashari, and led to civil war with disastrous implications.147 Their 
differences began over the division of the fertile lands of Kacchi and Sibi, and led to a 
thirty-year civil war. The legendary chiefs of the two tribes, Mir Chakar Rind and Mir 
Gwahram Lashari, sought help from neighbouring rulers.148 Finally, the Lasharis suf­
fered a humiliating defeat at the hand of Mir Chakar and fled to Gujarat. Mir Chakar, 
however, weakened by this war stayed in Sibi. Simultaneously he faced the invasion 
of the Arghuns of Kandahar. After a fiercely contested battle with Shah Baig Arghun, 
the ruler of Kandahar, Mir Chakar gave up Sibi his capital and moved to Multan.
As earlier mentioned, Mir Chakar Rind ruled for about three decades from 
Sibi, which became the centre of Baloch authority. Dining his reign, and under his 
leadership, new standards were set in the arts, literature, bravery and chivalry.149 Even 
today almost every Baloch tribe aspires to treat in the footprint of Mir Chakar who no 
doubt was a brave warrior and at the same time a man filled with compassion, gener­
osity, and hospitality.150 Describing the medieval importance of Sibi, the capital city 
of the Rind-Lashari confederation, Sardar Khan wrote:
The town of Sibi took its place as the most cultured and commercial town 
in the whole of Baluchistan under the Baluch Ameerate. It remained as 
the most celebrated capital of Chakar who maintained his imperial court 
with barbaric and luxurious pageantry patent to medieval glamour. The 
capital o f Rinds acted as the eye of Baluchistan and mother of gay socie­
ties and songsters. The past traditions speak of Sibi as the most high and 
palmy city of Baluchistan, housing a population of one hundred thousand
1451. Afshar (Sistani), Balochistan wa Tamaddon-e Dirineh-e An. Tehran. 1371/1993, p. 125.
146 Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan. vol. 4, p. 90.
147 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 97.
148 Mir Chakar brought in Arguns of Kandahar while Gwahram had the assistance of many indigenous 
tribes and moral support from the Sindh rulers. In the final battle, the Rinds, supported by the Arguns, 
defeated the Lasharis but subsequently became too weak to continue their hold in the area. The editor 
of Balochi Dunya Chakar Khan Baloch and former director of radio Pakistan, Bashir Ahmad Baloch 
believe that the Sammah rulers o f Sind supported Mir Gwahram Lashari (Interview with Chakar Khan 
Baloch and Bashir Ahmad Baloch); According to Anwar Roman, there is no proper evidence of any 
direct military support to Mir Gwahram by Sindhi Rulers. Cf., Anwar Roman, Aina-e Baloch. Multan: 
Qasar-e Adab, n. d., p. 31; See also Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches 
and Balochistan. p. 184.
149 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, A Literary History o f Baluchis, p. 72.
150 Ibid.
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souls... In Sibi, flocked poets and beaux esprits o f Makuran, Sind and 
songstresses of Persian Balochistan.151
The Baloch nationalists describe the reign of Mir Chakar Rind as the golden
age of the Baloch and regard him as the "Great Baloch".152 Sardar Khan asserts, “The
age of Rind supremacy in all spheres of Baloch life, in its way and colour was just as
important in its crude form in Baluch history as the Age of Pericles in ancient Greece,
the Renaissance at the close of the Middle Ages, and the Industrial Revolution in 
1modern time”. Having moulded their destiny by uniting them under one banner, 
Mir Chakar Rind gave the scattered Baloch tribes a common identity. Thus, in nation­
alist account he is considered “like a pillar of strength for the Baloch race and author 
of Baloch code of honour and Balochi traditions”154
It is believed that Mir Chakar had an army of 40,000 men, while Babur con­
quered India with an army of only 12,000 soldiers.155 Describing his army, Marri 
wrote, “Forty thousands warriors collect on Mir’s call, all descendants of one ances­
tor. All bedecked with coats of mail and iron armours covering their head, chest and 
fore-arms; all are aimed with bows and arrows, with silken scarves, with overcoats, 
and red boots on their feet, with golden rings on their fingers.”156 The Baloch under 
Mir Chakar were well organised and well disciplined. It is speculated that Mir Chakar 
had some 400,000 to 500,000 followers on his march.157 The misfortune of Mir 
Chakar according to Inayatullah Baloch was that he did not have the political imagi­
nation or skill to convert his tribal confederacy into a more unified political iden­
tity.158
The Baloch nationalists regard Mir Chakar as the symbol of their unity and 
strength. “We are the sons of Chakar”, is the most famous song in the Baloch nation­
alist circles.159 He mastered the martial virtues of the Baloch and established the larg­
est ever, even though short-lived Baloch confederacy. Marri writes of him:
To this day Mir Chakar is regarded as one o f the greatest heroes o f the 
Baloches. He is the centre of Baloch love-lore and war-ballads. A natural
151 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan. Quetta: Khair - un -Nisa, 
Nisa Traders, (3rd Edition) 1984.
152 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch. p. 113.
153 Ibid., pp. 216-17.
154 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, A Literary History of Baluchis, p. 73.
155 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 96.
156 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan. pp. 60-61.
157 Ibid., p. 62.
158 Ibid., p. 97.
159 The National Anthem o f the Baloch Students Organisation.
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leader of men, it was him who nearly for two decades remained the sole 
leader of all the Baloches. He captured by strength of arm the Kalat high­
lands as well as lower Balochistan, and settled the Baloches there. Again, 
thanks to him and his arms, the Baloches later on ruled not only in Ba­
lochistan but also in Punjab and Sind as well. Had it not been for Mir 
Chakar, there would have been no Kalat State, nor Talpur rulers o f Sind; 
nor could the Punjab Baloches have found it easy to secure Jagirs and set­
tle down there.160
Although the Baloch who settled in Punjab and Sindh are not closely linked to 
the mainstream of Baloch life today, but the principal link with their past for most of 
them is the vast body of popular ballads dating back to the day of Mir Chakar. Handed 
down from generation to generation, and first recorded by British scholars, sung by 
professional wandering minstrels, centre to a considerable extent on Rind-Lashari 
conflict. In these ballads, Mir Chakar occupies a dominant position.
In Balochi poetry, be it war ballads or love lyrics, Mir Chakar is mentioned 
extensively. As indicated above, it was he who led the Baloch tribes into the high­
lands of Kalat or lowlands of Kacchi. Again it was due to him that the Baloch came to 
rule over parts of Sindh and in Multan, even if for only short periods. He died in 
ca.1550 A.D., and lies buried in a mausoleum in the Sahiwal district of Punjab.
The inter-tribal rivalry dealt a fatal blow to the Baloch confederacy. It de­
stroyed Baloch central organisation, weakened their strength and forced them to leave 
Balochistan and migrate eastwards, to Sindh and Panjab. In Sardar Khan Baluch’s 
opinion, “The fratricidal plunged the whole race into a bath of blood and made the 
Baluch structure to collapse and sapped to its foundation”.161 The main reasons, ac­
cording to Inayatullah Baloch were the nomadic character of the Baloch society and
*  ^ft)the lack of statesmanship of Mir Chakar Rind. They could not resolve petty matters 
by diplomacy. Despite prosperity in Sibi and Kacchi, Mir Chakar’s failure to stop 
Lashari challenges had so polarised the community and the civil war so drained the 
tribes that the Baloch failed to maintain their confederacy. The division of the newly 
occupied land and the political power, according to Professor Abdullah Jan Jamaldini
160 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Mam Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan. Karachi: Royal 
Book Co., 1974, p. 181.
161 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, p. 40.
162 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 97.
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of Balochistan University were the main cause of war between the two main rival fac-
* i  f i ' i
tions, the Rinds and the Lasharis.
In this respect, however, the interference of the two powerful neighbours of 
Balochistan, the Arghuns of Kandahar and the Sammas of Sindh played an important 
role. Their constant involvement protracted the war. As viewed by Dr Shall 
Mohammad Marri, “The rich lands of Sibi not only coveted the Baloch feudals, but 
also whet the appetite of the outside rulers.”164 The Arghuns supported the Rind chief, 
Mir Chakar Rind, while the Sammas gave their assistance to the opponent camp, 
headed by Mir Gwahram Lashari. As a result of this lasting war the Baloch power in 
Balochistan weakened and finally disintegrated.165
Thus, weakened by years long war with the Lasharis, Mir Chakar Rind after 
being badly mauled by the Arguns in a battle near Sibi, moved with his remaining 
army to Multan. At the end of the Chakarian era the whole Baloch society was dis­
rupted by the inter-tribal wars, which led to enormous migrations toward Sindh and 
Punjab. Mir Chakar, as mentioned above, migrated with about four to five hundred 
thousand persons.166
The end of the Rind-Lashari confederacy in about 1512 A.D. ended an era in 
Baloch history. Subsequently, the Baloch country was divided into several independ­
ent kingdoms, including the Dodai Kingdom of Derajat, the Makkoran Kingdom of 
Malik and Boleidai, and the Khanate of Kalat. Civil strife continued for about a cen­
tury until Mir Ahmad Khan of the Ahmadzai tribe established the Khanate of Ba­
lochistan or the second important Baloch confederacy in 1666 AD. Its unification, 
however was completed by the Khans of Kalat, Abdullah Khan (1714-1734), and Na-
1 47sir Khan the Great (1749-1795) , which will be discussed in the following section.
The Khanate of Balochistan
The Khanate of Balochistan grew, and became established, from the middle of 
the seventeenth century onwards. Centering in the Kalat highlands, southwest of Mir 
Chakar’s former capital, the Khanate was the first Baloch State to embrace all the Ba­
loch regions such as Makkoran, Western Balochistan, Derajat, Sistan, and Lasbela and
163 Interview with Abdullah Jan Jamaldini.
164 Shah Mohammad Marri, Baloch Qaum. p. 102.
165 Ibid., pp. 102-103.
166 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan. p. 62
167 It is believed that Bampur was governed by Nasir Khan the Great and paid revenue to the Khan of 
Kalat. See V/23/6/34; cf. Abdul Reza Salar Behzadi, Balochistan Par Sal-ha-e 1307-1317 Oamarh 
Tehran, 137271994, pp. 15, 64-65, 122, 128.
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consolidate them into a body under the authority of a central government. The Khan­
ate not only gave the Baloch a concept of unity and patriotism but also provided an 
unwritten constitution (Rawaj or Dastur) that became a “holy” document.168 The 
Khanate of Balochistan later became known, as the Khanate of Kalat or Kalat State 
because of its capital city, Kalat.169
When in 1666, Mir Ahmad 1 was elected by the Jirga (council of the elders or 
tribal assembly), as the Khan of Kalat, the Khanate was a loose confederacy of Baloch 
tribes living around Kalat. As a political synthesis, its internal cohesion was still very 
weak, and indeed such weakness is typical of all tribal confederations; there were nu­
merous local power centers, but no sovereign figure of reference. The Khanate of 
Kalat came into being by exploiting this very vacuum, which followed after the disin­
tegration of the Rind-Lashari confederacy in Balochistan in the early fifteenth cen­
tury.
Mir Ahmad I expanded the border of the Khanate. From the on, the history of 
the Khanate assumed a clear, definite shape; and its chronology could be deter-
i  nr\
mined. Formation of the Khanate of Kalat, according to historian Inayatullah Ba­
loch, was another important and significant chapter of Baloch history. The Rind- 
Lashari Confederacy did not survive because of its nomadic character. The Baloch 
State of Derajat was feudal in character but it did not expand because of its depend­
ency on Mughal India. Makkoran maintained its independence but failed to expand 
due to the Persian invasion and internal tribal conflicts with its Baloch neighbour, 
Kalat.171
As indicated above, since the fall of the Rind-Lashari confederacy in 16lh cen-
tury, various empires and political syntheses were in fact contending for the Baloch 
country; the Shiite Safavids to the west and the Mughal to the east, both intent upon 
consolidating their frontiers, so as to fend off forays and incursions by nomadic tribes
i nofrom Afghanistan and Central Asia. Thus, the rising Baloch confederacy was en­
tangled in continual straggle with the Mughal and Persian empires. To encounter the 
growing pressure of the Shiite Safavids, the founder of the Ahmadzai dynasty, Mir 
Ahmad I pursued a policy of friendship with the powerful emperor of India, Aurang-
168 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 101.
169 Ibid.
170 Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e-Balochistan. volume one, Quetta, 1952, pp. 27-29.
171 Ibid.
172 Cf. Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 15.
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zeb.173 However, in the reign of Mir Samandar, the Iranian army under General Tah- 
masp invaded Balochistan aiming to occupy western Balochistan but it was defeated 
and Tahmasp was killed. The Mughal emperor not only admired this deed but also 
agreed to pay him Rs. 200,000 annually as military aid to meet the challenge of Ira­
nian aggression.174
The Khanate of Kalat consolidated most of the Baloch country into a feudal 
state during the 18th country. During the early 18 th century, Abdullah Khan, the fourth 
Khan (1714-1734) expanded his realm “from Kandahar in what is now southeastern 
Afghanistan, across the Makran area all the way to Bandar Abbas in what is now a 
southern Iranian port and extended his dominion to embrace Dera Ghazi Khan District 
on the edge of Punjab”.175 By the middle of the eighteenth century, Nasir Khan I (the 
sixth Khan), the most popular, powerful and dynamic ruler of the Khanate (1749- 
1795) claimed sovereignty over “all lands where Baloches lived”. He brought Karachi 
and most of western (Iranian) Balochistan under his administration.176
Speaking of Nasir Khan, Masson, narrator of various journeys in Balochistan, 
said, “At an early period he consolidated his authority over an immense kingdom, the 
secret of his success being that he had influence enough to ensure the obedience of his 
feudal chiefs, and discretion enough to refrain from interfering in their internal af­
fairs”.177 With the confederate force bound to him by this feudal tie, Nasir Khan con­
solidated his dominions. The Marris and the Bugtis, Las Bela, Makkoran, Kharan, and 
Quetta was his kingdom. Moreover, according to Harrison, at the height of his power, 
Nasir Khan renewed Kalat’s claims of sovereignty over the Iranian Baloch areas and 
sent occasional expeditionary forces to his western borderlands.178
Nasir Khan I reigned from the seaboard stretching from Karachi for about 400 
miles west to the present Iranian frontier, the cairn of the Maliks (Maliki Chedag) on
1 7 0the “Minab River” , and up to Quetta and east from Quetta to the Derajat border -  a 
country considerably greater than Great Britain and Ireland.180 Administratively, Nasir 
Khan came closer to establishing a centralized bureaucratic apparatus covering all of
173 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 102.
174 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Mukhtaser Tarikh-e-Baloch aur Khawanin-e-Baloch. Quetta: Aiwan 
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Balochistan than any other Baloch ruler before or since. Organizing the civil and mili­
tary affairs of the Baloch Khanate on semi-modern lines, Nasir Khan established a 
“proto-parliament based on a workable constitution and congenial Baloch tradi­
tion".181 He had a Wazir (prime minister), who supervised all internal administration 
and foreign affairs matters, and a Mustoufi, whose responsibility was to collect reve­
nue from crown lands.182 The Khanate under Nasir Khan had its own flag and cur­
rency.183 Like Mir Jalal Han and Mir Chakar Rind, Nasir Khan continues to be the 
most popular hero in the Baloch folklore and political literature.184
In 1816, describing Nasir Khan’s personality, the Brithish traveller, Henry 
Pottinger wrote, “If we contemplate the character of Nusseer [Nasir] Khan, whether as 
a soldier, a stateman, or a prince, and call to mind the people among whom he was
placed, we shall find in him a most extraordinary combination of all the virtues at-
1 •tached to those sations and duties.” Possibly the most interesting aspect of the long
reign of Nasir Khan was his skilful internal policy, directed towards the strengthening 
the powers and figure of the “Khan”, though without destroying traditional political 
mechanisms of a society that was still eminently tribal and pastoral in nature. The 
Khanate under Nasir Khan, as observed by Janmahmad, was an improved version of 
the Rind-Lashari tribal union.186 It did not bring any changes to the general tribal set­
up. The tribal alliance was broad-based with tremendous power allowed to the tribal 
chiefs, who recognised the Khanate as the paramount power and contributed nominal 
revenue to him as well as a fixed contingent of men in time of war. The tribal area of 
responsibility was fixed and allowed to continue. A council of advisors representing 
the major tribes and allied people assisted the Khan, with a Wazir (Prime Minister) 
usually selected from Tajik or Hindu immigrants of Kalat.187 Like the Afghan King, 
Ahmad Shah Abdali, in important affairs, Nasir consulted the Ulema.m
The most important innovation of Nasir Khan I was a tribal army, traditionally 
known as the Lashkar. Being an accomplished fighter and commander, he had 
watched the Afghan and Persian techniques of warfare, and realised the necessity of
181 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan. Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1975, p. 84.
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maintaining a well-organised army in his Khanate. Accordingly, he chose and sta­
tioned a permanent army unit, called Dasta-e-Khas (Special Division) in his capital 
numbering 1,200 men. In emergencies Dasta-e-Khas increased to 10860 men. Fur­
thermore, he had created two additional Divisions, which used to be called the “Sara- 
wan Lashkar” (Sarawan Division) and the “Jhalawan Lashkar” (Jhalawan Division). 
Nasir Khan was the Supreme Commander of this whole body of the State army.189 
Describing Nasir Khan’s army, Selig Harrison stated:
Nasir Khan’s most notable achievement was the creation of a unified Ba­
loch army o f some 25,000 men and 1,000 camels, an impressive force by 
eighteenth-century southwest Asian standards. For the first time in their 
history, most of the major Baluchi tribes were rallied under the banner o f  
an agreed system of military organization and recruitment.190
The main revenue was from land produce and collections from the port of Ka­
rachi and goods passing through the Bolan Pass. Taxation was unequal and depended 
on many factors including the distance of the area from the capital. Taxation on sea­
borne trade from Makkoran coast was also nominal. Generally, the Sarawan and Jha­
lawan tribes who provided the bulk of the Khan’s troops and other important factions 
in the area were exempted from land revenue. In Makkoran one-tenth of the land pro­
duce was the state share while the Jatt of Kacch-Gandhava paid one half and the in­
digenous and Dehwar cultivators of Kalat, Mastung and Shal (Quetta) paid one-third 
to the Khan.191
Nasir Khan I was the greatest and most powerful Khan among all the rulers of 
the Khanate. As a result of his successful reformist policies, he is sometime campared 
to “Peter the Greate” of Russia, in the Baloch nationalist circles.192 Nasir Khan I 
sought to build a kingdom in which all tribes, including those in Kachhi, would be 
voluntarily united. In doing so, he was largely successful. The constituency of tribal 
chiefs, who willingly subordinated themselves, moderated his rule. The Khan stood at 
the head of a large tribal confederacy and went methodically about building the Khan­
ate. So, the Khanate was a loose confederacy. Nasir Khan I augmented the union by 
an enlightened policy. He succeeded in evolving the most effective and strong union 
of tribes in the history of the region. In a grand gesture of political farsightedness, he
189 Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, Tarikh-e-Baloch wa Balochistan. vol. 5, pp. 224-232,
190 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 16.
191 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 122.
192 Shah Mohammad Marri, Baloch Oaum. p. 131.
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never interfered with internal tribal issues.193 The Rind and Magasis of Kacch- 
Gandhava and a few others in Sistan had complete independence, without paying any 
land revenue. Their political allegiance was considered sufficient.194
The reunification of the vast Baloch territory into a single political entity en­
couraged trade. Possession of the ports of Makkoran made the Khanate an important 
trading centre between the Iranian plateau, Central Asia, India, the Indian Ocean and 
the region that gave on to it, also attracting numerous communities of Hindu and Is- 
maili merchants, with beneficial results for the Khanate’s fiscal revenue. Moreover 
Nasir Khan encouraged trade by reducing taxes and induced Hindu traders, book­
keepers and moneylenders to return by paying for the upkeep of the Hindu temple at 
Kalat. These measures strengthened the Khanate and the Khan. “Furthermore”, M. H. 
Hosseinbor argues, “Nasir Khan strengthened the economic infrastructure of the state 
by constructing an extensive network of roads, caravanserais, and forts, expanding the 
irrigation systems, and improving the state treasury by reorganising the collection sys­
tem for taxes and other revenues”.195 Accordingly, the 44 years’ rule of Nasir Khan I, 
known to the Baloch as the “great”, and the hero of Baloch history, was the years of 
strenuous administration and organisation interspersed with military expeditions.
While having a loose feudal relationship with the Afghan king, Ahmad Shah, 
Nasir Khan I never regarded himself a tributary to the Durranis but rather a junior par­
ticipator in the division of the Persian Empire after the death of Nadir Shah Afshar in 
1747.196 However, the Afghan attitude towards the Khan provoked Mir Nasir Khan to 
declare the complete independence of Kalat in 1758. As a result, the Afghan forces 
under the command of Ahmad Shah himself invaded Balochistan and besieged the 
Kalat fortress for forty days. Ultimately they came to an amicable agreement and the 
Afghan troops were withdrawn. The agreement known as the “Treaty of Kalat”
107(1758), recognised the sovereign status of Balochistan. The Afghan monarch prom­
ised not to interfere in the internal and external affairs of the Baloch confederacy. The 
Khan in turn promised to help Afghanistan in the case of external aggression against it 
or in its foreign expeditions. Both the countries agreed not to give asylum to rebels
193 M. G. Pikulin, Baloch. p. 110.
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within their states. The agreement provided the basis for the Khanate’s subsequent
1 Q O
relations with Afghanistan.
Apparently the Afghan-Baloch alliance developed as a response to the com­
mon threat posed to their respective states by a relatively powerful, and Shiite- 
dominated Persian Empire. Interviewing with the author, a prominent Baloch scholar, 
Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch said, “It was mostly the common fear from Shiite of Iran 
which shaped the Baloch-Afghan alliance”.199 Subsequently, Nasir Khan joined the 
Afghan king in his military campaigns in Mashhad against the Persians in 1759 as 
well as his expeditions against the growing Sikhs in Punjab in 1761-1762.
Nasir Khan I, according to Inayatullah Baloch, was the first Baloch ruler to 
pay attention to foreign policy. He exchanged ambassadors with Iran, Afghanistan, 
and the Sultanate-Imamate of Oman as well as with Ottoman Turkey.200 The Ottoman 
Sultan as the Caliph of Islam awarded him the titles of the Ghcizi-e Din (religious 
fighter) and the Naser-e Mellat-e Mohammadiyah (supporter of the Mohammedan
• 901nation). As viewed by Inayatullah Baloch, even the title of Beiglar Beigi (the Beig 
of Beigs or the Khan of Khans), was also awarded to him by the Ottoman Sultan.202
However, about his relation with Mughal India, nothing is known. Moreover, 
he received wakils (representative) from the Derajat Confederacy and Sindh, the vas­
sal provinces.203 As asserted by Janmahmad, “the foreign policy of the Khanate was 
one of peaceful coexistence with all the neighbouring states. Although nominally un­
der Afghan hegemony, the various Khans remained neutral and the Khanate was a 
sort of buffer zone between Persia and Afghanistan.”204
With the death of Nasir Khan I in 1795, the deterioration of the central author­
ity in Khanate started, even though it maintained its independence until the arrival of 
Britain on the scene in the mid-19th century. Given to ease and luxury, his son and 
successor, Mahmud Khan soon proved to be incapable of holding the vast territories 
and the state built up with so much hard work and bloodshed by his father, Nasir 
Khan. "Naseer had been hardly a year in his grave before the whole achievements of
198 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 338.
199 Interview with Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch
200 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 120.
201 Shah Mohammad Marri, Baloch Oaum. p. 136.
202 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 106.
203 Ibid., pp. 120-21.
204 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 163.
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• 90^  •his life were in destruction of oblivion". During his rule, Afghanistan occupied 
Derajat, the vassal province, the district of Kech in Makkoran refused to pay taxes, the 
port of Karachi slipped away from his dominions and was recovered and possessed by 
the Talpur, while in western Balochistan several chiefs became independent and re­
fused to pay taxes.206 By 1810, the British team of spies (Pottinger, Christie and 
Grant) found the Khanate in chaos and anarchy.
While the Khanate and its military ally, Afghanistan, were in anarchy at the 
beginning of the 19th century, Punjab came under a powerful ruler, Ranjit Singh, and 
Iran became strong. Thus, the main source of income of the tribes and their chiefs, 
which was the share in the war-booty from their invasion of Mughal India, Iran and 
Sindh, disappeared with the new circumstances. The tribal chiefs instead occupied the 
crown lands and fried to consolidate their own power that according to Dr Inayatullah 
Baloch led to disintegration of the Khanate of Balochistan.207 Perhaps, it was against 
this background that the Baloch Hakomates (principality) of the distant western prov­
inces were the first to succumb to their tribal/feudal loyalties, and become independ- 
ent in the early nineteenth century.
In 1809, Captain Grant, wrote that Shaikh Samander chief of Kaserkand and 
Mir Soban chief of Dashtiari-Bahu collected taxes for themselves. Similarly, Mir 
Mohammad Khan Hakom of Geh (Nikshahr) the second largest principality of Mak­
koran, after Kech was independent. As observed by Grant, none of them paid taxes to 
the Khanate of Kalat.209 At the time of his visit the following years, Sir Henry Pot­
tinger, a British officer, also found that most of the Hakomates (principalities) in 
Western Balochistan were independent. Shah Mehrab Khan Hakom (ruler) of Bampur 
according to Pottinger was acknowledged from Dezzak in the Southeast to Bazman 
bordering Kerman in the north.210
It is believed that the main reason for the disintegration of Khanate was the 
personal life of the Khan, and the economic crisis. Mahmud Khan was weak and fond
205 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, p. 88.
206 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problelm of Greater Baluchistan, p. 124.
207 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 124.
208 For more detail see, N. P. Grant, “Journal of a Route through the Western Part o f Mekran (1809)”, 
in: Royal Asiatic Society. Vol. 5, 1839, pp. 329-340.
209 Ibid.
210 Henry Pottinger, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde. London, 1816, pp. 169-170.
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of luxury.211 The Russian scholar’, Gankovsky, however, attributes the decline of the 
Kalat State to the desire of the rulers of separate regions to raise their share in the 
gross feudal tillage by reducing the share due to the Kalat Khan as head of the state.212 
He gives the example that Mahmud Khan had an income of only 350,000 rupees as 
compared to the more than three million rupees collected by his father. By contrast, 
Nina Swidler, an anthropologist, writes that the Khanate of Kalat failed to impose a 
unified tax system on caravan trade and the tribes and instead relied more on revenues 
from irrigated crown lands.213 After the death of Mahmud Khan in 1821, his son and 
successor Mehrab Khan II, tried to correct many of the errors of his father but by then, 
the British had appeared on the scene and the affairs of Khanate had taken another 
turn. However, the disintegration of the Khanate, its political division into different 
provinces and states under British rule, and finally its annexation to the state of Paki­
stan, had great impact on the Baloch nationalism, which will be discussed in the fol­
lowing chapters.
The British Superiority
Modern Baloch nationalism is rooted in the anti-colonial struggle from the 
mid-19th century. The big-power rivalry in central Asia that resulted in the British in­
vasion of Afghanistan also brought British forces into the Baloch region. The Khanate 
of Balochistan during the British Afghan wars did not want to be involved in the for­
eign aggression against the Afghan people.214 The Baloch Confederacy had treaty ob­
ligations from the time of Mir Nasir Khan with Afghanistan. The British supply routes 
to Afghanistan could not be safeguarded without securing Balochistan, which had by 
now gathered much importance in British Central Asian policy. In his notes on Indian 
history wrote Karl Marx, “March 10, 1839, the column reached Dadar, at the mouth 
of the pass; Cotton rested a few days, found that Mehrab Khan of Khelat [Kalat], was 
hostile; no supplies to be obtained.”215 The British forces were therefore ordered to 
subjugate Kalat. A detachment from Quetta attacked Kalat on 13th November 1839. 
The Khan Mir Mehrab Khan refused to surrender and fought back against the invad­
211 Mir Kluida Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, p. 241; Mu­
hammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, p. 88; Inayatullah Baloch, The 
Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 124.
212 Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 151.
2,3 Nina Swidler, “The Political Structure of a Tribal Federation: The Brahui of Baluchistan”, PhD. 
Dissertaion, Columbia University, 1969.
214 Nek Buzdar, “Social Organization, Resource use, and Economic Development in Balochistan” in: 
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ers. Along with four hundred of his men he was killed in the battle.216 The British in­
stalled Shahnawaz Khan, a fourteen-year-old distant relative of the deceased Khan, as 
the new ruler with a Lieutenant Loveday as regent, and started the dismemberment of 
the Baloch country. Quetta and Mastung were given to Shah Shuja of Afghanistan and 
Kacchi was annexed into Sindh. However, as soon as the British army left Kalat, 
Baloch tribes revolted and Mehrab Khan’s son, Nasir Khan II, was enthroned as the 
new Kir an.
Nasir Khan II (1830-1857) was recognised by the British in 1841 and 13 years 
later (1854) Kalat signed its first twenty-year treaty. British political agents were as­
signed to the Khan and an annual subsidy was paid in exchange for loyalty, and also 
Quetta was returned to the Khanate.218 In a new treaty with Kalat, which was ratified 
at the end of 1876, it was arranged that British troops might be stationed in Kalat terri­
tory. The establishment of the Balochistan Agency with its headquarters at Quetta fol­
lowed early in 1877. In the same year, Robert Sandeman was appointed Agent to the 
Governor General (A.G.G), Chief Commissioner and put in charge of the Agency for 
Balochistan.219
With Sandeman’s appointment as the Agent to the Governor General in Ba­
lochistan a new chapter was opened up in relations between the colonial power and 
the Baloch.220 Robert Sandeman was bom in 1835 in Perth, Scotland. His father re­
tired as a General from the army of the East India Company. In 1856, Sandeman was 
offered an Infantry Commission and proceeded to India. After briefly serving on ac­
tive duty during the Great Mutiny (1857-58), he was transferred to civil post in 1859 
as Assistant Commissioner in Punjab. He served as District Officer in Dera Ghazi 
Khan (1866-1877), before being transferred to Balochistan in 1877. It must be borne 
in mind that the British tactics of indirect rule reached its most progressive and least 
clinical form in the 1870s through the so-called Forward Policy of Sandeman. In this 
respect, he is considered as the real “conqueror of Balochistan” by the British chroni­
clers.221
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As mentioned in chapter two, by changing the traditional character of the old 
Jirgas altogether, Sandeman introduced a new system, the “Sandeman system” as it 
was later to be known. This system was aimed at establishing direct relations with the 
Sardars and tribal chiefs, bypassing the Khan. Sandeman managed to have his way, 
and earned the loyalty of the Sardars by granting them allowances; his personal cha­
risma enabled him to establish a whole network of close personal relations, undermin­
ing the prestige and sovereignty of the Baloch central power. The “Sandeman system” 
gave the British a powerful weapon to control rebellions against themselves and broke 
the last remaining institution of a purely tribal character.222
Although, the Baloch people did not like to live under a foreign rule, soon af­
ter the martyrdom of Mehrab Khan in 1839, the hostility spread throughout the Ba­
loch tribes in the Eastern Balochistan.223 In order to break down the Baloch resistance 
power, first the British detached “Derajat” and “Khangarh” (Jacobabad) from Ba­
lochistan and annexed these regions to British India.224 In the late 1870s, the British 
occupied the Afghan territory of Pishin and the Thai Chotialri district under the Gan- 
damak Treaty. They also occupied the Afghan tribal areas of Zhob and Loralai and 
consolidated the British authority there. Under an agreement with the Khan of Kalat 
in 1883, the British leased Quetta, Bolan Pass, Nasirabad, Chagai, Marri-Bugti and 
certain other Baloch areas and attached those with the Pashtun regions to rename 
“British Baluchistan”.225
Under the British the Khanate’s administration was carried out through the 
Wazir-e~Azam (prime minister) who was appointed by the British Government. The 
State Budget was also subjected to the approval of the A. G. G.226 The leased regions 
(British Balochistan) were ruled by the "Agent to the Governor General of India" 
(AGG). The AGG with his headquarters at Quetta, was represented by "Political 
Agents" (PA's) at district level. As indicated above, with Sandeman's appointment as 
AGG in Balochistan in 1877, he armed the Sardars with unlimited powers over their 
tribes to such an extent that a tribesman could be arrested and imprisoned on the indi­
cation of the Sardar for disobedience to him while a tribesman who had been put in
222 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan. p. 141.
223 Riccardo Redaelli, The Father’s Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India f 19th -  20th Century). 
p. 63.
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prison for a serious offence could be released on the receipt of a letter by the mirza 
(accountant) of a niabat (district) from the Sardar?21
Generally, the State of Kalat held a unique position within the British Indian 
imperial system. In theory, it was sovereign and different from the other States. The 
northern belt of the Khanate (British Balochistan) and the responsibility for its de­
fence and foreign affairs were handed over to the British Crown on the basis of mutu­
ally agreed upon friendly treaties. The Khan in general was expected to regain these 
territories and rights whenever the British decided to leave. What the British had 
gained by the treaties was not transferable to a third party. Responsible British au­
thorities and Indian statesmen repeatedly confirmed these positions vis-a-vis the 
Khan’s legal status and rights.228
In practice, however, the situation was different. The "unruly" nature and 
past of Balochistan and the strategic concern over real or perceived Russian, German, 
Afghan and then Soviet moves toward the northwestern regions of the Sub-continent, 
required strict British surveillance. From a British point of view, the Russo-British tug 
of war- in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran during the 19th century; fear of German 
activities during the two great wars, uncertainties created by anti-western upheavals in 
Afghanistan and the Middle East in the early 20th century; and the Bolshevik Revolu­
tion of 1917, could not allow the border Baloch territory to enjoy the luxury of a re­
laxed policy. Constitutional, political, economic and educational reforms allowed to 
British India could not be extended to the Khanate and the leased territories (British 
Balochistan).229
The Khan at the top was traditionally bound to consult the Jirga (the Council 
of the main tribal Sardars) on social and political affairs. Only a limited number of 
Sardars, however, closer to the centre, participated in the decision-making process. 
The Khan also appointed a Wazir-e-Azam (Chief Minister) and other Wazirs (Minis­
ters) and Naib Wazirs (Deputy Ministers) for the administration of the Khanate. The 
Darbar (Court of the Khanate) was a loose combination of the resident tribal Chiefs 
(at Kalat), the Wazirs and the Khan's close influential relatives and administrators. 
The Darbar, the Jirga, the indigenous Cabinet of Ministers, and the Diwans of the
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Khanate were overshadowed and overpowered by the parallel British administration 
backed by their political and military power. Thus, in general the AGG at Quetta and 
the Political Agents at district levels, aided by their staff, ruled the country.230 
The early revolts
The British defeated the Khanate’s army, killed Mehrab Khan, and occupied 
Kalat in 1839. Incited by the British advancement westward, the Shah of Iran captured 
western Balochistan in the early 1850s. Throughout Balochistan the British and the 
Persians were expanding their authority. The Baloch era was coming to a close. It was 
in this milieu that many tribes stood in revolt against the alien forces.231 Writing about 
their bravery, Tucker stated that the Baloch never submitted to the British completely. 
During the blockades and in battles they fought to the last man. According to Tucker, 
the sheer number of casualties is the best proof of it. When on 1st October 1847, 700 
Bugtis were blockaded in a battle on the border of Sindh against Lieutenant Mere- 
weather, commanding the famous Sindh Horse, none of them surrendered to the Brit­
ish. All fought till the last man was killed, except two who avoided capture.232
On 26th January 1867, the 1200-strong combined forces of Bugtis, Marris and 
their allied tribe, Kethran, fought an important battle in the Chachar Valley near the 
border of Dera Ghazi Khan. Mir Ghulam Hossein Masoori Bugti led the Baloch 
troops in the battle. He was also killed in the battle, which was lost by the Baloch 
forces.233 On the 14th of October 1896, a religious group of Marri, called Ghazis, 
headed by Haji Kala Khan, commonly known as “Mast-Faqir”, attacked the British 
railway and telegraph lines. The Ghazi movement, however, couldn’t last long. The 
British soon defeated them, and Mast Faqir with five other Ghazis were executed in 
Sibi on the 2nd of November 1896.234
Simultaneously, there was unrest in Makkoran. Dissatisfied with the colonial 
administration, Mehrab Khan, who coveted authority in the Kech valley, detained the 
British nazim (agent) and the finance affairs manager, a Hindu, Diwan Udho Das on
230 For more detail see Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 123, and Gul Khan Nasir, 
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the January 189 8.235 This infuriated the British, who ordered an attack on the district 
from Karachi to assert their authority. Resistance was organised by Mehrab Khan and 
Mir Baloch Khan. A large number of lashkar (tribal force) gathered at Gokprosh, a 
few miles from Turbat, on 27th January 1898 to fight the advancing British troops. 
The British forces, however, defeated the Baloch lashkar, killing all 250 of them in­
cluding their leader Mir Baloch Khan.236 It is said that Mehrab Khan and Baloch Khan 
were encouraged and supported by their brethren from western Balochistan who were 
revolting against the Shiite Persians at the same time. The revolt leaders in Iranian 
Balochistan, Hossein Khan and later Mir Bahram Khan, both had close relations with 
Mehrab Khan and Baloch Khan.237 Defeated by the British army, Mehrab Khan 
Gichki who was the prime mover in the revolt sought refuge in Western Balochis­
tan.238
When a proposal to recruit mercenaries in Balochistan was put forward in 
January 1917, the Baloch sardars not only opposed the idea, but also revolted against 
it 239 Two decisive battles were fought at Gunbuz and Hadab in which the Marris were 
defeated 240 It is said that seven hundred of them were killed and five hundred re­
ceived injuries in the battle of Gunbuz. The rebel chief, Misri Khan Baloch, fled to the 
Soviet Union and formed the delegation to the famous “Baku Congress of the Peoples 
of the East”. In 1918, another rebel chief, Karim Khan Baloch, from Iranian Balochis­
tan migrated to Soviet Union with his tribe and took refuge. He was also one of the 
delegates to the Baku Congress.241 As the head of the Baloch delegation, it is said 
that Misri Khan also met Lenin and some other top leaders of Soviet Union 242
Having outlined the theoretical guidelines and directives for “national libera­
tion movements” in the east; the Bolsheviks launched campaigns to spread the revolu­
tionary views and proletarian revolutions to the colonies and semi-colonies of the 
East. In the credentials issued to Y. Z. Surites, first Soviet Representative in Afghani­
stan, signed by Lenin in 1919, it was stated that the Council of People’s Commissars
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appointed Y. Z. Surites the “Representative Extra-Ordinary and Plenipotentiary of the 
Soviet Federal Socialist Republic in Central Asia, empowering him to maintain dip­
lomatic relations with the peoples of independent Afghanistan, independent (tribes of) 
Balochistan, and the people of India fighting for their liberation.”243
Baloch resistance to the British authorities continued for more than a century 
with varying intensity. These were undoubtedly the acts of individual tribal chiefs or a 
collection of them who were aggrieved by one or another action of the government. 
The early uprisings could not assume the form of a national struggle. The lack of 
communication between the Baloch tribes and contact with the Indian people,244 hav­
ing an enemy superior in arms and resources, and the lack of a proper political organi­
sation to mobilise the masses were the main reasons for this. But in spite of these 
drawbacks, the Baloch continued their resistance in their own particular way through­
out the British period of hegemony and never allowed the alien influence to pervade 
their society.245 However, the Baloch look upon these battles as evidence of their val­
orous warlike traditions. Accounts of battle with the British have the same revered 
place in tribal folklore as those about war with the Persians, Afghans, Moguls and 
Hindus. The Baloch poets of the late 19th century, like Rahm Ali Marri, glorified the 
leaders of the uprising and composed songs of patriotism and condemned the pro- 
British Sardar s, declaring them traitors.246 
The Persian Occupation
In 1947, in the thick of the independence movement, Sardar Khan Baluch, the 
former director of education and secretary-e-kta (principal secretary) to the Khan of 
Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, wrote: “Baluch race indeed cannot afford to forget that 
what is now Iranian Baluchistan, has, through the greater part of its histoiy, been 
Western Makurann; and that it has always been ruled from the heart of Makuran ei­
ther by native or foreign governors as a pail; of Baluchistan”247. Historically, western 
Balochistan is the cradle of Baloch histoiy and the focus of their ancient heroic bal­
lads and popular poetry. It was from here that their ancestors began to spread to and 
consolidate their power in eastern Balochistan from the 13th century. The territory, as
242 Interview with Dr. Shah Mohammad Marri.
243 G. Bondarevski, “Bolshevik Policy and the Peoples of the East”, in: Mainstream. December 3, 1977, 
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earlier mentioned, was the centre of the first Baloch Confederacy under Mir Jalal Han 
in the 12th century. It may also be of some interest to note that Western Balochistan is 
not only the cradle of Baloch history, but also according to the most prominent au­
thority on the subject, Selig Harrison, the cradle of Baloch nationalism as well.248
Separated by the disintegration of the Khanate in the early 19th century, west­
ern Balochistan maintained its independence until the mid-19th century. Describing 
the state of affairs in Bampur, the major Hakomate (principality) of western Balochis­
tan, in 1810, a British spy, Henry Pottinger, wrote, “Shall Mihrab Khan is the most 
powerful chief in these quarters; his regular troops, or at least those that he can muster 
at a few days notices, are six thousand, and he is acknowledged to be the paramount 
authority from Dizuk [Dezzak] to Basman” 249 His revenue, according to Pottinger, 
was computed at four Lacs and a half of rupees annually.250 Noticing a deep hatred 
between the Baloch and the Persians, Pottinger pointed out:
Having explained these particulars as far as I supposed would be compre­
hensible, he begged to be informed why we Firingees, or European, did 
not root out the Persians (whom he styled Kafir Sheeas), saying, “I have 
understood, both from Grant and yourself, that the English government is 
eminently powerful; and if that is really the case, it will find no difficulty 
in exterminating that abominable race, for I myself can dispatch two hun­
dred horsemen and ravage a whole district, even bringing off their veiy 
dogs.251
Pottinger enquired if the intercourse was frequent between him and the government of 
Kerman, or if any species of trade was carried on between the two countries. “Inter­
course!” rejoined he, laughing, “no! We have had none for these last two years, nor is 
it likely to be again renewed”.252 In 1838, another traveller, Hajee Abdun Nabee, an 
Afghan sent by the British for collecting intelligence on the political conditions of the 
country, also found that the ruler of Bampur held the Persian authority in contempt.253
As in the early 19th centmy the Persians were deprived of their northern prov­
inces to the Russians, in order to compensate for lost areas, they pursued a policy of 
expansion towards Balochistan.254 During the two Russian wars, ending in the Trea­
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ties of “Gulistan” (1813) and “Turkmanchai” (1826), Persia lost all her territory on 
the west coast of the Caspian. By the terms of “Gulistan” peace treaty, Persia lost the 
Caucasian provinces of Qarabagh, Ganja, Shirvan, Baku, Georgia and parts of Talish. 
In 1826, the treaty of Turkmanchai not only deprived Persia of further provinces of 
Erivan and Nakhchivan, but also it affirmed Russia’s exclusive rights in the Caspian 
Sea.255
In Goldsmid5 s view, since Persia had lost a large portion of her territory to 
Russia in the North, and was checked by the Ottoman empire in the West, and by the 
British in Afghanistan, the only avenue for her expansion was in western Balochistan 
where the constant feuds between the petty chiefs had made the land an easy prey to 
their designs.256 In one of his reports prepared for the Government of Bombay and the 
Secretary of State for India on 27th April 1864, he had underlined the basic historical 
argument for recognising the Persian claims to their latest conquests in western Ba­
lochistan 257 General Goldsmid wrote in the final report of his proceedings to the Sec­
retary of State for India on 9th November 1871 that "these tracts, had they power to be 
independent, would be independent; not having power to be independent, they are as 
fair prey to the strongest neighbour" 258 Thereafter the name "Persian Balochistan" 
replaced "Western Balochistan" in official colonial documents.
Persian expansionism was furthermore stimulated by the extension of the Brit­
ish interest westward through Makkoran in the mid-19th century 259 In 1861, after the 
British intervention for the extension of the Indo-European telegraph line from Kara­
chi to Gwadar in the domains of Kalat and then up to Jask on the coast of western Ba­
lochistan, the Persian military expeditions were extended up to Bampur-Pahra (Iran- 
shahr) the major Hakomate in western Balochistan. It should be noted that the British 
telegraph project added to the geopolitical importance of the area. During the course 
of the British investigation for the construction of the telegraph line in 1862-68, they 
were confronted by conflicting territorial claims to western Balochistan by the Sultan 
of Oman, the Shall of Persia and the Khan of Kalat.260
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As observed by M. H. Hosseinbor, at the beginning the British took a neutral 
stand by avoiding accepting pretensions of sovereignty by any side, but finally they 
changed their position in favour of the Persians.261 In 1849, one decade after the Brit­
ish occupation of Kalat (1839), the Persian forces headed by Ibrahim Khan Taqizada 
occupied the major Hakomate of western Balochistan, Bampur 262 From 1850 onward, 
the Persian governor of Kerman on several occasions led attacks on the neighbouring 
district of western Balochistan and committed acts of unprecedented cruelty upon the 
helpless population. The Persian government continued its policy of playing off the 
local rulers one against another with the aim of reducing their authority and establish- 
ing its own as far as possible.
By the time the line was completed in 1869-70 the Persian forces had ad­
vanced as far* as Sarbaz, between the coast and Bampur. Up to the late 1870s the 
lesser Hakomates of Dezzak, Sarbaz, Geh and Kaserkand (Qasr-r Qand) also were 
invaded and subdued.264 In 1863, as the construction of the telegraph line began, Ibra­
him Khan the Persian governor in Bampur threatened the Omani representatives in the 
ports of Balochistan. In 1869, Mir Din-Mohammad, ruler of Dashtiari, occupied 
Chahbar (Chabahar) and it was never recovered by Oman. But a period of struggle 
and negotiation ensued between Oman, Mir Din-Mohammad and Persia, in the course 
of which the Persian governor-general appeared in Kaserkand 266 But from this time, 
the rule of the Arabs of Muscat ended in Chahbar, after eighty years.267 In 1872, the 
Persian general, Ibrahim Khan, occupied Chahbar' and amiexed it to Persia. Two year's 
later, in 1874, Bashkard then independent under Saif Ali Khan was also brought under 
subjection.268
Up to the late 1860s, the Khan of Kalat was claiming sovereignty over the 
whole of Balochistan. While contrary to his claim, the British and the Persian im­
posed the Goldsmid Line on the Khanate, In 1869 the King of Persia suggested a de­
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marcation of the Perso-Baloch Frontier. In the same year the Persian delegation, led 
by Ibrahim Khan, Governor of Bamm, and the Khanate delegation, led by Faqir 
Mohammad Bizenjo, met under the supervision of General Goldsmid, the British 
Chief Commissioner of the joint Perso-Baloch Boundary Commission at Bampur*. 
This meeting is known as the “Bampur Conference”, and was held on 1st December 
1869. The Baloch delegates not only opposed the proposed border demarcation, but 
also demanded the withdrawal of Persians from western Balochistan. They argued 
that this region is an integral part of the Baloch country, the Khanate.271 After two 
years of persistent Baloch resistance, however, in 1871, with the help of the British, 
the Iranians succeeded in dividing Balochistan.
In the 1870, a division of influence between Kalat, Afghanistan and Persia had 
been worked out and legitimised for the time being by the boundary commissions. But 
the Persians (working through Ibrahim Khan) both pre-empted and disputed some de­
tails of the commission's findings. They took Pishin in 1870, and Esfandak and Kuhak 
in 1871 directly after the commission had awarded these tracts to the Khanate. In the 
north Ibrahim Khan also defeated Syed Khan Kurd, known as sardar of the Sarhadd, 
in Kliash. From then on Ibrahim Khan controlled most of the western Balochistan 
up to the present border by a combination of force, threats, and the posting of minor 
officials, but he was not able to control the tribes of the Sarhadd 273
The Khan of Kalat, Khudadad Khan was not appointed to the border commis­
sions that divided Balochistan, nor was he even consulted.274 As mentioned earlier, at 
the time of demarcation in 1871, western Balochistan was already under the Persian 
occupation. However, in 1860, the Khan of Kalat, Khudadad Khan, decided to recap­
ture Geh (Nikshahr) and Kaserkand by force, but was warned off by the British au­
thorities.275 Moreover, on 20th February, 1863, when the British decided to build the 
telegraph line from Jask to Karachi, they signed a treaty with the Khan of Kalat, Khu­
dadad Khan, and the local Baloch Sardars of western Balochistan, not the Persian
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Government.276 This action itself, according to Baloch nationalists, was a justification
9 7 7of the Khan’s sovereignty claim over western Balochistan. It is important to note 
that despite the border demarcation and the British recognition of Persian sovereignty 
over western Balochistan, their rule was nominal. In fact it was the modern army of 
Reza Shall that finally defeated Mir Dost Mohammad Khan and occupied western Ba­
lochistan (Iranian Balochistan) in 1928, as will be discussed in the following section. 
Resistance in Western Balochistan
In 1896, the assassination of the Qajar king Nasir-al-Din Shah prompted the 
Baloch chiefs to take the opportunity for re-establishing their rule in western Ba­
lochistan.278 In 1897, the Baloch rose againt in Sarhadd, Saravan and Bampur under 
the leadership of the chief of the Narui tribe, Sardar Hossein Khan. In 1897, Hossein
9 7 0Khan attacked Pahra (Iranshahr) and led a general rebellion against Persian rule in 
the Sarhadd, Saravan, and Bampur, demanding a reduction of taxes, from one third to 
one tenth, and autonomy.280 The revolt spread to Sarbaz, Dezzak, Lashar, and Bam- 
posht. Hossein Khan occupied Bampur, Pahra, and Bazman and other places, which 
had small Persian garrisons, and controlled most of the northern part of Balochistan. 
Several Baloch groups, which had hitherto remained neutral in troubles between rul­
ing families and the Gajars (as the Baloch called Persians), joined him.281
In 1897, the Baloch defeated a large Persian force that was sent from Kerman 
to restore order. The uprising lasted for nearly two years but eventually Hossein Khan
9 50was defeated in 1898. However, according to Pikulin, a Soviet scholar who studied 
Western Balochistan, the revolt continued and spread and was only crushed when 
Hossein Khan was bought off by being made ruler of a Boluk (district), with the right 
to collect taxes.283 The widespread revolt in Western Balochistan, according to Pikulin 
was due to heavy taxation and the "tyranny and oppression" of the Qajar governors as 
the cause of rebellion.284
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The Baloch kept up their struggle during the reign of the Qajar dynasty, which 
ended ignominiously in 1921. In the process the Baloch lost effective control of most 
of their land. In spite of all this bloodshed and atrocities against the Baloch, the wish­
ful designs of the Persian Government to annihilate them did not materialise. The Ba­
loch with their usual tenacity and resolute determination maintained their political in­
fluence and semi-independent position. In spite of these military moves, Hosseinbor, 
the Baloch nationalist writer, wrote, "the Qajar rule in the country was more nominal 
than real and was directly limited to Bampur, then the capital of Baluchistan. The rest 
of the country remained independent or semi-independent to be disturbed only by pe- 
riodical military expeditions sent for levy taxes".
Even though, the revolt of 1896-1898 was crushed, it weakened and effec­
tively minimised the rule of Qajar in Balochistan.286 Hossein Khan, the leader of the 
revolt, as mentioned above, was defeated in 1898, and died in the same year. But his 
son Sayad Khan succeeded to retain the control of the forts of Geh, Bent, Kaserkand 
and the ports. At the same time he was recognized by the Persians as the ruler of Geh,
0  O '?with the right to collect taxes. Meanwhile, he decided to expand, and took Sarbaz. 
Next, he joined up with Mir Bahrain Khan Baranzai, who ruled Dezzak. However, as 
the Iranian Constitutional movement of 1906 weakened the central government, the 
Baloch began again to expand their raiding activities.
Having consolidated his power in Dezzak and Sarbaz, Mir Bahram Khan 
turned his attention in 1907, against the Persians. In the same year he recaptured the 
plains of Pahrah and Bampur. By 1910, he controlled as far as the seaports of Gwatr 
and Chabahar. Being defeated and lost the fort of Bampur, the Persians used a new 
tactic. They bought off Sardar Sayad Khan, by giving him the governorship of Ba­
lochistan.288 Sayad Khan was officially given the title of the “Sardar-e Nizam”, and 
the right and duty to collect taxes from the whole of Balochistan within Persia. In re­
turn, Sayad Khan acknowledged the Persian claims over the region. Thus, Sayad 
Khan betrayed his ally Mir Bahram Khan, and sided with the Persians. But in spite of 
all, the Persian never succeeded. The real power in Iranian Balochistan remained with 
Mir Bahram Khan.289 In 1910, another Qajar force sent by Sardar Nosrat Isfandiyari,
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the Commander of the Kerman Garrison, attempted to regain control of Bampur, but 
Bahram Khan too defeated them.290
However, after 1910, when the Baranzais established their authority in the 
area, the British influence beyond Makkoran became a source of constant worry in 
Iranian Balochistan. In his search for allies Bahram Khan maintained close links with 
foreign governments especially with the Germans.291 Being a devout Sunni-Muslim, 
he tried also to win the moral support of the Ottomans and Afghans. In the late 1914, 
Bahram Khan was in a powerful position, possessing almost 10,000 rifles. In addition, 
he was believed to have purchased a considerable number of firearms in Muscat 
through a weapon smuggler, Mir Kamal Chahani. Armed with his weapons and his 
grievances, Bahram Khan launched an uprising against the British government. In 
1915, he defeated troops under the command of British agent and occupied the whole 
Kech valley in Makkoran.
During this raid his lashkar numbered 5000 to 8000 men. Furthermore he was 
supported by the tribal Sardars, Mohammad Shah ruler of Sib and Suran, Shah Sawar 
Damani from Sarhadd, Sardar Din Mohammad from Dashtiari, Shah Jehan of Magas, 
Jalal Khan of Hoshagwala, and many others.293 Moreover, the German activities dur­
ing the First World War in the region also encouraged him. During the War, the Ger­
mans and Ottoman Turks attempted to enter into relations with him with the aim of 
supporting the Baloch against the British.294
Impressed by Syed Jamal al-Din Afghani’s pan-Islamism and supported by 
Bahram Khan and Barkat Khan of Jask, Khalifa Khair Mohammad, on May 1915, 
proclaimed Jihad (holy war) against the British.295 Khalifa from Karawan was a 
Naqshbandi sufi. He used his spiritual authority to command the allegiance of his fol­
lowers, some of whom like Bahram Khan and Barkat Khan were tribal chieftains. Fur­
thermore, Khalifa’s Fatva was supported by many mollas of Sarhadd and by the chief 
qazi (judge) of Dashtiari, Qazi Sayad Ali 296 Many religious people or mureeds (fol­
lowers), mostly from Karawan, Bint, Jask and Geyavan, accepted Khalifa’s invitation.
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Mir Yar Mohammad, the nephew of Barkat Khan of Jask, commanded the mureeds?91 
On the 3rd of May 1915, the mureeds attacked the British garrison in the fort of Cha- 
bahar. After one day’s fighting the mureeds were repulsed with heavy losses. Mean­
while, they cut the telegraph line between Chabahar and Jask. However, the pro- 
British Sardars, Sardar Sayad Khan of Geh, known as Sardar-e-Nizam, Nawab Khan 
Bamari, and Islam Khan Mir Hajee of Bent, were opposed to Khalifa’s call for jihad 
(holy war).
Meanwhile Khalifa and his moreeds (disciples) were busy propagating anti- 
British feelings throughout western Balochistan, Bahram Khan by attacking Kech and 
defeating the British forces, created a real threat against the British interest in the re­
gion. Supporting Bahram Khan’s action, Khalifa declared it as a Jihad against the in­
fidels (the British). The British anxiety was unavoidable. On the 6th of October 1915, 
Ramsay, AGG in Balochistan to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political 
Department, Simla wrote:
And what will Muhammadan opinion say when it is know that the British 
are retreating before Muhammadans, who are well-known (as they will 
say) to have German support behind them? Why should we give what will 
be considered ocular demonstration that Germans are speaking the truth 
when they say that British power is receiving its death-blows in 
Europe?298
Anti-British Baloch chiefs of Kech also supported Mir Bahram Khan. Mehrab 
Khan Nausherwani of Kuhak and Mehrab Khan Gechki were in close alliance with 
him. “The common talk is” said Mehrab Khan Gechki to the British authorities, “if 
Government does not protect us, why should we pay revenue? The power has been 
taken from our national leaders and, if we must pay, why should we not pay to the 
stronger party (Bahram Khan), who are Mohammadans, and obtain their protection?” 
In western Balochistan, anti-British agitation continued. On 26th of October, Khalifa 
ordered his followers to cut the Sadeich telegraph line, the most important communi­
cation line between Makkoran and Karachi.299
To stop Bahram Khan’s further advancement, the pro-British Sardars, Sayad 
Khan of Geh, Islam Khan Mir Hajee, Mahmud Khan of Dashtiari, Mir Hoti Khan of 
Lashar, Nawab Khan Bamari, Rustam Khan of Champ, Sahib Khan Dehwari and 
Lalla Khan Bozorgzada were given arms and ammunition to raid inside his territory.
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The British called these Sardars “Friendly Chiefs”.300 Not only was Bahram Khan’s 
advance toward Gwadar and Pasni forts stopped, but by the intrigue of these Sardars, 
he was compelled to leave Kech and return to Bampur. On December 1915, Bahram 
Khan made another attempt to capture the border villages, Goumazi, Mand and Tomp, 
but this time also, retreated with heavy losses, and his brother, Mir Ameen, was killed. 
Subsequently, after the retreat of Bahram Khan, Khalifa came under pressure and 
gradually his jihad  movement also eased.
To counter Russian, German, and Ottoman designs, the British had to dispatch 
a mission of their own, headed by Colonel Dew of the Political Department, to enter 
into a political arrangement for the peaceful settlement of disputes with Mir Bahram 
Khan.30i Dew offered a peace treaty, which was accepted by Mir Bahram Khan. The 
treaty, which was signed on May 7, 1916, provided for recognition of Baranzai au­
thority in western Balochistan, and in return, an agreement by Bahram Khan to sus-
'J f iOpend hostilities against the Baritish. By recognising his position as the effective 
ruler of the Western Balochistan, the British ended Bahram Khan’s threat over East­
ern Balochistan. In justifying this agreement, Sir Percy Sykes stated that “in view of 
the fact that Persian Baluchistan had broken its connection with Persia for many 
years, and that Bahram Khan, an upstart adventurer had recently led a raid across the 
British border, Dew deserved much credit”.
Moreover, the agreement also served an additional purpose and that was to 
distract and neutralise Bahram Khan while the British launched a simultaneous pacifi­
cation campaign against the tribes of Sarhadd, which formed, at least nominally, part 
of his domain, hi 1916, the Gamshadzai, Yarahmadzai and Ismailzai tribes of Sarhadd 
put up the most effective resistance against the British occupation in Sarhadd. One of 
their leaders Sardar Khalil Khan Gamshadzai was killed in the fighting, while Sardar 
Jiand Khan was arrested. When the latter was being brought to Quetta a Baloch de­
tachment waylaid the government troops and freed their chief. The conflict with the 
government continued for nearly two years.304 However, in March 1924 the control of 
the tribes of the Sarhadd district (which was occupied by General Dyer in 1915-16),
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was formally surrendered by the British to the Persian government.305 Meanwhile, the 
tribes of Sarhadd, the Rikis (Rigis) and the Damanis306 protested against this British 
action and demanded to remain as a part of Western Balochistan ruled by Bampur.307
Mir Bahram Khan died in Bampur in 1921. Having no son, he was succeeded 
by his nephew, Mir Dost Mohammad Khan, who was bom in the late 19th century in 
Bampur. Mir Dost Mohammad Khan declared himself “Shah-e-Balochistan.308 He had 
become the most powerful ruler in Persian Balochistan, by virtue of personal control 
over both Pahra-Bampur and Sarawan and by marriage alliances with the rulers of the 
major principalities of Makkoran.309 Mir Dost Mohammad Khan extended the fron­
tiers of the confederacy and entered into military alliances with the Baloch tribes of 
Sarhadd and Sistan, and ruled independently until 1928.310
Dost Mohammad Khan successfully pursued the vigorous policies of his 
predecessor in consolidating the entire Western Balochistan under his rule. In this re­
spect, he launched a centralisation campaign, which curbed the immense powers tradi­
tionally enjoyed by the hereditary Sardars of various principalities.311 As stated by the 
Baloch nationalist writer, Janmahmad, “Mir Dost Muhammad, the ruler of Bampur, 
did not recognise the boundaries drawn by the Anglo-Persian commission between 
Persia and Balochistan in 1905, and resisted Iranian hegemony in the country. He de­
clared independence and established close relations with other Baloch rulers in eastern
31 JBalochistan, particularly Kalat”. He also tried to establish links with Sultan of 
Muscat, king Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.313
Mir Dost Mohammad Khan established a modern army with regular daily 
trainings and special uniform. A deserted officer of the British Levies at Khwash, 
Subedar Jamal-ud-Din Somailzia was appointed as the head of this army.314 Simulta­
neously, a semi-police force called “Kotowal”, responsible for the security and reve­
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nue collection was also established in all most all the provinces. Moreover, a heavily 
armed security guard, headed by Hayatan Khan Rind, was keeping guard on the fort 
of Pahrah, the head quarters of the Khan. His position was so strong that he no longer 
was merely appointing tribal leaders, but actually naming governors for the area under 
his control.315 He appointed one, Mirza Hashom, as his Wazir. It is interesting to note 
that, according to the India Office Records, to translate the English language newspa­
pers and reports from India, the daughter of a Hindu trader from Simla, was recruited 
as his personal translator.316
Describing Mir Dost Muhammad Khan’s military ability, in 1958 Muhammad 
Sardar Khan Baluch wrote, “He was able to muster up 10,000 fighting men equipped 
with maitini-peabody rifles.”317 According to Sardar Khan Baluch, Bampur in his 
time was well guarded and well administered. As a free stronghold of the Baloch, it 
served as an asylum for all insurgents who absconded from Kalat state.318 Hossein 
Makki, a Persian historian, however, numbers Mir Dost Mohammad Khan’s regular
O 1 Q
army to 5000 men. The revenues from produce, which was 1/10, and the Khani- 
Arziat (crown land) were the main sources of income to the treasury of the Hakomate. 
The custom posts of Chabahar, Gwatr and the other part of Balochistan constituted 
another important source for the state treasury.320 On demand each tribe had an obli­
gation to provide Lankbandi (troops). Of course, those tribes who provided Lankbandi 
were exempted from paying taxes.321
Having defeated the revolutionary movements in Azerbaijan (1920), and Gilan 
(1921), in northern Iran, Reza Khan formalised his dictatorial rule to become the Shah 
of Iran, Supported by the British, he overthrew Ahmad Shah, the last king of the Qajar 
dynasty in 1925.322 On December 12, 1925, he proclaimed himself as Reza Shah Pah- 
lavi, the Shah of Iran. Reza Khan was a shrewd politician; any force that stood in 
his way mercilessly attacked and, so far as possible destroyed.324 With Ahmad Shah
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thus deposed and dictatorial powers handed to Reza Khan, he adopted a policy to 
crush sub-nationalism in Iran. In 1925, he annexed the British-protected Arab princi­
pality of Khuzistan or Arabistan, as it used to be called, which was ruled then by an 
Arab ruler, Shaikh Khazal.325 The Baloch Sardars, and especially Mir Dost 
Mohammad Khan, were informed that they would no longer be treated as independent 
rulers and that they were to surrender to Iran's rule.
Consequently, a Perso-Baloch war, led by Mir Dost Mohammad Khan 
started.326 In the early 1928, Iranian troops invaded Balochistan with artillery and 
aeroplanes. Various hotly contested battles were fought between the two sides for 
seven months. Describing the intensity of resistance, and the bravery of the Baloch 
forces in the battle with Iranian army in 1928, the commander of the Iranian aimed 
forces, general Amanullah Jahanbani stated, “In my opinion the reason for such [Ba­
loch] resistance... lies in the [Balochs’] historical legends, ...”328 While acknowledg­
ing that none of the defenders surrendered, he said that they had to be eliminated one 
by one in order to secure the fort of Dezzak.329
What feelings did stimulate such a sacrifice in the Baloch? The most likely 
explanation for this lies in the Baloch desire to preserve their independence and to re­
sist political control by the non-Baloch. It may also be of some interest to note that to 
undermine the resistance morale of the Baloch, Iranian planes dropped leaflets over 
Bampur, Pahrah, and Dezzak, the major cities of Western Balochistan, printed in Per­
sian and English. These leaflets told the Baloch that the Iranian forces would soon lib­
erate them Rom the tyranny of the sardars and that after their liberation the Baloch 
could decide their own destiny.330
Being defeated in Dezzak and Bampur, Mir Dost Mohammad resorted to guer­
rilla tactics against the Iranians. In spite of numerical superiority and the sophistica­
tion of their armament, the Persians did not succeed in subjugating the Baloch. Seeing 
no other way, Reza Shall reverted to the traditional treachery of a Persian Monarch 
and sent word to Mir Dost Mohammad expressing the desire to reach a peaceful set­
tlement with the Baloch. Reza Shall sent a delegate carrying the Muslim holy writ, the
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Koran, to Mir Dost Mohammad, along with a letter in which the Shall gave a solemn 
commitment that he wanted to negotiate with Mir Dost Mohammad in Tehran.331 He 
promised that Mir Dost Mohammad would remain ruler. The letter said Balochistan 
would be allied with Iran only in the conduct of its external affairs. The Shah, the let­
ter promised, was keen to have a settlement on the same lines arrived at between the 
British government and the Khan of Kalat.332
Taking Reza Shah’s assurances for granted Mir Dost Mohammad not only 
stopped the hostilities, but also set out for Tehran along with some of his trusted col­
leagues. But soon after his arrival in Tehran he was arrested and put in jail. A reign of 
terror was let loose, killing and maiming hundreds of people in Balochistan.333 To 
continue the freedom movement of his country, Mir Dost Mohammad managed his 
escape, but returning to Balochistan was arrested and executed in 1931 by the Iranian 
government.334 According to the India Office Records, before his defeat, Mir Dost 
Mohammad sent a delegation headed by Abdul Karim and Arz Mohammad Bo- 
zorgzadeh from Dezzak, to British Balochistan’s capital Quetta, to meet the Agent to 
the Governor General for help against the Persians, but with no success.335
His first hope was king Amanullah of Afghanistan. It is said that Amanullah 
wanted to help the Baloch, because of having common religious faith and common 
anti-British and anti-Persian feeling. It may also be of some interest to note that a pro- 
Dost Mohammad Khan lobby in Kabul including Amanullah Khan himself were 
propagating that the Baranzais of Balochistan, were ethnically the same as the Ba- 
rakzais of Afghanistan, a Pashtun tribe to which Amanullah and other members of the 
royal family belonged. Perhaps the reason then was to justify the Afghan claim 
over the Baloch country. But in 1928, the King himself was struggling for his own 
survival and was not in a position to support Mir Dost Mohammad.337
Criticising king Amanullah Khan’s foreign policy, Syed Mehdi Farrokh, a pro- 
Iranian writer, pointed out: “Amanullah wanted to create some excitations in Iranian
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331 L/PS/10/1136.
332 Baluchi Dunya. Multan, February 1972, p. 6.
333 L/PS/10/1136.
334 Baluchi Dunya. Multan, February 1972, p. 6; People’s Front. London, November 1979, p. 5.
335 L/PS/10/1136.
336 Interview with Afghan historian Mohammad Azam Sistani.
337 In 1929, one year after Mir Dost Mohammad’s fall, king Amanullah Khan was overthrown.
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Balochistan.”338 Meanwhile, the Persian army arrested one of Mir Dost Mohammad 
Khan’s messengers, leaving toward Afghanistan. According to Persian sources he was 
carrying a letter from Dost Mohammad Khan to the ruler of Afghanistan. In this letter 
Iran was mentioned as the neighbouring country, which had attacked Balochistan. He 
was requesting help from his Afghan brethren.339 Similarly, in 1928, the Khanate of 
Kalat was experiencing its worst political crisis. Under the direct control of the British 
administration, the rule of the Khan of Kalat, Mir Mahmud Khan was nominal. Thus, 
Dost Mohammad Khan’s repeated requests to the Khan of Kalat for ‘come and help 
us’, according to the nationalist writer Sardar Khan Baluch, were answered “immedi­
ately and mercilessly” by a decided no.340
On the Soviet Union side, Dost Mohammad Khan was not too optimistic; 
firstly, because of Reza Khan’s democratic and anti-British gestures, and secondly, 
because of geographical distance. In the same way he was not expecting any help 
from the British. The British having their own vested interest, had already sided with 
the Persians, and, as mentioned earlier, they openly rejected his request for help. 
Without hope of outside help, Mir Dost Mohammad Khan resorted to a new tactic. He 
tried to attract the attention of the followers of the exiled Shah, Ahmad Shah Qajar. 
He stated that Ahmad Shall was the legitimate king of Iran, and that he would support 
the Qajar king. On the 9th of June 1928, a report by the British consul at Keiman 
stated that “Ahmad Shall will shortly land in Baluchistan and join Dost Mohammad”, 
and added, “Ahmad Shah has left Paris for Beirut”. 341 There were also rumours that 
the Russians were following the events with curiosity.342 However, nothing is known 
about the reaction of Ahmad Shah Qajar.
In 1810, as mentioned earlier, a British spy, Henry Pottinger noted a profound 
hatred between the Persians and the Baloch in his discussion with Mehrab Khan of 
Bampur, in Western Balochistan. Expressing such revived old hatreds, on 25th January 
1927, about one century later, Sir J. Ramsay, the AGG in Balochistan wrote:
The tracts named are Persian in international law, because the boundary 
pillars prove that they are so; but there is not a vestige of Persian author­
ity existing, nor has Persia any means of asserting her theoretical claims
338 Syed Mehdi Farrokh, Tarikh-e-Sevasi-e Afghanistan, p. 455.
339 Jafar Mehdinia, Nakhost Waziran-e-Iran C4T Zendagi-e Sevasi-e Sawed Zeva-ul-Din Tabatabai. 
Tehran, 1369/1991, p. 614.
340 Interview with Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch. See also, cf. Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, 
Baluch a Nation. Lahore, 1947, p. 158.
34t L/PS/10/1136.
342 Ibid.
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to sovereignty over an area in which Persians are aliens and in which they 
detest and are detested by the people... Not only has the country under 
discussion slipped out of Persian grasp; it has been so hostile to Persia
that its inhabitants have taken Persian forts and lands and have laid waste
districts further west which still own allegiance to Persia, while they have 
carried off numbers of Persian subjects into slavery.343
Mir Dost Mohammad Khan’s rebellion in the late 1920s was a prototype of 
post-World War nationalist movements. In Harrison’s view, it was a turning point in 
the history of the Baloch in that nationalism was the prime factor.344 Dost Mohammad 
Khan based the legitimacy of his rule on ethnic criteria such as Sunni Islam and his 
tribal alliances. The townsfolk and Baloch Ulema (clergy) supported him. The fear of 
Shiism prompted the maulavis to issue a religious Fatva, declaring the Persian armed 
forces "infidel" in order to mobilise popular support for Dost Mohammad Khan
against Reza Shah in 1928.345 His weaknesses, however, were the usual ones: inter­
tribal rivalry. The Rikis, the Naruis, the Kurds, and many other tribes made a separate 
peace with Tehran to guarantee their relative strength vis-a-vis the newly created ur­
ban power centre of Baranzais. Event in Makkoran, the power base of Mir Dost 
Mohammad Khan, several tribes who fought the hardest against the Iranian, were 
willing to make a deal. Another reason for tribal reticence in Sarhadd to be involved 
in a rebellion was the chieftains’ reluctance to jeopardise the relationships they had 
cultivated after the British departure from the region and the transfer of the Sarhadd 
administration to Iranian in 1924. Bampur fell against the overwhelming power of the 
Iranian army, but it had been weakened by tribal desertion to the other side before the 
army took a single town.
With Mir Dost Mohammad Khan’s fall, the Iranians succeeded, for the most 
part, in pacifying the Baloch tribes. Occasional revolts, however, continued in Iranian 
Balochistan throughout the remainder of Reza Shah’s reign. Major examples were the 
revolt of Jumma Khan Ismailzai and Jiand Khan Yar-Ahmadzai in Sarhadd in 1931. 
Both were subdued by the intensive Persian air bombings. Being unable to stand 
against the superior Persian power, Jumma Khan with his forces took refuge to British 
Balochistan, but was soon extradited to Iran; there he was exiled for life to central 
Persia, Shiraz. The other rebellious chief, the ninety years old Jiand Khan, was ar­
343 L/PS/10/875.
344 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p, 3.
345 Amanullah Jahanbani, Amalivat-e Qushun dar Balochistan. p. 70.
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rested and died in a jail in Mash-had northern Iran.346 The next major rebellion was 
the rebellion of a number of tribes led by Mehrab Khan Nausherwani in Kuhak in 
1938, demanding reduction of customs duty on livestock, in which more than 200 Ba­
loch were executed under orders from Persian General Alborz.347
The last rebellious chief, who took up arms against the Tehran power, was 
Mirza Khan of Jask, but at last he was forced for his safety to flee toward the Arab 
Sheikdoms. "Henceforth", wrote the Baloch nationalist writer, Muhammad Sardar 
Khan Baluch, "the entire Persian Balochistan remained like a body without head. De­
scending unto most mean ruptures of beastly whims, Reza Shah, destroyed one by 
one, the rank and fashion of the millions of Persian Balochis, by means, most deplor­
able. Family after family were deported, thousands were deprived of their property; 
the elders of distinguished families exposed to most inhuman tortures were flayed, 
blinded maimed and often minced". However, as it will be discussed in chapter 
five, the Baloch nationalist struggle in Iran, encouraged by the upsurge of the Baloch 
nationalism in Pakistan, was resumed in the early 1960s.
The main causes of the failure of the various Baloch resistance movements, 
according to historian Inayatullah Baloch, were the disunity of the tribal chiefs, lack 
of a social base for Baloch nationalism in Iran, a powerful Iranian military force, and 
the joint Perso-British interest in pacifying the Baloch tribes.349 In spite of the large 
popular support enjoyed by Mir Dost Mohammad Khan in his confrontation with the 
Iranian forces, his feudally structured government was highly frssiparous and vulner­
able. The defection by some Sardars who viewed the increasing concentration of 
power in the hands of the Baranzai ruler as a threat to their traditional hereditary privi­
leges very soon proved it. As a result, Jahanbani reports that several Sardars in Dez­
zak district defected to him during the course of the military operation.
Apart from the inadequate aiming of the Baloch forces, the Persian air attacks 
made the launching of general offensives by the Baranzais difficult.350 It should be 
noted that the air power was an effective means by which Reza Shah consolidated his 
power, especially against the Baloch, just as British air power was instrumental in 
consolidating British’s imperial power in the post-World War I Middle East. More­
346 General Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs. London, 1964, p. 254.
347 Gholam Mohammad Lalzad, “Baloch Kist?”, p. 34.
348 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, p. 261.
349 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 144-45
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over, the lack of active material support from other Baloch regions, the lack of a so­
cial base for the Baloch nationalism in Iran played also an important role to the defeat 
of Mir Dost Mohammad Khan.351
After Hossein Khan and Bahram Khan, Dost Mohammad Khan’s rebellion 
was the third Baloch-wide attempt within three decades (1898-1928) to establish the 
Baloch rule in Western Balochistan. Dost Mohammad Khan called for a Baloch na­
tion to be united under his leadership, and he based his legitimacy on his control of 
Baranzai tribe. As a tribal leader, Dost Mohammad Khan controlled the allegiances of 
the tribal members who would fight for his cause. However, due to the British in­
trigues and counter-activities, Mir Dost Mohammad Khan’s attempts to include the 
Sarhaddi tribes into his domain was unsuccessfiil.
Dost Mohammad Khan’s rebellion was tribal. Although a few members of the 
ruling class may have been exposed to modem nationalistic ideas through their con­
tact with the British and the Baloch of Eastern Balochistan, the society was highly un- 
derdeveloped socially and economically. There were no notable middle class or 
other modem classes, which are identified as the base for modern nationalism. How­
ever, a delegation of Iranian Baloch attended “the Balochistan and all India Baloch 
Conference” in December 1932, at Jacobabad.353 It is said, influenced by this delega­
tion, that Magasi himself took a secret tour to Sarhadd, Iranian Balochistan.354 Was he 
able to meet the Sarhaddi rebellious chiefs? Nothing is known about this. In 1934, 
however, according to Inayatullah Baloch, Magasi suggested an armed struggle for 
the liberation and unification of Balochistan. Similarly, in 1933, Mir Abdul Aziz 
Kurd, a prominent national leader of Balochistan, showed his opposition to the parti­
tion and division of Balochistan by publishing the first map of Greater Balochistan.356
The Baloch struggle for their freedom, during the whole British period, like in 
the two other parts of the Baloch country (British and Iranian Balochistan) continued 
in Sistan (Afghanistan) as well. Impressed by king Amanullah’s anti-British cam­
paign, the Baloch of Nimruz showed their protest against the demarcation and occupa­
tion of their land by intensive raiding inside British Balochistan in the early 1920s. By
351 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 145.
352 M. G. Pikulin, Baloch. p. 198.
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attacking Kundi, a British garrison, Ghazi Sher Jan Sanjarani arrested a British officer 
and his escorts and took them to the court of Amanullah Khan in Kabul.357 Ghazi Sher 
Jan is a legendary hero among the Baloch of Afghanistan and songs about him are 
sung even today.
Summation
The strength of Baloch identity is rooted in proud historical memories of de­
termined resistance against the would-be conquerors who perennially attempted, 
without success, to annex all or part of Balochistan to their adjacent empires. It seems 
that the migration of the Baloch into the territory of present-day Balochistan was an 
important milestone in their ethnic history. It is in this territory that the ethno- 
linguistic community formed as a result of various contacts with the local pre-Indo- 
European, Indo-Aryan and Iranian populations during the eleventh and thirteenth cen­
turies. It is evidently during this period that the major tribal unions, which formed the 
nucleus of the Baloch feudal nationality, arose. Thus, in seeking to mobilise a nation­
alist movement today, the Baloch leaders are manipulating the powerful historical 
symbolism of a tortuous struggle for survival stretching back more than two thousand 
years.
Much of the Baloch ancient history is clouded over with uncertainty, and con­
troversy exists about many aspects of it. Basing their arguments mainly on legendary 
accounts, some Baloch scholars’ today claim that their ancestors came horn Babylo­
nia, in modern Iraq, through northern Iran to Makkoran. According to Sardar Khan, 
this migration began in 538 BC., when Cyrus the Great conquered Babylonia. West­
ern investigators, relying essentially on the evidence of phonological and etymologi­
cal comparisons of the Baloch language, have tended to an alternate view that the Ba­
loch are first identifiable in history inhabiting an area in northern Iran adjacent to the 
southern coasts of the Caspian Sea. Virtually all of them judge the Baloch a racial 
amalgam of many peoples and classes. The Balochi language, together with Persian, 
Pashtu and Kurdish, is the Iranian group of the Indo-European language family. Some 
Baloch writers, however, believe that the Baloch are the ancient inhabitant of Mak­
koran,
From the 12th century onward the powerful Baloch chieftains, such as Mir 
Jalal Haii, Mir Shaihak and Mir Chakar, forcefully extended their rule over most of
356 ibid.
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Balochistan. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a number of regional 
state formations, in which the feudalizing aristocracy of the Baloch tribes was in the 
ascendant, arose in the territory of Balochistan. Of these the Malik dynasty of Kech 
and Bampur, Buledai dynasty, the Dodai Confederacy of Deraj at and the Khanate of 
Kalat are the most important.
In 1734, the Iranian conquerer, Nadir Shah Afshar, invaded the subcontinent. 
In order to save his realm, the Khan of Kalat paid tribute to Nadir Shah. On the death 
of Nadir in 1747, the Khan of Kalat acknowledged the superiority of Ahmed Shah 
Durrani for some years. In 1758, however, the Khan declared himself entirely inde­
pendent, upon which the Afghan forces under the command of Ahmad Shah himself 
invaded Balochistan and besieged the Kalat fortress for forty days. This expedition 
terminated in a treaty of peace, by which the Khan agreed to furnish troops to assist 
the Kabul armies, and the Afghan King in return, agreed to pay cash allowance. From 
that time till 1839, when the British army occupied the country, Balochistan was 
completely independent owing no allegiance to any authority in India or elsewhere. 
The British government in India never claimed the doctrine of paramountcy was ap­
plicable to its relations with Kalat; nor has the Khan ever admitted that the powers of 
paramountcy could be exercised against him and his government.
Like the Rind-Lashari confederacy, Nasir Khan’s powerful state was also 
short-lived. His domain declined soon after his death. The Qajars of Persia annexed 
western Balochistan to Persia. The Talpurs of Sindh took over the port of Karachi. 
Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Lahore occupied Harrand and Dajal (Dera Ghazi Khan 
area). The insurrection also started in Sarawan and Jhalawan supported by the Mengal 
and Bizenjo tribes. There was anarchy in Makkoran. Under Khan Mohmud Khan the 
process of disintegration and weakening of Khanate reached to its lowest ebb.
Britain, whose interest in India's Trans-Indus western frontiers dated from the 
early nineteenth century, was the only foreign power to succeed in establishing rela­
tively effective control over Balochistan prior to the founding of modem Pakistan in 
1947. The First Afghan War (1839-41) and annexation of Sindh and Punjab to British 
India soon thereafter mark the formal arrival of British military and political power to 
the region.
357 Gholam Mohammad Lalzad, “Baloch Kist?” in: Tran No 5, Baloch Komitte, June 1999, Stocholm, 
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Opposing to cross his territory, Mehrab Khan, the Khan of Kalat was killed by 
the British troops on 13 November 1939. Furthermore, internal strife and weakness in 
the Khanate opened the way to British manipulation of the Baloch confederation. 
However, in its early phases, British influence over Balochistan was exerted largely 
through agreements negotiated with tribal leaders, and through subsidies, manipula­
tion of tribal feuds, and the conduct of periodic punitive expeditions against rebellious 
tribesmen.
Balochistan came under British influence by the treaties of 1854, and 1876. In 
1854, the British entered into an agreement with Nasir Khan II, the ruler of Kalat, 
which was subsequently renewed and affirmed in another treaty in 1876, in which the 
British government once again committed itself to respect the independence of Kalat, 
and to aid the Khan in case of need in the maintenance of a just authority and protec- 
tion of territories from external attack. Dining British hegemony, the Baloch coun­
try was arbitrary divided into several parts. One portion was given to Iran, a small 
portion was with Afghanistan and the northeastern region remained with the colonial 
administration under lease. The rest of the countiy was left in possession of the Kalat 
State. The Kalat state was further carved into the agencies territories and the federa­
tion of Balochi States (Kalat, Kliaran and Las-Bela) with the Khan of Kalat as the 
head of the federation. In 1879, British Balochistan included the Pashtun districts and 
the leased Baloch areas with it capital at Quetta was created.
The British hegemony in Balochistan in 19th century aroused the question of 
Baloch national sovereignty. Big-power rivalry in central Asia, which resulted in the 
British invasion of Afghanistan, also brought its forces into the Baloch region. In 
1809-10, the East India Company’s army had sent a Captain Christie and a Lieutenant 
Pottinger to explore Balochistan. British frontier policy in the early 19th century was 
motivated by an urge to consolidate the colony and reduce perceived threats to its se­
curity. This demanded acquisition of information, creation of allies, dependencies or 
buffers, delimiting and then demarcating frontiers and finally, the deployment of re­
sources to maintain the impermeability of the frontiers. Threats from an equally ex­
pansionist Czarist Russia led to an era of intrigue and conspiracy along the border.
Up to the mid- 19th century, the Baloch state of Kalat, then generally known as 
Balochistan, embraced the present day Balochistan provinces of Iran and Pakistan in-
358 See “Treaty Between the British Government and the Klielat State -  1876” in: Mir Ahmad Yar 
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eluding some areas now forming parts of Punjab and Sindh provinces in Pakistan, and 
was an independent state. When the British arrived in the subcontinent, they entered 
into treaty relations with the state of Kalat. Kalat and Nepal were the two states which 
never formed part of the Indian Empire.
With the beginning of the twentieth century, Baloch discontent found new 
forms of expression. Political unrest took various forms and there was an increase of 
sporadic uprisings both in eastern and western Balochistan. External events, such as 
the Iranian Revolution (1907), the First World War, the 1917 Russian revolution, 
Turkish and German activities, pan-Islamism and the Indian freedom movement also 
had effects on the Baloch. The Baloch tribes of Sarhadd resisted against the British 
occupation in Western Balochistan. However, they were defeated and Sarhadd was 
occupied in 1915. Simultaneously, the Mengal and the Marri revolted against attempts 
by the British government to raise mercenaries in Balochistan. Rebel chiefs fled to the 
Soviet Union and formed the delegation to the famous “Baku Congress of the People 
of the East”. Communist influence in Balochistan, though not to be overestimated, 
dates from that time, and Lenin’s appeal for the “right of self-determination for all 
oppressed nations had already had some influence on rapidly developing nationalist 
tendencies.
Western Balochistan became part of Iran in 1871 under the Perso-Baloch 
agreement. The British representative, General Goldsmid, supervised the demarcation 
of the Perso-Baloch frontier. In the late nineteenth century, Pan-Islamism as propa­
gated by Syed Jamal al-Din Afghani and Caliph Sultan Abdul Hamid influenced the 
politics of Persian Balochistan. Their influence led to Baloch revolts against Persian 
rule and against British control of eastern Balochistan. During the First World War 
(1914-18) a number of Baloch tribes, irrespective of their beliefs or sectarian affilia­
tion, took part in uprisings, which were guided by the Turko-German alliance. In 
1907, the Baloch tribes of Makkoran (Iranian Balochistan) under the leadership of Mir 
Bahram Khan Baranzai established a semi-independent state in Persian Balochistan, 
which lasted until 1928.
Mir Dost Mohammad Khan united the most of the Iranian Balochistan by 
force, by marriages, and by tribal alliances, in face of Iranian weakness. In 1925, Reza 
Shall, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty implemented an aggressive policy towards 
minority ethnic groups aimed at their Persianization and at restricting their autonomy. 
In 1928 the Iranian army defeated the Baloch forces in western Balochistan. Some
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Baloch tribes, however, supported the Iranians. Dost Mohammad Khan’s defeat marks 
the beginning of a thirteen-year crusade by Reza Shah against the Baloch, until the 
Shah had flirted with the Axis powers, and the Allies removed him from office in 
1941,
In the course of time, however, the British direct rule in Eastern Balochistan 
led to the construction of the first networks of roads, railroads, and telegraph lines. 
The British though on a limited basis, introduced the modern education. They also 
developed several coal-mining fields, and related servicing facilities in that part dur­
ing the second half of the 19th century. As a result, the first educated and politically 
conscious Baloch class emerged in Eastern Balochistan and formed the original nu­
cleus of the modern Baloch nationalism in the 1920s, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Nationalism in Practice 
National Consciousness and Nationalism
In the mid-19th century, the nationalistic sentiments, along with the first repro­
duction of European nationalist historical works in India and other lands of Asia 
started to spread all over the continent. For example, Sir William Jones and other 
founding European scholars of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784 eventually 
yielded a sizeable accumulation of knowledge about the history of India. In this man­
ner “educated Indians increasingly were to learn about their own culture through the 
mediation of European ideas and scholarship”. Then, in these circumstances, “Indians 
began to write history in the European mode”.1 The lumping together of the vast and 
diverse multiple civilisation of the Indian subcontinent not only demonstrates distort­
ing effects of nationalistic doctrinal restrictions but also reveals an overarching con­
tempt for sound and principled methods of historiography. Thus India became the 
subject of rigidly maintained misconceptions among its native scholar's as well among 
Western historians who conceptualised India in a nationalistic context. In the same 
fashion, the Baloch, educated from the Indian universities introduced this new concept 
of history for their homeland in the turn of the 20th century.2
The British occupation of eastern Balochistan and the martyrdom of Mehrab 
Khan in 1839, the Persian occupation of western Balochistan in 1928, and the subse­
quent execution of its leader Mir Dost Mohammad Khan, the death of famous free­
dom fighters, such as Barkat Khan of Jask and Jiand Khan of Sarhad in the Persian 
jails, and the imprisonment of the rebellious tribal chief, Noora Megal by the British, 
mark the beginning of far-reaching changes in Baloch political history. The Baloch 
nationalist writers and poets recapitulated these events in subsequent decades. Al­
though, the war economy retarded the consolidation of the Baloch as a nation; the de­
struction and suffering stimulated a political consciousness that was unprecedented in 
the region.
Since the 1920s, the Baloch national awareness grew rapidly with every 
fresh Baloch outbreak. Although at times it may have seemed deceptively like modern 
nationalism, Baloch national awareness did not actually attain to this stage until the
1 Bernard S. Cohn, “Representing Authority in Victorian India”, in: E. Hobsbawn, T. Ranger (ed.), 
Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 182-183.
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early 20th century, especially after the Young Baloch movement and the Anjuman It- 
tehad Balochan in 1920s. This movement coupled with other developments and 
events within and without the British Indian Empire, hastened the emergence and 
growth of doctrinaire nationalism among the Baloch. The Baloch national sentiment 
thus acquired a new motive power, and became a political force of great importance in 
the affairs of the region.
Moreover, the twentieth century inherited all the territorial and administrative 
ambiguities, as well as the awkward political and social system, which were the con­
sequences of the events of the nineteenth century in Balochistan. What had been good 
enough for securing imperial frontiers was inadequate to cope with the needs and as­
pirations of a people entering the “modern world”. Entering the first decade of the 20th 
century, the Baloch peoples’ discontent found new forms of expression. Political un­
rest took various forms and there was an increase of sporadic tribal uprisings. External 
events such as the First World War, the 1917 Russian revolution, the subsequent civil 
war, revolution in Turkey and the Indian nationalist struggle acted as catalysts for the 
Baloch nationalist tendencies.
It should be remembered that at the same time as the Baloch tribes were in re­
volt, the Hijrat Movement was started by some Muslim Ulema calling for the migra­
tion of British Indian Muslims to Afghanistan and Muslim Central Asia. It wanted to 
put pressure on the British to change its anti-Ottoman policy during and after the 
World War 1. The religious-minded people and a few Baloch from Derajat, Jacoba- 
bad, Nushki and Quetta migrated to Afghanistan.4 However, the movement, according 
to Inayatullah Baloch, had very little appeal for the Baloch tribesman, who did not 
understand peaceful agitation against British imperialism.5
From the end of the First World War the Baloch nationalists increased their ef­
forts to achieve unity among the people and work to create an independent Balochis­
tan. “The failure of the Baloch resistance movement”, Inayatullah Baloch writes, 
“gave rise to groups of nationalists”.6 He classifies them into two categories: those 
who decided to migrate from Balochistan to Soviet Union and got Soviet support 
against British imperialism. This group he termed as revolutionaries, led by Misri
2 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 90.
3 M. G. Pikulin, Baloch, p. 181
4 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan. p. 143.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 147.
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Kliaii Baloch, one of the leaders of the Marri-Khetran uprising in 1917; the second 
group consisted of the constitutionalists, who were educated in British educational 
institutions and had a middle class background, and followed the style of the Indian 
nationalists.7 It is, this group which organised the Anjuman and later on the Kalat 
State National Party.
The war economy, as indicated above, not only retarded the consolidation of 
the Baloch as a nation, but also accelerated the trend toward west to east migration. 
By the end of 1930s, there were more Baloch in the British Indian Provinces of the 
Punjab and Sindh than there were in the Khanate.8 However, the destruction and suf­
fering of war and migration as well as the new Sardari system (Sandeman System) 
stimulated the Baloch nationalism. The Baloch of Sindh and Punjab sympathised with 
the cause of the Khanate-based Baloch Movement, although there was no mechanism 
to transform this romantic sympathy to meaningful and effective action.9
As mentioned in chapter 3, after much blood was shed on both sides, the Ba­
loch and Persian, western Balochistan was subjugated in 1928. This, and the subse­
quent atrocities of the Iranian armed forces, led to mass migration of the Baloch to­
wards eastern Balochistan and Sindh. Most of these people settled in Karachi. Ac­
cordingly, this mass migration of the Baloch, affected their brethren on the eastern 
side, and provoked their sympathy and national feeling towards western Balochistan 
and Baloch nationalism as a whole.10 Perhaps, it was against this background that in 
1981, Selig Harrison opined in his Book, In Afghanistan’s Shadow that the idea of 
Baloch nationalism originates with Mir Dost Mohammad’s resistance against the Per­
sians in Western Balochistan.11
The Persians’ state system not only denied the Baloch national identity but 
also subjected it to political, economical, cultural and military domination. The Per­
sian-dominated governments have turned their state-building strategies into a "Per- 
sianization" campaign aimed at socio-cultural assimilation and the absorption of sub­
ordinate nationalities into the Persian-dominated state structure, culture and society. 
All decisions in respect to the Baloch and other nationalities were made in Tehran and
7 Ibid.
8 Aijaz Ahmad, “The National Question in Baluchistan”, pp. 7-26
9 Yu. V.Gankovsky, The People of Pakistan, pp. 203-209.
10 Interview with Yusuf Naskanti.
11 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 3.
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carried out through provincial bureaucracies dominated overwhelmingly by the Per­
sians. 12
Having responded to the missionary activities, the first anti-British intellec­
tual movement started in the 1880s in Balochistan. This movement called the “Dark­
hani” movement was inspired and pioneered by Maulana Mohammad Fazil of Dark- 
han (now called Fazil Abad). The Maulana is said to have called a gathering of the 
Ulema in 1883, and it was decided that they would translate religious books into Ba- 
lochi and Brahui. Such books were in Persian or Arabic but it was now felt that they 
would be more effective in countering missionary propaganda if they were available 
in Baloch.13 Maulana Huzoor Bakhsh Jatoi translated the Koran into Balochi in 1902- 
1903. It is said that this literary movement wrote a fairly large number of books up to 
the end of the 19th century. Exact numbers are disputed but Syed Abdul Quddus lists 
as many as 600 books, which were published from the “Maktaba-e Darkhani” (the 
Darkhani school).14
The Baloch intelligentsia gradually developed political awareness during the 
British rule. In 1891 there were only one high school and one middle school for girls 
in eastern Balochistan. There were 27 boys and 15 girls enrolled in these schools. This 
number had risen to 14 schools mostly in Quetta municipality, in 1901. In 1903, there 
were 21 Schools with 800 students.15 Maulai Shaidai, however, mentions 2 secondary 
and 22 primary schools, out of a total number of 24 schools in the country in 1902.16 
Mostly the children of non-Baloch, the servicemen of the British administration were 
enrolled in these schools (only 349 children of the local citizens were included). Me­
dium of instruction was in Urdu, and at the secondary schools in English and not in 
Balochi.17 The people were usually given some religious education and primary-level 
knowledge in Persian through the mosque schools. In 1903, it was estimated that 
some two thousand people were being given religious education in these mosques.18 
As the Muslim University of Aligarh was created in 1912, a number of Baloch, 
mostly from Sardar families received modem education. Many of them, however,
12 Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979, pp. 102- 
117.
13 Nadir Qambrani, “Brahvi Adabi Akabereen”, in: Pakistan Studies, Vol. I: No. I, 1990, pp. 13-21.
14 Syed Abdul Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan. p. 72.
15 M. G. Pikulin, Baloch. pp. 84-85.
16 Moulai Shaidai “Education During British Rule in Balochistan”, in: Quman. Karachi, August 1951,
pp. 9-10.
47 Ibid. 
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quit school before completing a high school education. Along with financial difficul­
ties, their political activism distracted them before they could fit into the Imperial In­
dian system.
As the British authorities established themselves in Balochistan in the mid-19th 
century, they made Urdu the official language alongside English and replaced Persian. 
It is said that to isolate Balochistan from its western part (Iranian Balochistan), the 
British changed from Persian to Urdu an Indian language.19 Consequently Urdu and 
English languages became the medium of communication, education and administra­
tion in Balochistan. Thus the Baloch nationalists had no other options but to express 
their thoughts in Urdu or English. In the late twenties, however, in Balochistan, there 
were curbs on open expression of political opinions and there was no press.20 In 1927, 
the Baloch nationalists, Abdul Aziz Kurd and Master Pir Bakhsh, also known as Na- 
sim Talwi, together started publishing a newspaper called "Balochistan" in Delhi.
The British introduced an entirely new administrative system in Balochistan. 
Political Agencies were established in eveiy District, with a Political Agent at the 
head of the District Administration; below the Sub-Divisions, Tahsils (district), and 
Sub-tahsils were administered by the Extra-Assistant Commissioner, Tahsildars and 
Naib-Tahsildars respectively who also supervised the revenue matters in their respec­
tive jurisdiction and were also vested with judicial powers to deal with judicial cases, 
which they decided with the help of local Jirgas. The Political Agents, the District 
Judges, the thanas (prisons) and the Levies men played an important part in the matter 
of law and order, while in the towns where regular law was enforced, the maintenance 
of law and order was the responsibility of the Police.21 Thus, the British brought a 
completely new concept of province and administrative system to the region.
As mentioned above, the opening of Western-style schools in the early 20th 
centuiy, which reached a total number of 24 by 1902, served as an important channel
9 9of new awareness. Moreover, the intellectual works of the European writers and 
travellers in the ninetieth and early twentieth centuries had a stimulating role for the 
Baloch awareness and the imagination of the modern Baloch nationalism. The British 
secret agent, Lt. Henry Pottinger, in his work, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde
19 Interview with Anwar Sajidi.
20 Monthly, Balochi Labzank. Hab, June 1995.
21 R. Hughes-Buller (ed.), Baluchistan District Gazzetteer Series: Ouetta-Pishin, 2nd Edition (1st Pu- 
bished, 1906), Quetta: Gosha-e Adab, 1986, pp. 215-16.
22 Moulai Shaidai, “Educatiion During British Rule in Balochistan”, in: Ouman. Karachi, August 1951, 
pp. 9-10.
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(1816) wrote freely, giving a detailed account of the geography, histoiy and politics 
(1809-10) of Balochistan. In the mid-19th century, Charles Masson (1842) published 
his work in four volumes. Hughes (1877) introduced, in a modem style, the Baloch 
histoiy, geography, topography, ethnology and a comprehensive map of Balochistan 
for the first time. The works of Longworth Dames (1904) and (1907), and other Brit­
ish officials and scholars who prepared the Provincial Series of the Imperial Gazetteer 
of India (1908), which included the "Balochistan" District Gazetteer, and many other 
valuable documents during the first quarter of the 20th century, deserve credit and ap­
preciation.
It should be remembered that the Balochistan series of Imperial Gazetteer of 
India, was an extraordinary compendium of information, and ranks among the best of 
all the Indian gazetteers as well as other literature of the same type.23 In the last dec­
ades of the British rule, however, we see also the further consolidation of such meth­
odology and acceleration of publications on various topics both by the British and the 
Baloch writers like Magassi, Uhka and Sardar Khan Baluch. Thus, in the early 20th 
century the western methodology for the conceptualisation of the Baloch nation was 
established.
However, the organizational break with feudal and tribal politics occurred in 
the late 1920s, with the formation of the “Anjuman-e Ittehad-e Balochan” (Organisa­
tion for Unity of the Baloch) in Mastung, Eastern Balochistan. The bulk of its leader­
ship and membership were largely drawn from the urban bourgeoisie, large and small, 
educated youth, and nationalist-minded members of the clergy and tribal aristocracy. 
After Magasi’s death in 1935, the Anjuman was replaced by the “Kalat State National 
Party” in 1937, in order to establish constitutional rule in the Khanate and an inde­
pendent Balochistan after the British departure, as it will be discussed in this chapter. 
The Founding Fathers
Influenced by Indian nationalistic thought, some Baloch called for an inde­
pendent state of Balochistan with the end of the First World War. During this period 
of Baloch resurgence, urban dwellers as well as the tribes were caught up in a new 
sense of Baloch nationalism. The modern Baloch movement, however, unlike the 
past, was non-tribal, but national in its nature. It included, for the first time in Baloch 
history, individuals from all classes and from many different tribes in the rank of its
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activists.24 The change could be observed in the involvement and participation of 
Azam Jan, Ahmad Yar Khan, Ibrahim Khan and Agha Abdul Karim, from the Khan 
family; Yusuf Ali Magasi, Shahbaz Khan Nausherwani and Abdul Rahman Bugti, 
from the top Sardar houses; Abdul Aziz Kurd, Gul Khan Nasir and Ghaus Bakhsh 
Bizenjo, from the upper middle class related to the lesser Sardar families; and Mo­
hammad Hossein Unqa, Naseem Talavi (Master Pir Bakhsh), and Addul Karim Shor- 
ish, from the commoners 25
Thus, the ethnic element was a present and conscious force facilitating popular 
mobilisation and providing focus to the movement. This universal aspect of the move­
ment owed much to the emergence of modern nationalism all over the world and, 
nevertheless, to the British intervention. However, the British administrative per­
sonnel and most of the greater Sardars as well as lesser Sardars who were recognised 
by the British Establishment as members of decision-making Jirgas on various levels 
were against the national movement.26
Yusuf Ali Magasi had rightly been considered as the organiser and the moving 
spirit of the modern Baloch national movement. “This young man”, stated Sardar 
Khan Baluch in his book, Baluch a Nation, in 1947, “preached a crusade against the 
Pharoahs of capitalism, though he himself was a capitalist” 27 Magasi (1908-1935) 
was the son of the chief Sardar of the Jhal-Magasi region. The Magasi Sardar en­
joyed not only traditional political prestige in the Baloch system but also occupied a 
part of the most productive agricultural lands in Balochistan and Sindh28 The Magasi 
Sardar was traditionally included in the Kalat Darbar (The State Council), the highest 
decision making institution under the Khan.
In 1913, a private tutor was engaged for the young Magasi’s religious and tra­
ditional classical education. Later a graduate (BA) from Lahore was employed for his 
modern education including English. His father Qaisar Khan had earlier received the 
title of “Nawab” from the British government. However, Qaisar Khan’s liberal and 
populist attitude did not suit the British authorities in those days.29 The British-
23 Brian Spooner, “Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography”, pp. 598-632, In: Ehsan 
Yarshater, (ed), Encvclopadia Iranica, Vol. Ill, London -  New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1989, 
p. 614.
24 Malik Faiz Mohammad Yusufzai, Yaddashtain. pp. 101, 113, 141, 151, 163.
25 Ibid.
26 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 152, 156.
27 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, Baluch a Nation. Lahore, 1947, p. 131.
28 Inamul Haq Kausar, Balochistan Men Urdu, pp. 109-115
29 Ibid.
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appointed Chief Minister of the Khan, Sir Shams Shah (a non-Baloch Indian), forced 
Qaisar Khan to abdicate from this Sardarship, Sir Shams Shah later became a target 
of the movement.
Yusuf Ali Magasi lived with his family in exile in Multan and Lahore until 
1929.30 In these cities of the British Indian Province of Punjab, Magasi had better 
chances for education and political training. According to one report, he completed
'5 1 g
his college degree in Lahore. During this period the ongoing political movements in 
India more closely influenced him. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and Maulana Moham­
mad Ali, the famous scholar-j ournalist-activists of Muslim India, especially impressed 
him. Zafar Ali was a prominent pressman and was famous for his writings for the 
cause of independence of India and the rights of the Muslim population.32 Through 
Magasi’s political poems and essays in some Urdu language newspapers and 
periodicals in Pimjab and other parts of Muslim India, he was introduced to wider In­
dian circles. Admiring his growing popularity, in a poem, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan 
commented: Lafz-e Baloch mehr-o-wafa ka kalam hay, Manee hay, es kalam ke Yusuf 
Ali Aziz (The word Baloch is a word of love and affection. The meaning of this word 
is Yusuf Ali Azi).33
Yusuf Ali Magasi kept in contact with news horn the Khanate and the British 
Balochistan. In 1916, Sir Shams Shah, who belonged to the British Political Depart­
ment, was given the post of the Political Adviser to Khan Mahmud Khan and later he 
assumed the title of Wazir-e-Azam. In 1920 Khan Mahmud Khan lost his eyesight and 
became blind. After that Shams Shah became practically the ruler of Kalat State with 
vast powers to rim the administration of the State for the next ten years. By 1929, he 
isolated the Sardar of Jhal-Magasi. Among the independent minded and nationalist 
circles, Sir Shams was considered the most notorious official. Magasi, bitterly criti­
cised the policies of the Shams government and demanded constitutional rule through 
elected representation.34
In 1929 when Magasi returned to the Khanate, he started his political career by 
publishing an article, the “Faryad-e-Balochistan”, (Cry of Balochistan), in the 17th 
November 1929, issue of Weekly Hamdard. Lahore. In the article an appeal was made
30 Ibid.
31 Sir Edward Wakefield, Past Imperative: Mv Life in India. 1927-1947. p. 129
32 M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 244.
33 Maulana Zafar AH Khan quoted in Shah Mohammad Marri, Baloch Oaum. p. 285.
34 Ibid., p. 14.
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to the Baloch to organise themselves for the liberation and unity of Balochistan. Criti­
cising the policies of the British government and the Prime Minister of Kalat State Sir 
Shams Shah, he also demanded for constitutional reforms.35 It is said that Magasi’s 
“Faryad-e-Balochistan” was the first Baloch literary document for the cause of Baloch 
nationalism.36
In 1929, Magasi was arrested, fined Rs. 20,000, and sentenced to a year of im­
prisonment in the central prison at Mastung, a town well known for the political initia­
tives of its residents throughout the history of Kalat State.37 He had almost regular 
contact with the politically minded young men of the town and its suburbs, and these 
contacts and the exchange of ideas greatly encouraged him for the achievements of his 
future objectives. After his release in 1931, the Anjuman was reorganised. Magasi be­
came the president and Abdul Aziz Kurd General Secretary.38
Magasi was also a wealthy young man and financed the publication of several 
Urdu language Baloch nationalist newspapers in Karachi.39 As mentioned earlier, his 
article, the “Faryad-e-Balochistan”, in 1929, resulted in his arrest and detention for 
nearly a year. On the 20th November 1931 Magasi published a pamphlet, “Shams- 
gardi”, Tyranny of Shams, the prime minister of Kalat, condemning the undemocratic 
maimer of his government.40 In another pamphlet in 1933, entitled “Balochistan ki 
Awaz” (the voice of Balochistan), Magasi informed the British Parliament about the 
grave socio-political conditions in Balochistan.41
Next to Magasi, the most popular figure in the movement was Abdul Aziz 
Kurd. He was born in 1904. His father was a civil servant of Kalat State. His early 
childhood and teenage experiences, his socio-political background and the resulting 
state of mind and political career are similar to those of many other activists of the 
Anjuman. There are, however, some differences with those of Yusuf Ali Magasi who 
came from an upper stratum of the Baloch society 42 It is said that after he was ap­
pointed as the president of the Nation Party in 1937, he hung a map of the “Greater
35 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem o f Greater Baluchistan, pp. 150-62.
36IOR. L/P+S/12/45 file PZ 7548/31.
37 Inayatullah Baloch, The Broblem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 150.
38 Monthly, Azad Baluchistan. December 1984, p. 4.
39 Carina Jahani, Standardization and Orthography in the Balochi Language, p. 134.
40 Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan. vol. II, p. 420.
41 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 168.
42 Baluchi Dunva. Multan, June-July 1968.
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Balochistan” behind his desk.43 This may have shown Kurd’s intention to be the 
leader of all the Baloch in southwest Asia.
Mohammad Hossein Unqa who in real terms represented the commoners, was 
another popular leader in this period. He was born in 1907. His family and a number 
of labourers had migrated from the coastal areas to Mach, a small town along the Ba­
lochistan railroad in the leased Khanate territory. Life in such places of British ori­
ented activities had the advantage of contact with the outside world. Though basically 
for the non-local migrants, this contact meant establishment of elementary schools 
and access to publications and information from other parts of India. Unqa passed his 
elementary school in Mach, and in 1924 he graduated from a High School in Quetta. 
Apart from the fact that Unqa came from a non-tribal commoner family, he is impor­
tant for his role as a poet and journalist for the movement. Nevertheless, Unqa was 
among the few intellectuals of the movement who participated in militant and para­
military activities on several occasions.44 It must be born in mind that traditionally, 
participation in politics was restricted only to the upper classes, the Khans and the 
Sardars or the Hakoms as they were called in Makkoran. The commoners, the artisans 
and the poets, were not expected to be involved in the affairs of the state and nation 45 
Thus, the new political activists (the nationalists) consisted of different classes 
in the Baloch society. Being expanded beyond the traditional political centres like 
Mastung, Quetta and Kalat, they included Magasi from Jhal, a Kalat-State region 
close to Sindh, Abdur Rahman Bugti who later, like Magasi, was deprived of the 
Sardarship of the largest and most powerful Baloch tribes (Bugti) by the British be­
cause of his anti-British political activities46; and Mohammad Hossein Unqa, a com­
moner from coastal Makkoran. This mass participation was a new phenomenon, 
which indicated the emergence of a Baloch nationality with a sufficient developed 
national consciousness and distinctive characteristics shared by the members of all 
classes of the Baloch nation.
Aniuman-e Ittehad-e Balochan
Inspired by the political upheavals in Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Russia, as 
well as the anti-colonial movement in British India itself, Baloch nationalism became
43 Interview with Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai.
44 Malik Faiz Mohammad Yusufzai, Yaddashtain. pp. 163-177
45 Inamul Haq Kausar, Balochistan Men Urdu. (Urdu in Balochistan-in Urdu), Lahore, 1967, pp. 107- 
137.
46 Balochistan, Organ of “Jonbesh-e Khalq-e Baloch-Iran, No. 7, 1364/1985 (Persian).
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established in the 1920s. In 1920, an underground organisation, called “Young Ba­
loch” was formed by a group of Baloch nationalists under the leadership of Yusuf Ali 
Magasi, educated in India, and Abdul Aziz Kurd son of a Kalat state official.47 A few 
years later, the movement changed its name to the “Anjuman-e Ittehad-e Balochan” 
(Organisation for Unity of the Baloch, hereafter called Anjuman) and its direction 
from being a clandestine organisation to being an open political party under Magasi’s 
leadership in 1931 48 In many ways the Anjuman marks the beginning of a new force 
in Balochistan -  the secular, non-tribal nationalist movement, organised as a political 
party. Being a clandestine organisation for many years, the exact date of the move­
ment’s early formation is not certain.
The Anjuman called for political and constitutional reform within the Khanate, 
and ultimate unification of all Baloch lands into an independent state. As noted above, 
from 1931, the Anjuman stalled to work openly, promoting different ideas of reform 
within the state, and advocating the need for more representative institutions.49 During 
the early 1920s, which was the formative decade of modern Baloch nationalism, the 
movement worked underground. Its leaders, adherents and other like-minded persons 
in the Baloch regions including those in Sindh, Punjab and Karachi, acted on an indi­
vidual basis. During this period, the leaders accumulated experience, continued their 
self-education, observation and contemplation, and maintained contacts through cor­
respondence and the media.50 The newspapers and periodicals published by some 
like-minded Baloches of Karachi during this period, and the sympathetic attitude of 
some Indian newspapers with mass circulation played an important role in communi­
cation and training.51
Being the largest Baloch urban centre, Karachi has played an important role 
for development of the Baloch national consciousness. Karachi is not only the cradle 
of the modern Balochi literary movement, but also the centre of the modern Baloch 
politics. Simultaneous with formation of the Anjuman, the Baloch intellectuals in Ka­
rachi formed a nationalist organisation, called the Baloch League. Gholam Mo­
hammad Noor ud-Din, educated from Bombay, was appointed as its president. The
47 Monthly, Azad Baluchistan. No 6, December 1984
48 It also is known by some sources as the “Anjuman-e Ittehad-e Balochan wa Balochistan” (Organisa­
tion for the Unity of the Baloch and Balochistan), see Riccardo Redaelli, The Father’s Bow: The Khan­
ate of Kalat and British India. 19th -  20th Century. Firenze: II Maestrale, 1997, p. 143.
49 Taher Bizenjo, Balochistan: Kia Howa. Kia Hoea. Karachi: Pakistani Adab Publisher, 1989, p. 121
50 Balochi Dunya. Multan, June-July 1968.
51 Ibid.
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other members of its leadership were: Waja Omar Bakhsh Sabera, a famous merchant, 
Maolavi Mohammad Osman, Mehrab Khan Issa Khan, Maolavi Abdul Samad Sar- 
bazi, Khan Sahib Osman, Pir Bakhsh Shahdad and Allah Bakhsh Gabol. In its annual 
conference in 1930, the League condemned Magasi’s imprisonment and openly de­
manded his immediate release from the British authorities. In the late 1930s, after his 
graduation from Aligarh University, the legendary nationalist leader, Mir Ghous 
Bakhsh Bizenjo also joined the League.52
In 1931, with the presidency of Yusuf Ali Magasi, the Anjuman, as noted, 
started a new and open career. Its activities evolved around three fundamental de­
mands: 1 -  Reform in the Khanate. 2 -  Unification of the traditional Baloch lands 
which were divided between different administrative units (and countries). 3 -  Estab­
lishment of a sovereign, independent and united Balochistan.53 For initiation of reform 
in the Khanate the party demanded abrogation of rules and regulations, such as the 
Frontier Crime Regulation, which curbed political freedom. They demanded estab­
lishment of an elected parliament for the Khanate, and consequently, of a responsible 
constitutional cabinet under the Khan. Such an act would mean the end of the Sardari- 
Jirga system as well as the end of indirect, but overwhelming, British rule. The An­
juman, it seems, was more interested in political-structural change rather than educa­
tion, and economic and social reform. It was a reflection of their belief that nothing 
could be done before bringing change in the political structure.54
The British used the Sardari system as their main instrument of oppression in 
Balochistan.55 To confront the British, the nationalists attacked the Sardari system, 
which they depicted as one in which the Sardars were able to exert total power over 
their subjects, even to the extent of oppression and abuse. Being closely allied with 
the colonial government, the Sardars were intolerable in the eyes of the young nation­
alists.56 Under these circumstances through the mandate given by Yusuf Ali Magasi 
and his principal colleague Abdul Aziz Kurd, one of the main objects of the move­
ment and the party when organized under the latter’s auspices was the abolition of the 
Sardari system. "They could not fight the Sardars", Aijaz Ahmad, a leftist Pakistani 
writer wrote, "by fighting the British, but they could fight both the Sardars and the
52 Interview with Yusuf Naskanti.
53 Monthly, Azad Baluchistan. December 1984
54 Malik Faiz Mohammad Yusufzai, Yaddashtain. pp. 53-58
55 Jamnahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 170
56 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 150-62.
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British by fighting against the Sardar whose aggression was more immediate, who 
was more accessible and vulnerable, and on whose presence the imperial hold itself 
was predicated".57
Traditionally, the Khans nominated their successors. Mahmud Khan, however, 
did not. According to historian Dehwar, “he [the Khan] knew that none of his sons 
had the capability to be his successor.”58 In the middle of 1930, when the Khan fell ill, 
the prime minister Shams Shall realised the gravity of the situation and started to 
make endeavour’s to contact the British authorities to get the nomination of Mahmud 
Khan’s elder son, Mohammad Anwar Khan, as his successor. By this gesture Shams 
wanted to peipetuate his tenure of office indefinitely, with the view that Mohammad 
Anwar, thus selected, would certainly depend upon him for running the administration 
of the State. But, in the same year, the Anjuman secretly negotiated with the impris­
oned prince Mohammad Azam Jan, the Khan’s brother, who was pro-Anjuman, and 
announced its support to him for the Khanship. The Anjuman thus directed its efforts 
against the pro-British Sir Shams Shall. Its leaders initiated a mass migration from the 
Magasi area to Sindh and Punjab to force Shams into resigning.59
The migration of Magasis had a great impact on the neighboring Baloch tribes. 
Sympathising with them, the Rind, Mengal, and Bugti tribes revolted against their 
Sardars, who were the supporters of Sir Shams Shah or the British.60 Moreover, the 
mass migration of Magasi tribesmen into Sindh had given rise to complications in the 
social life of the people of the area and created problems of law and order. When the 
reports regarding this situation were disclosed, the British authorities made Sir Shams 
Shah responsible for the popular unrest and rejected his proposal to appoint prince 
Mohammad Anwar Jan, Instead the British administration accepted Mohammad 
Azam Jan’s nomination as the new Khan, under certain conditions.61
57 Aijaz Ahmad, “The National Question in Pakistan”, p. 23.
58 M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan. p. 240.
59 S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State, p. 134.
60 M. Hossein Unka, “Baloch Sardaroun ka Ghair Mustahsen Rawiya”, in: A1 Baluch. Karachi, 13 Au­
gust 1933.
61 The British conditions for the selection of Azam Jan as the new Khan were: 1. The treaty of 1876 
shall remain in force. 2. The present system of administration shall remain intact including the revenue 
system without any drastic change. 3. The state council should be expanded to include the S a r d a r s  of 
the big tribes with two sessions in a year in order to acquire their opinion in important matters of the 
state. The Khan and his W a zir -e  A za m  should abstain from issuing such orders without the consent of 
the State Council, which directly or indirectly may affect their position or interest. 4. The S a r d a r s  must 
consider themselves as right hand of the Khan while the Khan should also consider them as such giving 
due weight to their wishes (cited in: M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan p. 241),
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With Mahmud Khan’s death in 1931, his brother, Mohammad Azam Jan, suc­
ceeded. His formal coronation ceremony, however, was held on 26th April 1932. Lord 
Willington, the viceroy of India, personally attended the darbar. Azam Jan's ascen­
dance to the Kalat throne was considered a victory for the Anjuman. In the same 
month as he ascended to the throne (December 1931), he removed Sir Shams Shah 
and installed a new prime minister, Khan Bahadur Gul Mohammad Khan. However, 
the authorities and the Sardars, it seems, after his nomination, warned the Khan about 
the Anjuman. After a dialogue with Magasi on 22 December 1931 about the Anju- 
man’s demands, the Khan asked Abdul Aziz Kurd to stop his political activities.62 The 
British government's attitude may be ascertained from Lord Willingdon's speech dur­
ing the coronation ceremony. Addressing the Khan he said: "You are not only the 
ruler of Kalat State but also the head of an old and powerful confederacy. Therefore, it 
is appropriate for you to work and think together with the Sardars".63 Pointing to the 
danger posed by the Anjuman to the Sardari system, Lord Willingdon assured the 
Khan of his help for the maintenance of the system: "Every State Ruler is sometimes 
confronted with difficulties and concerns. You should rest assured that our officers 
will provide all kinds of help and advice on such occasion. Be sure that I would per­
sonally continue my deep interest in your State's affairs.64
When Azam Jan assumed the reins of the Khanship of Kalat, the state was ex­
tremely backward. The sphere of education was limited and the schools for children 
were few in number and hospitals for health care were almost unknown except in 
Quetta. The educated people had received education up to secondary level and some 
of them received employment in niabats (districts) as moharrers (clerk) while grade 
posts and posts of teachers were filled by non-locals most of whom came from Pun­
jab. Although the educated people were limited in number in the State, political awak­
ening was sharply progressing. This was considered as an important development dur­
ing the reign of Khan Azam Jan. The people of the State after a long period of stale­
mate were jubilant at his election as the Khan, which was considered to be a change 
for the good.
/Tf
Being an aged person , Khan Azam Jan could not therefore involve himself 
directly with politics, contrary to the expectations of the younger generation. His
62 Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e-Balochistan. Two volumes, Quetta, 1954, p. 407.
63 Baluchi Dunya. Multan, June-July 1968.
54 Ibid.
65 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 110.
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promise to abolish bigar (forced labour without due remuneration), cancel the illegal 
taxes, and stop the encroachment of Sardars over state land in Kacchi remained unful­
filled, because the Sardars opposed such reforms.66 However, during his short rule 
(1931-1933) the political awakening of the people intensified and soon took the form 
of a full-fledged political movement under the leadership of Yusuf Ali Magasi and 
Abdul Aziz Kurd.67
The Anjuman and the Issue of Independence
After having declared its (Anjuman’s) goal to be the establishment of an inde­
pendent and united Balochistan with a representative form of government, the General 
Secretary of the Anjuman, Abdul Aziz Kurd said, “In the magazine Zamindar of Sep­
tember 9, 1932, I have presented an ideology to separate Balochistan from India and 
form an independent Muslim government in this country, which I had formulated not 
today but twelve years ago in 1920 in view of local conditions, and which I had ex­
pressed before the world earlier in 1922 in a publication of the newspaper “Ham- 
dam”... I want to see a constitutional government in Balochistan which is purely Is­
lamic and independent in all aspects. That is, just as I cannot like the fact that Balu­
chistan remains under the slavery of the Hindus, I am also opposing to my country 
wealing the enslaving chains of the colonizing Europe” 68 It must be remembered that 
the All India Muslim League had not yet formulated the demand for Pakistan. Instead, 
having faith in a United India, they were struggling for the preservation of the rights 
of Indian Muslims.
The Indian reaction, Muslim as well as Hindu, was not favourable to the An- 
juman’s increasingly explicit demands for the secession of the Baloch land from the 
sub-continent and the formation of a sovereign, independent Balochistan. “The Mus­
lim Outlook”, Lahore (1932), called the idea of a free Balochistan “a British imperial­
ist conspiracy”, and The Daily Zamindar. a pro-Muslim League newspaper, opposed 
the idea and advised for the creation of a “United Muslim front against the Hindu bu­
reaucracy”.69 The Baloch activists were confronted in Balochistan with a Muslim, 
principally Punjabi bureaucracy. For the Baloch, the problem of Hindu bureaucracy
66 M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan. p. 244.
67 Monthly, Azad Baluchistan. December 1984.
68 Daily Zamindar. Lahore, 18 September 1932, quoted in Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater 
Baluchistan, pp. 153-54.
69 Daily, Zamindar. 28 September 1932, quoted in ibid.
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was non-existent. The debate over independence was still continuing when the Anju­
man decided to convene the Balochistan and All India Baloch Conference in 1932.
Having decided to summon all the Baloch nationalists to the “Balochistan and 
All India Baloch Conference”, on October 20, 1932, the Anjuman leaders issued the 
following statement regarding its purpose: “It has been decided to convene the Balu­
chistan and All Baluch Conference at Jacobabad in the month of December (1932). 
The Baluch are properly acquainted with democratic principles but our nation is being 
tremendously affected by external influences. Consequently, we have no choice but to 
organize ourselves by establishing bonds of unity and alliance. Otherwise, this will 
result in our lagging behind all other nations. Our objectives are the following ex­
tremely important aims... Unity of Baluch, compulsory education, protection of rights, 
religious education and legal reforms. We have faith that members of our nation will 
spare no efforts to make this conference a success”.70
On 27 December 1932, the Anjuman-organised “Balochistan and All India Ba­
loch Conference” was held at Jacobabad, Sindh. The conference commenced with the 
Presidential address by Mir Ali Nawaz Khan Talpur, the ruler of Khairpur State, in 
which he called on the Baloch for unity. The deliberations of this first Conference 
lasted for three days.71 More than 200 delegates from Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab, 
including the non-Baloch Abdus Samad Achakzai participated in it.72
Numerous resolutions were passed. The following aims were the most signifi­
cant:73 1 - To unite the Baloch that is to create the unification of the different regions 
of Balochistan. 2 - The establishment of a constitutional government in Balochistan. 3 
- The abolition of the Frontier Crime Regulation in Balochistan. 4 - The establishment 
of colleges of advanced education in Balochistan. 5 - The establishment of industries 
in Balochistan. 6 - Conference condemned the Iranian occupation of western Ba­
lochistan and demanded an end to Persian atrocities.74 It should be noted that a few 
days before the Conference, the Anjuman’s weekly, al-Balnch. from Karachi, in its 
issue of 25th December 1932, published a map of Greater Balochistan, showing the
70 Daily, Zamindar. 22 October 1932, quoted in ibid.
71 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 169,
72 Baluchi Dunya, Multan, June-July, 1968: Malik Ramazan, who later became a member of the 
Movement and survived as a local journalist, had mentioned that 200 delegates from Karachi, Sindh, 
Punjab and Balochistan proper attended the Conference; See also A. B. Awan., Baluchistan, p. 165
73 Khan Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai, “A Brief Summary of Evidence, Before the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee, London”, in: Daily Gazette Press. Ltd.. 1st May 1933; see also Baluchi Dunva. Multan, 
June-July 1970.
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Baloch areas of Iran, the territories of the Kalat Confederacy, the leased areas under 
the British control and the Baloch land in Punjab and Sindh,75
The “Balochistan and all Indian Baloch Conference” was a great opportunity 
for the Baloch nationalists from different parts of Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab to 
communicate their views about the destiny of the Baloch nation and Balochistan. 
Western Balochistan (Iranian Balochistan) was represented by the Baloch refugees 
living in Karachi.76 A second Baloch Conference was convened at Hyderabad (Sindh) 
towards the end of December 1933. While supporting the resolutions of the previous 
conference, it stressed the establishment of a constitutional government in Balochis­
tan.77 The Baloch conferences were a demonstration of a common Baloch forum 
shared by all (British) Baloch regions.78 A famous political poem of Yusuf Ali Magasi 
was recited in the last day’s session of the Conference.79
In January 1934, the Anjuman’s General Secretaiy, Abdul Aziz Kurd was ar­
rested. By issuing statements and publishing articles in weekly Al-Hanif (Jacobabad), 
Balochistan Jadid (Karachi) and daily Azad (Lahore), he was demanding the return of 
leased districts of Queta, Bolan and and Nasirabad to the Kalat state, and also the 
tribal areas of Marri and Bugti, which had been integral part of Khanate in the past. 
He was sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment by the Shahi-Jirga at Sibi. In 
his message to the party at the time of his arrest Kurd said:
Comrades! You must understand Britain’s position in Baluchistan 
veiy well. Do not view it from the perspective of Indian politics.
Keeping in view the significance of our country for all o f Asia consti­
tutes your political ideology under provisional exigencies in accor­
dance with local conditions and national aspirations. The Baluch na­
tion should not imitate Afghan, Indian or any foreign politics. You 
should impress on your minds the fact that Britain has neither con­
quered your counfry nor bought it from any one. Therefore you are not 
her slave and she is not your master. In fact, Britain has set up tempo­
rary camp in your country with the status of a trader holding special
74 Inayatullah Baloch, “Mir Mohammad Yusuf Ali Khan Magasi”, in: Monthly Azad Baluchistan. Lon­
don, December 1984, p. 4.
75 Weekly Al-Baluch. Karachi, 25 December 1932, p. 7..
76 Weekly Young Baluchistan. 15 January 1934; Saeedi Baluch, “Azad Baluchistan aur Hokumat-e- 
Iran” in: Weekly, Baluchistan. 4 March 1936, cited in: Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater 
Baluchistan, p. 145.
77 Monthly, al-Hanif, Special Number on Balochistan, Jacobabad, 1937.
78 Given the existing restrictive rules and regulations, such a conference could not be held in Balochis­
tan proper.
79 A. B. Awan, Baluchistan, p. 165.
169
concessions by virtue of friendly and equal treaties. Therefore you 
must always be aware of your true status and political dignity.80 
Having been hardly two years in power, Mohammad Azam Jam died on 9th 
September 1933, and was succeeded by his son Ahmad Yar Khan on the 20th of the 
same month in 1933. Ahmad Yar Khan was bom in 1902 at Loralai, where his grand­
father (Mir Khudadad Khan), father (Mir Azam Jan), and other family members were
O i
imprisoned by the British. He received his early education from private tutors in 
Persian, Arabic and English. He was married to the granddaughter of the famous 
leader of Pan-Islamism, Syed Jamal al-Din Afghani.82
Mir Ahmad Yar Khan was a supporter of the programme and manifesto of the 
Anjuman and his policies gave the movement legitimacy. Consequently, his accession 
to the throne led to the development of more favourable conditions for the Anjuman’s 
work aimed at achieving independence for Balochistan. Influenced by the Baloch na­
tionalist movement, he carried out some important reforms in the state. For example, 
he abolished the bigar system, improved the judiciary and education. The education 
budget was raised from Rs. 13000 to 400,000. Scholarships were given to students to 
study in Indian and other foreign universities. Preference in employment was given to 
the Baloch, and he also established a printing press in Kalat.83
To improve the woeful economic condition, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan established 
a factory for manufacturing small arms and ammunition, thereby providing employ­
ment to people and the needed equipment for the state army. Small-scale industries 
like spinning and cloth weaving, carpet making and leather tanning were opened at 
various places. Moreover, by establishing numerous farms, and by giving the Baloch 
students special stipends to specialise in this field, he paid due attention to agriculture. 
An extensive chain of fruit farms was set up under the direct management of the state 
government to streamline the horticulture production on commercial basis. To link 
towns and ports, attention was given to road and communication. This created a good 
and healthy competitive atmosphere between the state-run and private sector farms.84
More important, however, was his sympathetic and cooperative role in the An­
juman’s struggle for independence. In this respect his contribution is much greater 
than the previous Khans. In 1934, he sent Magasi to Britain as his personal represen­
80 Abdul Aziz Kurd, quoted in Inyaytullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 154.
81 M. A. Shaheen Qaisarani, Balochistan, Tarikh wa Mazhab, Quetta: Edareh Tadris, 1994, p. 142.
82 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 161.
83 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 126.
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tative to discuss the sovereignty of the Khanate of Kalat with the highest authorities
o r
and to negotiate the return of all the leased area to the Khanate. However, according 
to Malik Faiz Mohammad Yusufzai, a leading figure of the Anjuman, Magasi’s travel 
to London was in fact a secret conspiracy against the Anjuman by the British. The 
British thought that in the absence of Magasi the Anjuman could not survive.86 Of 
course, before Magasi’s compulsory departure, the Khan asked him to look for means 
and ways in London for the freedom of the Khanate.87
While in London, Magasi tried to contact some British circles. Apparently he 
was advised to keep his activities peaceful and constitutional, British-Indian style, in 
other words to generate public opinion pressure through organisation, public meet­
ings, strikes and resolutions. Ironically, these activities were possible only in British 
India, where a degree of constitutional reforms, providing comparative freedom for 
political action, had taken place. It was not possible in the Khanate a frontier state, 
which suffered from a lack of urban population centres and an abundance of restric­
tive rules and regulations. Magasi’s talks in London were not very productive and the 
British Government refused to introduce reforms in Balochistan. As written by the 
historian Inayatullah Baloch, “The failure of Magassi’s mission resulted in radical­
ism”.88
According to some sources, Magasi as president of the Anjuman favoured an 
armed struggle with the help of the USSR.89 Magasi’s relaxed mood when he returned 
to Balochistan and his unexpected death in 1935, added to the lack of available 
sources, and made it difficult to ascertain the degree of his seriousness about the 
armed struggle. The death of Magasi was the great loss for the future of the Baloch 
national movement. In his last days he planned to reorganise the Anjuman on revolu­
tionary lines. He wrote to his friends about his plan to expel the pro-British element 
from the Anjuman and to devote himself to the cause of Balochistan.90
Up to 1937 the activities and the strategies of the modem Baloch national 
movement (1920-1937) were based on demands for political, social and economic re-
84 Ibid., pp. 126-127.
85 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 155; M. A. Shaheen Qaisarani, Balochis­
tan. Tarikli wa Mazhab. Quetta: Edareh Tadris, 1994, p. 204
86 Malik Faiz Mohammad Yusufzai, Yaddashtain. Progressive Writers Association, Balochistan Quetta, 
1997, p. 30.
87 M. A. Shaheen Qaisarani, Balochistan. Tarikh wa Mazhab. Quetta: Edareh Tadris, 1994, p. 204.
88 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 155
89 Ibid.
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forms within the jurisdiction of the Khanate. The movement opposed special adminis­
trative and judicial arrangements in the Baloch regions, which limited political activi­
ties and the development of modern institutions similar to those evolving in British 
India. As a result of gradual constitutional reforms, the provinces of British India were 
moving towards home rule and parliamentary representative government. This devel­
opment implied greater freedom of the press, political activities and public opinion 
and a more equitable judiciary system on western lines. The Baloch national move­
ment established the goal of liberalisation of colonial political rules for the enhance­
ment of its struggle.
Since 1937, as the goals of the movements on the sub-continent shifted rapidly 
toward independence, the Baloch national movement concentrated its activities on the 
consolidation of the Kalat State’s legal status as a sovereign state, hoping that Kalat 
would become the nucleus of a Baloch state after the departure of Great Britain and 
would attract other Baloch areas. The idea behind the party’s political support to the 
Khan, according to Baloch nationalist writer Janmahmad, lies in the fact that while the 
nationalists favoured a united front, which included the Khan and his loyal Sardars, it 
aspired to identify itself with the Baloch Confederacy of Kalat.91 In different ways, 
the Anjuman’s programme and activities involved the Khan, and the British who ruled 
the country; the Sardars', the Pashtun population;92 the Indian National Congress, 
which was working for a free united India; and the Muslim politicians of India,
Kalat State National Party (KSNPf
Yusuf Ali Magasi was killed in the Quetta earthquake in 1935. After Magasi’s 
death the Anjuman’s left wing decided to reorganise. In February 1937, the “Kalat 
State National Party” emerged with the Anjuman’s objective articulated more ar­
dently. Political workers from the Kalat state and a few members of the Anjuman at­
tended a convention at Sibi on the 5th of February and formed the National Party.93 
The party convention discussed the prevailing situation in Balochistan and views were 
exchanged regarding Baloch national identity in the fast-changing political conditions 
of the region. The National Party recruited educated Baloch youth and state employ­
91 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 170
92 The “British Balochistan” included some areas populated by Pashtun-speaking people. The process 
was similar to annexation of many Baloch region to Sindh and Punjab.
93 In the same convention, the National Party elected Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd as its first President. Malik 
Faiz Mohammad Yusefzai and Mir Gul Khan Nasir were elected as Vice President and General Secre­
tary of the party respectively.
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ees. The National Patty also persuaded the Khan to abolish a number of taxes levied 
on tribes by the Sardars,94
The party manifesto issued at the convention maintained that Balochistan had 
gained immense importance because of its geographical position as a buffer state 
separating Afghanistan, Iran, and India. It declared its objective of uniting the Baloch 
people under one centre, with a representative government which could reflect their 
glorious traditions. The party manifesto was one of the best documents ever produced 
on the Balochistan situation. It reflected the deep nationalistic sentiments and con­
scious expression of a political elite, determined to work for the liberation of their 
country. The manifesto took pride in the traditional heritage and glorious past of the 
Baloch people, linking it with the ancient people of Babylonia.95 “The Baloch”, the 
document maintained, were committed to achieve the goal of national independence. 
In the meantime the party expressed its desire to fill the political vacuum of a sensible 
and responsible government in the state.96
The National Party's programme was very similar to that of its predecessor, 
the Anjuman, and it tried to broaden its base of support among all Baloch classes. The 
party's nationalist programme influenced the intelligentsia in Balochistan, consisting 
primarily of employees of the Kalat state.97 This group was responsible for the party’s 
financial support.98 The National Party was dominated by the more secular-minded, 
anti-imperialist and populist elements. Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Gul Khan Nasir, Abdul 
Aziz Kurd and most of the other National Party leaders, by temperament and practice 
were more impressed by Abul Kalam Azad and other moderate Muslims, who sup­
ported a secular federal United India, rather than the Muslim League leadership. Al­
most all the Baloch Ulema (clergymen) in the Baloch regions had graduated from the 
famous Deoband School of Islamic studies. Some of these Baloch Ulema such as 
Maulavi Mohammad Umar and Maulavi Arz Muhammad were among the National 
Party's activists. The leaders and adherents of the Deoband School all over India were 
overwhelmingly opposed to the Muslim League.99
As the National Party started to work intermittently in the open, promoting dif­
ferent ideas of reform within Kalat and advocating the need for more representative
94 Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan. pp. 453-456.
95 Ibid., p. 444
96 Ibid., pp. 443-45.
97 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, Baluch a Nation. Lahore, 1947, p. 127.
98 Ibid.
99 Interview with M a u la n a  Abdul Haq Baloch.
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institutions, the reaction of the Khanate was mixed. Even if a Khan like Mir Ahmad 
Yar Khan personally sympathised with the nationalists, there was little room in which 
to manoeuvre. On the one hand, the Khans were dependent upon a consensus being 
reached on every major issue with the Sardars, on the other; they were under the tight 
control of the British political agents. They also had to consider the maintenance of 
their historical legitimacy, drawn from the ancient confederacy, as well as growing 
demands for the formation of democratic institutions. The leaders of the Anjuman and 
its offspring, the National Party, expressed their loyalty and their spirit of continuity 
with the traditional democratic tribal organisation and thus indirectly threatened the 
autocratic features of the Khanate as well as, more directly, the power of the Sardars, 
the latter having evolved from a tribal toward a form of “feudal” system.100 It was 
possibly under the pressure of the movement that in 1938, the Khan issued a farman 
(order), equalising the status of all his subjects and fixing an equal amount of blood 
compensation for all persons including Ghulams, Lohris, Jamots, etc.101
The Baloch nationalists had based themselves on the argument that the Kalat 
state like Nepal had direct treaty relationships with London.102 They declared their 
goal as being the restoration of an independent, unified Balochistan, to which the Brit­
ish must revert the forcibly leased area of northern Balochistan and the self-made 
principalities of Las-Bela and later on Kharan. Although the National Party declared 
its backing for the government of the Khan, it never gave up its progressive stand 
against the Sardari system which the British, with the Khan’s connivance, had estab­
lished in Balochistan, and which was the main instrument of oppression in the state. 
While avoiding any conflict with the Khan, the party worked secretly against the 
Sardari system.103 The Khan for his part, though he agreed with certain viewpoints of 
the party, especially its demand for a sovereign independent Balochistan and its com­
mitted goal of maintaining the traditional norms of the Baloch people, which by im­
plication meant the Khan’s continued over-lordship, could not go very far in the 
party’s support without compromising his position with the British or annoying the 
Sardars. However, it appeal's that the Khan had little enthusiasm for the activities of 
the party and the convention, which it held at Mastung in June 1937.104
100 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem o f Greater Baluchistan, pp. 155-56,
101 V/10/636.
102 Munir Ahmad Marri, Balochistan: Sevasi Kash-makash. Quetta: Gusheh-e Adab, 1989, p. 86.
103 Inayatullah Baloch, “Baloch Qaumi Tahrik Men ‘Kalat State National Party’ Ka Kerdar”, in 
Monthly, Azad Baluchistan. December 1982, London, p. 4.
104 Shaih Ragam, “Aqelan Sassa Kan et” in: Monthly, Balochi, Quetta February 1988.
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In its struggle against social injustices, the National Party continuously en­
couraged the Khan to follow its programme. In this regard, the party succeeded to cor­
rect many political wrongs. The bigar system and the illegal taxes, for example were 
abolished. Thus for his services and his cooperation to materialising the party’s radi­
cal programme, in 1938, the National Party conferred the title of “Khan-e-Muazzam” 
(the great respected Khan), on the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan.105
The National Patty wanted an independent and sovereign state for the Baloch 
people. For this, the party was gathering tremendous support especially from the edu­
cated people.106 The party workers and its leaders were not unaware of political 
movements in India but they wanted a separate identity and were by no means ready 
to lose their political sovereignty. They were conscious of the fact that Balochistan 
faced a peculiar geographical situation and the National Party had a tremendous task 
to achieve the pre-determined objectives of national independence. Balochistan was a 
sovereign state independent of India. The British had certain treaty relations with the 
Baloch stating that they were not to be treated like the Indians whom the British 
claimed to be their conquered people.107
As noted above, one of the National Party’s objectives was to abolish the 
Sardari System. This annoyed the Sardars. In 1939, when the British Government 
failed to obtain the Jiwani port, because of the Party4s opposition, it gave the British 
and the Sardars sufficient cause to ally themselves against the National Party.108 On 
July 6, the tribal lashkar (tribal armed force) of the Sardars launched an armed attack 
against the Mastung convention of the National party and disrupted the gathering.109 
On the next day the Sardars, headed by Nawab Mohammad Khan Shahwani de­
manded that the National Party should be banned and its leaders arrested. They also 
demanded the closure of Darul-Uloom (a religious school) of Mastung and a ban on 
the entry and circulation of all the newspapers and especially weekly al-Hanif and the 
Kamal of Jacobabad, the weekly Balochistan Jadeed and the Baluchistan of Karachi,
105 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Mukhtaser Tarikh-e-Baloch aur Khawanin-e-Baloch. Quetta: Aiwan 
Kalat, 1972, p. 86.
106 Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan. vol. 2, p. 446.
107 Inayatullah Baloch, “Baloch Qaumi Tahrik Men ‘Kalat State National Party’ Ka Kerdar”, in: 
Monthly, Azad Baluchistan, p. 5.
108 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 156,
109 Shaih Ragam, “Aqelan Sassa Kan et” in: Monthly, Balochi. Quetta, February 1988.
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in Kalat State. The Khan and his British-Indian dominated administration sided with 
the tribal chiefs opposed to the party.110
On July 20, 1939, the Prime Minister of Kalat banned the National Party 
within the Khanate and asked its activists, Malik Abdur Raheem Khwaja Khel, Abdul 
Karim Shourish, Mir Gul Khan Naseer, Rais Mulla Hossein Abizai, Mirab Shah- 
nawaz, Mian Noor-ul-Haq, Maulavi Arz Mohammad, Maulavi Mohammad Umar and 
numerous others to leave Kalat territory. The party shifted its headquarters to Quetta 
but the Second World War brought open political activities to an end all over India.111
After the banning of the National Party and the forcing of its leaders to exile, it 
continued its struggle as a clandestine organisation even inside the Kalat State. More­
over, from its headquarters at Quetta, the Party remained a strong force over public 
opinion. The National Party strongly condemned the move by the British government 
to recognise Kharan as a separate state, independent of Kalat. The National Party’s 
Secretary, Abdul Karim Shourish, termed the move an attempt to break-up Balochis­
tan. He feared that Kharan’s separation would be one in a series of similar actions, 
which would ultimately destroy the Baloch identity.112 On 25th August 1939, he 
warned against attempts at the further disintegration of Balochistan. He said: "... at 
present Kalat state is the name of the surviving Baloch front in whose name we can 
form a united front of all the Baloch in time to come. If this is broken into pieces to­
day it renders the inevitable disorganisation of the Baloch. Thus political wisdom de­
mands that we should avoid such short-sightedness, which contains the seeds of disin-
1 1 n
tegration and ignominy”. He called upon the people to demand the merger of Kha­
ran and Lasbela with Balochistan.114
After the War the banishment orders on the National Party leaders were with­
drawn. In the meantime the party entered an alliance in 1945, with the All India States 
People Conference, headed by Jawaharlal Nehru. In a meeting held in Srinagar- on 6th 
-  8th August 1945, the Standing Committee of the All India States People Conference 
discussed the question of the alliance of Kalat State National Party with the confer­
ence. The committee also expressed concern over the ban by the government of Kalat 
on the struggle launched by the National Party, banning of the party president and
110 M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan. pp. 266-67.
111 Ibid., p. 270.
112 Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan. vol. 2, p. 472.
113 Abdul Karim Shourish, quoted in Inayatullah Baloch, “The Baloch Question in Pakistan and the 
Right of Self Determination”, p. 195.
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others, and the restrictions on entry into the state of newspapers from British Ba­
lochistan.115 This decision of the National Party in 1945 to join a Congress dominated 
movement which was working for a united, federal India reflected the complication 
and ambivalence which had developed in relations between the Khan and the Party.
The National Party started its activities in society with a strictly tribal set-up in 
which politics circled round the figure of the Sardars. A corrupt and inefficient gov­
ernment manipulated by the British agents was running the state. The National Party, 
not only received tremendous support from the general people but also from some 
tribal elders and Sardars of the country.116 Between 1937 and 1948, the party was al­
lowed to operate for less than two years, but it left a tremendous impact on the people. 
When the Khan held elections, the party was returned to parliament with a quite large 
majority in spite of the fact that it was not allowed to contest as a party and its mem­
bers contested in their individual capacity.117 
Independence: its Emergence and Collapse
In the early 1947, when the independence issue was in its apex, Sardar Khan 
Baluch, the Secretary-e-khas (principal secretary) to the Khan of Kalat, wrote, “To 
begin with the question of a united and freed Baluch race, the question of a Greater 
Baluchistan is inevitable”.118 As the prospect of the British withdrawal was coming 
closer, the National Parly and other nationalist organisations joined the Khan of Kalat 
to seek independence for Balochistan.119 The Khan made a strong legal case for inde­
pendence, arguing that Kalat like Nepal enjoyed a legal status based on direct treaty 
relations with Whitehall and was not bound to deal with the British Raj government in 
New Delhi as was the case with the other princely or “native states” of the subconti­
nent.120 He invoked the treaty of 1876, which committed Britain to respect the “inde­
pendence of Kalat” and to protect its territory against external aggression.
The Labour Party Government headed by Clement Atlee in Britain, after con­
siderable debate, decided to send a three-member Cabinet Mission to India in a final
115 M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, pp. 270-71; see also Baluchi Dunya. Mul­
tan, June 1973 and Nokien Dour. Quetta, 21 October 1966. Malik Abdur Raheem Khwajakhel, Mir 
Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Malik Faiz Mohammad attended many meetings of the Conference held in 
Jodhpure, Jaipure and Delhi. They explained the Balochistan situation in the context o f the Indian free­
dom movement.
116 Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan. vol. 2, p. 457.
117 Aziz Mohammad Bugti, Tarikh-e Balochistan. p. 99.
118 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, Baluch a Nation. Lahore, 1947, p. 205.
119 Riccardo Redaelli, The Father’s Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India. 19th -  20lh Century. 
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bid to devise the methodology for the transfer of power in India. The Mission com­
prising the Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick Lawrence, AV Alexander and 
Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in India on March 24, 1946. With his case prepared by 
eminent lawyers like 11 Chundrigar, Sir Sultan Ahmed, Sardar BK Memon and Sir 
Walter Monkton, and including M. A. Jinnah, the Khan of Kalat Mir Ahmad Yar 
Khan approached the Mission on behalf of his government to discuss the future status 
of his state in the scheme of independence for India.121
Submitted in the form of an official memorandum to the Mission in March 
1946, the main concern of the Government of Kalat regarding the future position of 
the Khanate at the time, according to the document, was to restore its independence 
with the British withdrawal. In the memorandum the Khan of Kalat, stated that Kalat 
expected to restore its pre-1876 status by regaining its full independence and recover­
ing its sovereign rights over all the Kalat territories held or leased by Britain upon the 
cessation of her power in India. As stated by the memorandum, the state of Kalat: 
“will become fully sovereign and independent in respect to both internal and external 
affairs, and will be free to conclude treaties with any other government or state... The 
Khan, his government, and his people can never agree to Kalat being included in any 
form of Indian Union.. .”.122
It is interesting to note that in 1936, the Khan of Kalat Mir Ahmad Yar Khan 
retained a barrister, M A Jinnah, to defend Kalat’s claim to independence in post­
colonial India. Defining the case of Kalat state, the future founder of Pakistan, Jinnah 
wrote to the Cabinet Mission in 1946: “Several representatives of the British have de­
scribed Kalat as a sovereign and independent state. In 1872, Sir W L Merewether, 
who was in charge of the British Government’s relations with Kalat, wrote as follows: 
there cannot in my opinion, be the least doubt of the course which should be followed 
with regard to Kalat or Baluchistan as it should be correctly termed, H H the Khan is 
the de facto and de jure ruler of that country. We have treaty engagements with him 
under which he is bound to keep his subjects from injuring British territory or people 
to protect trade etc. But the treaty is with him as ruler only.”123
The Baloch nationalists also point out to another petition prepared the same 
year by Pakistan’s future prime minister, I I Chundrigar, in which he stated: “Kalat,
120 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 174-175.
121 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, pp. 255-296.
122 Ibid., pp. 141-42.
123 M A Jinnah quoted in Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 265.
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which is not an Indian state and which was brought in relation with the British Gov­
ernment on account of its geographical position on the border of India, is just like Af­
ghanistan and Persia. The State had no intention of entering into a federal relationship 
with successive government or governments in British India and I have, therefore, to 
request your Excellency to declare the independence of Kalat State”124
Apart from the independence, the Kalat cabinet considered four other possi­
bilities: 1 - Kalat becoming a British protectorate: rejected by the foreign minister of 
the Khan, Douglas Y. Fell. 2 - Merger with Iran: also rejected since Tehran was al­
ready engaged in brutal suppression of the Baloch demanding self-determination. 3 - 
Merger with Afghanistan: supported by some members of the royal family but Mr. 
Fell pointed to the possibility of Communist infiltration of the Khanate through Soviet 
influence in Afghanistan; the devoutly religious Khan then rejected this option. 4 - 
Merger with India: recognised as awkward geographically and an option that would 
be unpopular. Such a decision would be seen in Pakistan as a provocation. The Khan 
asked the Prime Minister to accept the fifth proposal. 5 - Independence: Kalat would 
maintain friendly relations with Pakistan and ensure sovereign equality. A merger was 
not considered.
Simultaneously, a memorandum signed by the Baloch chiefs of the Marri- 
Bugti areas, Sardar Doda Khan Marri and Sardar Mohammad Akbar Khan, was sent 
to the British government demanding to join the Khanate. Sardar Jamal Khan Leghari 
and several other Baloch chiefs of Deraj at also demanded their separation from Pun­
jab and to be linked with the Kalat state. The British, however, ignored all these re­
quests and demands.126 Similarly, the directly administered “British Balochistan” had 
taken a different course. One month before Kalat’s declaration, the British-nominated 
council of tribal elders, the Shahi Jirga (royal assembly), and the Quetta municipal 
coimcil had voted to join Pakistan; that decision was not changed.127 The British rep­
resentatives, in R. Redaelli’s opinion, failed to settle any of the matters put forward by
1241.1. Chundrigar, Memorandum to Viceroy. 1946, cited in Inayatullah Baloch, “The Baluch Question 
in Pakistan and the Right o f Self Determination”, in Zingel Lallement (ed.) Pakistan in the 80s. Lahore, 
1985, p. 350.
125 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 181-182.
126 Weekly, Bolan, (Macch, Mastung), 8 April, 2 May and 16 1947; see also Mir Ahmad Yar Khan 
Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, pp. 143-144.
127 It should be noted that since the early 1940, besides the National Party, the Anjuman-e Watan a lo­
cal party and the Muslim League were active in British Balochistan. The Pashtuns dominated both par­
ties. Anjuman-e Watan a supporter of All India Congress was straggling for constitutional reform in 
British Balochistan. Muslim League was founded in 1938 in Quetta and its main aim like the Anju-
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Kalat, both because of the Muslim League’s opposition to any concessions being 
made to the Khan, and because of the Government of India’s own evident loss of au­
thority.128
On 11 April 1947, in the Ailamiah (The Declaration of Independence), which 
was published and distributed as a pamphlet by the KSNP, the outlines of the Consti­
tution of a Free Baloch State were explained.129 Balochistan according to the Aila­
miah, would become a welfare state and protect minority rights. The foreign policy of 
Balochistan, according to the Ailamiah would be based on “friendly treaties with the 
government of Afghanistan, Iran, Arab countries, Pakistan, India and other countries”. 
About M. A. Jinnah, the Ailamiah said that he had been a consultant to the Khan and 
the former had “fully agreed with the freedom of Kalat, return of the leased regions 
and inclusion of Baloch territory to Kalat”.130
The Khanate was neither an English protectorate, nor part of the Indian Fed­
eration, but an independent state linked to Great Britain by a Treaty of Alliance.131 
However, in 1935, a unilateral English act, the “Government of India Act”, treated the 
Khanate as an Indian state, but the state was never consulted in the drafting of the Act, 
nor was it a party to it in any manner.132 The territories of the Kalat State being out­
side the limits of the legislative authority of the British parliament, the Act could not 
be held binding on the state. Nevertheless, the Khan of Kalat lodged a protest against 
the provisions of this Act, to the Government of India. He considered that the “Gov­
ernment of India Act”, to be an infringement of the treaty of 1876. On June 1939, 
however, the British Government informed the Khan that “His Excellency (the Crown 
Representative) recognises the treaty of 1876 as fully valid in every respect and that it 
would henceforth form the relations between the British and Kalat”133
To discuss the future position of Balochistan and the return of leased areas 
hitherto under the control of the British Government, the Chief Secretary of Kalat 
State was sent to Delhi with a draft of the new position of Kalat State as prepared by
man-e Watan was the constitutional change in the province. For more detail see Inayatullah Baloch, 
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128 Riccardo Redaelli, The Father’s Bow: The Khanate o f Kalat and British India (19th — 20th Century). 
Firenze: II Maestrale, 1997, p. 187.
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legal experts. This resulted in a round table conference, held on August 4, 1947, in 
which Lord Mountbatten, Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Kalat, Sir Sultan 
Ahmed, the Legal Advisor of Kalat State and the Khan of Kalat took part in the delib­
erations. The following points were agreed upon: "Kalat State will be independent on 
August 5, 1947, enjoying the same status as it originally held in 1838, having friendly 
relations with its neighbours. In case the relations of Kalat with any future govern­
ment become strained, Kalat will exercise its right of self-determination, and the Brit­
ish Government should take precautionary measures to help Kalat in the matter as per 
the Treaties of 1839 and 1841”134
Thus, the “Standstill Agreement” (formally announced on the I I th August 
1947), accepted the sovereign status of Balochistan. It stated: “The government of 
Pakistan recognises the status of Kalat as a free and independent State which has bi­
lateral relations with the British Government, and whose rank and position is different 
from that of other Indian states”.135
After the formal announcement of the Standstill Agreement on 11th August 
1947, the Khan of Kalat proclaimed Khanate’s independence on August 15, 1947. 
Addressing his audience in Balochi, the Khan announced, “Today our country is in­
dependent, and I can express my views freely and openly.”136 The lower house of the 
Kalat diwan, the Darul-Awam, which was convened specially for that purpose in Sep­
tember of 1947, overwhelmingly approved this move. The majority of the fifty-two 
assembly members voted for independence, but did not foreclose the possibility of a 
special relationship between the independent Kalat and the newly established state of 
Pakistan.137
The traditional flag of the state in green over red colour and the crescent and 
star in the centre was hoisted. A khutba (a welcome address) was read in his name, at 
the beginning of the Friday prayers in the Jamia masque of Kalat, as the independent 
ruler of the state. After the prayers the Khan addressed his audience in a lengthy 
speech expressing his determination to achieve three important objectives. 1- com­
plete independence of the country from the foreign yoke and domination. 2- Promul­
gation of Shariat Law with a constitution based on the injunctions of the Holy Quran
134 India Office Record “Independence of Kalat, 1948”, cited in: Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of 
Greater Balochistan. p. 352; see also Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e-Balochistan. (vol. II), p. 487.
135 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan. p. 352.
136 Malik Allah-Bakhsh (ed.), Tarikh-e Khawanin-e Baloch. Quetta, 1979, pp. 407-413.
137 Mir Ahmad Yav Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, pp. 150-66.
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as understood. 3- the unity of the Baloch as a nation spread over a large part of Asia in 
large numbers. Immediately after declaration of Independence, the Khan announced
n o
holding of election for the new diwan,
The diwan, a bicameral legislative body, consisted of the Darul-Umara (the 
House of the tribal chiefs or Upper House) and the Darul-Awam (the House of Com­
mons or Lower House). Darul-Umara was composed of the hereditary chiefs of the 
tribal provinces of Jhalawan and Sarawan, 35 in number. Darul-Awam had 52 mem­
bers, of whom 47 were elected and 5 nominated by the Khan.139 The Rawaj (unwritten 
constitution) continued to be valid as the constitution of the Khanate. However, be­
sides the Rawaj, the Kalat Act of 1946 was used as the written constitution. The legis­
lative period was five years. It should be noted that the 1947 election was held only in 
Kalat and Makkoran, and it was the first general election in Balochistan5 s history; the 
National Party won 32 out of 52 seats in the Darul-Awam}40
Struggling since 1920s for the independence of their country, it was a big vic­
tory for the Baloch nationalists. One of the important decisions taken during the brief 
life of the Kalat parliament was the recognition of the Balochi language as the state 
and national language of Balochistan. The Darul-Awam in its first three-day meeting, 
held in Dadar on December 12 andl4, 1947, recognised Balochi as the “official and 
national language55 of the state of Kalat and decreed that it should be taught in 
schools.141 The decision was then approved unanimously by the Darul-Umara in its 
meeting of January 4, 1948 and “a committee was formed to study and report on the 
adaptation of measures and methods for the introduction of Balochi as a medium of 
instruction in schools55.142
As the head of a sovereign state, during his visit to Pakistan in October 1947, 
the Khan was received as the King of Balochistan by thousands of Baloch in Karachi. 
In a reception at Masti Khan Lodge, the Khan urged the Baloch to make eveiy effort 
for the uplift of their country and to raise their educational standard. The Khan ap­
pealed to the gathering to inspire the people with freedom and equality.143 “It was a 
great occasion55 the seventy years old Yusuf Naskanti, then a young participant, said
138 Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikli-e-Balochistan. (vol. II), pp. 489-490.
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proudly.144 However, contrary to diplomatic tradition, he was not received by the 
Governor General or by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. In Dr. Baloch’s opinion, “it
was a clear* signal of a shift in Pakistan’s policy towards the Khanate”.145 M. A. Jin-
nah advised the Khan to expedite the merger with Pakistan. The Khan, although re­
fused his demand and argued:
As Baluchistan is a land of numerous tribes, the people there must be 
consulted in the affairs prior to any decision. I take, accordingly to the 
prevalent tribal convention, no decision, which can be binding upon 
them unless they are taken into confidence by their Khan.146 
Following Jinnah’s proposal on Kalat’s merger, the Khan of Kalat summoned 
the Kalat State diwan, on December 12, 1947. Opposing unanimously the merger pro­
posal of Kalat's state with Pakistan, the Dar-ul-Awam, (Lower House) argued that the 
proposal militated against the spirit of the earlier agreement arrived at between Kalat 
Government and the spokesmen of Pakistan on August 4, 1947, as well as against the 
Independence Act of 1947. Similarly the Dar-ul-Umara (Upper House) composed of 
the majority of the Sardars, hailed the decision of Dar-ul-Awam, in its meeting on 
January 4, 1948. In view of this opposition, the diwan, however, supported the Khan’s 
decision to initiate talks with Pakistan.147
In order to discuss the leased areas, under the Kalat-Pakistan Agreement of 
August 1947, late in September 1947 Kalat’s Prime Minister, Nawabzada Mohammad 
Aslam, and Foreign Minister Douglas Y Fell, were sent to Karachi to meet the Secre­
tary to the Government of Pakistan’s Ministiy of Foreign and States Affairs. The 
meetings between the officials of the two states were not fruitful because their host 
advised a merger with Pakistan rather than a treaty relationship. Thus negotiations 
provided for by the “Standstill Agreement” of August 1947 did not take place.148
Since then the Pakistani authorities not only started a campaign against the 
9 Khan to compel him to join Pakistan, but also prepared to use coercive methods for a 
forced merger of the state.149 Realizing the gravity of the situation, the Khan in­
structed the Commander-in-Chief of the Khanate’s forces, Brigadier General Purves, 
to reorganize the forces and arrange the arms and ammunition. In December 1947, 
approaching the Commonwealth Relations office and the Ministry of Supply in Lon­
144 Interview with Ysuf Naskanti.
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don, General Purves failed in his efforts, because of British refusal to supply any arms 
to the Khanate without the Pakistan Government’s approval.150 In the same time, 
however, the Khan desperately requested to the Indian authorities and the Afghan 
king for help, but with no success.151
When it became apparent to Pakistan that the Khan was merely playing for 
time, the Government of Pakistan announced on March 18th, separate accessions by 
the states of Lasbela and Kharan, which were feudatories of the Khan, and of Mak- 
koran, which was never more than a district of the State of Kalat.152 Accession of 
Makkoran, Kharan and Lasbela robbed Kalat of more than half its territory and its ac­
cess to the sea. The following day the Khan of Kalat issued a statement refusing to 
believe that Pakistan as champion of Muslim rights in the world would infringe the 
rights of small Muslim neighbour's, pointing out that Makkoran as a district of Kalat, 
had no separate status and that the foreign policy of Lasbela and Kharan was placed 
under Kalat by standstill agreement.153
In a desperate attempt on 25th March, three days before accession, the Khan 
tried to summon his Sardars and persuade them against accession. But only two un­
important Scirdctrs obeyed the summons. All others refused to attend. The Khan, ac­
cording to India Office Reports, then intensified his efforts to rally people to his side, 
and is believed to have distributed large sums of money to Mullas in the hope of ob­
taining their support, but the State Muslim League emissaries counteracted these ef­
forts.154 However, a letter of 27 March from the Khan to Jinnah denied reports that he 
had attempted to urge Sardars and people against Kalat’s accession to Pakistan. In it 
he also denied reports that he had entered into negotiations with India or Afghani­
stan.155 The independence moves, however, came to an end when the Khan of Kalat, 
Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, hearing of the movements of troops in Pasni and Jiwani and 
fearful of further problems, acceded to Pakistan on March 27, 1948. The Khan defines 
the matter of signing, the merger document as a “dictate of history”, adding, “I con­
fess, I knew I was exceeding the scope of my mandate... [but] had I not taken the im­
mediate step of signing Kalat’s merger, the...British Agent to the Governor-General
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could have played havoc by leading Pakistan into a fratricide war against the Balu- 
ches”.156 Even so, the Pakistani Army moved to Kalat on April 1, 1948 with orders to 
overcome resistance from the nationalists.157
Obviously the Baloch nationalists never even entertained the merger idea with 
Pakistan.158 The independence case was best articulated by Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Biz- 
enjo, then an assembly member from the majority party, the Kalat State National 
Party, who argued in the diwan meeting of December 1947 that: “We have a distinct 
culture like Afghanistan and Iran, and if the mere fact that we are Muslims require us 
to amalgamate with Pakistan, then Afghanistan and Iran should also be amalgamated 
with Pakistan. They say we Baloch cannot defend ourselves in the atomic age. Well, 
are Afghanistan, Iran and even Pakistan capable of defending themselves against the 
superpowers? If we cannot defend ourselves, a lot of others cannot do so either”.159 
Rejecting the merger proposal with Pakistan, Bizenjo continued, “This mean signing 
the death-warrant for 15 million Baloch in Asia. We cannot be guilty of this major 
crime to humiliate the Baloch nation to a merger with a non-Baloch nation.”160
A well-known authority on Pakistani affairs, Lawrence Ziring maintains that 
Baloch leaders did not enter into the arrangement to join Pakistan willingly. The gov­
ernment of Pakistan was threatening to use force to achieve the accession of the coun­
try. The Baloch nationalists were ill prepared to ignore this fact.161 The National Party 
and the diwan, which it dominated, repeatedly rejected accession to Pakistan and in­
sisted on preservation of a free Balochistan.162 They also demanded return of those 
Khanate territories, which were already annexed to Pakistan. On March 27, 1948, af­
ter Pakistan’s armed forces had been mobilized for military operations against the 
State, the Khan silently signed the Document of Accession.163
The accession of Balochistan into Pakistan was one of the epoch-making 
events in the history of Baloch people and their countiy. On 28 March, the Khanate 
became a part of Pakistan. A Political Agent, an officer subordinate to the AGG was 
appointed to look after the administration of the state and guide the Prime Minister in
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all internal affairs. By this, the legal entity of the Khan of Kalat was abolished, and 
most of the members of the Balochistan Cabinet were arrested or exiled from Ba­
lochistan.164
With this, the Baloch Confederacy and rule came to an end after nearly three 
hundred years (1666-1948). The Khan’s decision was opposed by the Baloch nation­
alists; wrote a Baloch writer, “Nasir I united all. Nasir II endeavoured to maintain it. 
Khudadad Khan fought for the whole of his life to organise a government. Mahmud 
Khan II prepared the coffin for the state, and Ahmad Yar, the present Khan, buried all, 
and the glory and vanity of his line.”165 
Oppression and First Baloch Resistance
The merger of the Khanate into Pakistan in 1948 resulted in unrest and anti- 
Pakistan rallies throughout Balochistan.166 The National Party, which had espoused 
the cause of a “Greater Balochistan” incorporating all Baloch areas into an enlarged 
Kalat state, rejected accession and was behind much of the agitation. Its leaders, Mir 
Gaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd and others, were arrested.167 This first 
encounter between the Baloch and the forces of the Pakistan state was crucial in shap­
ing nationalist insecurity and fear of repression at the hands of foreigners. Under the 
Raj, Baloch affairs outside of British Balochistan had been left to the Baloch; now, 
centralising forces appeared that the Baloch tribes could not easily accept.
Under theses circumstances, 011 15 April 1948, Agha Abdul Karim, brother of 
the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan (1933-1948) started an armed movement in 
the Jhalawan area backed by some nationalist leaders and with the secret approval of 
the Khan. Agha Abdul Karim was educated in Karachi, and served as the governor of 
Makkoran province until March 1948. He invited the leading members of the nation­
alist parties (the Kalat State National Party and the Baloch League), to join him in the 
struggle against Pakistan. “The showdown between Kalat and Pakistan” Harrison 
wrote, “came in April 1948, when the Pakistani army ordered its garrison Commander 
in Baluchistan to march on Kalat and arrest the Khan unless he signed a agreement of 
accession.”168 However, neither the Baloch nationalist parties nor the Darbar (Royal 
Court) of Kalat were prepared for any armed resistance.
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In addition to this, the nationalist leaders were also divided on the future line 
of action. Mohammad Hossein Unqa, a prominent journalist, Malik Saeed Dehwar, 
the Secretary General of the National Party, Abdul Wahid Kurd, Qadir Bakhsh Ni- 
zamani and some other activists, favoured aimed struggle in the form of guerilla war, 
while Abdul Aziz Kurd, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Gul Khan Nasir along with some 
other leaders of the Kalat State National Party “were cool to the idea of a military 
showdown with Pakistan” because of the lack of preparation and internal and external 
support.169
On 16 May 1948, after brief skirmishes with the well-trained and well- 
equipped army of Pakistan, Agha Abdul Karim and his partisans, the “Baloch Muja­
hideen” (holy warriors), as they called themselves, about 1000 in number, crossed the 
border into Afghanistan and erected their camp at Karez Nazar Mohammad Khan 
situated in no man’s land known as Sarlat in search of help. The National Party mem­
bers who were still free, along with a few Baloch individuals from Sindh and Deraj at,
t  nr |
joined the Prince.
While staying in Afghanistan, the Mujahideen adopted the following measures 
to achieve their goal: 1 -  The sending of messages to the Baloch chiefs of eastern and 
western Balochistan, asking them to join in the struggle. 2 -  The running of a propa­
ganda campaign in Balochistan, aimed at the creation of unrest, disturbances, and re­
volt as well as the enlistment of a national liberation force. 3 -  The search for interna­
tional support, particularly from Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.171
The propaganda campaign was to be carried out on two fronts: The national 
cultural front and the religious front. On the national cultural front, the party distrib­
uted a series of pamphlets all over Balochistan, aiming to cause an uprising against 
the oppressive rule of Pakistan. On the religious front the Baloch nationalist Maulavis, 
Maulavi Nazeer Hossein, Maulavi Arz Mohammad, Maulavi Mohammad Umar, 
Maulavi Mohammad Afzal and a few others issued the fatwa (decree by a learned re­
ligious figure) and proclaimed Jihad (holy war) against Pakistan and demanded that 
the Baloch people join the national movement.172 Addressing the government servants 
and military personnel of Pakistan the fatwa demanded that the Muslims of Pakistan
169 M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan. p. 323
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and particularly the soldiers, should engage in Jihad against the non-Islamic Govern­
ment of Pakistan.173
The Prince, who was also chosen as the supreme commander of the Baloch 
Mujahideen, issued an appeal to personages to help with the recruitment. A person 
recruiting 100 men was offered the rank of a major and a person recruiting 50 men 
was entitled to the rank of captain. The Baloch Mujahideen had a secret agency called 
Jannisar (devotee), whose duty was to provide information, destroy the communica­
tion system, and watch the activities of traitors. In addition to this, there was a secret 
unit Janbaz (darer), to kill all traitors. The headquarters of the agency was known as 
Bcib-i-Acili (secret war-office) and headed by the Prince himself.174
The Afghan authorities, however, refused to provide any sort of help and told 
the Baloch Mujahideen either to reside as political refugees at Kandahar or to leave. 
The Prince approached the Soviet Embassy in Kabul for help. The Soviet embassy 
was sympathetic, but offered no material assistance, which was to be the pattern for 
relations between Baloch nationalists and Moscow. Under these circumstances, the 
Prince returned to Balochistan with his militia.175
The Afghans were not happy hosts. Kabul-Karachi relations had been embit­
tered over the Pakhtimistan issue. But, since the rise of Ahmad Shah, the Afghan had 
treated Balochistan as a vassal state until the Baloch-Afghan war in 1758, when an 
agreement of “non-interference” was signed between the parties. In the 19th century, 
Afghan rulers like Shah Shuja and Amir Abdur-Rehman desired to occupy Balochis­
tan. With the ending of Imperial paramountcy, it was only fitting in Kabul’s view that 
its historical claims be fulfilled. Kabul’s irredentist claims included what had now be­
come Pakistan’s Balochistan province, a fact Prince Karim’s nationalists failed to ap­
preciate. As argued by Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, “the idea of an independent Baluchis­
tan was contradictory to the Afghans because Pakistani Balochistan was a part of Af­
ghanistan’s concept of Pashtunistan”,176
It must be borne in mind that the Afghan expansionist policy reflected the eco­
nomic considerations of a landlocked state. At the same time, it was impossible for 
the Afghan Government to neglect its own national interests and to support the
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movement of an independent Greater Balochistan, which claimed the Baloch region in 
Afghanistan.
As earlier mentioned, before the Khan signed the Accession Document, All
India Radio announced that the Baloch Khanate had offered and requested accession
to India.177 Whatever the authenticity of this controversial report, the government of
India did not take any effective action to accept the offer and protect the allegedly
Congressite leaders of the National Party. In 1948, Agha Abdul Karim, approached
the “Iranian” Baloch Sardars for help but his appeal was refused because the Sardars
were afraid of repression.178 Meanwhile, messages were sent to Mir Ghulam Faruq of
the Rudini tribe, Sardar Mehrab Khan, Sardar Mir Jumma, Mir Wazir Khan Sanjrani
1 *10of Chagai, and several other chiefs.
Agha Abdul Karim and his partisans, the Baloch Mujahideen, were soon asked 
by the Afghan government to leave.180 Being disillusioned, Prince Agha Abdul Karim 
and his party returned to Balochistan on 8 July 1948. After a minor clash near Harboi 
with the Pakistan army, the Prince along with more than one hundred of his followers 
was arrested. On 27 November 1948, he was tried by a special Jirga in Mach Jail and 
sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 5000. His colleague 
and advisor, Mohammad Hossein Unqa, a poet and intellectual, also received ten 
years’ imprisonment. The other members of his party were given various sentences 
and fines.181
Thus in 1948, the Baloch national movement was crushed by Jinnah’s Paki­
stan, which had inherited a part of the British Imperial Indian Armies, treasury and 
administration. Though the elected diwan (parliament) of the Khanate had noted what 
the leaders of the movement wanted: a sovereign independent Balochistan. The Ba­
loch political movement began by Yusuf Ali Magasi, Abdul Aziz Kurd, and some 
others in the 1920s continued through the 1930s and 1940s. In 1947-48, however, the 
ambitions of the Baloch national movement failed to materialise. The surviving lead­
ers and their new adherents, as we will see in the next chapters, continued the same 
movement on various lines after 1948 when the party was outlawed by the govern­
ment of Pakistan.
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Summation
The twentieth century marked a major watershed for the Baloch. Direct British 
rule in northern Balochistan led to the construction of the first networks of roads, 
railways, telegraph lines, the introduction of modern education, though on a limited 
basis, the establishment of several large cantonments, the development of several coal 
fields, and the related servicing facilities in that part during the second half of the 19th 
century. Due to these developments, the Baloch intelligentsia - and through them, 
their relatives, friends and tribesmen - came to know more than their forefathers had 
known about their country and the world at large. On the one hand the political devel­
opments in India, Afghanistan, Middle East and Europe, and on the other hand the 
publications prepared by British administrators, orientalists and missionaries contrib­
uted to the development of Baloch national consciousness.
The Baloch had never lost their freedom before their conquest by the modern 
armies of Britain and Iran. From the end of the First World War, underground activi­
ties and propaganda were strengthened mostly around a “classical” nationalist ideol­
ogy not adverse to the concept of “Greater Balochistan”. Greater Balochistan would 
have encompassed the Khanate of Kalat, British administered territories and western 
Balochistan. The Baloch bitterly resisted their forcible incorporation into Iran by Reza 
Shah in 1928. Thus, the alien domination, the British and the Persians motivated the 
rise and development of Baloch nationalism in the early 20th century.
Inspired by the political upheaval in Turkey and Russia, as well as the anti­
colonial movement in British India itself, some Baloch called for an independent state 
of Balochistan. Yusuf Ali Magasi and Abdul Aziz Kind were the early leaders in the 
Baloch national movement. In 1920 under the leadership of Magasi and Kurd, a secret 
political organization called "Young Baloch”, which remained underground until 
1929, was formed. Later on the organization was renamed as “Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e- 
Balochan" (Organization for the Unity of the Baloch).
After Magasi’s death in 1935, the movement was continued under the leader­
ship of Abdul Aziz Kurd. In February 1937, a formal political party, the “Kalat State 
National Party”, commonly known as the “National Party”, replaced the Anjuman. 
The party persuaded the Khan to abolish a number of taxes levied on tribes by pro- 
British Sardars, But within the state the party could not ignore the strength of the 
Sardari system or the designs of the British Government. Both of these were obstruc­
tions to national liberation that is to the establishment of an independent Balochistan.
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These policies, however, created a backlash against the nationalists. Consequently, the 
pressure from the British and several Sardars forced the Khan to declare the party il­
legal in 1939. However, the National Party intensified its activities for independence, 
as the partition of the subcontinent approached after the World War II.
The views of the Government of Kalat regarding the future position of the 
Khanate at the time of the British withdrawal, as submitted to the Cabinet Mission in 
1946, were as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Government of Kalat maintains, 
and they are supported in this by the unanimous will of the subjects of the 
state: That the Kalat State is an independent sovereign state whose relations 
with the British Government are governed by the Treaty of 1876; that its In­
dian associations are merely due to its connections with the British Govern­
ment; that Kalat being an independent state, the Khan, his government, and 
his people can never agree to Kalat being included in any form of Indian Un­
ion; and that with the termination of the treaty with the British Govermnent, 
the Kalat State will revert to its pre-treaty position of complete independence 
and will be free to choose its own course for the future.182
Despite the good prospects for independence after British withdrawal, the fro­
zen social structure, which was the legacy of the Sandeman system, directed Balochis­
tan along a gloomier path. Different possibilities for the future of the Kalat state and 
the British leased territories were considered. Despite the poor state of political life in 
Kalat, formally a sovereign state under the Raj, though linked by a treaty (frequent 
parallels were drawn to Nepal), the Muslim League, as well as the departing British,
at first seemed ready to allow independence to Kalat and to return to it some of the
1surrounding areas under direct British administration.
On the 15th August 1947, the Khan of Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan, declared the 
independence of his country. An assembly was formed, elections were held and the 
national forces became dominant in the parliament. This was the first instance of elec­
tions in Balochistan’s histoiy. Although the National Party was still an illegal organi­
sation, it participated indirectly in the elections through its members as individual
182 IOR.L/P& S/13/1847.
183 IOR. L/P & S/13/1846; S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State, p. 135; Inayatullah Baloch, “Baloch 
Qaumi Tahrik Men, Kalat State National Party Ka Kerdar”, p. 5.
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candidates. The National Party’s members won 39 seats out of the total 52, thus tak­
ing the Government of Kalat and the Sardars by surprise.
It seems odd that the Khan of Kalat should have turned to the leader of the 
Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. As the events immediately following the 
1947 partition were to reveal, Jinnah had no interest in bolstering the Khan’s position, 
or in giving him any hope of independence. Thus, since then, they (the Khan and Jin­
nah) confronted each other as political foes. The Khan and the National Party insisted 
on an independent sovereign Balochistan. Jinnah arranged the annexation of some
• 18 Apart of the Khanate territory to Pakistan by controversial means. For the remaining 
part of Balochistan, he demanded formal accession by the Khan. To counteract Jin­
nah’ s pressure, the Khan continuously referred the matter to the Khanate’s elected di­
wan. This action was in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Indian Independ­
ence Act of 1947, which required that the “Princes’ decision about the future of their 
States will take the desire of their people into consideration”.185
The independence of Kalat, however, did not last for more than eight months. 
On 27th March the Khan was forced to accept the incorporation of his state into Paki­
stan. This event provoked a rebellion led by his brother Agha Abdul Karim who un­
successfully sought to gain help from Afghanistan. Consequently, the state of Kalat 
with its weak socio-economic and political structure collapsed in the face of the Paki­
stan’s relatively very strong economic infrastructure and its modem civil and military 
institutions. Thus, the principal reason for the collapse of the Khanate was the over­
whelming force of the Pakistani army. However, the reasons the collapse occurred so 
quickly after the British departure were an old and dying tribal and feudal system, rep­
resented by the Baloch Sardars, and the lack of sufficient unity among the Baloch 
tribes for the cause of independence.
184 Gul Klian Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan. p. 509.
185 Sir Conrad Corfield, The Princely India I Knew: From Reading to Mountbatten. India: Indo-British 
Historical Society, 1975, pp. 146, 139-160.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Post-colonial Balochistan
Introduction
It is widely believed that the Baloch national identity, as opposed to identifica­
tion with tribes, has become stronger as Balochistan has been incorporated into the 
states of Iran (1928) and Pakistan (1948).1 “Our political process”, argued the former 
speaker of the Balochistan assembly, Mohammad Akram Baloch, “started with an­
nexation”.2 The former head of the Arts Council of Balochistan, Lai Bakhsh Rind, 
gave a further clear explanation on the development of Baloch nationalism. According 
to Rind, at the time of partition Baloch nationalism was in its primitive stage. To sup­
port his argument, Lai Bakhsh Rind said, “while Pakistan occupied the most part of 
Balochistan, there was no strong mass reaction, it means”, he said, “There was no 
strong national feelings. Only Agha Abdul Karim and few intellectuals reacted.” 
“However”, he continued, “Pakistan oppression was a beginning of mistrust and a 
motivation for growing the Baloch nationalism.” According to Rind, even the de­
mand of Nauruz Khan was limited to the release of Khan Ahmad Yar Khan. Although 
it was the arrest of Nauruz Khan and his guerrilla leaders that shaped Baloch national­
ism, believes Rind.4
As observed by the Russian writer, Y. V. Gankovsky the birth of Baloch na­
tional consciousness was evident in the early 1950s.5 The first Balochi publications 
emerged in 1951, with monthly Ouman. Gul Khan Nasir, Azad Jamaldini, Maulavi 
Khair Mohammad Nadvi and Syed Hashomi were the leading Baloch writers. The 
work for collecting and creating nationalist literature was in progress. The most in­
triguing personality in the field of history and other socio-political issues during the 
1950s and 1960 was Gul Khan Nasir. His works on various socio-intellectual topics 
such as epical history and revolutionary poetry sought to provide a portrayal of good 
and evil, right and wrong like a fashionable intellectual. As an untrained historian, he
1 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp. 94-102; Paul Titus, “Routes to Ethnicity: Roads, 
Buses, and Differential Ethnic Relations in Pakistani Balochistan”, in Paul Titus, (ed.), Marginality and 
Modernity, p. 273.
2 Interview with Mohammad Akram Baloch.
3 Interview with Lai Bakhsh Rind.
4 Ibid.
5 Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 208.
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made a significant impact on historical thinking and on popular knowledge about the 
recent and (to some extent) medieval history of Balochistan. He also was the most 
popular revolutionary poet in Balochi. Despite his literary role, Nasir participated in 
the Baloch struggle for national independence and remained behind bars for several 
years from 1941 to 1979.
Contemporary to Gul Khan Nasir, two other influential people enjoyed con­
siderable fame in their nationalist approach to historical topics, Muhammad Sardar 
Khan Baluch (Gishkouri) and Khuda Bakhsh Marri Baloch. Sardar Khan played, one 
may say, a consequential role in consolidating the national and racial sentiments ex­
pressed in academic work. In his writing, Sardar Khan never concealed his national- 
chauvinist ideas. Sardar' Khan’s The Baluch a Nation (1947), History of Baluch Race 
and Baluchistan (1958) and The Great Baluch (1965) provide an interesting account 
of the Baloch golden age or the Chakarian period (1487-1511). Khuda Bakhsh Marri 
has a similar place for himself as a purveyor of a bombastic nationalist propaganda of 
history and national heritage. In generating nationalist feeling, equally important, 
however, was the role of Azad Jamaldini and Syed Hashomi. Syed Hashomi (1926- 
1977) in his several compilations of poems, published in the early 1960s, reminded 
the Baloch of their glorious past and asked them for sacrifices to secure a position of 
honour and respect. Similarly, Azad through his monthly Balochi. which was pub­
lished in Karachi from 1956, contributed to the propagation of the idea of Baloch na­
tionalism.
Gul Khan Nasir’s two-volume Tarikh-e Balochistan (the history of Balochis­
tan) in 1952, Sardar Khan’s History of Baluch Race. Marri’s Searchlight on Baloches 
and Balochistan. and several other similar works glorified the Balochs’ past. The Brit­
ish-created hatreds and divisions among the different Baloch tribes especially the “Ba­
loch -  Brahui” division, were replaced by ideas of the common Baloch -  Brahui his­
torical bond and racial origin.6 Gankovsky mentions a number of national organisa­
tions (All Pakistan Baluch League, Baluchistan Students League, Ustaman-Gall and 
others) in which he believes, “apart from bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, landlords also 
were urging the establishment of a single province in West Pakistan incorporating all 
Baloch-peopled territories.”7
6 Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors. Islamabad: 
Institute of Policy Studies, 1988, pp. 95-95.
7 Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 208.
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Describing this evolutionary process of Baloch nationalism, Nawab Khair 
Bakhsh Marri, whose tribe took an active part in both the major revolts during the 
1960’s and 1970’s, had this to say. “In earlier years our struggles had been tribal but 
since 1947 they have become more and more political. It has been a natural process, 
like a child growing from an embryo. Our people have slowly sensed that they (Paki­
stanis) would destroy our identity as a nation if we did not fight back. Agha Abdul 
Karim’s revolt”, he said, “was the first expression. What did he want? He was not too 
clear about it, but he knew he wanted a state, something separate, and what he did, 
when he went to jail, it had instructive effect and began with the growth of a Baloch 
consciousness that had been advancing and maturing ever since... When Nauroz 
Khan went to the hills in 1958, what did he want? Like Abdul Karim, it was vague, 
but it was also a desire for a Baloch state. He suffered and he believed their promise 
of safe conduct, and then what was the outcome? What happened to him made a great 
impression on educated young people, on the petty bourgeoisie, on the generation 
coming up. Call it an eruption, an outflow, what happened is a part of history. They 
went to the hills and their tribes followed. I wonder what was in the mind of Nauroz 
Khan? He could not have it explained in terms of nationalism, but it was to protect his 
traditions, his sense of identity. There was something in his mind, some vision of 
freedom for the Baloch”.8
It was within Pakistan that the Baloch local economy was integrated with the 
modern and market-oriented economies; simultaneously, it was brought under a vast 
web of central bureaucratic controls. In practical terms, this meant the construction of 
roads and growth in transport, the spread of commercialised agriculture and the insti­
tutions and technology to sustain it, the promotion of land reforms and of changes in 
systems of land tenure, increasing pressures for the migration of local manpower to 
distant cities and to areas abroad, the opening of new industries and -  above all -  a 
steady decline of tribalism and its traditional economic autonomy.9 Thus, economi­
cally, politically, administratively, and culturally, new forces began to act on both
8 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet, pp. 47-48.
9 In the course of time “Tribal or S a r d a r i  ownership”, however, often changed into personal ownership. 
The Land Reform Acts of 1959, 1972 and 1977, which placed limited land ownership undermined the 
legal status o f large land holding also. For more detail see, Aijaz Ahmad, “Balochistan’s Agrarian 
Question”, in: Feroz Aluned (ed.), Focus on Balochistan and the Pashtoon question, pp. 44-67; Syed 
Nawab Haider Naqvi, Mahmood Hasan Khan, M. Ghaffar Chaudry, Structural change in Pakistan’s 
agriculture. Islamabad: PIDE, 1989.
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eastern (Pakistani) and western (Iranian) Balochistan, as it will be discussed in this 
chapter.
The Punjabi Domination
The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and his Muslim League Party 
espoused the ’’Two Nation Theory” that led to the original division of the subconti­
nent into a Muslim and a Hindu state namely Pakistan and India respectively.10 How­
ever, the Muslim League, which received power from the British at the time of parti­
tion, was a motley collection of Muslim politicians including the regional leaders, 
who shortly prior to Partition had come together with the sole objective of avoiding 
the domination of Congress in a united India. The death of Jinnah on 11 September 
1948 weakened the Muslim League profoundly. Defections and splits rendered it inef­
fective and the civilian political process disintegrated.
As observed by Professor Lawrence Ziring, the idea of Pakistan found its 
warmest reception in the Indian cosmopolitan regions where the Muslim minority 
perceived an immediate threat from the Hindu majority.11 Such a fear was an action 
replay of pre-partition fears of the Muslims, who had then argued that under the Brit­
ish parliamentary system of governance, there would be permanent rule of the major­
ity, the Hindus. This fear of rule of the majority was one of the reasons to put forth the 
two-nation theory -  the ultimate raison d’etre for creation of Pakistan.12
However, the Baloch and Pashtuns who did not feel such a threat from the dis­
tant Hindus, to their remote frontier regions of Balochistan and North-West Frontier 
Province (NWFP), respectively, opposed the idea of Pakistan from its very begin­
ning.13 As the partition of sub-continent approached, the Baloch opted for independ­
ence, as described earlier, while the Pashtun nationalists under the leadership of Khan 
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the head of the Khudai Khidmatgar, (Red Shirts) joined Nehru’s 
Congress Party in opposing the division of Subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan.
Successive Pakistani rulers have attempted to propagate Islam as the basis of 
state nationalism in the hope that religious homogeneity would supersede ethnic het­
erogeneity and would eventually serve to unite and integrate its various nationalities 
into the state structure.14 Nevertheless, the common Islamic faith has not prevented
10 Lawrence Ziring, The Subcontinent in World Politics. New York & London: Praeger Publishers, 
1978, pp. 89-90, 96-100.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ishtiaq Ahmed, Separatistrorelser i Sydasien, p. 14.
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different nationalities from coming into collision or from harming each other ever 
since the independence of Pakistan.15 There are other major historical, ethnic, politi­
cal, economic, and socio-psychological factors, which shape the question of nationali­
ties comprising Pakistan as well. In this respect the Baloch case in Pakistan, as ob­
served by Selig Harrison, is good example. Harrison wrote, “The inability of the Pun- 
jdhi-Muhajir establishment to neutralize ethnic self-assertion with Islamic appeals has 
been particularly evident in the case of the Baluch”16.
Since the Partition, a number of imbalances attended the creation of Pakistan. 
Along with differences of language and culture, not to mention unequal levels of in­
terest in the very concept of Pakistan, the regions forming Pakistan were also charac­
terized by uneven development. Originally comprising two geographically separated 
Eastern and Western wings, the newly created state came to be dominated from the 
outset by the Punjabis in alliance with the muhajirs. This domination came to be seen 
by the other regional groups in ethno-national terms. Thus, the seeds of ethnic conflict 
and tensions were sown from the beginning in the Pakistani state structure. The large- 
scale Muslim immigrants from India contributed greatly to aggravating ethnic imbal­
ances. The muhajirs, according to Pakistan’s 1951 census constituted some seven mil-
1 7lion people.
As said, the muhajirs and the Punjabis together dominated Pakistan’s econ­
omy and controlled its civil and military administration as inherited from the British. 
This was the case in spite of the fact that at the time they were even a minority as 
compared to the majority East Bengalis let alone other non-Punjabi nationalities.18 
Given their urban base and dominant economic position as well as their control of the 
state bureaucracy, the ruling Punjabis and their muhajir allies began to shape and de­
fine the state identity and structure according to their own perceptions and image.19
Initially, the muhajirs were over-represented in the powerful civil service of
9 0Pakistan. A prime example of their dominance was the imposition of Urdu, spoken 
only by muhajirs, as the lingua franca of the state to the exclusion of the various other 
languages used by the indigenous national groups, a decision which led to the 1952
15 K. K. Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958. Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and 
Cultural Research, 1976, pp. 139-78.
16 Harrison, Selig S., “Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan: The Baluch Case”, in: Hutchinson, John & 
Smith, Anthony D., (ed.), Ethnicity. New York: Oxford University Press 1996, p. 299.
17 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modem History, p. 101.
t8 Gul Khan Nasir, Balochistan Kadim aur Jadid Tarikh ki Roshani men, p. 350.
19 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, pp. 82-83.
20 B. Ali, “Political forces in Sind”, p. 184.
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language riots in East Bengal and the subsequent defeat of the Muslim League at the 
polls in 1954.21 It is important to note that Urdu was not the language of all the muha­
jirs. A lot of them spoke either Punjabi or Gujarati. In the early 1950s only around 7 
per cent of the Pakistan’s population spoke Urdu as their mother tongue.22 Another 
example was the adoption of the One-Unit plan designed to merge the four ethnically 
distinct regions of Balochistan, Punjab, Sindh, and NWFP into a single wing of West­
ern Pakistan in 1954. The informal ruling alliance of the Muhajir-dominated Bureauc­
racy and the big Punjabi landowners during the first decade of Pakistan’s existence 
perceived National Unity as a system securing their own hegemony. Muhajirs pro­
vided administrative and economic experience, while the Punjabi elites political 
power. Anybody, who was not part of this combination or not willing to be co-opted 
as a junior partner, was perceived as a potential threat to Pakistan. Therefore, ethnic 
minorities or most provincial governments became marginalized.23
However, some significant changes occurred after partition in the ethnic com­
position and structure of the oligarchy in the country. Pakistan, as stated by Bjorn 
Hettne, gradually “became more and more a state for Punjabis.”24 On 18 October 
1951 Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, the most senior muhajir leader, was assassi­
nated while addressing a public meeting at Rawalpindi in Punjab. In muhajir percep­
tions it was the beginning of the decline of their influence in Pakistan. The murder 
remains a mystery to this day. At any rate, the Punjabi bureaucrats expanding their 
control over the state followed it immediately. In 1958 when general Ayub Khan 
brought the first military coup, he fired many top civil servants of muhajir back­
ground In 1960, he also shifted the capital of Pakistan from Karachi a muhajir- 
dominated area, to Islamabad in northern Punjab. Those muhajirs working for the 
federal government had to abandon Karachi. Furthermore, the governments of Ayub 
Khan (1958-69), Yaliya Khan (1969-71) and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) carried 
out retrenchments of government officers on charges of corruption. Muhajir bureau­
crats figured prominently in these expulsions. More dramatically, the rise of the PPP 
and its coming into power in Sindh in 1972, followed by the language riots, created a 
tremor in muhajir circles.25 Later when General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq captured
21 Ishtiaq Ahmed, State. Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia. London, 1996, p. 221.
22 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modem History, p. 26.
23 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, pp. 82-83.
24 Bjorn Hettne, Att studera Intemationella relationer, Goteborg: Padrigu Papers 1990, pp. 75-76.
25 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change, p. 154.
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power in July 1977, the predominantly Punjabi army eclipsed the bureaucracy, which 
was constrained to play second fiddle.
Muhammad Ali Jinnah most probably wanted a secular and bourgeois democ­
ratic state in Pakistan. “Our decisions in the affairs of the State”, he said, “shall be
0 f\guided by discussion and consultation”. On August 11, 1947, Pakistan’s constituent 
assembly met in Karachi for the first time and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was 
elected to preside the meeting said:
I think we should keep in front of us our ideals and you will find that 
in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims 
cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the 
personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens 
of the state,27
However, his subsequent behaviour does not show that he was really able to progress 
beyond the communal politics of pre-partition India. By eliminating strong leaders 
and planting pliable men in the provinces, Jinnah made it extremely difficult for a col­
lective leadership to emerge after his death. Jinnah expelled the popular Sindhi leader 
and president of the Sindh Provincial Muslim League (during 1943-45), G. M. Sayed, 
from the Muslim League because of his outspoken criticism of Sindh’s landowning 
politicians and the Central High Command.
Similarly the Pakhtun nationalist leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan tried to prevail 
upon Jinnah to make the Muslim League a non-communal party. Being disappointed 
to convince Jinnah, these nationalist leaders formed “All Pakistan People’s Party” 
later renamed the “People’s Organisation” on 6 May 1948.28 Ghaffar Khan became 
the president and G. M. Syed, was elected the Party’s general secretary. The party 
demanded full autonomy for “linguistic groups” in the country and the recognition of 
the inalienable rights of the people to rule. Ghaffar Khan was arrested on 15 June 
1948, on the charge of creating sectional hatred.29 Moreover, it was Jinnah who estab­
lished a tradition for the dismissal of elected governments in Pakistan. Under his ex­
press directions, the Governors of the Frontier and Sindh dismissed the Ministries of
26 Govermnent of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Directorate o f Research, 
Reference and Publications, Speech of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: As Governor General of 
Pakistan 1947-48, Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d, p. 58.
27 Ibid.
28 Yunas Samad, A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan. 1937-1958. p. 129.
29 M. Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan. National Commission on Historical Research, Is­
lamabad, 1976, pp. 90-91.
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Dr. Khan Sahib and M.A. Khuhro on 22 August 1947 and 26 April 1948 respec- 
tively.30
Much to the surprise of the nationalists, both in East and West Pakistan, in 
February 1948 Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan stated in the Pakistan Constituent As­
sembly that Urdu would be the sole national language of Pakistan. Governor General 
Mohamed Ali Jinnah reiterated this later in March in a public speech at Dhaka. Now, 
Bengali was not only the mother tongue of more than 55 per cent of Pakistan's 
population but also a highly developed language, which had been in official use for a 
long time. Jinnah's speech provoked angry demonstrations by Bengali students. The 
language question was not only to become the centrepiece of emergent Bengali 
nationalism, but it also led to further politicisation of the Balochi as argued by the last 
Wali (ruler) of Swat, Miangul Jahanzeb.31 However, Jinnah’s attitude towards the 
language question was criticised by the nationalists throughout Pakistan. The Pashtun 
leader, Ghaffar Khan, even went much further and accused Jinnah to be a British
T9agent. Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s later speeches in 1948, give some more clues to his 
thinking not only about his position on Balochistan but also about his undemocratic 
manner. For example, on 15 February 1948, addressing a “Royal Darbar” in Sibi, Jin­
nah surprised his audience by expressing a preference for a dictatorial, rather than 
democratic, form of government in Balochistan. He announced that until the Pakistan 
Constitution was finally worked out in about two years’ time Balochistan would con­
tinue to be governed by himself, assisted by an advisoiy council nominated by him.33 
The day after, in an interview with the Daily Telegraph. Jinnah explained that he did 
not mean in his speech that a dictatorial form of government would have been more 
suitable for the rest of Pakistan. “Baluchistan”, Jinnah explained, “is very undevel­
oped, and I think my record shows that I can be very useful to it in its present condi­
tion”.34 Anyhow from the very beginning of accession, the popular leaders in Ba­
lochistan were jailed and political parties were bamied with the exception of the Mus­
lim League.
30 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p. 128.
31 Miangul Jahanzeb, The Last Wali of Swat: An Autobiography as told to Frederick Barth. Oslo: 
Univesitetsforlaget, 1985, pp. 51, 114.
32 M. Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan, pp. 90-91.
33 L/P& S/13/1846.
34 Ibid.
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From Federation to Province
With the lapse of paramountcy in 1947, as mentioned in chapter 4, Balochistan 
(the Khanate of Kalat) emerged as an independent, federal, and constitutional monar­
chy, with the Khan of Kalat as its formal head. The Khan Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, 
however, made the formal declaration of its independence, on August 15, 1947. Terri­
torially, in 1947-1948, the Baloch federation constituted the Khanate of Kalat, includ­
ing Makkoran35, and the states of Kharan and Las Bela. In other word it comprised 
only a portion of the Baloch land, the proper Balochistan as the British called it.
Under the British, as earlier mentioned, the Khan was the head of the State 
only on paper. For all practical purposes, authority was vested with the political 
Agents who functioned under the direct orders of the Agent to the Governor General. 
Nasirabad, Chagai and the tribal regions of Marri, Bugti had each a separate Political 
Agent. Dera Ghazi Khan was absorbed in the Punjab, and Jacobabad (formally Khan- 
garh) was given over to Sindh. Also a substantial tract of the borderland of Balochis­
tan was handed over to Iran and Afghanistan in 1871, and 1894, respectively. Quetta 
was occupied in 1870, but the Treaty of Lease was signed with the Khan on the 1st of 
April 1883, against payment of Rs.25, 000 for revenue annually and Rs.30, 000 in lieu 
of tolls. Nasirabad was occupied in April 1893, and leased in 1903 for Rs.115, 000 
annually. Nusliki was leased on 1st July 1899 for Rs.9, 000 annually,36 However, since 
the withdrawal of the British in 1947, the Baloch federation was demanding the return 
of all its territories. In March 1946, as noted, in an official memorandum, submitted to 
the Cabinet Mission, the Khan demanded that all such regions as were given under the 
control of the British in consequence of any treaty should be returned to the sover­
eignty of the Kalat state.37
Thus, up to its annexation in 1948, the Baloch federation not only was strug­
gling against its merger with Pakistan, but also demanding its separated lands back to 
resume their original status as pails of the Kalat state. These territories were now 
handed over to Pakistan, with the partition by the British. Forcing the Baloch state 
into merger with Pakistan, as noted in chapter 4, Karachi decided to cut off Kharan, 
Lasbela and Makkoran by giving them an equal status as the Kalat state and obtaining 
their "mergers" with Pakistan directly a few weeks before the forced annexation of
35 Makkoran became a separate state after partition.
36 A. B. Awan, Baluchistan, pp. 213-214.
37 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, pp. 255-296.
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Kalat itself. With its annexation on March 27, 1948, the proper Balochistan (the 
Kalat state) was reverted to the position it held in the British period. Thus, politically, 
in the early 1950s, the disintegration of Baloch country was at its apex.
By this time, like their territory the Baloch population was also divided. In the 
early 1950s, there were more Baloch in Sindh than in Balochistan proper. It is impor­
tant to note that it was in Sindh that the Baloch petty bourgeoisie and bourgeois intel­
ligentsia were taking shape. During the Second World War and the immediate post­
war’ years the number of Baloch in Sindh rose from 235,000 to 442,000 an increase of 
88 per cent.39 In addition, more than a hundred thousand Baloch lived in the vicinity 
of Karachi. In 1951, most of those literate in Balochi were living beyond the frontiers 
of Balochistan proper, mainly in Karachi.40 It was also in Sindh that the Baloch peri­
odical press emerged in the 30’s (first in Urdu and later, in the 40’s, in Balochi). For 
years the Baluchistan Gazette, published in English at Quetta, was the only newspaper 
in Balochistan itself There were neither newspapers nor books published in Balochi. 
Farsi and Urdu were in use as literary languages among the Baloch.
As earlier mentioned, the government of Pakistan assumed power in the whole 
of Balochistan including Kalat State on 15th April 1948 and officials administered the 
province from Karachi. In late 1950 the Pakistan government broached the idea of 
forming the “Balochistan States’ Union” by merging the states of Las Bela, Makkoran 
and Kharan into Kalat. In 1950, the Muslim League Government, headed by Liaqat 
Ali Khan, formed a committee to propose constitutional reforms in Balochistan41 
About a month after the death of Liaqat Ali Khan, the committee presented its report 
to the Pakistan Constitutional Assembly. It recommended the formation of a Gover­
nor’s Province in Balochistan, without disturbing the existing institutions of the Sard- 
ari System 42 As mentioned earlier, in 1950, the Baloch nationalists, headed by Abdul 
Karim Shurish, a former General Secretary of the National Party, had formed the “Ba­
lochistan Peace Committee” with the aim of struggling for the right of self­
38 IOR.L/P&S/13/184.
39 Government o f Pakistan, Office of the Census Commissioner, Census o f Pakistan, (vol. VI), Karachi: 
Manager of Publications, 1951, pp. 107-108.
40 Ibid., see Vol. I, Table 8, p. 37; Vol. II, p. 53.
41 Government of Pakistan, Report of the Committee on Constitutional and Administrative Reforms in 
Balochistan. Karachi, 1950, p. 21.
42 M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan. p. 333.
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determination for the Baloch people. This committee could not make any headway 
and was soon to be replaced by the Ustaman Gall.43
Having supported the concept of a unified Baloch State, the states’ rulers ar­
rived at a “Covenant” On 12th April 1951. Approved by the government of Pakistan, 
the covenant maintained that the leaders of the four states were convinced that the 
welfare of the people of the region could best be secured by the establishment of a 
United States comprising territories of the respective states with a common executive, 
legislature and judiciary, under the common Constitution of Pakistan. The document 
provided for a council of rulers, with one of the rulers elected as its President. The 
Wazir-e-Azam (Prime Minster) was to be a nominee of the government of Pakistan. 
An interim constitution provided for a legislative assembly of 28 elected and 12 
nominated members.
As a result of the above arrangement, the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar 
Khan became the president of the Council of Rulers of the Union (Balochistan States 
Union) in 1951.44 In April 1952, the Pakistan government appointed a civil servant, 
Agha Abdul Hamid as its Prime Minister 45 The formation of Balochistan States Un­
ion was a starting move towards consolidation of the Baloch country and the constitu­
tion of a single political entity.
But there were hitches. Within two years, differences erupted between the 
Punj obi-Muhajir dominated Central government and the Khan of Kalat. Many Paki­
stani leaders including the Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra and the Governor 
General, Iskandar Mirza Began to think that the Khan had his own agenda and was 
working towards creating an independent Balochistan.46 Thus, in the early June 1954, 
the Pakistan States Ministry dismissed the Balochistan States Union’s assembly47, and 
nearly a year later the Union itself was dissolved and merged by the One-Unit scheme 
into West Pakistan in 1955 48
Overriding objections and opposition from the nationalist forces of the op­
pressed nationalities, the four ethnically distinct regions of Balochistan, Punjab, 
Sindh, and NWFP were amalgamated under the so-called One-Unit plan into a single
43 Shaih Ragam, “Aqelan Sassa Kan et” in: Monthly, Balochi. Quetta February 1988 (Balochi).
44 Riccardo Redaelli, The Father’s Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India (19th -  20th Century), 
p. 193.
Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan. pp. 530-31.
46 Interview with Agha Naseer Khan Alunadzai.
47 Outlook. Vol. 2, No. 41 January 12, 1974, p. 10.
48 Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan. p. 541.
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political unit of West Pakistan on 30 September 1955.49 The purpose of this plan was 
to counter the numerical majority of the Eastern wing in order to ensure the Punjabi 
control of the government as well as to prevent the growing political alliance and co­
operation between the non-Punjabi nationalities of West Pakistan with the East Ben­
galis.50
In the early 1950s Pakistan’s ceaseless bickering with India over Kashmir, 
Punjab and Indus river waters51, disputed frontiers and enclaves, distribution of assets 
and liabilities, the management of evacuee property, and the lack of a workable con­
stitution left its rulers feeling beleaguered. This was reflected in its policy-making.52 
The insecure political elite developed linkages with the Punjabi-dominated civil and 
military bureaucratic apparatus that had held together the imperial superstructure and 
now maintained the new order. Punjab’s feudal interests lent support to, and co-opted, 
the state structure as an insurance. This was the nature of Pakistan’s emerging power 
elite when the new state’s Bengali majority began demanding an equal share in politi­
cal and economic decision-making. As Pakistan approached constitutional rule, the 
potential threat posed by the Bengali petit bourgeoisie grew. To counter east Bengal’s 
demographic weight, the rulers in Karachi contrived the One-Unit formulation 
whereby Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan and the various states were grouped into 
a single province enjoying parliamentary parity with East Pakistan.53
The One-Unit scheme became the unifying factor in.the struggle of all nation­
alist parties and elements within West Pakistan. The perceived threat of assimilation 
by the more numerous Punjabis, and the concern to protect their national and cultural 
identities became the major driving force in the national movement of the Baloch and 
other nationalities in Pakistan. As stated by Professor Lawrence Ziring:
Just as the Muslim League raised the cry of ‘Islam in Danger’ and 
mobilised a movement for the independence of a Muslim state in the 
subcontinent, Sindis, Baluchis, and Pathans believe their way o f life 
and particularly their distinctive culture are in jeopardy, especially 
given their experience with the Pakistan movement and their fear for
49 aIshtiaq Ahmed, State. Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia, p. 192. On 22 November
1954, Mohammad Ali Bogra the Prime Minister of Pakistan proposed the One-Unit plan designed to merge 
the various provinces and princely States in the West wing of Pakistan into one single province.
50 Inayatullah Baloch, “Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan”, in: Aussen Politik. no. 3, 1980, p. 295; 
Selig S. Harrison, In Afgahnistan’s Shadow, p. 27.
51 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, London: Hurst & Company, 1998, pp. 112-113.
52 C.f., Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 167.
53 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 236.
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the more numerous Punjabis. In some ways it is the same fear that 
Jinnah exploited to get the British to partition.54
When Agha Abdul Karim and Mohammad Hossein Unqa were released after 
completing their term of imprisonment in 1955, they called a meeting of their promi­
nent followers at Karachi and a political party was organised there, under the name of 
Ustaman Gall, (People’s Party). The former was elected the president while 
Mohammad Hossein Unqa became the general secretary. The party had identical ob­
jectives to those of the Kalat State National Party. However, under the changed cir­
cumstances, the Ustaman Gall mentioned its goal of creating a separate province for 
the Baloch people on the basis of ethnicity, geography, culture and language.55 It also 
aimed at establishing a republican federal political system in the country with equal 
rights and complete provincial autonomy for the constituent units; all the Baloch areas 
of Balochistan were to be merged in a separate province where Balochi would be the 
official language.56
During the life of the Balochistan States Union (1951-54), little had been done 
in the way of economic development. Now under the One-Unit scheme, the domestic 
autonomy enjoyed by the Khanate was again removed. Opposition from Baloch, 
Sindhi and Pathan politicians was matched by support from Pakistan’s patrons in 
Washington. There, it was seen as one way of consolidating the Pakistani State, which 
could serve as a stronger link in the global anti-Communist chain.57 Pakistan became 
a part of the Western strategy of ringing the Soviet Union with military and air bases 
in the early 1950s. The country signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in 
May 1954, and joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in Septem­
ber 1954, and the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organisation -  CENTO) in 
February 1955.
The end of the Balochistan States Union increased Pakistani worries about the 
Baloch response to the One-Unit scheme. To preclude protests on legal grounds, the
co
government presented a ‘New Instrument of Accession’.
Being pressed by the Centre, the Khan of Kalat expressed his support for the 
merger scheme on 23rd November 1954. In a conversation with the court minister of
54 Lawrence Ziring, The Subcontinent in World Politics, p. 89.
55 Gul Khan Nasir, Baluchistan Kadim aur Jadid Tarikh ki Roshani men. Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1982, 
pp. 337-38.
Baluchi Dunya. Multan, June-July 1973, p. 19.
57 S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State, p. 139.
58 Ibid.
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the Khan, Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai on this subject, he said, “The Khan signed 
the agreement under duress, and later repudiated his support”.59 The Khan’s support 
for the merger plan was actually announced by the Government on 3rd January 1955.60 
The delayed announcement of the Khan’s support spread speculation that his approval 
was not freely given.
It was said that the Khan was ordered to come to Karachi in December 1954, 
and discuss the plan with the minister for States and frontier regions. On his arrival at 
the ministry at Karachi he was asked to sign the instrument of accession. The Khan 
complied with the instruction before he left the room.61
On the 30th November 1956, six nationalist political parties joined hands to­
gether in a meeting at Lahore and formed a new political party, Pakistan National 
Party. Those who attended included Ustaman Gall (People’s Party) from Balochistan, 
the “Azad Pakistan Party” of Punjab, “Khodai Khidmatgar” (Red Shirts) of Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan from Frontier Province, G. M. Syed’s “Awami Party” from Sindh, 
“Sindh Hari Committee” of Haydar Bakhsh Khan Jatoi and, the “Wror Pashtun” of 
Abdul Samad Achakzai. The main objective of the newly created party was opposi­
tion to the One Unit plan, because according to the party this plan made the smaller 
provinces feels that “they were being denied their constitutional, national and eco­
nomic rights.” The Pakistan National Party demanded dissolution of the West Paki­
stan Province and provincial autonomy. In 1957, Maulana Bhashani of the East Paki­
stan Awami League, joined the new party, and the party was renamed National 
Awami Party, commonly known as the N. A.P.62
The NAP set the following as its main aims: 1 - Defence of the sovereignty, 
integrity and independence of Pakistan. 2 -  Non-aligned, independent foreign policy. 
3 -  Ending of exploitation of Pakistan externally and its people internally. 4 -  Aboli­
tion of One-Unit and reorganisation of provinces on linguistic basis. 5 -  Right of vote 
to every adult citizen. In July 1965, as the manifesto was amended, the NAP de­
clared that the system of government in the country should be based on the concept of 
people’s sovereignty. The Party advocated the maximum provincial autonomy in a 
federal structure. Only Defence, Foreign Affairs and Currency were to be left with the
59 Interview with Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai.
60 Lawrence Ziring, The Subcontinent in World Politics, p. 338.
61 Ibid.
62 Gul Khan Nasir, Balochistan Kadim aur Jadid Tarikh ki Roshani men, p. 339.
63 Ibid.
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Federal government, while other powers were to rest with the autonomous units. One- 
Unit in West Pakistan had to be replaced by a “regional Federation where no province 
could dominate the other on the basis of its population”, a clear reference to the Pun­
jab whose numerical strength surpassed all the other provinces in the West wing put 
together. In foreign affairs the Manifesto asked for non-alignment and withdrawal 
from the military pacts.64
Thus the NAP’s position on provincial autonomy influenced the Baloch na­
tionalists and it brought their activities within the ambit of opposition politics in Paki­
stan and led to socialisation between the regional and progressive forces that had been 
kept at bay by an entrenched elite; and it provided a formal channel to the leftist 
groups for expressing their alternative view of what the Pakistani state should be.
1960s was a very decisive period for the Baloch nationalism. Pakistan gov­
ernment reacted by removing the traditional Sardars and replacing them with their 
own supporters. By killing the Pakistan-selected Sardars, the Baloch showed their 
dissatisfaction against the government. These events led to open confrontation be­
tween the Baloch and the Centre, which fanned the sense of separatism.66 It was in 
this period that the Baloch students realised the necessity for their own organisation. 
In 1967, the Baloch Student Organisation (BSO) was formed. The Baloch press ap­
peared on a scale which never existed before. The Baloch language was homogenised 
partly through the Balochi, a radio programme, which were broadcast both from Iran 
and Pakistan, and partly through the newly established educational academies and so­
cieties. In Professor Aziz Mohammad Bugti’s view, it was difficult to understand the 
different dialects of Balochi prior to 1960s. Being a speaker of Eastern Balochi, Bugti 
opined that They did not understand the western dialect of Balochi up to 1960s prop­
erly, as they do it today’.67 It appeal's that from this time on Balochi became more 
homogenised and commonly spoken.
In 1969, Yahya Khan replaced Ayub Khan. With the departure of Ayub Khan, 
the Baloch leaders were released and the army withdrew. Yahya Khan met the Baloch 
leaders, Ataullah Mengal, Akbar Bugti and Kliair Bakhsh Marri. The new military
64 National Awami Party (NAP), The Manifesto of National Awami Party o f Pakistan. Karachi: Anju- 
man Press, nd, p. 5.
65 The tribesmen assassinated Doda Khan an uncle of Kliair Bakhsh Maui, and Karam Khan Mengal, 
the uncle of Ataullah Mengal’s father. See, Pakistan Progressive. Vol. Ill, No. Ill and IV December 
1980, p. 33. In April 1963, the Centre appointed Sardar Karam Khan was killed after ten days of his 
nomination.
66 Interview with, Abdul Ghaffar Nadeem, the former secretary of education in Balochistan.
67 Interview with Professor Aziz Mohammad Bugti.
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ruler agreed to withdraw the One Unit Plan, establish a unified Balochistan province 
and introduce free elections in the country, thus bringing a cease-fire between the Ba­
loch guerrillas and Pakistan army.68 The restoration of Balochistan as a unified prov­
ince constituted a major achievement for Baloch nationalists.
Western Balochistan: end of the Hakomates
Like Eastern Balochistan, it took a similar long process for Western Balochis­
tan (Iran), to become a full-fledged province in 1959, As discussed in chapter three, 
before the Persian occupation in 1928, Western Balochistan was divided into several 
political and administrative units called Hakomates.69 After the death of Mir Nasir 
Khan the Great (1795), Makkoran and Sarhadd became two separate political identi­
ties. In the early 20th century Sarhadd was occupied by the British and remained a 
British influenced zone until their departure from the region in 1948,70 while Mak­
koran with its several “Hakomates” remained a semi-independent federation, headed
71by Bampur. With the Persian invasion and the annexation of Western Balochistan in 
1928, the process of centralisation of power or detribalisation, which was started by 
Mir Dost Mohammad Khan, was disrupted. After year’s of war, especially with the 
tribes of Sarhadd, the Persian consolidated their position in the western Balochistan 
up to the end of 1930s. In 1937, Balochistan was proclaimed a Hakomate, called 
“Hokomat-e Makkoran”, later renamed as “Hokomat-e Balochistan”.72 Politically and 
administratively, the Hakomate of Balochistan was under the control of the 10th prov­
ince, namely, Kerman.
As mentioned earlier, it was in the mid 19th century, that the Persian forces in­
vaded western Balochistan. After various hotly contested battles with the Baloch, the 
tired and half defeated Persian forces, also pressed by revolutions and uprisings inside 
Persia, withdrew from Balochistan to their own region in 1907, but the Persian claim 
remained over the Baloch territory.73 When in 1905 for the first time Persia became a
68 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp 29-33.
69 A region ruled by a Hakom (Hakem) was called a Hakomate. Prior to 1928, Western Balochistan was 
divided into several Hakomates, namely Bampur, Dezzak, Magas, Geh, Jashk or Jask, Kaserkan and 
Bahu-Dashtiari.
70 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, pp. 355-56.
71N. P. Grant, “Journal o f a Route through the Western Part of Mekran”, pp. 329-340.
72 Hossein Ali Razm-Ara, Joglirafiva-e Nezami Shahrestan-ha-e Marzi. p. 97; Interview with Amir 
Hussain Khan Khozeime Alam. He was the first Governor General of Balochistan in 1939-40.
73 The Persian claim on Baloch territories resulted in the setting up of a mixed commission in 1870 to 
settle the frontier beyond which Persia should not be permitted to move eastwards. The Commission’s 
proceedings, when announced, were also objected to for various reasons by the British officials. Colo­
nel Holdich remarked that he could hardly agree to the statements on boundary claims from point to
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constitutional monarchy, the first Majlis (parliament) recognised the country as con­
sisting of five separate ayalat (provinces), including Balochistan.74 The other four 
were Azerbaijan, Fars, Kerman, and Khorasan. However, in practice Balochistan was 
not under Persian influence in the first quarter of 20th centuiy.
Moreover, the ruler of Bampur (Balochistan), Bahrain Khan did not recognise 
the Iranian Majlis and had already refused to send any representative to Tehran. Thus, 
there was no representative in the Iranian Majlis from Balochistan in 1905. It was in 
1935 that the first Baloch representative from Balochistan, Morad Khan Rigi, was 
elected for the 10th Majlis, It is important to note that some Persian nationalists claim 
that prior to the occupation of Western Balochistan in 1928, the country had a repre­
sentative in the fourth Iranian Majlis in 1922. They refer to one Syed Hassan Khan 
Nannanshiri, a representative from Bam, Kerman. The ruler of Bampur, Mir Bahram 
Khan, sent this Syed Hassan Khan Nannanshiri, according to a Persian writer, Jafar 
Mehdinia, to the fourth Majlis, to represent Balochistan.
In a conversation with Akbar Barakzai on this subject, he strongly dismissed 
the Baloch representation in Iranian Majlis in 1922, and called it a groundless Persian 
claim to justify the occupation and the forced annexation of the Baloch land by Reza 
Shah in 1928.76 There are several reasons for the Baloch to call it an empty claim. For 
the first, the fourth Majlis was inaugurated in 1922, during the reign of Dost 
Mohammad Khan, not Bahram Khan as stated by Mehdinia. Mir Dost Mohammad 
Khan had already proclaimed himself, as the “Shah-e Balochistan” (king of Balochis­
tan), and he did not recognise Persian superiority. Secondly, Hassan Khan Narman- 
shiri, did not belong to Balochistan, but Kerman, and he was also a representative 
from that region. Thirdly, as discussed in the third chapter, Western Balochistan, until 
the end of the 1920s, was struggling to maintain its independence both from the Per­
sians and the British.77
In 1937, Reza Shah introduced a new political organization, according to 
which Iran was politically and administratively divided into ten Ostans or provinces. 
Each Os tan was subdivided into a number of Shahrestan (equivalent to Division in
point which the Perso-Baloch commission completed. For more detail see, Government of Pakistan, 
The Frontier o f Pakistan. Karachi: The National Publishing House, 1971, p. 205.
74 Mehrdad Arfah-Zadeh, 188-Payegah-e Mardom-Salari, Paris, 1376/1998, p. 24.
75 Jafar Mehdinia, Nakhost Waziran Iran. No 4: Zendagi-e Seyasi-e Sved Ziauddin Tabatabai. Tehran, 
1369/1991, p. 605.
76 Interview with Akbar Barakzai.
77 For more detail see, Jafar Mehdinia, Nakhost Waziran Iran. No 4: Zendagi-e Seyasi-e Sved Ziauddin 
Tabatabai. p. 605.
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Pakistani Balochistan). Each Shahrestan was subdivided into one or more Bakhsh, 
each, in turn, subdivided into one or more Dehestans; each Dehestan included a num­
ber of small towns and villages. Furthermore, a smaller administrative unit known as 
Farmandari Koll, which is a degree lower in status from that of Ostan, has been fash-
no
ioned. Comparatively, since 1970, Eastern Balochistan comprises six administrative 
divisions, namely, Quetta, Sibi, Kalat, Makkoran (Makran), Loralai and Nasirabad. 
Furthermore every Division consists of several Districts. In spite of the above- 
mentioned plan, Iranian Balochistan was officially constituted as an Ostan-e Nezami 
(Military province) in 1937.79 It was in early 1939 that the government of Reza Shah, 
however, appointed for the first time Amir Hussain Khan Khozeime Alam as the Ha- 
kom (Governor General) of Balochistan.80
With the Anglo-Russian invasion of the country and the forced abdication of 
Reza Shah in 1940, the central government temporarily lost control over the region 
due to the ensuing disintegration of the Iranian armed forces and the simultaneous up­
rising by the Baloch, events which disrupted the process of its integration into Iran 
during the war. Reza Shah’s son and successor Mohammad Reza Shah reinstated the 
central authority after the Second World War and initiated a more aggressive integra- 
tionist policy, which continued to progress until his downfall in 1979.81
Fearful that the Greater Balochistan movement developing in Pakistan would 
influence the Baloch in Iran, the Shall pursued a ruthless, hard-line policy toward the 
Baloch, designed to stifle any expression of Baloch identity. In particular, he was de­
termined to prevent the growth of a politicised Baloch intelligentsia. Sharply limiting 
education in the Baloch areas, he banned the use of the Balochi language in the few 
schools attended by Baloch students and made the use of Persian mandatory. He com­
pelled Baloch students to use histoiy textbooks in which the Baloch were described as 
Persian in ethnic origin and prohibited the use of Balochi in government offices. He 
also made it a criminal offence to publish, distribute, or even possess Balochi-
78 Dr. Kazem Vadiei, Moghaddameh-i bar Joghrafiva-e Iran. (An Introduction to the Geography of 
Iran), Tehran, 1974, p. 194.
79 Hossein Ali Razm-Ara, Joghrafiva-e Nezami Shahrestan-ha-e Marzi, p. 97.
80 Interview with Amir Hussain Khan Khozeime Alam; c.f. Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, The Amirs of Bor­
derlands and Eastern Iranian Borders, pp. 195-96.
81 E. Jansson, Pakistan and Indien 1947-83, p. 39.
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language books, magazines, and newspapers, a prohibition, which curtailed but did 
not entirely choke off the flow of underground publications from Pakistan.82
In 1959, Balochistan, under Mohammad Reza Shah, was administratively di­
vided into three major and separate parts, as has been the case ever since. The north­
ern part was included in the neighbouring Persian-speaking province of Kerman. The 
westernmost part was included in the Governorate-General of the Ports and Coasts, 
which later became a full province called Ostan-e Saheli (The Coastal Province) and 
is presently known as the Province of Hurmuzgan. The third and the largest part con­
stitute the “Ostan Sistan-wa-Balochistan” (province of Sistan and Balochistan). This 
covers 181,578 square kilometres, which is in itself the second largest province after 
Khorasan. It is divided into seven Shahrestan (districts or townships), namely Za- 
hedan (the provincial capital), Iranshahr (Pahra), Saravan (Dezzak), Nikshahr (Geh), 
the port of Chabahar, Khash, and Sistan. The policy of dividing and assigning large 
portions of Western Balochistan to adjoining Persian-speaking provinces appeal's to 
have been intended to speed up the process of its consolidation under the Iranian civil 
and military machinery, thus facilitating its integration into the state.83
In the early 1970s, Iran was divided into 21 provinces including Balochistan. 
Appointed by royal decree, the province was administered by an Ostandar (Governor- 
General).84 No Baloch were ever appointed to this position throughout the Pahlavi 
reign. In fact, the first Baloch governor-general was Dr. Danish Narui, who was ap­
pointed immediately after the revolution of 1979, a position which he held for less 
than a year.85
Apparently, the revolt of Dad Shah Baloch was the most significant event un­
der the second Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah that furthered the Baloch national 
emotions both in Iran and Pakistan. Dad Shah stalled his rebellious activities in the 
early 1944 by attacking government outposts and harassing the Iranian officials. By 
1957, several events brought Dad Shah’s revolt to the world attention. The first in­
volved an ambush of a convoy, on 24th March 1957, killing two American military aid 
officials. An American contractor and two Iranians were also killed in the attack. 
They were driving to Chabahar, a port-city on the Makkoran coast (Gulf coast).86
82 Brian Spooner, Baluchistan: Geography. History, and Ethnology, p. 620; E. Jansson, Pakistan and 
Indien 1947-83. p. 39.
83 Shah Mohammad Marri, Baloch Oaum. p. 295.
84 Iran Yearbook 1977. Tehran, 1977, p. 47.
85 Interview with Dr. Danish Narui.
86 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 104.
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From then on the scope of the Dad Shah’s movement widened and its charac­
ter drastically changed. It attracted the attention of the nationalist and anti-imperialist 
forces of the region to the Baloch question. The killing of the Americans, however,
07
was by mistake. Dad Shah and his men took the jeep to contain Persian soldiers, the 
gajars,88 The event was given prominent coverage in the Western press. The outside 
world came to know the Baloch resentment against the Iranian government for the 
first time in many decades. The Persians took it as a big affront. The Prime Minister, 
Hossein Ala resigned. The Shah put a price of 10,000 dollars on the head of each 
member of the Dad Shah Guerrillas, dead 01* alive.89 A military operation on an un­
precedented scale was launched jointly by Iranian and Pakistani forces, and lasted for 
nearly ten months after the killings of the American officials. Dad Shah not only suc­
cessfully faced the situation but also rallied around him more men to fight the enemy.
On March 1957, the Iranian aimed forces launched a heavy assault on Dad 
Shah’s stronghold, Ahorran. As a result, several of his men were wounded and his 
yoimgest son, Kamal was killed. Avoiding further army and gendarmerie operations, 
his elder brother, Ahmad Shah along with the women, children, and the older men of 
the tribe, entered an adjacent Pakistani area in the eastern Balochistan and demanded 
asylum in that country. However, they were arrested by the Pakistani authorities and 
handed over to Iran, later in the same year, despite the lack of an extradition treaty 
between the two countries.90
In 1957, denouncing the move to extradite Ahmad Shah as a violation of hu­
man rights, Jumma Khan, a Baloch nationalist, organised a vigorous Baloch protest 
movement in Pakistan that quickly took on broader nationalist overtones.91 He raised 
Ahmad Shah’s case in the High Court of Pakistan. The High Court, however, issued a 
statement in favour of Ahmad Shah, but as indicated above, the Pakistani government 
handed him over to the Iranian authorities.92
Protesting against this action of the Pakistan government, the Baloch national­
ists struck in big cities of Pakistan like Quetta and Karachi. Even the Baloch from 
Punjab and interior Sindh sympathised with Dad Shall. The Baloch masses saw in
87 Ibid.
88 The Baloch always refer to a Persian individually or collectively as Gajar.
89 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 104.
90 Ibid., p. 105.
91 Azim Shahbakhsh, Pozhuheshi Par Tarikh-e Maaser-e Balochistan. Shiraz, 1373/1995, p. 161.
92 For more detail see, ibid., pp. 114-116.
93 Interview with Professor Ali Mohammad Shaheen.
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him a symbol of a “true Baloch” who upheld the Baloch code of honour and martial 
virtues against the gajars, thus identifying with him to the extent that eveiyone saw 
himself as a potential Dad Shah. The nationalists venerate him as a “national leader 
who raised the flag of revolt” and “gave great sacrifices for the cause of independ­
ence, for awakening the Baloch nation and fighting against imperialism”.94 The 
Monthly Balochi, Karachi, in its issue of March 1958, eulogised him as one of the 
greatest of Baloch heroes who had laid down their lives for the great cause.95 The Dad 
Shah case, according to Selig Harrison, marked the first time that a Baloch leader had 
attempted to rally nationalist sentiment in both Pakistan and Iran around an issue of 
common concern under the banner of Greater Balochistan”.96
Unable to suppress his activities, the Persians again adopted treacherous 
means by offering negotiations with Dad Shah. But during the negotiations in 1958, 
the agents of the Iranian government killed him. The rebellion of Dad Shah acted as a 
catalyst in awakening the Baloch national consciousness and reviving their sense of 
pride. According to the writer of Pozhuheshi Par Tarikh-e Ma'aser-e Balochistan (Re­
search on the Contemporary History of Balochistan), Azim Shahbakhsh, Dad Shah’s 
case brought closer the whole Baloch community together, for the first time, after the 
division of Balochistan into different states (Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan).97 “As 
Dad Shah’s brother, Ahmad Shah was arrested by Pakistani army,” said the former 
Baloch political activist from Karachi, Akbar Barakzai, “we supported him, because 
he was a Baloch.”98
Establishing close relation with the Shall of Iran, the first act of Ayub Khan’s 
regime was to deal with the supporters of Dad Shah. Thus, shortly after martial law in 
1958, Jumma Khan fled to Dubai.99 Staying in Dubai, Jumma continued his national­
ist activities from there. Encouraged by the Baloch dissidents of Iranian Balochistan, 
he shifted his activity centre to Baghdad in 1964. Supported by the Iraqi government, 
he organised the Baloch dissidents living in exile especially in Gulf States under the 
name of “Balochistan Liberation Front” (BLF).100
94 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 105.
95 Monthly Balochi. Karachi, March 1958.
96 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 105.
97 Azim Shahbakhsh, Pozhuheshi Par Tarikh-e Maaser-e Balochistan. p. 161.
98 Interview with Akbar Barakzai.
99 Abdul Samad Amiri, “Chest o Eyr”, in: Monthly Balochi. Quetta, Feb. 2001, p. 17.
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The BLF scored its biggest success when it attracted the support of one of the 
best-known tribal chieftains in Iranian Baluchistan, Mir Abdi Khan Sardarzai.101 In 
the late 1950s, Mir Abdi Khan, while demanding greater autonomy, clashed with the 
Iranian government. He was supported by Ali Khan Naqdi of Bent, Hout Ibrahim of 
Kouchu, and many other lesser Sardars.102 The Iranian gendarme forces attacked 
Dashtiari, his stronghold, Kaserkand and Sarbaz. Many Baloch including Hout Ibra­
him and his famous commander, Mahmmad Sheran, were killed. Abdi Khan was de­
feated but did not submit to the Iranian will.103
Protesting against the Persian atrocity in Balochistan, Mir Abdi Khan went 
into self-imposed exile to the United Arab Emirates in 1963.104 Following the Ba’th 
Party’s takeover in 1968 in Iraq, Abdi Khan obtained the Iraqi state support and estab­
lished his office in Baghdad. Sine then, the Baloch nationalists made Balochi- 
language broadcasts beamed from Baghdad to Iranian Balochistan and regularly 
toured the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, rallying Baloch emigres and migrant workers to 
the Greater Balochistan standard. Several intellectual Baloch, like Abdul Samad 
Amiri, Adul Rashid Amiri, Akbar Barakzai, Rahim Zardkohi, Yar Mohammad Baloch 
(Bewatan), and in the late 1971, Mussa Khan Mobaraki joined the movement.
The lightly armed Baloch militias organized attacks on Iranian army units in 
the name of the Front. But it was Mir Abdi Khan's identification with the movement 
that gave it an aura of legitimacy previously lacking, not only in Iranian Balochistan 
itself but also in the eyes of its sympathisers and supporters outside Iran, especially in 
the Arab world. “Abdi Khan wanted independence. He internationalised the Baloch 
question”, stated the nationalist poet, Azizullah Baloch.105 However, with the Iran- 
Iraq agreement in 1975, which deprived the Iraqi Kurds of the Shah’s support, the 
Iraqis for their part also withdrew assistance for the Baloch dissidents, and their ac­
cess to the publicity media came to an abrupt end.106
The Iranian central government, in addition to military pressure and economic 
inducements, initiated a policy of general amnesty for the Baloch guerrillas who laid 
down their aims, promising them employment and subsidies as well. The programme 
proved largely successful, particularly after SAWAK (Sazeman-e Amniyati Wa At-
101 Ibid.
102 A. B. Adenag, Salarani Karawan, no detail, 1999, p. 260.
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tila’ati-e Keshwar) used its intermediaries to convince Mir Abdi Khan to return from
1 0 7exile in Iraq in 1971. However, as earlier mentioned, the final blow to the move­
ment came as a result of the Iraqi termination of its support in the aftermath of the Al­
giers agreement signed between the Shah and Saddam Hussein in 1975. Conse­
quently, not only did the BLF lose its external base of support, but also its leaders 
were forced to disperse from Baghdad and seek haven in other Arab Gulf states. Ab­
dul Samad Amiri, a prominent nationalist leader was eventually captured and sent to 
Iran by SAWAK. His brother Abdul Rasheed Amiri and his son were assassinated in
1ORBaghdad. Threatened for their life, the two other prominent nationalist leaders, Ak­
bar Barakzai and K. B. Nizamani went to London.
The repression of this small insurgent movement proved effective. There was 
no organised political activity in Iranian Balochistan in the last years of the Shah.109 
The Shah's secret police (SAWAK) and the gendarmerie kept the area under tight 
control. Moreover, the economic boom of the 1970s allowed the state to co-opt an 
important segment of the population, so that disaffection remained subdued. Salaries 
of teachers and civil servants rose considerably, and the private sector boomed.
Although overwhelmed by the weight of the Shah’s combined military and 
economic pressures, the BLF’s activities had some major impact on the Baloch na­
tional movement in Iran. The Front’s use of radio broadcasts in Balochi was as effec­
tive, if not more, as its guerrilla warfare in raising Baloch national consciousness. 
Secondly, the advent of the BLF gave the question of the Baloch and Balochistan a 
new urgency in Iran, thus forcing the central government to reverse its long-practised 
policy of economic and social neglect toward the Baloch.110 Discussing with the 
American journalist, Selig Harrison, the Shah’s former Prime Minister, Abbas 
Hoveida admitted, “ if it were not for the Soviet Union and its friends in Iraq, we 
would not give such inflated importance to such a small part of our population.”111 
Finally, it succeeded in gaining a limited degree of international support and recogni­
tion for the Baloch movement even though that was limited to the radical Arab 
sources.112
107 Abdul Samad Amiri, “Chest o Eyr”, in: Monthly Balochi. Quetta, Feb, 2001, p. 19.
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Criticising the Persians attitude toward the Baloch question, on May 1973, 
People’s Front wrote, “We have learnt that, let alone, the feudal monarchy, even the 
progressives of Fars [Persians], refuse to accede our right to autonomy.”113 According 
to People’s Front even the Hezb-e Tudeh (communist party of Iran) could not tolerate 
any mention of national oppression by Tehran.114 This view also was supported by 
other observers. For example, in 1979, a prominent authority on the subject of Persian 
nationalism, Richard Cottam wrote that most of the liberal-minded “Iranians”, mean­
ing here Persians, favoured the banning of non-Persian publications in the country.115
In 1952, the Hezb-e Tudeh, however, had defined a policy toward the "na­
tional question" which directly emulated the Soviet model. While the Baloch and 
other minority nationalities were accorded the residual right of self-determination, 
"progressives in all parts of Iran were enjoined to work together for the overthrow of 
feudalism and imperialist-controlled reaction in Teheran." Nevertheless, there were a 
handful of Tudeh sympathisers among the Iranian Baloch, some of whom joined a 
Tudeh-sponsored group in Baghdad known as the “National Front of the Iranian Peo­
ple”. Led by former Iranian army General Mahmud Panahiyan, an Azerbaijani Turk, 
this group championed the grievances not only of the Baloch but also of the Azerbai­
janis, the Kurds, and the Khuzistani Arabs. It published its own journal, Rah-e-Ittahad 
(Path of Unity), in Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Turkish, and Balochi, and conducted its
1 1 / 7
own radio broadcasting in these languages.
By concentrating their fire on Teheran, the Iraqi leaders were able to Persuade 
Panahiyan's National Front and the Baloch nationalists to avoid attacks on each other.
117But the differences between the two groups were deep rooted. In its political pro­
gramme, the Baloch branch of Panahiyan's coalition, which called itself the “Democ­
ratic Party of Balochistan”, advocated a "national democratic government" in Ba­
lochistan that would be a provincial component of a "federal, socialist" Iran. Demand­
ing a redemarcation of provincial boundaries in Iran on a linguistic basis and the right 
to use Balochi as a medium of instruction in the schools, the programme pointedly 
avoided saying whether the party's goals should be pursued peacefully or through
113 People’s Front May 1973, p. 4.
114 Ibid.
115 W. Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 32,
116 Interview with Yusuf Naskanti.
117 Ibid.
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military struggle.118 On the contrary, the Baloch nationalists were demanding that the 
only way of liberating their country is through the armed struggle, thus, rejecting the 
idea of compromise and political solutions.119 
Iranization or Persianization
Iran is a nation built on the Persian nationalism, under this nationalism; na­
tional minorities such as the Baloch, Turks, Kurds, and etc. are not only equally repre­
sented in the state, but are constantly being assimilated by the state nationalism; in 
practice this means the “Persian nationalism”. Upon the incorporation of Western Ba­
lochistan in 1928, the government initiated the process of its integration into the Ira­
nian State. Under the influence of Nazi Germany, Reza Shah started the movement of 
Pan-Iranism. In 1937, the new policy as noted earlier resulted in the administrative 
division of Iran into 10 ostans (provinces) aiming to divide and destroy non-Persian 
nations. The names of the provinces such as Balochistan, were officially dropped 
from use. Reza Shall’s government, however, relied on the military for its administra­
tion in Balochistan. This was so because the military not only had effected its incorpo­
ration, but was also to pave the way for the gradual introduction of the civil bureauc­
racy in the area. For this purpose, the military had to pacify a series of successive 
tribal revolts, which lasted until 1938 in order to secure its own hold in the region.120
The Pahlavi monarchy combined extreme violence with extensive propaganda 
in order to build the nation-state of Iran -  one nation, one language, and one central­
ised state. Ideologically, the Pahlavi State propagated racist and national chauvinistic 
myths in the state-controlled media, in educational institutions (all state owned), and 
in government departments. “Iranians” were declared to be of nezhad-e asil-e arya’i 
(pme or genuine Aryan race) boasting a 2500-year old civilisation. Imperial power 
was the cornerstone of this ancient civilisation, which was said to have extended from 
Egypt to India. The pre-Islamic past associated with the Persian culture and its Zoro- 
astrian religion was glorified, while the post-Islamic culture, rooted in Arabic lan­
guage and traditions, was vilified. Turkish and Arab domination over Iran in the re­
118 Political Program o f the Democratic Party of Balochistan, in Mahmud Panahiyan, Farhang 
Joghrafiva-e Milli Balochistan Iran. Baghdad, 1971, pp. 8, 11, 15-19.
119 M. H. Hosseinbor, “Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism”, PhD. Thesis, The 
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mote past was declared the main historical obstacle to the continuity of the glorious 
Persian Empire.121
This racist ideology denied the national, linguistic and cultural diversity of 
Iran. Turkish, Kurdish, Balochi and other languages were branded “local dialects” of 
Persian. The culture (for example, dance, costume, music and food) of non-Persian 
peoples were also labelled as mahalli (local) or ashaJeri (tribal) varieties of “Iranian” 
-  that is, Persian -  culture. The state machinery especially the educational system and 
the media, was used to Persianize the non-Persians. Some champions of Persian 
nationalism like Mahmud Afshar, went even to the extent of calling for the eradica­
tion of linguistic diversity in Iran by uprooting the non-Persian-speaking nationalities
1 O'Xfrom their homelands and scattering them in other parts of Iran.
In 1935, Reza Shah’s regime replaced the word “Persia” with “Iran” in official 
documents (for example, diplomatic correspondence in European languages, pass­
ports, and stamps), and informed other governments of the change.124 However, this 
measure was not motivated by respect for non-Persian people. To the contrary, in a 
country where non-Persians were forcibly assimilated into the Persian entity, “Ira­
nian” and Persian could not be but full synonyms. It should be noted that the concept 
of Millat-e Iran (the Iranian Nation) developed during the constitutional revolution 
(1905-1906), for the first time in Persia’s history.125
The construction of a nation-state in a multinational country where the domi­
nant nation constituted no more than 50 per cent of the population could not be 
achieved without the destruction of the ethnic and linguistic identity of non-Persian 
peoples.126 The Pahlavi State, especially under Reza Shah, conducted genocide, eth- 
nocide and linguicide in order to Persianize non-Persians.127 The use of languages 
other than Persian was strictly prohibited for literary purposes as well as for official
121 Ali Reza Ardbili, “Dad-Nameh-e Azerbaijan”, in: Tribun, Solna, No. 4, Winter 1999, pp. 270-72.
122 Ibid., pp. 276-82.
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Now, 1377/1998, p. 62.
124 Mo’assesa-e Tahqiqat Strategic America, Tarh-e Strategic America Par Bareh-e Iran wa Khawar 
Mavaneh. London, 1987, p. 29.
125 Ervand Abrahimian, Iran Between Two Revolutions. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982,
p. 82.
In 1980, only 45% of Iran’s population were Persians. For more detail see, Ingvar Svanberg, 
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use in their respective homelands. As pointed out by Eden Naby, only Persian history 
was taught as the “Iranian” history, never the histoiy of other national groups. No cul­
tural institutions 01* activities were tolerated among the non-Persians.128 In this regard, 
each ethnic region was divided into several parts, which were incorporated in different 
provinces at different times. For instance, under Mohammad Reza Shah, Kurdistan 
was divided into three parts each forming part of a separate province namely, Kurdi­
stan, Kermanshah, and Western Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan itself was also divided 
into the Western and Eastern halves each forming a separate province. And, so was 
the case of Balochistan.
The Shall followed a policy of destruction of the Baloch national identity. He 
was unhesitatingly attempting to Persianise eveiy aspect of Baloch society, according 
to the former Iranian MP, Mohammad Khan Mir-Lashari.129 As ealier mentioned, the 
assimilation of the Baloch in Iran took various forms and was exercised at various 
levels. There was also forceful recruiting of young Baloch into the Iranian army. Such 
measures were severe because the Baloch hated the Persian army. Yet, despite all the 
hardships, the Baloch managed to maintain their separate identity. The Pahlavis, how­
ever, viewed the Balochs’ clinging to the distinctiveness of their culture as a threat to 
the building of a millat-e Iran (Iranian nation) based 011 Persian national, linguistic 
and cultural identity.130
To eradicate the very existence of the Baloch identity, the Persians changed 
the historical names of the important Baloch cities and districts and replaced them 
with Persian names. Thus, Duzzap became Zahedan, Pahra, Geh, Magas and Dezzak, 
respectively, became Iranshahr, Nikshahr, Zaboli and Dawarpanah. They attached 
ethnically mixed border areas, where the Baloch claim an estimated population of 
300,000, to adjacent provinces such as Kerman and Khorasan.131 Furthermore, this 
policy of politically smothering and dividing the Baloch was reinforced by the sys­
tematic immigration of Persian settlers, who bought up or confiscated Baloch lands 
and businesses with the backing of the Persian-manned bureaucracy and gendarmerie. 
By 1978, Persian immigrants constituted about 40 per cent of the population of 75,000 
in the provincial capital of Zahedan. It is believed that an estimated 150,000 Iranian
128 Eden Naby, “The Iranian Frontier Nationalities”, pp. 72-79, 83-110.
129 Interview with Mohammad Khan Mir-Lashari.
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Baloch migrated during the Shah’s reign to the Arab sheikhdoms across the Persian 
Gulf.132 It is important to note that even the Iranian census data did not reflect the na­
ture of the country’s ethnic heterogeneity. Instead it used religious designations to 
emphasise Muslim homogeneity, thus distorting the multi-ethnic nature of the coun­
try. Therefore, there is no accurate data about different ethnic groups in Iran.133
Reza Shall’s army conducted many operations in order to integrate the nation­
alities, and to suppress the tribal and nomadic ways of life. Far from succeeding in de- 
ethnicizing the nationalities, repression fanned the flames of nationalism, especially in 
Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Balochistan. After Reza Shall’s abdication, despotism was 
moderated between 1941 and 1953, but his nation-building policies were pursued un­
til the fall of the dynasty.134
Under Mohammad Reza Shah, central authority manifested itself in Balochis­
tan mainly in the form of a watchful military and administrative machinery tightly 
controlled from Tehran. This was augmented to some extent, particularly after 1963, 
with the implementation of what the Shah hailed as a White Revolution, by attempts 
to introduce social, economical and political reforms.135 The centrepiece of the White 
Revolution was the break-up of large estates and distribution of land to poor peasants; 
but vast human and material resources were also to be poured into female emancipa­
tion, literacy, health and other social welfare and development programmes.136 How­
ever, regarding Sistan-wa-Balochistan, the monarchy showed no sign of interest in 
encouraging greater cultural or political self-expression among the Baloch, even of 
the limited sort accepted in Pakistan. On the contrary, in the 1970s Tehran’s response 
to upheavals on the other side of the border was to repress the Baloch language, dress 
or any other expression of Baloch identity even more vigorously than before.137
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The period in Iranian history between the end of World War II and the Iranian 
Revolution was turbulent. Winds of change buffeted the Iranian state: the Mossadeq 
coup, the 1953 counter coup, the Shah’s White Revolution, the rise of the religious 
opposition. While these events were taking place in Tehran, they were reflected palely 
in Iranian Balochistan. The Iranian Revolution, however, was the most important 
event which affected the Baloch society. While it was primarily an urban phenomenon 
centred on (but not limited exclusively to) Tehran, the Baloch intellectual class par­
ticipated on the periphery of the struggle. When the monarchy was deposed and 
Khomeini took charge of Iran, there was rejoicing throughout Balochistan. 
Khomeini’s pronouncements while in exile about the democratic nature of his pro­
posed regime led the many Baloch intellectuals to believe that he would be sympa­
thetic to the Baloch demands for autonomy.
Like the Iranian Baloch, the Baloch in Afghanistan have received the least at­
tention from their central government. The main effect on their lives of the Helmand 
project that began in 1948 and continued in various forms until the end of the
Mohammad Dawud regime in 1978, was that it brought a steady stream of outsiders 
* 1into an otherwise isolated part of the country. The declaration of the Afghan gov­
ernment for a “Pakhtunistan” was inspired by the idea of restoring the Afghan rule 
over the areas lost to the Khanate of Kalat and the British. According to Syed 
Mohammad Shiranzai, a former government official in Nimruz province, until the end 
of 1970s, many Baloch in Afghanistan related more to their brethren in Iran and Paki-
• 1 *30stan than to the rest of Afghanistan.
The Second Uprising: nationalism marches on
The second round of the Baloch confrontation with Pakistan took place during 
the early years of the Ayub regime (1958-69). With the merger of the Balochistan 
States Union with the provinces of West Pakistan in 1955, the feeling of neglect and 
deprivation grew deeper and became acute.140 The Baloch leaders immediately re­
acted by organising open opposition in defiance of a ban on political activities.
Reviving his 1947 demand for the restoration to Kalat of other Baloch areas 
taken away by the British, the Khan mobilised widespread demonstrations against the 
One-Unit plan through the tribal chieftains in his former domain. In October 1957, a 
large gathering of Baloch leadership took place in Karachi, in which forty-four tribal
138 Interview with Rasul Raheen.
139 Syed Mohammad Shiranzai, “Baloch-ha-e Afghanistan”, unpublished, Septerber 1999.
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Sardars including the Baloch Sardars of Dera Ghazi Khan and Sindh participated. 
Chaired by the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, the meeting demanded abolition 
of One-Unit system and regaining the original position of the Kalat state.141 It is said 
that in the same time the Khan also hoisted the old Kalat flag over his palace.142 How­
ever, the main opposition to the One-Unit plan was spearheaded by the Ustaman Gall 
and later by its successor, the National Awami Party (NAP).
On 7 October 1958, President Mirza and General Ayub Khan abrogated the 
Constitution, dismissed the central and provincial governments, dissolved the con­
stituent and provincial assemblies, banned all political parlies and proclaimed martial 
law. However, it must be borne in mind that on 6 October, one day before the procla­
mation of martial law, Balochistan was attacked by the Pakistan army due to the agita­
tion in Balochistan aiming at the right of self-determination.143 The Khan of Kalat de­
scribed the military action in the following words:
I gave myself up to the army which paraded with me on the roads 
and streets o f Kalat. I witnessed several o f my men falling dead on 
the ground by the indiscriminate firing of the army... When my peo­
ple saw me, they rushed with tearful eyes towards me to bid farewell, 
but fire was opened at them. I shut my eyes in agony, and knew noth­
ing of what happened there till I found myself in the Lahore jail.144 
So they arrested the Khan and his advisors, confiscated his property, and rounded up 
around three hundred Baloch leaders in other parts of Balochistan. They accused 
Agha Abdul Karim, the Khan’s brother, of collaborating with Afghanistan in assem­
bling a tribal force of 80,000 for rebellion and plot against the central government. 
The Khan who saw the whole episode as a fabricated pretext for declaration of martial 
law by General Ayub Khan’s military government in October 1958, however, vehe­
mently denied the charge.145 As observed by Yimas Samad, the plan to seize power 
was decided by the Pakistan military around 15 September, before “the rebellion by 
the Khan of Kalat”.146
However, the expedition of the Pakistan army into Balochistan and arrest of 
the Khan provoked the second major Baloch rebellion in less than one decade. The
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first, as earlier mentioned, was Agha Abdul Karim’s rebellion against the accession of 
Balochistan to Pakistan in 1948.147 On 10th October 1958, four days after the Khan’s 
arrest, the army came face to face with a Lashkar (tribal force) near Wadh about 40 
miles south of Khuzdar and tried to inflict losses on it, but the power of the rebels 
could not be broken. In fact it was admitted that they continued to hit wherever the 
opportunity lent itself.
From this point onwards the Baloch ethnicity became a significant force. The 
movement spread mainly to the villages in the Jhalawan and organised the tribesmen 
by combining a resolute nationalist posture. Aroused by the bombing and confiscation 
of his house and properties, the ninety year old Nauruz Khan, the chief of the Zehri 
tribe, who had previously participated in a series of armed revolts against the British 
in the 1920s and 1930s, emerged as the leader of a hastily assembled force, number­
ing according to Selig Harrison, 750 to 1,000 men.148 As the spirit of insurgency 
grew, a number of guerrilla bands from various tribes joined him in the hills. Soon the 
revolt spread all over Jhalawan Sub-Division of Kalat district and the army got deeply 
involved in counter insurgency measures
The government responded by bombarding the villages and sustaining a reign 
of terror in the entire area. But the troops failed to counter the activities of the de­
fenders. With the aim of deceiving the leader of the revolt, government envoys met 
representatives of the rebel leader and took an oath on the Koran, the Muslim holy 
writ, that if he stopped hostilities and surrendered to the government along with his 
close comrades he would be received honourably for peace negotiations and the Ba­
loch demands would be considered sympathetically.149 Nauruz, a simple and honest 
man, as described by the Khan of Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan, could not imagine such a 
mean deception after an oath taken on the Holy Book by the government officials. 
When the rebels came down from their sanctuary in the hills, their leadership was sur­
rounded and taken into custody. They were removed to Kuli Camp in Quetta. Ayub 
Khan’s military government, however, denied such a promise by its officers150
Nauruz Khan and seven of his colleagues, including his elder son, were tried 
in Hyderabad and sentenced to death on charges of treason. The death sentence on
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Nauruz was commuted to life imprisonment because of his old age.151 He was above 
ninety years at that time. He died in a Pakistani prison in 1964. Others, Wali Mu­
hammad Zarakzai, Ghulam Rasool Nichari, Sabzal Khan Zehri, Masti Khan, Bhawal 
Khan, Jamal Khan and the elder son of Nauruz, Mir Batay Khan, were hanged on 15th 
July 1960 in Hyderabad and Sukkar Jails. Jalal Khan Zarakzai, Bahand Khan, Mu­
hammad Umar and Dil Morad were given life imprisonment. Their bodies were taken 
to Balochistan and buried in the graveyard of Kalat Nasiri. There was general mourn­
ing for the executed souls. Their bodies were received with all solemnity and greatest 
respect. Thousands of people turned out to participate in the burial ceremonies in 
Kalat.152
This atrocity of the Pakistan army shook the whole Baloch society, not only 
in Balochistan, but as far away as Sindh and Punjab. “Most of us got an inspiration 
with Nauruz Khan’s uprising”, said the former president of NDP (National Democ­
ratic Party), Sherbaz Khan Mazari, from Punjab. “For the first time” he continued “I 
realised that I think, it was the beginning of the Baloch nationalism. This was the time 
when people in Karachi and in Lahore tried to look like Baloch. They wore Balochi 
Sawas, (traditional shoes), grew a Baloch style beard, and wore Balochi dresses. At 
that time, internationally I remember Baloch issue and Baloch cause broke down the 
barriers and the boundaries. For the first time I felt that the Baloch issue was an inter­
national issue. Now, it was not limited only in Balochistan. It was the first expression 
of the Baloch nationalism in Sindh and Punjab. But more than one unit, after the 
atrocity and suppression the army committed, villages burnt down, people mercilessly 
killed and livestock were auctioned, then the Baloch felt it was a raiding army, and 
not their army. I think, that was the time, when Balochistan’s national spirit and na­
tional identity spread, and continued right up to Bhutto ages”153
Compared to Agha Abdul Karim, Nauruz Khan fought in a wider area against 
the army and had about 1000 to 5000 guerrillas with him.154 His main demands were 
the release of the Khan and the withdrawal of the One-Unit plan. The government re­
sponded by bombing villages suspected of harbouring guerrillas and by reinforcing 
army units. Finally, with no end to hostilities in sight, representatives of the army and 
the guerrillas met in early 1960 to discuss peace terms. As mentioned earlier, accord­
151 Ibid.
152 Interview with Chakar Khan Baloch.
153 Interview with Sherbaz Khan Mazari.
154 M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History o f Balochistan. p. 357.
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ing to Pakistani sources, no agreement was reached. But in nationalist accounts, Nau­
ruz Khan and his men agreed to lay down their arms in return for the withdrawal of 
the One Unit scheme and a promise of safe conduct and amnesty.155 Once again, as in 
the case of Agha Abdul Karim in 1948, the army representatives sanctified their safe 
conduct pledge with an oath on the Koran and, once again, they dishonoured the 
pledge. The significance of these events for the Baloch national movement was direct 
and notable. One result was that nationalist feeling grew deeper and was expressed 
more clearly in the political literature of early sixties. Nauruz Khan emerged as the 
archetypal hero and the Baloch were depicted as being exploited by the anti-Baloch 
forces of Centre.156
After the executions the government ordered an intensification of the military 
operations. The leadership of the insurgency had now passed in to the hands of politi­
cal activists, who condemned the cruelties of the army against the people. On the eve 
of Ayub Khan's visit to Quetta in August 1962, a meeting of political workers was 
convened, in which the Baloch leaders warned Ayub Khan against contemplating a 
military solution of the issue. However, the Pakistan military dictator was infuriated
and in a public meeting threatened the Baloch with “total extinction” if they continued 
1resistance. Contrary to this threat, by the early 1960s, the guerrilla activities had 
increased in the Jhalawan and Marri areas. In 1963, a group of Baloch nationalists 
headed by Sher Mohammad Marri, the leading Baloch strategist of irregular warfare, 
and a man who already had undergone a total of 14 year's imprisonment for seditious 
activities, began to lay down the organisational infrastructure of the Parari Movement 
with the aim of waging an all-out guerrilla war to back the Baloch demand for the 
withdrawal of the Pakistani army from Balochistan, cancellation of the One Unit Plan, 
and restoration of Balochistan as a unified province.158
Sher Mohammad Marri, also known as General Sherof, was born in 1924 at 
Kohlu, a remote area of Balochistan. He was educated in Sibi and joined politics in 
1945. He founded “Mazlum Party” in the tribal areas of the Sulaiman Mountains aim­
ing to oppose the Sardari system and support an independent Balochistan.159 In 1963, 
as mentioned earlier, Sher Mohammad Marri organised the Parari Movement. He had
155 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 186.
156 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, pp. 132-34.
157 Mir Alnnad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 189.
158 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p. 28.
159 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 282.
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two “commands”, the Northern and the Southern. The Northern Command of the 
Marri-Bugti area was under his personal supervision. Here Mir Hazar Ramkhani who 
was in charge of recruitment and training assisted him.160 Ali Mohammad Mengal 
headed the Southern Command in Jhalawan district.161 A command force of 400 per­
sons ^ manned each of the two Headquarters. They could also call hundreds of reserv­
ists at short notice.162
At the beginning of 1968, the Army, under the command of Major General 
Tikka Khan, struck the “Pararis” Sher Mohammad Marri put up a stiff resistance. 
Meanwhile, the government took some administrative measures to break the power of 
the Sardars, and the sons and relatives of the Sardars, who in its view were behind 
the apparently populist insurgency. Prominent tribal Sardars, Akbar Bugti, Ataullah 
Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Mani were deposed from their chieftainships.163 The gov­
ernor of West Pakistan Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh appointed other men in 
their places who were favourably disposed towards the Government. Even the British 
had not changed the Sardars in such an arbitrary manner as Kalabagh did. In 1963 
the tribesmen assassinated the new appointees, Doda Khan, an uncle of Khair Bakhsh 
Marri, and Karam Khan Mengal, the uncle of Ataullah MengaPs father.164 The killing 
of the nominated chiefs was to undermine the Government’s authority. The Baloch 
seemed more united now. In fact, military operations supported by the airforce made 
them die-hard.165 Sher Mohammad Marri’s movement gained momentum and Baloch 
youth from the urban centres started joining the Pararis in the hills. The Baloch Peo­
ples Liberation Front (BPLF) became stronger. The Pararis published an underground 
weekly paper called Chingari (Spark) in Balochi, Urdu, and English languages.166 It is 
said that the Chingari gained currency among the Bengalis as well as the Baloch.167
In Chingari. the movement declared its ultimate goal to be Baloch self- 
determination without defining the concept in terms of self-autonomy or independ­
ence. “Our struggle was for equal rights - the formation of provinces on a national ba­
sis and for the right of self-determination and autonomy”, declared Sher Mohammad 
in an interview with the News International after his return from Kabul. “We had
160 Outlook. Vol. 2, No. 41 January 12 1975, p. 10.
161 Ibid.
102 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 30.
163 Outlook. Vol. 1, No. 24, 16 September 1972, p. 11.
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grievances against one unit... Then there was a conspiracy by the Shah of Iran to con­
vert the Baloch into a minority in their own land. These were the key factors which 
compelled us to go into the mountains, not as escapists but as revolutionaries”.168 
Pararis, however, had close ideological affinity and organisational links with the 
NAP. And since NAP had clearly started its goal as Baloch self-determination within 
a “federal-socialist” Pakistan, one can assume that Pararis had tacitly accepted the 
NAP’s position on self-determination, i.e. autonomy.169 Between 1962 and 1969, 
about two hundred Baloch leaders were taken into custody from Karachi, Quetta, 
Kalat and other places. They were charged in the courts for “rebellion” and were put
17flin jails at Quetta, Mach, Bolan, etc.
It was believed that by July 1963 there were about ten base camps in the 
Marri-Bugti area, which had been established by the guerrilla fighters. The same was 
the case in Jhalawan and Sarawan Sub-divisions. The camps had been established for 
the purpose of giving training to the people in guerrilla warfare. It was estimated there 
were nearly 400 hard core hostiles in each area apart from hundreds of loosely organ­
ised part time reservists. The guerrillas engaged the Pakistan army over an area of 
four thousand sq. miles. The guerrilla forces divided in groups headed by commandos 
avoided pitched battle and resorted to harassment of the army in classical guerrilla 
fashion. They ambushed army convoys and army engineers engaged in road construc­
tion and army signals deputed on telephone maintenance. The army hit back with 
force but could not pursue them in the difficult terrain of the area because they had no 
experience of combating a guerrilla force in a mountainous area. The guerrilla com­
mandos eventually engaged themselves in organising and supporting guerrilla activi­
ties on a large scale over a vast area against the Government of Pakistan.
The Pararis of Sher Mohammad Marri were influenced heavily by the concept 
of “Popular War” as experienced in Algeria, Cuba, China, and Vietnam. The Pararis 
gradually established a network of 23 camp bases in the major strategic points of Cen­
tral and Eastern Balochistan.171 By 1969, these camps employed a command force of 
900 full-time activists responsible for organising and training reserve forces, operating 
schools and medical facilities, and manning logistical supplies in areas under their
168 Sher Mohammad Marri’s interview with The News International. 3rd-9th July 1992.
169 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 296.
170 Inayatullah Baloch, “The Baluch Question in Pakistan and the right of selfdetermination”, in: W. 
Zingel (ed.), Pakistan in its Fourth Decade. Hamburg, 1983, p. 202,
171 Syed Iqbal Alunad, Balochistan. p. 197.
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control. With this organisational infrastructure, they were able to wage a nine-year 
guerrilla war of attrition, which ended in 1969 when General Yahya Khan replaced 
Field Marshal Ayub Khan as the head of government. Yahya Khan negotiated a truce 
with the Pararis through his Governor of West Pakistan, Air Marshal Nur Khan.172
In November 1969, General Yahya Khan announced two major changes in the 
coming political system. The first was the proposed dissolution of the One Unit in 
West Pakistan. The other major announcement was the regime’s commitment to the 
principle of “one-man-one-vote”. The first proof came in the form of a Legal Frame­
work Order on 30th March 1970. This order broke up one unit in West Pakistan into 
the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Frontier and Balochistan.173 It also did away with 
the “Parity Formula”.174 Under this Framework Order general elections to the national 
and provincial assemblies were held on 7th and 17th December 1970 respectively. 
Thus, by abolishing the One-unit system and allowing the first free elections, General 
Yahya Khan opened the way to a new attempt at a federal solution for Pakistan in De­
cember 1970.
The greatest challenge to Pakistan’s ruling elite, the Punjabis, however, was 
presented by then East Pakistan, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami 
League, who insisted on a federation under which East Pakistan would be virtually 
independent. He envisaged a federal government that would deal with defence and 
foreign affairs only.175 Even the currencies would be different, although freely con­
vertible. His programme had great appeal for many East Pakistanis, and in the election 
of December 1970 called by Yahya, Mujib, as he was generally called, won by a land­
slide in East Pakistan, capturing a clear majority in the National Assembly. Out of the 
total of 313 seats in the National Assembly Mujeeb's Awami League won 167 seats 
out of 169 seats in East Pakistan and Bhutto's Pakistan People’s Party 88 seats out of a 
total of 144 seats in West Pakistan.176 In the provincial elections the Awami League
172 Rashed Rahman, “The Rise and fall o f Baloch Nationalism”, in: The Quetta Times (Weekly). 
Quetta, October 27-November 2, 1997.
173 Aziz Mohammad Bugti, Tarikh-e Balochistan. p. 117.
174 The Pakistan’s Constitution o f 1956 was based on the Parity Formula, which means equal represen­
tation in Parliament for East and West Pakistan.
175 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p. 188,
176 Accusing Mujib of secessionist politics, Yahya in March 1971 postponed indefinitely the convening of 
Hie National Assembly. Mujib in return accused Yahya of collusion with Bhutto and established a virtually 
independent government in East Pakistan. Yahya opened negotiations with Mujib in Dhaka in mid-March, 
but the effort soon failed. Mujib was arrested and brought to West Pakistan to be tried for treason. 
Meanwhile Pakistan’s army went into action against Bangali freedom fighters, who demanded that East 
Pakistan become independent as the nation of Bangladesh. The Awami League leaders took refuge in 
Calcutta and established a government in exile. India finally intervened on December 3, 1971, and the
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swept the polls. In West Pakistan the PPP won large majorities in the Punjab and 
Sindh assemblies while in the remaining two provinces NWFP and Balochistan the
1 7 7NAP and JUI together were in the majority.
Baloch nationalism and the Pashtuns
The Baloch ethnic identity, according to historian Ian Talbot, has gained im­
portance in the post-colonial era because of the competition for resources with the 
Pashtun.178 The Baloch nationalists consider the Pashtuns in the province to be a con­
stant hostile element dominating the provincial economic and social life.179 The dif­
ferences between the Baloch and Pashtun are rooted in history. As earlier mentioned, 
once occupied, the British divided Balochistan into the British Balochistan which in­
cluded the mainly Pashtu speaking north-eastern regions, for strategic reasons rela­
tively modern infra-structure was built, while Balochistan under the Khan remained 
backward and neglected. “Nevertheless”, Talbot believes, “the colonial inheritance for 
the region was the favouring of the Pushtun population in competition with the Baloch
1 Rfl * *for resources and power” . However, the joint struggle against the Punjab from the 
political platform of the NAP could not diminish the Baloch suspicions of the long­
term aims of the Pashtuns.
When in 1970, Balochistan became a full-fledged province, the differences be­
tween the two communities widened. The Baloch, because of their numerical superi­
ority took control of the provincial government. This situation was not acceptable to 
many Pashtun nationalists and in fact the rise of Khan Samad Khan and his faction of 
the NAP was a direct response to this development. Furthermore, the armed resistance 
in Balochistan and the government ban on the National Awami Party accelerated the 
process of alienation between the two peoples, which came to a climax when the Ba­
loch leadership formed a separate party of their own, the Pakistan National Party, on 
1st June 1979.181 It is important to note that geographically, both Baloch and Pashtun 
inhabit fairly exclusive ethno-territories; there is a cultural boundary, to the north of 
which are the Pashtun and to the south the Baloch. This territorial separation is quite
Pakistani army surrendered 13 days later. On December 20, Yahya relinquished power to Bhutto, and in 
January 1972 Bangladesh established an independent government. When tlie Commonwealth of Nations 
admitted Bangladesh later that year, Pakistan withdrew its membership, not to return until 1989. However, 
the Bhutto government gave diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh in 1974.
177 A. B. Awan, Baluchistan, p. 254.
178 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp. 56-57.
179 Interview with Dawood Khan Ahmadzai.
180 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modem History, p. 58.
181 The Herald. Karachi, March 1992, p. 63.
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real. The members of the two groups perceive themselves as occupying territories, 
and competition for a range of opportunities and resources is often framed in spatial 
terms. As mentioned earlier, it was in the second half of the seventeenth century, that 
the Baloch Khanate consolidated Baloch tribes into a sort of proto-nation state, and 
the Afghan state did the same for Pashtun tribes when it was established one hundred 
years later by Ahmad Shah Durrani.182 Prior to this, the Pashtun areas were either un­
der the control of groups from Central Asia or Persia, or decentralised and divided 
among autonomous tribes.
The Pathan territory within Balochistan is mainly the outcome of Gandamak 
Treaty of 1879 AD, and the Durand Agreement of 1894 AD. The British concluded 
the Gandamak Treaty with Yaqoob Khan, son of Sher Ali, the then ruler of Afghani-
1 SITstan. The area, which the Pashtun tribes cover, is 23,000 square miles out of the to­
tal 134,000 square miles of Balochistan province of Pakistan. The Pashtun population, 
according to the Pakistan Census of 1972, was 5 lacs.184 According to the same Cen­
sus, the total population of the province was 2,500,000. The area which Pathans oc­
cupy is mountainous and witnesses a severe cold climate, with heavy snowfalls in the 
winter.185
Furthermore, the massive influx of Afghan refugees during 1980 and 1981, the 
overwhelming majority of whom were Pashtuns from Afghanistan’s eastern prov­
inces, created difficulty in regal'd to the ethno-political balance in Balochistan prov­
ince. Wherever the refugees settled, they were competitors for limited economic re­
sources. No wonder then, that as early as July 1979, the Baloch nationalist leader Mir 
Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo chided the government for turning Balochistan into a Moha- 
jiristan (land of immigrants) and demanded that the Afghan refugees be sent back to 
their own land.186 His sentiment has been echoed many times since then among the 
Baloch.
The Baloch-Pashtun conflict, however, remained a burning issue throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s. Expressing his concern over the issue in 1997, the nationalist 
Chief Minister of Balochistan, Akhtar Mengal stated, “We consider Pushtoons,
182 The Khanate o f Balochistan was found in mid 17th century, while Afghanistan became independent 
after the death o f Nader Shah of Persian in min 18th century. For further information, see Inayatullah 
Baloch, The Problem o f Greater Baluchistan, pp. 101-105.
183 Olaf Caro, The Pathan. p. 375.
184 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan. p. 291.
185 Syed Abdul Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan. Lahore: Ferozsons (Pvt.) Ltd., 1991, p. 109.
186 The Muslim. 28 July 1979.
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Hazaras, and settlers livig in Balochistan as Balochistanis. They have equal rights. But 
we can’t allow certain Pushtoon elements calling themselves ‘nationalists’ to destroy 
the age-old relationship between Pushtoon and Baloch just to increase their vote
1 Q7bank”. Thus, the Pashtun threat escalated the Baloch national feelings, as a counter-
i no
reaction, believe many Baloch nationalists.
Summation
As discussed in this chapter, the modem expression of Baloch ethnic identity, 
as opposed to tribal identification, became stronger in the post-colonial era, due to the 
growth of a middle class (even though small), urbanization, modernization of trans­
port and communication system and the increased political influence of other progres­
sive ethnic movements of that period. The political mobilization was structured 
around the issue of abolishing of One-Unit system and the restoration of Balochistan 
as a unified province, the language rights etc. Veiy soon, the problem of economic 
inequalities, lack of participation in decision-making, denied access to employment 
opportunities, colonization of newly irrigated land by Punjabi migrants and domina­
tion of Punjabi civil and military bureaucracy raised the Baloch national feelings to 
the extent that led to the uprisings of the 1950s and 1960s.
The description of Pakistan by the Lahore Resolution in March 1940 as fed­
eral, took into consideration a complex heritage of populations with diverse histories, 
socio-cultures, languages, and economies (not to mention the awkward geographical 
distribution of potential constitutive parts of a future Muslim State). The de facto out­
come, however, was that the Punjabis had 85 per cent of the aimed forces and civil 
administration and control over an assembly with a Bengali majority. Successive mili­
tary dictatorships replaced civilian regimes that had become entangled in political in­
trigues and feuds and which were incapable of handling the fundamental regional dis­
tortions in the newly created state. Yet, neither the political system together with the 
so-called “basic democracy”, nor the 1973 constitution that nominally restored a fed­
eral state and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s banner of Islamic Socialism, ful­
filled the demands of the Pashtuns, the Baloch or the Sindhis for provincial autonomy 
or their due share of representation within the country’s institutions.
From the veiy inception of Pakistan, Punjabis and muhcijirs dominated the up­
per levels of the state’s bureaucracy and military. Relatively developed under the Brit-
187 Daily Jang. London, 18 October 1997.
188 Interview with Dawood Khan Ahmadzai.
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ish, Punjab was an important recruiting ground for the colonial bureaucracy and army. 
In other areas Hindus, not Muslims had predominated in the colonial civil service, and 
in some, such as Balochistan, most of the civil servants were recruited outside the 
province. Such factors as higher levels of urbanisation in Punjab and Sindh - muha- 
jirs, not Sindhis, predominate in Sindh's cities - and the tendency for appointments to 
be made on the basis of social connections as well as merit, maintained a pattern of 
over-representation of Punjabis and muhajirs in the bureaucracy in Pakistan's first 
decades. The perception that the state was run by and for those groups contributed to 
the dismembering of Pakistan in 1971, and such perceptions have been a source of 
ongoing friction between the smaller provinces on one hand, and the Punjab and/or 
the central government on the other.
Being united with “Ustaman Gall” (People’s Party), and with other social and 
political organisations, such as the “Baluch League”, the “Baloch Student Federation” 
etc, the Baloch intelligentsia came forward with the demand for greater autonomy in­
side Pakistan in the early 1950s. The intelligentsia made demands for social and eco­
nomic reforms directed towards raising the national level of the people. In this period 
the main concern of Baloch, as well as other sub-nationalities in Pakistan, was One- 
Unit. The failed system aimed at consolidation of various provinces and semi­
independent entities into a single administrative unit West Pakistan, despite its smaller 
population, had representative parity with ethnically homogeneous East Pakistan. The 
Baloch saw this administrative-political structure as reducing their autonomy, and in 
the 1950s and 1960s their opposition to the central government grew as a result. Op­
position to One-Unit in Balochistan took various forms, including well-organised, 
though small-scale, armed opposition to the expanded army presence that it brought.
The One-Unit system and the Parity formula invoked a sharp reaction among 
the Baloch, and the demand for its dissolution took a violent turn in Balochistan. 
Thus, the fifties saw the resurgence of nationalist aspirations. Agha Abdul Karim, 
who was released in 1955, laid the foundation of Ustaman Gall (People’s Party) in the 
same year. Its nucleus was the former “National Party” (Kalat State National Party) 
and its manifesto declared that it would establish a “Baloch province on linguistic and 
cultural lines” with Balochi as the official language. In 1956, the Ustaman Gall joined 
the Pakistan National Party that merged in the National Awami Party (NAP). The 
forces of ethno-nationalism were represented by NAP in both East and West Pakistan.
236
In the Western Balochistan (Iran), the Pahlavis successfully repressed any nas­
cent Baloch national feeling from the 1930s to 1950s. Harsh measures were taken to 
suppress the Baloch and force them to assimilate. The Balochs’ veiy existence was 
denied. Balochi language, Balochi publications, Baloch associations, Balochi names 
and music were banned. However, Baloch nationalism reawakened during the 1960s, 
inspired, in part by the Arab nationalism of Gulf States, but also as a result of political 
and socio-economic developments in Iran. Many Baloch became aware of the eco­
nomic backwardness of their region and of the violence of the state in suppressing 
their nationalism.
The 1970s in Iranian Balochistan were characterised by the spontaneous and 
parochial nature of the Baloch revolts. Given the commonality of their cause, goal, 
and impact, these revolts were the popular manifestation of a political-military 
movement against the central government or, as called by the Baloch, against the Ga~ 
jars . Apart from their economic and military costs to the Iranian regime, they also 
served to politicise the masses, awaken the Baloch national consciousness, and, in 
short, keep the spirit of resistance alive.
Nauruz Khan’s revolt lasted until 1960, when he allegedly received the gov­
ernment’s promise to withdraw the One Unit Plan, thus agreeing to cease-fire with the 
army. He, however, was deceived and arrested along with his associates by the Ayub 
Khan’s regime. All of them were sentenced to death; only the octogenarian Nauruz 
Khan was spared from the scaffold because of his age. In the 1960s, the Baloch came 
under the influence of the leftist-nationalists, especially the Pararis led by Sher 
Mohammad Marri. The Pararis were keen to apply Marxist-Leninist theoiy to the re­
gion. Throughout the 1960s the Baloch Mountains were the scene of guerrilla activi­
ties.
However, much of the political opposition to One-Unit was channelled 
through the NAP, a coalition of left-wing and ethnic-nationalist parties from East and 
West Pakistan. Because it was an alliance of parties, the programme of NAP was 
broad and addressed both national and international issues. Of special concern to Ba­
loch and other West Pakistanis in the NAP was the replacement of One Unit with four 
ethnically defined provinces. The NAP’s platform called for “cultural-ethnical” and 
geographical boundaries to coincide, and for those provinces to have maximum 
autonomy in a federal structure. Several influential Baloch Sardars either joined the 
NAP or actively supported it without actually joining.
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In 1970, Balochistan became a full-fledged province after the fall of Ayub 
Khan and Yahya’s decision to break up the One-Unit system and the Parity formula. 
However, he did a great disfavour to the country by not demarcating the provinces on 
the basis of language and geography. Balochistan was declared a separate province 
but a large number of Pashtuns in the three districts of Loralai, Zhob and Pishin were 
included in the province, while the Baloch living in adjacent districts of Sindh and 
Punjab (Jacobabad and Dera Ghazi Khan) were excluded against the wishes of the 
Baloch. In the following general election, however, the Baloch nationalists emerged 
as the majority in the provincial parliament and formed their first representative gov­
ernment in the history of Pakistan in 1972.
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CHAPTER SIX
Autonomy, its Rise and Fall
Nationalists in power
With the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, its official “Two Nation The­
ory” was disclosed as wishful thinking.1 The former East Pakistan became independ­
ent as the new state of Bangladesh, after a civil war cum external war, in which the 
Muslim Bengalis of East Pakistan joined forces with the “Hindu enemy”, India, 
against Muslim West Pakistan. As a result of this defeat, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was in­
vited by the Pakistan army to take control of the rest of the country. He became the 
President of Pakistan and Chief Martial Law Administrator on 20 December 1971. 
Bhutto, a top Sindhi landlord, began his political career when General Ayub Khan re­
cruited him as a minister. After serving in some junior ministries, Bhutto rapidly rose 
to become the veiy conspicuous foreign minister of Pakistan. In 1967 he founded the 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). In the 1970 general elections the PPP won victoiy in 
Punjab and Sindh, but not Balochistan.2
On the evening of 20 December 1971, upon assuming the offices of Civilian 
Martial Law Administrator and President, Bhutto made his emotional “Picking up the 
Pieces” speech on the national radio and television network. Speaking in English 
Bhutto said: “We have to pick up pieces, very small pieces; but we will make a new 
Pakistan” 3 In order to meet the challenge of building a new federal Pakistan, Bhutto 
asked the majority party of the NWFP and Balochistan to co-operate with him in the 
creation of a democratic system. He signed an agreement with them on March 6, 
1972. The most important clauses of the agreement were as follows: 1 - Martial law 
will be lifted with effect from August 14, the day, when the National Assembly would 
be convened to consider the Draft Constitution. 2 - ... The Centre would appoint gov­
ernors in consultation with the majority party in the two provinces of the NWFP and 
Balochistan. 3 - The Government at the centre and in the provinces will be formed 
on the basis of parliamentary majority. The three parties settled for PPP rule at the 
Centre and in Punjab and Sindh, and NAP-JUI rule in the NWFP and Balochistan.4
1 C.f. Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 188.
2 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modem History, p. 200.
3 The Pakistan Times. Lahore, 21 December 1971.
4 Dawn, Karachi, 7 March 1972.
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The NAP formed the largest single group in both the provinces of NWFP and 
Balochistan (8 out of 20 seats), but in order to get a majority, it was obliged to make 
an alliance with the JUI representing the interests of orthodox Muslims in certain dis­
tricts of Pakhtunistan.5 The federal government appointed the veteran Baloch nation­
alist leader, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, as governor of Balochistan. Bizenjo (1917- 
1989) was born at Nal in the Sardar Khail {Sardar family) of the Bizenjo tribe. After 
passing his elementary school in Quetta, Bizenjo joined the Ali Garh University in 
1936. Returning from Ali Garh in 1939, he stalled his political career by joining the 
“Baloch League” of Karachi. In the same year (1939), as a representative of the Ba­
loch League, Bizenjo participated in the convention of the National Party in Mas- 
tung.6 Having joined the National Party in the early 1940s, Bizenjo served as its 
president in 1946-1947 and opposed the merger of Balochistan with Pakistan. He also 
became the Vice President of the Ustaman Gal and later National Awami Party. As 
observed by one of his closest colleague, Sherbaz Khan Mazari, “Bizenjo always pre­
ferred negotiation to confrontation. He believed that ‘a door’ for a compromise should 
always be left open.”7 Thus, being a populist leader, Bizenjo, was widely regarded as 
the “Baba-e-Balochistan” (the Father of Balochistan). In Harrison’s view, he was one 
of the ablest politicians in Pakistan in the 1960s and 1970s.8
The Sardar of the Mengal tribe, Ataullah Mengal was appointed as chief min­
ister. His government commanded a 13-7 majority in Balochistan Assembly, and his 
opponents, according to Harrison, “were almost all Pushtons and other non-Baluch” 9 
Mengal was born in the early 1930s in Wad, a remote village in southern Balochistan. 
By 1956, Ataullah Mengal along with Nawab Akbar Bugti and Khair Bakhsh Marri 
were influenced by Bizenjo and they began to espouse a style of politics, which was 
different from the traditional-feudal politics of pandering to the government.10
Known as the most radical and uncompromising of the three giants of Baloch 
politics since Partition, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri headed the NAP in the assembly, 
which met in April 1972. He was the Sardar of the most numerous tribe, the Marri, 
with a population of some 135,000, historically centred in a strategic 3,300 square-
5 Ibid.
6 Ibrahim J. Negwari, “Balochistan-e Siasi Tarikh o Gall o Sarokani Kerd” in Monthly Balochi Lab- 
zank. Hab (Balochistan), May-June 1996, pp. 42-43.
7 Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p. 310.
8 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 52.
9 Ibid., p. 34.
10 Zainab Rizvi, “The Last Warrior”, in: Friday Times. April 18-24,1997.
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mile area in the north-eastern corner of Balochistan.11 Initially Bhutto had no intention 
of letting them govern Balochistan but a wave of demonstrations against his appoint­
ment of an unpopular governor, Ghaus Bakhsh Raisani, made him change his mind. 
According to Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Bhutto would never have agreed to this; the 
only reason he surrendered was that the army was still facing the Indian forces on the 
border; thus he could not afford a confrontation with the nationalists in Balochistan.12
The first attempts by the provincial government to "Balochistanise" regional 
administration, as well as the pressures exerted by tribal people on Punjabi landown­
ers, antagonised the Punjabis. The provincial government began to set up a regional 
guard known as Dehi Muhafiz (rural police) and to establish its own press. A pro­
gramme aimed at upgrading Baloch culture in the province was launched. The Na­
tional Council of Arts was established at Quetta. Lai Bakhsh Rind, a prominent Ba­
loch leader from Karachi, headed this. The council contributed to Balochi literature 
and culture. The NAP-controlled provincial government attempted to address the is­
sues of mother-tongue education in Balochistan and a standard writing system for Ba­
lochi.13 To resolve these issues the provincial minister of Education, Gul Khan Nasir, 
held a convention in Quetta in September 1972. The convention was an attempt to 
gain formal support from Baloch intellectuals for introducing the Roman script for 
Balochi. In a speech Gul Khan Nasir pointed out that the Arabic script was not a script 
chosen by the Baloch themselves, and that it presented a number of unsolved ortho­
graphic problems for writing Balochi.
Supported by left-leaning Baloch intellectuals,14 Gul Khan Nasir suggested in­
troducing a “phonemic-Roman” script, which he said would be both easy to learn and 
profitable to use in the present scientific era.15 He favoured the adoption of a phone­
mic Roman script with 36 letters. Giving quasi-linguistic arguments, the students of 
the BSO appeared to support Roman as a reaction to the Pakistani State’s emphasis on 
Arabic as a marker of Islam and Pakistani identity. For them the Arabic script would 
not symbolise the distinctiveness of the Baloch identity, as it was common to ail the 
languages of Pakistan. Opposing the secular ethno-nationalism of NAP, the right wing
11 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 42.
12 Weekly, Friday Times, April 18-24, 1997, pp. 24.
13 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 41; Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? 2nd printing, 
Penguin Books, 1983, pp. 112-14.
14 Abdul Hamid, “Balochi Zaban ke Rasmulkhat ka Convention”, in: Jang. (Daily) Karachi, October 1,
1972.
15 Government of Balochistan, Balochi Rasm ul-Khatte Kanwinshin, Quetta, Text Book Board, 1972.
241
religious parties attacked Romanization as a conspiracy of socialists against Islam and 
Pakistan.16 In the meantime, however, the Mengal government retreated on the lan­
guage issue and adopted Urdu as the provincial language. Balochi was neglected, and 
did not gain its status as a provincial language. Apart from asserting its concern with 
the preservation of Baloch identity through its position on standardisation, the NAP 
did not do much to promote the use of Balochi. Perhaps the only other event of note is 
the passing of a resolution in the Legislative Assembly that Radio Pakistan Quetta 
should give two-thirds of the time to the local languages and one-third to Urdu.17 But 
this was only an empty gesture as Urdu kept getting stronger at the expense of the lo­
cal languages in all domains.
When it came to power in Balochistan in 1972, the NAP supported the re­
gional languages of the people and opposed the imposition of Urdu by the Centre. 
Thus, it was expected that Balochi would be made the official language of the prov­
ince. As the Governor, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the Chief Minister, Ataullah Mengal; 
and the Minister of Education, Mir Gul Khan Nasir, were all nationalists most Baloch 
felt that Urdu would not be allowed to keep its privileged place in Balochistan. How­
ever, the Governor declared that Urdu would be the official language of Balochistan.18 
The paradox has never been fully explained but it is a significant landmark in nation­
alist politics and opinions about it need to be recorded. According to Janmahmad:
The Baloch leaders, mindful of the Pathan role, proceeded very cau­
tiously. They reluctantly decided to declare Urdu the official language 
of the province not because they had any love for the language, or be­
cause Urdu had any place in the province’s social and political life at 
all, but because adopting Balochi as official language would have 
been severely opposed by the Paklitoons, who would have demanded 
that their tongue should also be given official status.19
Like Janmahmad, the linguist Tim Farrell believes that the Baloch and Brahui 
are ethnically one people, but linguistically quite distinct. Thus, according to him, so 
long as Urdu is the means of instruction in schools in Balochistan, their ethnic unity is 
not questioned, but when there are separate Balochi and Brahui schools established 
the distinctiveness of the two language groups is more in focus. If the Baloch and 
Brahuis were seen as two, rather than one, people, then it was feared that the Pathans
16 See editorials in Jang. (Daily) Karachi, 6 Aug. 1972; Nawai Waqt. Aug. 6 & Sep. 8, 1972; see also, 
M. Musa Bhutto, “Balochi Zaban ke Rasmulkhat ka Masla”, in: Jasarat, September 14, 1972.
17 Interview with Bashir Ahmad Baloch.
18 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp. 52-61.
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might claim to be the single largest people in the province. With demography being 
one of the most powerful forces in politics, it was felt by some that it would be better 
to carry on with Urdu education in the province so as not to raise the linguistic differ-
0C\ences of the Baloch/Brahui people.
Most probably the NAP government being aware of their precarious position 
vis-a-vis the central government did not want to highlight which had been a major 
cause of the secession of the East Bengal. As observed by Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, “A 
decision against Urdu would have immediately raised the scare of secession”.21 Harri­
son’s opinion, however, is somewhat different. According to him it “was partly to de­
flect Brahui pressures that Bizenjo and Mengal agreed to the designation of Urdu, the 
Pakistani national language, as the official language of the state government, thus 
providing a pretext for temporarily setting aside the choice between Baluchi, Brahui, 
and Pashtu” 22
As the Bhutto administration gradually lost its populist, Islamic-socialist im­
age and increasingly depended on established interests, the NAP, and especially the 
administration in Balochistan, appeared to him to be dangerously radical. The stri­
dency with which the NAP govermnent advocated radicalism could also lead to diffi­
culties in Iranian Balochistan. In the early 1970s, Iran had become an influential 
power in West Asia, holding together the edifice of an alliance with the West. As 
power at the Iranian centre grew, the relative influence of the periphery declined. 
Therefore, any resistance appeared as a challenge that had to be met.
It seems that the Shah's invitation to Bizenjo to visit Tehran in the early 1973 
was unprecedented in terms of diplomacy and protocol. It reflected the intensity of the 
Shah's discomfiture and the degree to which Bhutto was beholden to Tehran. Accord­
ing to exiled nationalist poet, Akbar Barakzai, the Iranian government invited Mir 
Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, because they thought that, he gave them assurance of not in­
terfering in Iranian Balochistan.23 But Bizenjo would not promise to tone down Ba­
loch rhetoric or action. “Even after Bizenjo’s visit to Tehran,” stated a close friend of
19 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 292.
20 Tim Farrell, “Mother Tongue Education and the Health and Survival o f the Balochi Language”, pa­
per for the Symposium on the Balochi Language at Uppsala University, Sweden, 16th August 1997 
(unpublished manuscript).
21 Inayatullah Baloch, “Nationality Problems and Political Parties of Pakistan: The National Awami 
Party (NAP) and its Successors” in: Georg Berkemer, Tilman Frasch, Hermann Kulke, and Jurgen Lutt 
(ed.), Explorations in the History of South Asia. New Delhi: Manohar, 2001, p. 359.
22 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 185.
23 Interview with Akbar Barakzai.
243
his, Gul Mohammad Hout, “the NAP continued to encourage nationalism in Iranian 
Balochistan.”24 On the contrary, Bizenjo’s visit to Tehran, as claimed by the Baloch 
nationalists in Iranian Balochistan encouraged their national feelings further.25 How­
ever, according to the last head of SAWAK, General Hossein Fardoost, Bizenjo prom­
ised the Shah that he would not extend his party’s activities to Iranian Balochistan. As 
pointed out by General Fardoost, Bizenjo kept his promise up to general Zia’s coup in 
1 9 7 ? 26 q£ cours6j [t is difficult to trust the statement of general Fardoost, because a 
few months after his return from Tehran, the NAP government was overthrown, Biz­
enjo along with other NAP leaders, was arrested and remained in prison until his re­
lease by the coup leader General Ziaul Haq in 1978. It is important to note that Mir 
Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo’s request to visit Iranian Balochistan was rejected by the 
Shah.27
The Shall, widely regarded as the keeper of the regional peace, conceivably 
decided that the Baloch in Pakistan could no longer be allowed the luxury of provin­
cial autonomy. Bhutto also viewed the provincial government's moves with concern, 
and cautioned the governor against steps that could threaten national integrity. Biz­
enjo claimed that the NAP-JUI government, far from threatening national integrity, 
was strengthening Pakistan by developing democratic forces in Balochistan. These 
exchanges did not help the growth of mutual confidence. Tension mounted in Sep­
tember 1972, when Islamabad accused the NAP leaders Wali Khan and Ataullah 
Mengal of hatching the “London Conspiracy” with Bangladesh's Prime Minister, 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, when they were in London. They were alleged to have 
agreed to turn Pakistan into a confederation of four autonomous states, which could 
then be joined by Bangladesh, India and Afghanistan. The NAP dismissed it as a ’fig- 
ment of imagination1.
Sabotage and organised rebellion by Centre
When Bhutto came to power in December 1971, the military stood totally ex­
posed as a result of their insane and brutal policies in East Pakistan. He lifted the ban 
on the NAP with a view to getting NAP support for strengthening his own position 
with the military-bureaucracy alliance. Moreover, at that stage Bhutto was not in a
24 Interview with Gul Mohammad Hout.
25 Interview with Dr. Habibullah Malik, Azizullah Baloch and Sardar Sher Ali Narui,
26 Hossein Fardoost, Zahoor wa Soqoot-e Saltenat-e Pahlavi. vol. 1, p. 547.
27 Interview with Siddiq Baloch.
28 A. B. Awan, Baluchistan, p. 267.
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position to invite confrontation with and ignore the NAP, which had a clean record 
and held a majority in two provinces.29 He immediately offered two seats to the NAP 
in the Federal Cabinet. However, to his surprise the NAP refused to co-operate with 
him as long as he was head of the Martial Law Administration, with no definite date 
for its withdrawal fixed.30 This was the real point of NAP’s difference with him.
As soon as Bhutto found his position secure, after getting his constitution 
passed, he launched a campaign of vilification against the NAP ministries,31 Eveiy 
effort was made to paralyse administration in the NAP-controlled provinces especially
on
Balochistan by all available means. Almost all secretaries and heads of department 
came from the Punjab bureaucratic cadres where the People’s Party held sway.33 Their 
security of service and promotions depended on the good will of the PPP. They were 
instructed to put every possible obstruction in the provincial administration. These 
officials, who considered themselves the servants of the PPP Government in Islama­
bad, acted in complete disregard of their ministers’ instructions. They were made to 
believe by the Centre that the NAP Ministries were only for a short period. Hence 
they should not ruin their future by becoming loyal to them.34
Finding itself powerless against the intransigence of federal government, the 
Mengal ministry recruited a new force called the Dehi Muhaftz (rural police), which 
consisted of Baloch and other local people in 1973. The federal government looked at 
it with considerable suspicion and planned to defeat the move by any means. Accord­
ing to Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the Dehi Muhaftz force in Balochistan was organ­
ised with the full knowledge and approval of the Governors’ Conference. Yet the 
Centre launched a campaign alleging that this was a private “army” of the NAP.35 The
29 Friday Times. Lahore, Aril 18-24, 1997, p. 24.
30 Rashed Rahman, “The rise and fall o f Baloch Nationalism”, in: The Quetta Times October 27- 
November 2, 1997, pp. 6-7.
31 It may be o f some interest to note that the majority of the Baloch leaders did not sign the 1973 Con­
stitution, because they were not satisfied with the quantum of provincial autonomy granted in the 
document. Out of the five MNAs from Balochistan, only two, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Abdul Haq 
put their sign on it, while the other three, Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch, Khair Bakhsh Marri, and Mrs. Jeni- 
far Musa refused to sign the Constitution. They were opposed to the concurrent list for the federation 
and federating units given in the constitution. They were emphatic to state that the federal government 
should deal with currency, foreign policy and defence only. Taxes should be collected by the provincial 
governments and they should make financial contribution to the federation according to a formula to be 
mutually agreed upon to enable the federal government to take care o f itself (See, Daily Balochistan 
Express, Saturday, 12 May 2001).
32 People’s Front. London, Vol. 2 No. 6-7, 1975, p. 5.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35  TUJrl
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PPP ministry later maintained this force, with only its name changed into “Balochis­
tan Police Reserve” and its chief Col. Sultan Mohammad Mengal removed. Before the 
NAP took over, there was a Civil Armed Force in the two provinces of Balochistan 
and NWFP. The Inspector General of the Frontier Corps used to be the secretary to 
the Governor in NWFP. In Balochistan, the Deputy Inspector General of this force 
used to be the Secretary to the Agent to the Governor General. On the NAP’s take­
over of the administration, the Federal Government abolished it, depriving the two 
provincial ministries of an instrument for the maintenance of law and order.36 The 
former Chief Minister, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, recalling the event to Tariq Ali in 
1981, said, “When we tried to correct the balance in the police force, Bhutto and his 
Punjabi aide Khar organised a police strike against our government.”37 The Governor 
of Punjab, Ghulam Mustafa Khar also withdrew all Punjabi bureaucrats who were 
serving in Balochistan, creating a severe administrative problem. This was followed 
by a police strike, which paralysed the province.
In fulfilling its electoral mandate, the Balochistan government attempted to 
consolidate its power by purging the overwhelmingly non-Baloch officials from the 
provincial bureaucracy, by taking control of the police and law enforcement forces, 
and by resisting the habitual Pakistani military intervention in the provincial affairs. 
These actions were strongly opposed by Bhutto’s government for being incompatible 
with the national constitution. At the same time the relation between the two parties 
was further damaged by the growing popular Balochi resentment over the non-Baloch 
settlers who were competing for the limited arable lands in the province. The central 
government officials incited and encouraged disputes among cultivators. When the 
provincial government suggested that all land be nationalised and distributed to the 
real tillers, this suggestion was ignored by the Centre. Apparently, the People’s Party 
rulers had no interest in the abolition of landlordism, which they were pretentiously 
advocating.39 Bhutto, however, blamed the incident on the Baloch leaders.40
When all these means failed in defeating the NAP administration, in the early 
1973, in order to undo the provincial government of Balochistan, the Federal govern­
ment created an artificial law-and-order problem in Pat Feeder and Las Bela districts
36 M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan. p, 390,
37 Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive?, pp. 117-118.
38 Zainab Rizvi, “The last warrior”, p. 24.
39 The Herald. Karachi, July 1986, p .59.
40 Ibid.
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of Balochistan.41 Thus, on the initiative of the Federal Government of Pakistan, sev­
eral disturbances occurred in Quetta, Las Bela and Pat Feeder. The Dehi Muhaflz (Ru­
ral Force) and supporters of the NAP advanced to prevent the marauders backed by 
the Centre from marching on Las Bela and to eject them from their hideout and bring 
an end to their mischief. The centre interfered and sent its own armed force to oppose 
the provincial force! When the NAP protested against the Federal Government’s 
armed intervention in Balochistan, the Centre flatly denied i t 42 However, they stealth­
ily continued sending more and more Federal forces into Las Bela. Reports poured in 
from all parts of Balochistan about army and militia deployments. Simultaneously to 
the astonishment of the NAP, the controlled media began to explain that these moves 
were being made at the request of the provincial Chief Minister with the aim of help­
ing the provincial forces restore law and order, although by this time law and order 
had been fully restored 43 The Mengal Government successfully crushed those at­
tempts. It was alleged that the Mengal Government was trying to bring about civil 
war.44 The Government was dissolved and later, the majority of the provincial assem­
bly members were arrested including Governor, Mir Gaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the NAP 
chief, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, and the Chief Minister, Sardar Ataullah Mengal.
On 2nd December 1973, Abdus Samad Achakzai of Pashtunkhwah-NAP was 
assassinated and his death meant one seat less for the Opposition in the Provincial As­
sembly. Achakzai was an outspoken critic of Z. A. Bhutto's politics and style of gov­
ernment. The culprit, of course, was never traced. According to the NAP leader Wali 
Khan, by murdering Abdus Samad Achakzai, Bhutto intended to create civil war be­
tween the Baloch and Pashtuns. In an interview with the People’s Front. Wali Khan 
stated:
The murder o f Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai should have been most 
opportune for Mr. Bhutto -  with a prominent Baluch killed in retalia­
tion there would have been real cause for a civil war between the 
Baluchs and the Pushtoons, and that would exactly suit Bhutto’s poli­
tics.45
We might deal here with one more victims, Maulavi Shamsuddin. One day in March 
1974, Maulvi Sahmsuddin, Deputy Speaker of the Balochistan Assembly of the oppo­
41 Janmahmad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 301-302.
42 People’s Front. London, Vol. 2 No. 6-7, 1975, pp. 3-4.
43 Ibid.
44 S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State, pp. 145-46.
45 People’s Front. Vol. 2, N o.l, 1974.
247
sition party Jamiat-i-Ulema Islam (JUI), was vanished but proved difficult to dispose 
of. Rumour said he had been kidnapped, kept in detention and pressurised to change 
sides. But the Maulavi did not succumb; neither did he open his mouth. On 13 March 
1974, his dead body was found in a parked car, one more member of the opposition 
out of the way. The police said this was a ’’pre-planned conspiracy by the Afghans”
A/r
but failed to trace the culprits.
In the 1970 election, the People’s Party could not get a single member elected 
to the Provincial Assembly in Balochistan.47 Whereas in 1974, it had the majority in 
the assembly though no general elections were held during this period 48 How did this 
take place? The PPP achieved its majority by unconstitutional means, brute force, po­
litical bribery and blackmailing. False cases were instituted against the NAP members 
of the assembly and their seats declared vacant and then the PPP men were brought in 
unopposed.49 The appointment of Ghulam Qadir (Jam of Lasbela) as Chief Minister 
was made in violation of article 131 of the constitution, which required a vote of con­
fidence by the majority of the total members of the house for such an appointment.50 
Instead of calling an assembly session, signatures forced from members comprised 
hardly one-fourth of the total membership of the house. A no confidence motion 
moved against Jam Ghulam Qadir in accordance with article 54 (2) was ignored and 
not allowed to be discussed. The Budget was sanctioned by an ordinance in utter vio­
lation of article 125 of the constitution.51
On 20 October 1974, the government of Pakistan published its White Paper on 
Balochistan. In the White Paper, the main allegation against the provincial govern­
ment of Balochistan was the expulsion of Punjabi employees from various utilities 
and departments such as the railways, the education sectors and in the administration, 
requiring them to go back to their provinces of birth.52 It should be noted that this de­
cision was taken at the break-up of One-Unit during the rule of General Yahya Khan 
in 1970, and the decision was in the process of implementation when in 1972, the
46 Aziz Mohammad Bugti, Tarikh-e Balochistan. p. 138.
47 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modem History, p. 200.
48 People’s Front. London, Vol. 2, No. 6-7, 1975.
49 Ibid.
50 See Sardar Muhammad Ishaq Khan (ed.), The Constitution of Islamic Republic o f Pakistan. Lahore,
1973.
51 People’s Front, London, Vol. 2, No. 6-7, 1975.
52 Government of Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan. Rawalpindi, 19 October 1974, pp. 5-39.
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NAP-JUI coalition came into power. The decision at the break up of One-Unit had 
been that these employees gradually would go back to their provinces.53
The government of Pakistan maintained that a small clique of tribal sardars, 
determined to resist any form of socio-economic change that might erode their abso­
lute feudal authority, had provoked the conflict. The government in its White Paper in 
October 1974 declared:
But some of the sardars who wanted to keep their tribes isolated and 
lands free from the impact of roads, schools, dispensaries, electricity, 
tubewells, industries and impersonal administration and to retain their 
tribesmen as serfs decided to resist the ending of their privileges. It 
was this resistance to change which led to a confrontation, in some ar­
eas o f Baluchistan, between the forces of progress and those o f reac­
tion.54
Islamabad has always ignored the emergence of Baloch nationalism. It tends to think 
of Baloch society solely in terms of its traditional tribal character and organisational 
patterns. Baloch discontent is artificially stimulated by the tribal sardars to protect 
their feudal privileges, it argued, and economic modernisation would alleviate Baloch 
unrest by gradually eroding the sardari system.55 This argument, according to Selig 
Harrison, is undercut by the fact that the central government has been more than will­
ing to protect and extend the privileges of co-operative sardars,56 The NAP leader, 
Wali Khan, in an interview with People’s Front said:
Bhutto claims that he is against the Sardari system according to him 
[Bhutto] Bizenjo was removed because he was a Sardar -  which he 
was not. But then he replaced Bizenjo with Akbar Bugti -  a really big 
Sardar! Akbar Bugti was a bigger Sardar than Bizenjo -  and now o f  
course he has the Khan of Kalat, the Khan of all the Sardars put to­
gether -  and yet Mr. Bhutto claims that he is totally against the Sard­
ars and Sardari system!57
Bhutto exploited the sardari system. People’s Front wrote, in its tenth issue in 
1974, that “he was anxious to do away with Sardari system in Baluchistan he 
claimed. His anxiety continued but he lacks courage to act. Because contradictory to 
all his public claims, he and his stooges in Baluchistan drive their strength from this
53 M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan. p. 394.
54 Govermnent of Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan, p. 5.
55 Ibid., p. 39.
56 Selig S. Harrison, “Ethnicity and Political Stalemate in Pakistan”, pp. 298-299.
57 People’s Front, vol. 2, N o .l, 1974, p. 4.
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veiy Sardari system.”58 He played off the Marris and the Mengals against the Bugtis, 
and then in a volte-face, the Bugtis against the others. When the Bugtis were no 
longer helpful, he moved to the side of the Khan of Kalat and proceeded to throw the 
Pakistan military against the tribes, claiming that they were in open rebellion.59 The 
insurgency in Balochistan posed the Pakistan government the problem of justifying its 
military operations. For this purpose, all the Baloch nationalist leaders were painted as 
cruel sardars fighting for their own selfish ends. When in 1973, the Mengal govern­
ment proposed the abolition of the Sardari system in Balochistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
Prime Minister and the Chairman of the PPP (Pakistan People’s Party), contrary to his 
party’s programme, denied the approval of the Mengal Government’s proposal for the 
abolition of the Sardari system.60 Instead, according to historian Dr. Inayatullah Ba­
loch, Bhutto embraced the tribal and feudal chiefs in his party and made political alli­
ances to overthrow the Mengal Government. “Among those who joined him”, as 
stated by Baloch, “the most prominent was Nawab Akbar Khan, the chief of the Bugti 
tribe, who played an important role in the overthrow of the Mengal Government in
1 9 7 3 6 1
Accusing Bhutto, as the real supporter of Sardars and tribal chiefs, Mir Ghaus 
Bakhsh Bizenjo, in an interview with the monthly The Herald. 011 July 1986 said:
NAP introduced a bill in the Baluchistan assembly in 1973, for the 
abolition of the sardari system. The PPP opposed that bill and the cen­
tral government refused to ratify it. ... In fact however the PPP and 
then the martial law regime gave a new lease of life to the sardari sys­
tem. Apart from Nawab Khair Bakhsh and Ataullah Mengal ail the 
other sardars have supported every government in power.62 
A leader of the BSO, however, claimed that in the 1970s, out of seventy tribal chiefs 
(Sardars) of Balochistan, only five, including Akbar Bugti, Khair Bakhsh Marri and 
Ataullah Mengal, supported the NAP. All other important sardars, including the 
“chief of chiefs”, the Khan of Kalat were opposed to the NAP.63 “In the NAP”, the 
head of Balochistan Aits Council under NAP, Lai Bakhsh Rind said in jest, “we had
58 People’s Front, vol. 1, No. 10-11, 1974, p. 3.
59 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan. The Enigma of Political Development, Wm Dawson & Sons Ltd., 1980, 
p. 164.
60 Inayatullah Baloch, “The Baluch Question in Pakistan and the right o f Selfdetermination”, p. 204.
61 Ibid.
62 The Herald. Karachi, July 1986.
63 Manzoor Ahmad Baloch, Balochistan and Political Parties, pp. 3-21.
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only two and a half Sardars, namely, Marri, Mengal and Bizenjo, a half S a r d a r i  
Before losing office, Bhutto declared an end to the Sardari system and claimed the 
people of Balochistan would freely choose their leaders. In 1977, however, despite his 
populist rhetoric, Bhutto liberally dispenced PPP election tickets to the landlords.65
On 12 February 1973, Bhutto abruptly dismissed the ten-month old Balochis­
tan government, charging its leaders with repeated violations of their constitutional 
authority. The decision came two days after the discoveiy of a large cache of Soviet- 
made arms in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, which were allegedly destined for Ira­
nian Balochistan. As observed by Selig Harrison, Bhutto’s dismissal of the Baloch 
leaders was timed to a “broader international significance” by alleging not only that 
the Baloch leaders “had repeatedly exceeded their constitutional authority” but that 
they had done so “in collusion with Iraq and the Soviet Union as a part of a sinister, 
long-term plot to dismember both Pakistan and Iran”.66 In its White Paper on Ba- 
lochistan, issued on October 19, 1974, the Pakistani government repeated the same 
charges, but relied almost entirely on circumstantial evidence to support its case that 
the Baloch NAP leaders had sought in concert with unnamed hostile foreign powers to 
bring about the country’s disintegration”.67
Having rejected the Pakistani allegations, the Iraqis, however, claimed that the 
weapons were destined solely for Iranian Baloch, while the Pakistani Baloch leaders 
viewed the whole episode as a “conspiracy” plotted by Bhutto to justify their removal 
from office.68 In Sherbaz Khan Mazari’s word, “It was eerily reminiscent of Hitler’s 
plot of burning down the Reichstag and using it as an excuse to ban all forms of po­
litical opposition.”69 Thus, the news that Pakistan Intelligence had found Soviet sub­
machine guns and ammunition ordered by Baloch leaders in the Iraqi Embassy in Is­
lamabad was used as a pretext to dissolve the NAP government, according to Baloch
n r \
nationalists. Proof of this conspiracy was never found, not even after the arrest of 
NAP leaders and the Hyderabad trial, or later under General Zia ul-Haq.71
What was the main motive behind Bhutto’s move against the Baloch? At least 
two sets of explanations could be discerned from some of the fundamental political
64 Interview with Lai Bakhsh Rind.
65 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modem History, p. 231,
66 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 35.
67 Government o f Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan, p. 39.
68 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 35.
69 Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p. 292.
70 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 35.
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contradictions that existed between the Baloch nationalists, and his regime. The first 
explanation emphasises the contradiction between the emerging Baloch nationalist 
elites and the national elite of Pakistan. This contradiction had been further height­
ened by the emergence of the PPP government under Bhutto in which he mobilised 
political support of the provinces of Sindh and Punjab. The central government was 
predominantly Punjabi. Whether Balochistan remained a part of Pakistan or emerged 
as a separate state, it had to make up for the years of underdevelopment that the Brit­
ish and their successors, the Pakistani regimes, had imposed on the Baloch. As the 
new Chief Minister of Balochistan, Mengal’s main interest was to strengthen the eco­
nomic and political infrastructure of his province. Thus the nationalist historian, 
Dehwar argues, “Bhutto’s dismissal of the NAP Government was also conditioned 
primarily by his deep mistrust of groups demanding greater provincial autonomy”.72 
However, on the other hand, the second explanation puts a greater importance on the 
external factors. While he neither accepted nor rejected the government charges 
against Baloch leaders, Robert Wirsing observed that the latter had already won a ma­
jor concession from Bhutto on the issue of provincial autonomy, and therefore, “it 
seems unlikely that they would have so quickly and so clumsily risked destroying 
it”.73
Could one say that it was not so much any immediate threat from the Baloch 
nationalist movement that precipitated the dismissal of the NAP government as pres­
sure from Iran? According to Wali Khan, who made this charge in the National As­
sembly as well as during his trial in the Supreme Court, Bhutto was reluctant to install 
the NAP government in Balochistan and said; “I cannot hand over Baluchistan to 
NAP, because the Shahinshah [king] of Iran does not approve of it”.74 Noting that the 
constitutional disputes between Bhutto and the Baloch were not of “decisive impor­
tance in themselves”, Selig Harrison viewed “Bhutto’s larger political objectives in 
Pakistan, pressure on Islamabad from the Shah of Iran, Iraqi Iranian tension, and the 
Soviet support for Baghdad in its conflict with Tehran” as the “key factors” that also
71 M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan. p. 399.
72 Ibid., p. 387.
73 Robert Wirsing, “The Baluchis and Pathans”, in: The Minority Rights Group. Report No. 48. (This 
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p. 48.
252
contributed to Bhutto’s dismissal of Baloch leaders and the subsequent outbreak of 
hostilities between the two sides.75
The Shall’s regime, as the main supplier of economic assistance to Pakistan 
at the time, was particularly apprehensive that the autonomous Baloch government in 
Pakistan might provoke a similar quest for self-rule among Iranian Baloch. Moreover, 
the Shall also suspected the leftist-oriented Baloch leaders of assisting and harbouring 
the Iraqi-backed Balochistan Liberation Front guerrillas who were then active in Ira­
nian Balochistan. As noted by Selig Harrison, pressures from the Shah were largely 
responsible for Bhutto's decision to oust the Baloch autonomous government in 1973 
and to use air power as well as ground forces in crushing the Baloch insurgency. 
“Bhutto told me in a 1977 interview that the Shall had been very insistent, even 
threatening, and he promised us all sorts of economic and military help, much more 
than we actually got. He felt strongly that letting the Baluch have provincial self- 
government was not only dangerous in itself, for Pakistan, but would give his Baluch 
dangerous ideas”, Harrison pointed out in his book, In Afghanistan’s Shadow in 
1981.76
According to the Chief Minister of Balochistan, Ataullah Mengal, his ministry 
was dismissed for two reasons; firstly Mr. Bhutto had to tell the Iranian monarch that 
he was trying to protect his interests in the Persian Gulf and that is why the Balochis­
tan ministry had to be removed. Secondly, some of the policies adopted by the NAP 
Governments in Balochistan and the Frontier were being approved and appreciated by 
the people, who were making comparisons. “There were two provinces in Pakistan 
with People's Party ministries and two provinces with coalition ministries-the NAP 
and JUI”, Ataullah Mengal said. “People were realising that the rules and regulations 
that we were passing, and our attitude to national issues, were more rational in charac­
ter. Most of the reforms, in spite of what Bhutto says, were coming from Baluchistan 
and NWFP; educational reforms, land reform, laws for labour-they were much more 
progressive than Bhutto could tolerate. So he had to get rid of these ministries.” 77 Re­
jecting Bhutto’s allegations on lawlessness in Balochistan, Ataullah Mengal said, “As 
far* as the law and order situation was concerned; how many people were killed in 
Sind, ruled by the People's Party? In the entire Lasbela disturbance in Baluchistan 
only four people were killed - two from the Army side and two civilians. But hun­
75 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 34.
76 Ibid., p. 97.
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dreds were killed in Sind and hundreds in the Punjab. There were political assassina­
tions”, Ataullah Mengal continued, “in provinces ruled by the PPP, but none of these 
Ministries were punished for it. No, it wasn't that at all - it was definitely not that our 
NAP Ministries couldn't keep the law and order situation under control.”78
Similarly the governor of Balochistan, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo blamed the rul­
ing party, PPP, for using double standards. According to him, when police went on 
strike in Lahore and the public came to perform duties, they were praised for showing 
a high sense of patriotism. While a similar reaction by the people of Balochistan was 
termed as treason! Similarly, according to Bizenjo, when dozens of the people were 
murdered and hundreds rendered homeless in Sindh during the language riots, no 
blame was laid at the door of the People’s Party Ministry in the province. While dis­
turbances on a much lesser scale in Balochistan were considered sufficient cause for 
the Centre’s armed interference and dismissal of the provincial ministry.79 
The third Baloch uprising (1973-77): a new test for the Baloch Nationalism
Ironically, the provocative activities of the Pakistani central government con­
tributed to the revival and unity of the Baloch separatist forces. Thus, the dismissal of 
Balochistan's provincial government in 1973 and the arrest of its elected leaders pro­
voked the third aimed confrontation between the Baloch and the Pakistani central 
government. This war, according to Selig Harrison involved more than 80,000 Paki­
stan troops and some 55,000 Baloch guerrillas at various stages of the fighting.80 
“Armed with obsolete weapons”, Janmahmad wrote, “they fought a Pakistani army 
numbering three divisions and paramilitary forces, and aimed police totalling more
oi
than 100,000 men”. According to Janmahmad, almost eveiy section of the Baloch 
population was affected in central and eastern Balochistan by this war.82 It resulted in 
the loss of at least 3,000 Pakistani troops and 5,300 guerrillas with even higher casual­
ties among the civilians caught in the crossfire.83 Still thousands more were forced to 
leave their villages razed by the Pakistani army. The conflict ended only after the 
overthrow of Bhutto by General Ziaul Haq the coup leader, and his release of the Ba­
loch leaders.
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80 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 97.
81 Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 305.
82 Ibid.,
83 Selig S. Harrison, “Nightmare in Baluchistan”, in: Foreign Policy. No. 32, Fall 1978, pp. 136-60.
254
As earlier mentioned, differences over, for example, the wish of the nationalist 
government in Quetta to repatriate Punjabi bureaucrats or Punjabi abadkars (settlers) 
who had been allocated the most fertile lands in schemes such as the Pat Feeder Canal 
area, and to resist military and para-military intervention in local conducts, soured re­
lations between Islamabad and Quetta. However, these specific controversies were 
more the symptom than the cause of the government’s dismissal. Bhutto’s wish to 
dominate over all of Pakistan, and pressures from Iran to dismiss the nationalists from 
power in Pakistani Balochistan for fear their example would infect simmering nation-
OA
alist sentiments in Iranian Balochistan, played a central role in the drama.
The main proxies representing the Centre’s interests in this confrontation, 
however, were Sardar Doda Khan Zarakzai, chief of the Zehri tribe and Jam Gholam 
Qadir of Las Bela. These two tribal leaders had previously benefited as members of 
Muslim League during Ayub Khan’s ten-year regime and had strongly opposed the 
emerging force of Baloch nationalists. But Doda Khan and Jam Gholam Qadir were 
not the only ones already enlisted by Bhutto in his strategy to weaken the NAP pro­
vincial government. According to Bizenjo, Bhutto had been all too willing to believe 
the exaggerated stories Akbar Bugti fed him about a guerrilla army being raised in 
Balochistan. Bugti’s motivation was thwarted ambition, pure and simple, since the 
NAP had refused to make him Governor under the deal they had struck with Bhutto 
for the formation of the NAP-JUI government in Balochistan. Akbar Bugti was duly 
rewarded for his anti-NAP activities by being made Governor after the NAP govern­
ment was dismissed, but could not last more than a year because the army, by now 
fully engaged in counter-insurgency operations in the province, did not trust him en­
tirely. However, in the last days of his governorship, Akbar Bugti asked Bhutto to 
withdraw his troops from Balochistan and restore the dismissed NAP administration 
to power.85 With Akbar Bugti’s resignation, on New Year’s Eve (1973), Bhutto in­
stalled Ahmad Yar Khan, the last Khan of Kalat in the name of a PPP government in 
Quetta. The latter’s image had been tarnished by his weak-kneed reply to Pakistani 
pressures; under him Quetta was an extension of the state machinery in Islamabad.86
Nawab Akbar Bugti played an enigmatic and controversial role in many of 
these events. Akbar Bugti was the Sardar of the Bugti tribe, one of the three major 
tribes of Balochistan. He was born in 1927, in Barkhan, a small town in Northern Ba-
84 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp. 158-60.
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lochistan. In 1956, he was elected as an MNA (Member of National Assembly) from 
the only seat of Balochistan and soon after joined the cabinet of Sir Feroz Khan Noon 
as Minister of State for Interior. Then after Martial law (1958), along with Ataullah 
Mengal, Khair Bakhsh Marri and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Bugti joined the struggle for 
the rights of their province. In the election of 1970 the group led by Mengal, Marri 
and Bugti won a majority in Balochistan. The tension between Sheikh Mujib and
07Bhutto gave Bugti the opportunity to meet and befriend the former.
Akbar Bugti was appointed as governor by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after the NAP 
regime was sacked. But even Bugti couldn’t resist the pressures of being Baloch and 
resigned when the army began its more extreme action in the area and in protest
00
against the continuous detention of NAP leaders. Despite Akbar Bugti’s role in pre­
cipitating the guerrilla war* in Balochistan, he did not become an apologist for Paki­
stan as claimed by his opponents. He continued to agitate for greater autonomy and 
more resources for Balochistan within Pakistan, albeit in relatively moderate terms as 
Baloch political discourse became radicalised during the guerrilla war.
Faced with a powerless symbolic role, Akbar Bugti resigned as the governor 
of Balochistan on 31 October 1973. By the late 1970s his speeches were echoing calls 
made by Bizenjo and Mengal for a restructuring of the state to give parity to the four 
provinces in a confederal rather than a federal structure.89 During the 1980s, in his 
characteristically provocative and idiosyncratic style, he made a personal protest 
against the martial law government of Ziaul Haq by refusing to speak Urdu, Paki­
stan’s national language. He resumed speaking it only when elections were held in 
1988. Bugti’s nationalist and anti-Islamabad attitude throughout 1980s, however, con­
solidated his political position in Balochistan, which is evident from the fact that he 
was the first one to form a government after the 1988 elections.
Ironically, Bhutto’s dismissal of the NAP government made the prophecy of a 
guerrilla struggle a self-fulfilling one. The Baloch nationalists took to the mountains 
to mount resistance to the Bhutto regime’s violation of their democratic rights. They 
demanded to re-install their government in the province, based on the results of the 
1970 elections (the same results on which Bhutto based his claim to legitimacy as an
86 Aziz Mohammad Bugti, Tarikh-e Balochistan. p. 138.
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elected leader). When Baloch guerrillas, using their intimate knowledge of their home 
terrain and enjoying the support of their people, became increasingly effective in am­
bushing army and para-military units, Bhutto flew in April 1973 to Telman, where he 
announced after a meeting with the Shah that Iran would provide 200 million dollars 
in emergency and financial aid to combat the Baloch guerrilla resistance.90 The most 
significant aid came in the form of 30 Iranian US-supplied Huey Cobra helicopter 
gunships. These proved critical in improving the ability of the army to keep up with 
and intercept fleet and sure-footed Baloch guerrillas who knew the mountains like the 
backs of their hands. At the same time, on the other side of border (Iranian Balochis­
tan), the Shall concentrated 5 divisions of troops, according to People's Front more 
than 80 thousand aimed men.91 
The apex of insurgency
When in early 1973 the NAP government was dissolved and later, the majority 
of the provincial assembly members were arrested, the militant Baloch students and 
the political workers organised the Baloch People’s Liberation Front for an independ- 
ent Balochistan. It is said that two events contributed to the growing disillusionment 
among the Baloch nationalists, who had become increasingly sceptical of a democ­
ratic Pakistan ever emerging. The first concerned Bangladesh where elections, in 
Sardar Ataullah Mengal’s view, led not to a transition to democratic institutions, but 
to violent repression from an army unwilling and incapable of accepting democratic 
norms. The second was the dismissal of the Balochistan and NWFP assemblies and 
the arrest of their leaders in 1973.93 The sense of betrayal by Bhutto’s civilian regime, 
which had signed constitutional guarantees of Balochistan’s quasi-autonomous status, 
was only part of the growing nationalist sentiment that fuelled the four-year rebellion 
which followed. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo in his statement to the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan said:
However, I must accept that by use of superior force, it is possible to 
maintain state borders, even gain new territories, hold colonies or 
slaves in chains for certain historical periods, but you cannot create 
brotherhood by means of bayonets, butchery, deaths and destruction.
You cannot create a united nation by force. Nations have risen and 
come into being in historical processes by feeling o f common inter­
90 Ibid., p. 36.
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ests, by voluntary unions, by recognition of each other’s rights, by re­
spect and brotherly love for one another. Bayonet and bullets cannot 
give birth to a united nation, they can only damage that objective ir­
reparably,94
In early April 1973, the hostilities were at their peak under several young 
commandos in Sarawan, Jhalawan and Marri-Bugti areas, led by Mir Hazar Khan, Mir 
Lawang Khan, Ali Mohammad Mengal, Safar Khan Zarrakzai, and Kliair Jan Bizenjo. 
The northern sector comprising Kalat and Mastung areas was the responsibility of Su- 
laiman Khan Ahmadzai, while in Mohammad-Hassani area Mir Aslam Gichki was 
active.95 The total number of guerrillas in Jhalawan and Sarawan respectively was 
4000 persons each, who had adopted hit and run tactics against the army.96 The war 
continued at a high pitch during 1973-74.
On 7 August 1973, the military tried to come close to the villages, but were 
met with stiff resistance at Mali, the sector headquarters of Lawang Khan who while 
fighting exclaimed that he regrettably had the opportunity of defending Balochistan in 
his old age.97 In the operation Lawang Khan and 35 other Baloch were killed.98 The 
Pakistani army, reinforced with fresh troops, stretched all over the Baloch area which 
included Chaghi, Bolan, Makkoran, and Kharan. In spite of this coverage the rebels 
were blocking the roads linking Balochistan with the neighbouring provinces of Sindh 
and Punjab.99
Adopting the classical guerrilla approach of avoiding any large-scale encoun­
ters with the Pakistani army, the Baloch guerrillas used their knowledge of their lacal 
mountain to great advantage. They seemed to be well trained in guerrilla warfare and 
spared no opportunity to attack army convoys and camps. The area of operation ex­
tended from the town of Dera Ghazi Khan in the Punjab to Sibi east of Quetta includ­
ing Bolan up to Kolpur and Dadu in Sindh to Nusliki close to the Afghanistan bor­
der.100 In the area of their operation the army convoys moved under protection, and 
prior picketing on the routes in order to restore traffic was carried out everywhere.101
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The struggle grew in ferocity over the next four year's. The rest of Pakistan and 
the outside world learnt little of what was going on because of the news blackout 
Bhutto had imposed on the Balochistan operations.102 The fighting was more wide­
spread than during the previous resistance struggle and affected most of the Balochis­
tan’s population at some stage or other. By mid-1974, the guerrillas had been able to 
make travelling on any of the main roads linking Balochistan with other provinces a 
risky business. Periodically they disrupted the key Sibi-Harnai railway line, thereby 
blocking coal shipments to Punjab. The American company AMOCO’s attempts to 
drill for oil and gas, protected by the army were effectively stymied by guerrilla at­
tacks. The Bhutto regime responded by calling in the Pakistan Air Force to bomb 
guerrilla-infested areas. By the summer of 1974, seven thousand members of the Na­
tional Awami Party were detained in Balochistan; but many more were arrested when 
the guerrilla activities were increased. The Balochistan People’s Liberation Front es­
timated that apart from NAP workers, between five and six thousand of its supporters 
had been arrested by the end of 1974.103
Led by a sycophantic Bhutto loyalist, general Tikka Khan, the army unleashed 
in large numbers to pacify Balochistan by brute force. The turning point of the war, 
however, came in the Chamalang operations in the Marri tribal area in the winter of 
1974-75. Concentrations of the Marri tribe’s women, children, older men and live­
stock sprawling over a 50-mile area, where they had fled to avoid army operations, 
were attacked with the purpose of drawing out the guerrillas in defence of their fami­
lies and flocks. The tactic worked. The resistance fighters abandoned their guerrilla 
tactics and fought a pitched battle against hopeless odds, and suffered heavy casual­
ties. Describing a scene of invasion by the Pakistani army, Rashed Rahman, known as 
Chakar Khan, a Baloch guerrilla from 1970s, stated, “I remember how one woman, 
the wife of one of our fighters, took her husband’s gun and her little son and ran up 
the hill behind her house as she saw army jeeps approaching. She kept them at bay 
with that one rifle for six hours, until she was finally killed.”104 Of the 15,000 people 
gathered at Chamalang, 900 were captured along with 50,000 goats and sheep and 550
i,, camels, which were later auctioned. This success is what persuaded Bhutto to de-
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clare in early 1975 that: “The back of the insurgency had been broken”.106 Although
that may have been more hyperbole than reality, the fact is that the Chamalang battle
did dent the ability of the resistance to mount the same level of hostilities from then 
on. Justifying the Baloch struggle in 1975, in an interview with People’s Front Mir 
Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo said:
Under these circumstances, the Baluch people had no other way out 
but to resort to the natural right of self-defence, to take up arms 
against unprovoked attack on their lives and properties and defend 
their health and home as best as they could. Any man of honour and 
self-respect would adopt the same course in such conditions and the 
Baluch are no exception to natural human instincts for survival. All 
they have done in this connection, they have done under compulsion 
and extreme provocation on the part of the armed forces of the Federal 
Government who should be held responsible for this fratricidal strife 
and devastation.107
It was a war of attrition in which the guerrillas with favourable factors like dif­
ficult mountain terrain, poor communications, their good knowledge of the ground, 
friendly locals and secure hideouts were fighting a highly efficient army. Ultimately it 
was claimed the army had the better of the exchanges. The army had the expertise, 
great mobility firepower and resources including helicopters and fighter-bombers. In 
the changed atmosphere Mir Hazar Khan changed his strategy. In late 1975, along 
with some other commanders, he moved out to Afghanistan and created a number of 
sanctuaries along the border followed by Safar Khan Zarrakzai and Dad Mohammad, 
all with 60 followers, while Agha Aslam and Shaistan Khan shifted to Chaghi Dis­
trict. However, in November 1975, the guerrillas again ambushed the army in Soro 
near Kalat and inflicted heavy casualties on it.108
The Bhutto regime had greater success against the other six fronts than in the 
Marri area. It managed to kill, wipe out, or force to flee to Afghanistan, all the other 
tribally organised groups. The exception was the Balochistan People’s Liberation 
Front (BPLF), whose mainstay was the Marri tribe. But it too was forced to move 
women and children as refugees to neighbouring Afghanistan to avoid army action. 
Sardar Daud’s government in Kabul provided minimal help to the Baloch, until he 
was overthrown in the communist coup of 1978, according to his critics because he
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was getting close to the Shah of Iran and to Bhutto.109 In 1975, in response to the as­
sassination of a prominent PPP leader of the NWFP, Hay at Ahmad Sherpao, Bhutto 
sent a reference to the Supreme Court asking for a ban on the NAP. The Supreme 
Court duly obliged. In 1976, the Bhutto regime initiated the Hyderabad Conspiracy 
Case against 55 persons of NWFP and Balochistan, accused of “waging war against 
Pakistan”.
Fighting inside Balochistan, in the meantime, continued until General Ziaul 
Haq overthrew Bhutto in July 1977. The General, the most intransigent opponent in 
the Bhutto regime to any compromise with the Baloch guerrillas, ironically was the 
one who defused the insurgency through political negotiations. However, Bhutto in 
his testament claimed that the army overrode his plans for a withdrawal because the 
generals wanted to “spread their tentacles throughout Baluchistan.”110 Thus, not be­
cause General Ziaul Haq had suddenly developed any love for the Baloch nationalist, 
but because he was confronted with a two-front situation in the shape of the Baloch 
armed resistance and the overthrown and incarcerated Bhutto, General Ziaul Haq an­
nounced his decision to release the imprisoned Baloch leaders, withdraw the Hydera­
bad Conspiracy Case, and make a general amnesty to the Baloch leadership for politi­
cal negotiations,111
The Baloch leadership, however, only agreed to talk to General Zia’s regime 
after being released from prison. They put forward the following demands; the army 
should withdraw to its barracks in Balochistan; all political prisoners should be re­
leased; compensation be paid to all those who had suffered physical brutality and eco­
nomic destruction during the war. General Ziaul Haq prevaricated, buying time to ‘get 
rid’ of Bhutto. The Baloch leadership was divided over the attitude to adopt towards 
what was increasingly clear was General Zia’s bad faith. Some Baloch leaders did not 
accept the amnesty offered on the grounds that they had fought an illegal government 
and went to Afghanistan.112
From then on, the Baloch movement in Pakistan lost its impetus. Baloch po­
litical activities did not cease altogether but they remained on a very small scale. The 
BPLF, which had been established in 1973 by the militant Baloch students disinte­
grated. Some of its members took refuge to Afghanistan and, while maintaining a low
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profile, kept some of the party organisation of alive there. Thus, the Baloch national 
movement accumulated a heavy toll of human suffering and misery during the war. 
These pressures and internal differences produced an ‘implosion5 in the resistance 
movement. In a series of staggered returns, the refugees in Afghanistan trickled back. 
The last to return were the fighters and supporters of the BPLF, under the hostile pres­
sure exerted by the impending triumph of the Mujahideen in Kabul. It is important to 
note that on the one hand, through military actions, they crushed the Baloch move­
ment, economically and physically, intellectuals were put in jail or compelled to leave 
the country, and all political forces were discouraged, while, on the other hand, gov­
ernment pursued a penetration policy, through its intelligence agencies. “With a pol­
icy of bribe and threatening, by encouraging and patronising corruption55, stated the 
editor of the Daily Balochistan Express. Siddiq Baloch, “they succeeded to suppress 
the Baloch national movement.55113 To destroy the Baloch youths5 moral and physical 
health, according to the Director General of Jinnah Hospital, Karachi, Dr. Abdul Ma- 
jeed Baloch, even the promotion of alcohol, opium, and heroin were a part of this 
game of the Pakistan government.114 The lack of proper organisation, according to 
nationalist writer Janmahmad contributed to the disheartening of the “liberation 
forces.115
However, Rashed Reliman, a guerrilla in 1970s and now a journalist, blames 
the Sardar leadership for the failure of the movement. According to Rahman, when 
the political leaders, mostly Sardars, came out of jail, they felt threatened by the radi­
cal direction that the movement was taking. Seeing their politics under strain and 
pressure from the great mass of conscious commanders in the field, who had been 
hardened by the struggle itself, the Sardar leadership tried imposing their authority on 
a Sardari rather than political basis. They failed and this according to Rahman created 
tremendous contradiction and division within the movement,116 Furthermore, accord­
ing to Rashed Rahman, who was part of the resistance movement and was later given 
amnesty, because the Baloch could not get any help from either Afghanistan or Soviet 
Union, the resistance movement technically, logistically and militarily failed to over-
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One of the most serious problems encountered by Baloch nationalists has 
been the continual lack of external support, even during the period of their recent his­
tory prior to 1977 when they were fighting with arms. Wars have been waged with 
Second World War rifles, Chinese or US arms belonging to the Pakistan army, or 
even nineteenth century guns. Soviet historians long ago recognised the “nationali­
ties” of Balochistan and Pakhtunistan118 but their views bore no weight compared 
with the USSR’s recognition of Pakistan as a state following the backing by Moscow 
of the Muslim League's demands during partition. After the 1977 amnesty, some of 
the Baloch guerrilla, led by Mir Hazar, decided to stay in Afghanistan where their 
camps had been installed during the war. Khair Bakhsh Marri, a former member of 
National Awami Party (NAP) who was dismissed from the government and chose to 
settle in Kabul, backed this group. However, this “Kabul connection” was not new. 
Successive Afghan regimes had been obliged to give asylum to the Baloch refugees 
because of the importance of the Pakhtun issue in Afghanistan national politics and 
the Pakhtuns' direct and popular affiliation with Balochistan. Despite these theories 
the Soviet strategists have played down the "Baloch question" and allowed the refu­
gees to maintain a minimum subsistence level.119
It is believed that it was largely as a result of the Shah’s military assistance 
that the tide of war changed into the Pakistan army’s favour. At the height of the 
fighting in late 1974, United States-supplied Iranian combat helicopters, some 
maimed by Iranian pilots, joined the Pakistan Air Force in raids on Baloch camps.120 
Developed for the Vietnam war the Cobra gunships had formidable firepower, which 
included a 20mm cannon which spewed out 750 rounds a minute. Previously the 
troops attempted to block off guerrilla escape routes by concentrating soldiers at key 
points on the trails. The guerrillas who used their superior knowledge of the terrain 
easily overcame these tactics. With the Cobra gunships the Army could send them 
ahead of the guerrillas sealing off their escape. On the other hand the Baloch for their 
part, did not receive substantial foreign help and were armed only with bolt-action 
rifles, home-made grenades, and captured weapomy.
118 For more detail see Yur. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History. U.S.S.R. 
Academy of Sciences. Institute of Oriental Studies. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, Central 
Department of Oriental literature, 1971.
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Military operations in Balochistan, as mentioned earlier, began in early April 
1973. Significantly, when they started their insurgency, the Baloch were not fighting 
for independence but rather for regional autonomy within a radically restructured, 
confederal Pakistani constitutional framework. In his interview with People’s Front in 
1975, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo categorically refuted the accusation against the Ba­
loch about their desire and urge to build independent Balochistan outside Pakistan. He 
asserted that the rulers of Islamabad coined the terms like “greater Balochistan”. 
“Having destroyed all democratic institutions,” Bizenjo said, “they hurl such terms as 
accusations against their political opponents in order to suppress opposition and fur­
ther strengthen their strangle-hold on the people of Pakistan, to consolidate the dicta-
• • 101 torship of military bureaucratic clique” The Baloch were seeking the creation of a
Baloch-majority province122 as part of a larger re-demarcation of provinces to be fol­
lowed by a division of power within which Islamabad would retain control over de­
fence, foreign affairs, communications and currency, while the province would have 
unfettered local authority over everything else, including the exploitation of natural 
resources and the allocation of development funds.
The war of 1973-77 sharpened the divide between the central government of 
Pakistan and the Baloch. In 1977, by the time the shooting subsided, the separatist 
feeling had greatly intensified. The Pakistan government had not only failed to crush 
completely the armed rebellion of the Baloch guerrillas but also the use of combined 
superior fire power by the Pakistani and Iranian forces during the conflict, especially 
the indiscriminate air attacks on Baloch villages, had created deep-seated resentment 
and desire for revenge among the Baloch guerrillas. “If we can get modern weapons”, 
guerrilla leader Mir Hazar Khan said in an interview with Selig Harrison in his camp 
in southern Afghanistan, “it will never again be like the past... Next time we will 
choose the time and place, and we will take help where we can get it. In the beginning 
the Bengalis didn’t want independence, but if Pakistan continues to use force to crush 
us, we’ll have no alternative but to go that way.”123 Thus this conflict (1973-1977) left 
a legacy of bitter and enduring hatred. Since nearly all Baloch felt the impact of Paki­
stani repression, the Baloch populace has been politicised to an unprecedented de-
121 People’s Front, vol. 2, No. 6-7, 1975, p. 5.
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124 Azad Baluchistan. London, July-August 1983.
264
“For the first time in the modern history of Balochistan”, the former NAP MP, 
and the BNM leader, Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch said, “the whole Baloch people sup­
ported the Movement (1973-77).”125 The third resistance movement had some far- 
reaching consequences for Baloch nationalism as well as for the Baloch society as a 
whole. The cruelty of the Pakistan army led even the Baloch of Punjab, Sindh, and 
many other areas outside Balochistan to sympathise with their people inside Balochis­
tan. Moreover, it is said that many Baloch among the PPP’s own members throughout 
Pakistan resigned horn their party, as a protest. Many of these people according to the 
writer and former member of Pakistan National Party (PNP), Mansoor Baloch, dem­
onstrated against the military operations and army cruelties in Karachi’s streets.126 
Given its duration, scope, and intensity, the four-year conflict affected almost all the 
Baloch population and regions at various times, hence generating an unprecedented 
politicisation and political awareness among the Baloch of all classes and social strata. 
“The Baluchis”, Lawrence Ziring in his book Pakistan: The Enigma of Political De­
velopment (1980), wrote, “are more politically conscious today than any other time in 
their long history”.127
Psychologically, this war intensified the ever-widening gap of distrust and 
mistrust between the Baloch and the central government. Even after the release of the 
Baloch leaders from jail and the pronouncement of a general amnesty by the military 
government, the majority of Baloch guerrillas, including the main fighting force, the 
BPLF refused to surrender and lay down their arms. Instead they crossed the border
1951and went to Afghanistan. "The 1973-7 insurgency", wrote Selig Harrison, "aroused 
unprecedented political awareness in Baluchistan, and the degree of psychological 
alienation from Islamabad now evident in Baluchistan, is strikingly reminiscent of the 
angry climate that was developing in East Pakistan during the late 1960s".129 
Forces in the third uprising
The war of 1973-77 radicalised the Baloch national movement immensely. 
Prior to the beginning of the hostilities in 1973, NAP was the main political force in 
Balochistan. It was largely due to Bizenjo’s moderating influence that more radical 
elements within and without NAP limited their demand to autonomy within a consti­
125 Interview with Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch,
126 Interview with Mansoor Baloch.
127 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan. The Enigma of Political Development. Wm Dawson & Sons Ltd., 1980, 
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tutionally restructured federal state of Pakistan and took part in the democratic proc­
ess, which brought the first elected autonomous Baloch government to power in 1972. 
hi this respect, the dissolution of the elected provincial government and the ensuing 
conflict were major blows to the moderate forces represented by NAP, which was 
banned in 1975.
After the ban on NAP, the party workers formed its successor, the National 
Democratic Party, NDP, on 6 November 1975. However, the armed resistance in Ba­
lochistan and the growing differences with the Pashtun leaders specially Wali Khan, 
regarding the question of a political reconciliation with Prime Minister Bhutto and 
later with General Ziaul Haq, accelerated the process of alienation between the Baloch 
and Pashtun leaders. At its climax, on 1 June 1979, the Baloch leadership formed a 
separate party of their own, the Pakistan National Party (PNP). Like the NAP, the 
PNP also advocated federalism and greater autonomy, but it was banned within six 
months along with all other Pakistani political parties by Zia’s military regime.130
As previously noted, removal of the NAP ministry, installation of Akbar Bugti 
as Governor of Balochistan and formation of a puppet ministry in Quetta, disillu­
sioned many NAP workers. These events amply proved to the Baloch nationalists that 
the only course to achieve their national right was to organise themselves in a united 
front. The Baloch insurrection was not a spontaneous outburst of nationalist fervour 
but the outcome of concerted efforts by left-of-centre tribal sardars to transform an­
cient pattern of relationships that kept the tribes apart However, their attempts to 
forge an overall Baloch national unity transcending tribal loyalties were not success­
ful.131 As observed by Harrison, during the insurgency seven separate guerrilla groups 
operated independently in the hills under seven separate sets of leaders. He, how­
ever, acknowledges that due to a broadly accepted high-level Baloch leadership, there 
were no tensions among them.133
Of the three major forces of BPLF, tribal guerrillas, and BSO, which were ac­
tive on the Baloch political scene, the strongest was the BPLF. It emerged as the prin­
cipal vehicle of organised Baloch nationalist activity in Pakistan in 1973. Espousing a 
revolutionary doctrine in its programmes, the BPLF was known for its leftist tenden­
130 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp. 57-58.
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cies and advocating the goal of self-determination.134 It commanded mainly the west- 
ern front -  the Marri territory. Being a successor organisation to the Parari guerrilla 
movement, the BPLF adopted its name in 1973.136 Its decision-making organ, Peo­
ple’s Revolutionary Command, was still headed by the former Parari military com­
mander, Mir Hazar Khan, also a disciple of Sher Mohammad Marri, the founder of the 
Parari movement. Sher Mohammad Marri had been arrested in 1973 and spent the rest 
of the war- years in jail.137 After the Chamalang battle in 1975, the BPLF shifted some 
of its military camps inside Afghanistan. It is said that the BPLF had an estimated 
force of 7,000 to 12,000 combatant guerrillas.138 The BPLF, as earlier mentioned, 
drew support from both students and the Marri tribe, and numbered some 60,000 sup­
porters. As observed by the historian, Ian Talbot, the BPLF had bases in Kandahar 
and in Baghdad as well as in Balochistan.139 The tacit support of the Marri Sardar, 
Khair Bakhsh Marri, certainly greatly enhanced its power and legitimacy.
In addition, in the tribal belt of Jhalawan and Sarawan, the Mengals, Bizenjos, 
Mohammad Hasanis, Zarakzais and the Zehris organised their own tribal forces. Op­
erating in Las Bela, Kharan and Makkoran, they added up to about 8,000 guerrillas 
who had adopted hit and run tactics against the Pakistan army.140
Another important nationalist force in the 1973-77 Baloch movement in Paki­
stani Balochistan was the “Baloch Students Organisation”, BSO. In the turbulent 
years of the 1960s, the nationalists’ effort created the context in which many Baloch 
students, exposed to external influences, broke out of the tribal mould and became 
highly politicised within the Baloch Students, which spread headed the struggle 
against the Punjabi-dominated Centre. The students announced the formation of BSO 
on 26 November 1967, after a three-day convention in Karachi. A medical student, 
Abdul Hayee Baloch was appointed as its first chairman.141 However, in 1969, within 
a few years of its creation, BSO was transformed and polarised into two camps of 
moderates and revolutionaries, known as BSO and BSO-Awami or anti -sardar 
respectively. The National Awami Party’s rapprochement with the Peoples Party wid­
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ened the gap between the two groups furthermore and led to the formal formation of 
two separate student organisations in 1972 as named above.142
The BSO-Awami, according to S. Harrison leaned unambiguously towards the 
Baloch People’s Liberation Front. This orientation, Harrison wrote, “goes back to the 
controversy among Baluch leaders over the terms of the 1969 cease-fire”143. Equally 
important, however, were the intellectual activities of the BSO and BSO-Awami as 
reflected in their publications. The former published Giruk (Lightning) a monthly 
newsletter, while the latter’s publications included Paiiar (Identity) and Labzank 
(Treasure of Language), both monthly journals. Harrison estimated that between the 
1967 and 1981, 25,000 students had joined the two BSOs at one time or another.144 In 
this respect, the BSO served as one of the most important recruiting grounds for na­
tionalist organisations as well.
Writing on BSO, the nationalist writer Janmahmad, stated, “The most signifi­
cant organization after the Anjuman, the Kalat State National Party, the Ustaman Gal 
and the National Awami Party in the context of the Baloch national struggle is the Ba­
loch Students Movement, the Baloch Students Organization, BSO”.145 During the 
military rule of General Zia ul-Haq, many of its members were imprisoned, hanged or 
forced to go to exile. The BSO stands for socialism and the right of self- 
determination, including separation.
Being a powerful pressure group, BSO played a major role in organising the 
Baloch students not only in the educational and cultural fields, but also on issues relat­
ing to Baloch national rights, during the last three decades. One of its leaders, Dr. Ab­
dul Hayee Baloch, contested the National Assembly on the NAP ticket. He defeated 
Prince Yahya, the son of Ahmad Yar Khan, ex-ruler of Kalat. The selection of Abdul 
Hayee was recognition of BSO’s sacrifices and its appreciable role in the Baloch po­
litical movement.146 At present BSO is a great supporter of the “Balochistan National 
Movement” (BNM).
It is not within the scope of this study to analyse the Baloch national ques­
tion beyond the 1980s. What follows is therefore only a short note about the political 
developments of the 1980s and 1990s. After Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had tried a mixture of
142 On 25,h September 1983, the two factions merged again with each other in the name o f BSO.
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repression, social mobilization and populist rhetoric to defeat the Baloch nationalist 
movement, Zia ul-Haq mixed more repression with Islamic rhetoric and a skilful for­
eign policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan, which produced considerable amounts of US for­
eign aid. The Baloch, on the contrary didn’t find a foreign mentor.
As earlier mentioned, since the early 1980, the Pakistan military has won the 
armed contest against the Baloch autonomous movement, and for the immediate fu­
ture, Baloch nationalism has again been defeated. While there are no prospects for 
autonomous rule under the present regime, any serious crack in the state structure in 
Islamabad will bring Balochistan under the control of the Baloch parties once again.
After the death of General Zia ul-Haq in August 1988, demands for new elec­
tions were raised from many quarters. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a senior Pashtun 
bureaucrat, announced new elections for November 1988. This time political parties 
were free to contest in their own name. Formed before the elections, the BNA (Ba­
lochistan National Alliance) won victory in the province. Nawab Akbar Bugti who 
headed the alliance became the Chief Minister of Balochistan, while Benazir Bhutto’s 
PPP formed the government at the Centre. Although this government was short lived. 
On August 6, 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed Benazir Bhutto from her 
post as prime minister, accusing her government of corruption. The national and pro­
vincial assemblies were dissolved and new elections were called for October 1990.147
The General Ziaul Haq’s era, as indicated above, was a disaster in many re­
spects for the Baloch nationalists. By creating doubts about the credentials of their 
leaders and even workers, it fragmented the nationalist forces badly.148 Repeated ef­
forts by the Baloch leaders in 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997 failed to reunite the nation­
alists. However, as the result of Ataullah Mengal’s efforts the Balochistan National 
Party (BNP) emerged as the single most powerful nationalist party in the 1997’s elec­
tions. His son Akhtar Mengal, became the Chief Minister, with the support of “Jam- 
hoori Watan Party” and Maulana Fazlur Rahman’s Jamiat-ul Ullema-ul-Islam and 
later survived by the support of the Pakistan Muslim League. However, on the nation­
alist account the BNP’s victory didn’t mean a ‘nationalist revival’ of any sort in Ba­
lochistan. Criticizing the BNP’s nationalist policies, the leader of Balochistan Na­
tional Movement (BNM), Dr. Abdul Hayee, in October 1997, called the BNP’s vic­
tory, not nationalism, but the revival of Kursi (the chair) and the politics of opportun­
147 Ishtiaq Ahmed, State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia, p. 205.
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ism. According to Dr. Hayee, BNP’s ideological stand is negated by its relationship 
with the centre and the overwhelming support it has given to the Pakistan Muslim 
League.149
It must be borne in mind that the longest stretch of democratic rule in Pakistan 
is the period between 1988-1999. But this 11-year period of democracy was marred 
by the dismissal of four elected governments and the installation of a similar number 
of interim un-elected governments in between. This period has also been described, as 
one of "controlled" democracy where the President, empowered by the 1985, 8th 
Amendment, could dismiss the elected government at will.150 Thus the so-called de­
mocratic period of Pakistan’s existence, like that of its military rule has led to further 
alienation of the Baloch from the central government of Pakistan.
With little clout in the parliament, no share in civil and military bureaucracy 
and having only a marginal role to play in the process of decision-making, the Baloch 
find themselves marginalized in the Pakistani state apparatus more than ever. The cen­
tral government is seen to have over-enlarged its role not only in the financial sphere, 
but also in the province’s politics and administration. Politically the federal govern­
ment has been dismissing the provincial governments and assemblies at will, without 
any regard to Baloch sentiments and aspirations, since its very inception. Administra­
tively, the central government of Pakistan exercises total control over the province. 
Governors, chief secretaries, IGs of police and all other key appointments in Balochis­
tan are made by the centre.151
On October 12, 1999, General Pervez Musharraf dismissed Nawaz Sharif s 
Government. By this ended the so-called democratic period (1988-1999) and the af­
fairs of Balochistan took another turn. On 17 October 1999, one week after his taking 
over, Musharraf announced a seven-point reform agenda including the restoration of 
democracy and devolution of power. The Baloch leaders, however, rejected his devo­
lution plan and termed it a negation of provincial autonomy. On 22 August 2000, 
briefing newsmen, the president of the BNP, Ataullah Mengal said that the regime’s 
blueprint of local government is a mode of imposing unitary form of government in 
the name of decentralization. Comparing it to the One-Unit plan, Mengal said that it
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2001 .
149 Dr. Abdul Hayee, quoted in Jang London, October 18, 1997.
150 Torbjorn Pettersson , Pakistan och Demokrati (Pakistan and Democracy) i serien "Varldspolitikens 
Dagfragor", Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1990, p. 22.
151 Interview with Mohammad Akram Baloch.
270
would revive the bitter experiment of the 1950s and 1960, which was the major cause 
of the break-up of Pakistan in 1971.152 It should be noted that the new system as pro­
posed by General Musharraf transfers power form the provinces to districts, but not 
from the centre to the provinces, thus it would lead to further weakening of the pro-
153vincial authority.
Having formed a nationalist front (Pakistan Oppressed Nations' Movement, 
PONM), with the other four nationalities of Pakistan, namely the Muhajirs, Sindhis, 
Seraikis, and Pashtuns, the Baloch nationalists are presently using the demand for a 
confederation based on the same 1940 Lahore Resolution, to call for a new constitu­
tion.154 The PONM has a single agenda programme aimed for a complete autonomy 
of the provinces and the re-demarcation of the provincial frontiers. It favours only 
three subjects for the federation, such as defence, foreign affairs and currency.155
Since the end of the Cold war, a mixture of trans-border and ethno-nationalist 
conflicts has been a dominant feature of the changing geopolitics of Southwest Asia -  
the region comprising Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, as well as the Central Asian 
republics. This development has already challenged the very existence of the above 
states. In Pakistan, the 1999 Martial Law sharpened the divide between the Baloch 
and the Centre. From then on, a large number of Balochistan's nationalist leaders are 
either incarcerated or have been driven out of the country. For example the former 
governor and Chief Minister, Nawab Akbar Bugti has been confined to his native 
Dera Bugti, Nawab Kair Bakhsh Marri, a resolute nationalist leader with a militant 
background, and Abdul Nabi Bangulzai a former guerrilla leader, are behind bars, and 
the Balochistan National Party’s (BNP) Sardar Ataullah Mengal is again living in 
London in self-imposed exile, fearing the government may somehow do him what has 
been done to the others.156
Returning from Afghanistan, after the fall of Dr. Najibullah’s government in 
1992, the founder of the Parari Movement in the early 1960’s, Sher Mohammad Marri 
stated, “History is changing and I assure you that the existing set-up will not be able 
to be sustained”.157 However, at this moment an outright national movement in Ba­
lochistan is unlikely. But at the same time the last elections have shown a strong eth-
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nicization of politics in Pakistan. In the 1997’s elections hardly any party had truly 
‘national’ importance: the PML (Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif) had overwhelming 
support in Punjab. But in all other provinces it was weak. The PPP (Pakistan People’s 
Party) and the MQM (Muhajir Qaumi Movement) controlled the rural respective ur­
ban Sindh. And in Balochistan and -  to a lesser degree in the NWFP (North Western
1Frontier Province) the nationalist parties dominated. It is interesting to note that 
since the first (1970) election in Pakistan that was based on the adult franchise, the 
vote bank of the Baloch nationalists increased continuously. For example in 1988 the 
Baloch nationalists secured 47.8 per cent of the votes in Balochistan, while in 1970, 
they got 45.1. In the election of 1990, they received 51.74 per cent.159
As indicated, the fragmentation of political system in Pakistan, has increased 
considerably during the last three decades, and has grown more “provincial” in char­
acter than national. General Pervez Musharraf in his seven-point agenda, however, 
stated to take care of the issue of provincial autonomy by removing their sense of dep­
rivation. But his devolution plan, which is likely to create 106 district governments, is 
being perceived to be striking at the very root of the present (1973) constitution of 
Pakistan, which recognizes the country as a federation of four autonomous nationali­
ties. In view of all the above, it seems that there is little concern for the harmonious 
development of the Baloch and other national minorities by Pakistan, with its over- 
inflated military budget and nuclear* arms race with India.
Baloch Nationalism and the Iranian Revolution
The revolution of 1978-79 was the most popular* political struggle in modern 
Iranian history. It drew the majority of the population, especially in urban areas, into 
political activism for the overthrow of the monarchical dictatorship. However, the par­
ticipants in this revolution did not have a common goal. Visions of a future Iran were 
diverse, ranging from an Islamic regime to a democratic and socialist state. Activists 
among the non-Persian peoples, especially in Kurdistan, Balochistan, Turkmen-Sahra 
and Khuzistan, sought a secular, democratic, federal state allowing extensive auton­
omy in administration, language, culture and economy.160 It should be pointed out that
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this revolution acted as a catalyst in awakening the national aspirations and politicis­
ing the Iranian nationalities, especially the Baloch, to an extent never known before in 
the history of these people or that of Iran. On 11 February 1979, the revolutionaries 
announced the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of 
Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini, a Shiite theologian. Once again, the central govern­
ment was weakened while the struggle between secularists and clerics took place. In 
Balochistan, the Baloch nationalists took advantage of the power vacuum to press 
their cause.
The Revolution led to a total breakdown of government authority in Balochis­
tan. Faced with the prospect of loss of control in Balochistan, the provisional govern­
ment of Mehdi Bazargan responded favourably to the demand for appointing the Ba­
loch to positions of authority in the province. Thus Danish Narui, a mathematics pro­
fessor at the University of Balochistan and a Baloch favourite, was appointed to the 
post of governor-general of Sistan-wa-Balochistan. This was the first time a Baloch 
had been allowed to occupy that position since the incorporation of Balochistan into 
Iran in 1928. Similarly, among other top positions occupied by Baloch appointees was 
the Chancery of the University of Balochistan, which went to Ameer Gamshadzai a 
statistics professor. Persians, however, replaced both officials, in less than six months.
The revolution reinforced the centrifugal tendency among the Baloch trying to 
organise on the basis of ethnic and religious identification. Consequently the first Ba­
loch open political organisations were formed in Iran. The “Sazeman Demokratik 
Mardom Balochistan” (Balochistan People’s Democratic Organisation, hereafter 
called the “Sazeman Demokratik”), the Balochistan Raji Zrombesh (the Baloch Na­
tional Movement, hereafter called Zrombesh) and the “Hezb Ittehad ul-Muslimeen” 
(Muslim Unity Party) started their activities in public. In many ways the revolution 
marks the beginning of the new nationalist forces in Iranian Balochistan -  the secular*, 
non-tribal nationalist movement organised as political parties. By comparison, such 
political development took place five decades earlier in eastern Balochistan in the 
1920s.161
Sazeman Demokratik, which was formed shortly before the revolution, was 
the more organised, and more vocal organisation in its demand for autonomy. The 
Sazeman Demokratik derived its main support from the Baloch intelligentsia, stu­
dents, and the emerging middle class. Being a democratic and secular organisation, it
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absorbed large groups of leftist-oriented non-Baloch who were working and living in 
Balochistan. The naming of the organisation was debated upon and the term Balochis­
tan (Sazeman Demokratik Mardom “Balochistan”) instead of the Baloch was adopted 
to make it not only broad based but to include the Persians living in Balochistan, if 
they wanted to be included. However, certain Baloch intellectuals were sceptical 
about this designation.162
However, from its very formation, the Sazeman Demokratik was a nationalist- 
leftist front.163 As a front, it represented a loose coalition of leftist-oriented nationalist 
factions, including “Kanoon-e farhangi wa Siasi-e Khalq-e Baloch”, a youth organisa­
tion representing nationalist students with socialist tendencies, “Nabard-e Baloch” 
(The Baloch Struggle) serving as the provincial arm of the “Paikar organisation”, The 
“Bami Estar” (The Morning Star), local branch of the “Feda-i organisation”, and the 
Zrombesh. Of these Zrombesh was an armed underground guerrilla movement.
Like the NAP in Eastern Balochistan, in its manifesto, Sazeman Demokratik 
rejected “all the manifestations of secessionism” in favour of Khodmokhtari (self­
autonomy) in a united Iran. It defined self-autonomy in terms of full administrative 
autonomy for the Baloch, the adoption of Balochi language as the official medium of 
instruction and administration in Balochistan, the revival of the Baloch culture, full 
control of the Baloch over their natural resources, their representation and participa­
tion in the highest organs of the central government, and protection of Sunni relig­
ion.164 As indicated, the Sazeman’s main demand was self-government in the admini­
stration of local affairs, while reconfirming it would respect the Iranian integrity and 
Constitutional Law. This was a basic contradiction in the platform, since the Iranian 
Constitution did not provide for the kind of local autonomy for which the Baloch were 
calling. However, Iranian authorities accused the Sazeman to be secessionist, and re­
fused direct talks with its leaders.165
Speaking about the relation of the Sazeman Demokratik with their nationalist 
counterpart in Pakistani Balochistan, a former activist of the organisation, Ayub 
Hosseinbor said, “The Sazeman Demokratik sent a delegation to Pakistan to meet 
Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and other nationalist leaders. But due to political uncertainty in
161 Aziz Mohammad Bugti, Tarikh-e Balochistan. p. 83.
162 jyj Hosseinbor, “Iran and its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism”, p. 220.
163 Interview with Ayub Hosseinbor
164 For the text o f the manifesto of the H e z b  D e m o k r a tik  Balochistan, see Mai Balochistan. Karachi, 
August 1980, p. 10.
165 Interview with Dr. Habibullah Malik.
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Iran the delegation was not able to fulfil its mission and returned back half way.”166 
However, from the Pakistani side a close friend of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Gul 
Mohammad Hout, met the Sazeman Demokratik leaders in Zahedan in 1979. Inter­
viewing Hout, in 1997 in Karachi, the author was told that “in 1979 as I met the 
Sazeman Demokratik leaders in Zahedan, I was very impressed on their national feel­
ings.167
Zrombesh, as mentioned above, was formed in 1971. Disagreeing with the 
BLF’s policies, the Iraqi supported guerrilla group headed by Raheem Zardkohi, the 
field commander of the Front inside Balochistan, procalaimed itself as an independent 
organisation, the “Baloch Raji Zrombesh” in the early 1970s. Soon after the peace 
agreement between Iran and Iraq in 1975 (which is commonly known as the “Algiers 
Agreement”), the Iraqis ended their support to Baloch nationalists. Consequently, the 
BLF, which was backed by the Iraqi government, ceased to exist. Zrombesh, however, 
continued its activities mostly underground inside Iranian Balochistan. According to 
Selig Harrison, Zardkohi headed some seventy-five highly politicised guerrillas.169 
With the revolution, the organisation started its activities openly.170 Practically, how­
ever, it operated mainly as the guerrilla wing of the Sazeman Demokratik in 1979.
Zrombesh stands for an autonomous Balochistan with a sovereign legislature 
within the framework of a federal Iran. The provincial boundaries are to be re­
demarcated to include in the province of Balochistan all the Baloch areas of Iran now 
in various administrative districts of the county, in order to make a cultural and ethnic
171entity. According to Article 7 of the Barnama (manifesto), of the Zrombesh, the 
area of the autonomous government includes Iranian Balochistan; the boundaries of 
the autonomous government to be determined by keeping in view historical, geo­
graphical and economic factors, and the will of the majority of the people of Balochis­
tan.172
Zrombesh’s Barnama (manifesto), which was issued in 1983 from Karachi, 
was very similar to that of Sazeman Demokratik. It demanded that Balochi should be
166 Interview with Ayub Hosseinbor.
167 Interview with Gul Mohammad Hout.
168 Baluch Raj-e Zrombesh., Tarikh-cheh-e Jombesh-ha-e Milli Par Baluchistan. Kabul, 1986, p. 75.
169 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 107.
170 Monthly Balochi. Quetta, January-February 1979. See also, Baluch Raj-e Zrombesh., Tarikh-cheh-e 
Jombesh-ha-e Milli Dai' Baluchistan. Kabul, 1986, p. 75.
171 Baluch Raj-e Zrombesh,, Barnama-e Khodmokhtari wa Asasnama (Manifesto), Karachi, 1983, pp. 
1-18.
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declared the official language of communication in Balochistan. The Balochistan gov­
ernment, if the party comes to power, will replace all the imposed Persian armed 
forces in Balochistan by a newly created Baloch para-military force, which will be 
responsible for maintaining internal law and order and defence of the Balochistan 
borders. The government of Balochistan will support all the Baloch revolutionary 
movements in the neighbouring countries fighting for the achievement of their genu­
ine socio-cultural, economic and political rights. It should serve as a safe refuge for all 
Baloch exiled for political reasons from any neighbouring states. The Movement ad­
vocated an aimed struggle to achieve these objectives.173 Furthermore, Zrombesh’s 
Barnama, in article 54, emphasises that the autonomous government of Balochistan 
should give all possible assistance to the Baloch revolutionaries in eastern Balochistan 
(Pakistani Balochistan) and other Baloch areas, who are fighting to achieve their na­
tional rights.174
As soon as the first post-revolutionary government was established in Tehran, 
in February 1979, discussions and negotiations on the future status of Balochistan be­
gan between representatives of the Baloch and the revolutionary authorities in Tehran. 
In March 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini met a Baloch delegation headed by Maulavi Ab­
dul Aziz Mollazadeh and reportedly promised them to give equal treatment to both 
shi’a and Sunni branches of Islam in the projected constitution.175 In his return from 
Tehran, Mollazadeh declared to the Baloch ‘all your national and religious wishes 
have been accepted’ by the new Islamic leadership.176 He invited the Baloch to vote 
for the establishment of the Islamic Republic as proposed in the referendum of April 
1979.177
Objecting to the concept of “Islamic Republic” as lacking any precise defini­
tion in its form, substance, and content, Sazeman Demokratik, boycotted the referen­
dum. The new central authorities were, understandably, eager to assert their control 
over the entire country and severely distrusted the Balochs1 intentions. In the follow­
ing months, both the Baloch and the central authorities saw their mutual distrust con­
firmed. At several places there were violent clashes between Baloch nationalists and 
supporters of the Islamic regime, both of which accused the other of provocation.178
Ibid.
Ibid.
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177 Ibid.
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Islamic committee and Revolutionary Guards supported local Shiite minorities and 
other groups that clashed with the nationalist Baloch. The Balochs' demand for auton­
omy was not the only reason they were distrusted by the Islamic authorities. The Hezb 
was a pure Sunni organisation and the Sazeman had explicitly secular programme.179
However, in spite of the strong opposition by the national minorities and the 
secular opposition, Khomeini’s forces won the referendum of April 1979 with an 
overwhelming vote for the Islamic Republic. Taking notice of strong opposition dem­
onstrated by different national groups, Ayatollah Khomeini attempted to calm their 
fears in his message of congratulation to the nation for the approval of the Islamic Re­
public by stating that; “ ...Congratulations on such a government [Islamic govern­
ment] which does not discriminate between races, black or white, Turk, Fars [Per­
sian], Kurd or Balouchi. All are brothers and equal. Superiority is accorded to piety
1 Rfland virtue, ethics and good deeds..
The Islamic Republic's original draft constitution, which was released to the 
public on 18 June 1979, went to great lengths in efforts to appease minorities. Article 
5 stated that the minorities would have equal rights with the Persians: "All people in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, such as Persians, Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, Turco­
mans, and others, will enjoy complete equal rights.”181 Article 13 gave Muslims the 
right to follow their own school of religious thought182, and Article 21 authorised the 
use of local languages in schools and press: “The common language and script of Iran 
is Persian. All official texts and correspondence must be in this language and script. 
However, the use of local languages in local schools and press is permitted”.183 The 
draft constitution did not meet the approval of the secular parties, however, it insisted 
that the duly elected representatives of the people should approve the constitution.
The secularists' objections gave the hard-line clerics the opening they had been 
seeking. They agreed to an elected Assembly of Experts to revise the draft. The 
elected Majlis-e Khobregan (Assembly of the Experts) was dominated by pro- 
Khomeini clergys. Thus their revised draft, recognised only Shiism as the state relig­
179 Cf., M. H. Hosseinbor, “Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism”, pp. 210.
180 Government o f Iran (The Ministry of Islamic Guidance), The Dawn of the Islamic Revolution. Te­
hran: Echo o f Islam, 1982, p. 50.
181 Fereshteh Koohi-Kamali, “The Development of Nationalism in Iranian Kurdistan”, in: Philip G. 
Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (ed.), The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview. New York: Routledge, 
1992, p. 185.
182 Charles G. MacDonald, “The Kurdish Question in the 1980s”, in: Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabi­
novich (ed.), Ethnicity. Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1988, p. 245.
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ion and Farsi as the only official language in Articles 13 and 15, respectively.184 It ac­
corded no equal recognition to the Sunni branch of Islam nor did it include any provi­
sion for granting administrative or cultural autonomy to non-Persian nationalities. As 
a result, the Baloch members of the Assembly of Experts, Maulavi Abdul Aziz Mol­
lazadeh and Hamidullah Mir-Moradzai, a lawyer, tried in vain to persuade the council 
to introduce the necessary changes in the draft to meet the Baloch demands.185 Mir- 
Moradzai was the only person in Majlis-e Khobregan who rejected every aspect of 
Valayat-e Faqih (the supreme religious leader). But he was not allowed to justify his 
view, because the chairman of the session in which he chose to speak declared that the 
debate on the subject was closed.186 In the end, clerical supporters packed the Assem­
bly, and they wrote the concept of Valayat-e Faqih into the constitution. The final 
version of the constitution, which was eventually ratified on 2-3 December 1979 made 
no mention of ethnic minorities, their rights, or their religious schools of thought. Lo­
cal languages could be used in the press if alongside Persian, but textbooks had to be 
in Persian.
Khomeini's opposition to the Baloch came from his interpretation of Islam: 
“There are no nationalities in Islam. It supersedes and abolishes all of them. In a 
sense, nationalism is a ‘pre-Islamic legacy.’ Islam came to eliminate (national) fanati­
cism. The subject of Islam is man and not his nationalism...The issue of nationalities 
is not brought up by Islam. All Muslims are brothers in the view of Islam and all 
Muslims must shed whatever divide them, be its source nationalism, race or col­
our.”187 Khomeini's interpretation of religion, and its emphasis on Islam rather than 
nationalism, did not meet universal acceptance among the Sunnis. Like Maulavi Ab­
dul Aziz Mollazadeh, another prominent Sunni scholar, Izziddin Husayni criticising 
Khomeini’s views on Islamic interpretation of autonomy and the rights for minorities, 
stated: "At present, we do not fight for Islam because we are not at the outset of Islam.
1RRIslam is present, and strongly.” Contrary to the Shiite clergy the Sunni Maulavis 
emphasised the equal rights for the national minorities in Iran.
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Moreover, the Islamic regime was not homogeneous ideologically and politi­
cally; its various factions (liberal, radical, conservative; clerical and non-clerical) pur­
sued more or less similar approaches to the autonomist movements. They did not dis­
tinguish between the underdeveloped areas of Balochistan or Kurdistan and more de­
veloped Central Provinces such as Esfahan and Tehran. Like Persian nationalists, Is­
lamic leaders did not admit the existence of national oppression. As Khomeini had 
remarked, there was no difference, between the “provinces”, all had been equally op­
pressed.189 Thus there was no distinction between Persians and non-Persians; they 
were all Muslims, and had suffered equally under the previous regime. This view 
would, inevitably, reject demands for autonomy, and equate it with “secessionism”.190
When on the 3rd December 1979 the Majlis-e Khobregan approved the final 
version of the constitution, the Baloch, along with most minorities, demonstrated 
against it. On 5-6 December 1979, riots broke out in Tabriz among Azerbaijani sup­
porters of Ayatollah Shariat Madari to protest the new constitution.191 In spite of sharp 
ideological division between them, both the Hezb Ittehad ul-Muslimeen and the 
Sazeman Demokratik, as well as other lesser nationalist organisations, joined forces to 
organise large demonstrations in protest to the new Constitution.
The protests quickly spread throughout the province and took a violent turn. 
Soon, armed clashes between the Baloch and Revolutionary Guards became daily oc­
currences in the provincial capital where there existed a substantial Shiite popula-
1 Q9tion. The unrest grew so intense that the angry protesters stormed the office of the 
governor-general, Javad Jariri, a Persian in Chabahar, and took him captive.193 Calm 
was temporarily restored only when the Baloch leaders called for restraint after 
Khomeini’s promise in mid-January 1980 to amend the constitution.194 The Baloch 
demanded not only regional autonomy but also equal rights for Sunnis and greater al­
189 Government o f Iran (The Ministry of Islamic Guidance), The Dawn of the Islamic Revolution, p. 
50.
190 The more liberal or democratic individuals such as A y a to l la h  Taleqani admitted existence of eco­
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ing administrative measures as stipulated by the 1906 constitution and its amendments which allowed 
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Sabz, n.d., p. 114.
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192 New York Times. December 23, 1979.
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location of government development funds for their region.195 The dominant pro- 
Khomeini clerical forces in the final document adopted by the “Majlis-e Khobregan” 
as “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran” on 3rd December 1979, however, 
did not heed these protests.
Much like the Pahlavi regime, the Islamic State has consistently violated the 
right to mother tongue education. According to Article 19 of the Islamic constitution, 
“all people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy 
equal rights; and colour, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege.” 
This equality is, however, fictional. In real life, linguistic power in Iran is not distrib­
uted equally. The Persians alone enjoy the right to a native-tongue education. How­
ever, the use of local and ethnic languages in the press and mass media is allowed. 
The teaching of ethnic literature in the schools, together with Persian language in­
struction, is also permitted.”196 The teaching of “Balochi literature”, however, has not 
materialised yet, 21 years after revolution. Although the teaching of a literature does 
not necessarily involve the use of the language of the literature, the Islamic regime’s 
refusal to implement the stipulation of the Article 15 indicates, among other things, its 
strong Persian nationalist ideology.
In 1981, as all the political activities of the Baloch nationalist were banned, the 
Sazeman Demokratik was declared illegal, and the mass arrest of the Baloch national­
ists started, many of the members of Zrombesh and the Baloch supporters of other or­
ganisations crossed the border to seek asylum in Pakistan and Afghanistan. By mid- 
February 1982, an estimated 3,000 Baloch, most “accused of belonging to the Baloch 
separatist movement”, had crossed the border to seek refuge in Pakistan, while an­
other 4,000 of their fellows were reportedly being held in the jails of the provincial
1 Q H
capital Zahedan.
Like their brethren from eastern Balochistan, the Afghan revolutionaries in 
Kabul welcomed the Iranian Baloch. The Iranian Baloch, mostly from Zrombesh, 
were given governmental support to propagate their ideas. From exile, the Baloch na­
tionalists through the platform of Zrombesh continued their struggle against the Is­
lamic regime of Iran. However, the exile life and limited resources in the war torn Af­
ghanistan, shifted their strategy of struggle from direct confrontation with the ruling 
Ayatullahs to more cultural and educational realms. The Zrombesh started the publi­
195 Bamdad (Daily Tehran), 21 December 1979; Kavhan. (Daily Tehran) 23 December 1979.
196 Government of Iran, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, pp. 22-3.
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cation of its organ, the Balochistan from Kabul. It carried articles and write-ups on 
Balochistan, criticising the Khomeini government for its anti-populist policies. The 
paper advocated the socio-cultural and political rights of the Baloch people in Iran and 
elsewhere.198
The Zrombesh maintained its office in Afghanistan up to the defeat of the Af­
ghanistan Democratic Party by the Pakistan-Iran backed fundamentalist Islamic Mu­
jahideen in 1992. Other groups of Baloch exiled took refuge in Great Britain and 
Scandinavian countries as well. The overwhelming majority of these exiles were the 
former members of the “Sazeman Demokratik”, while a smaller number were the Ba­
loch followers of the leftist organisations, the “Fedai-e Khalq”, the “Fedaiyan-e 
Khalq”, and the “Paikar”. Of the detainees, several dozen were executed after being 
charged and tried for counter-revolutionary activities as well.199
Thus, as indicated above, in the early 1980s, the Islamic regime crashed the 
Baloch movement in Iran. However, with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in Sep­
tember 1980, the Iraqi regime tried to use the Baloch against the Iranian ruling Ayatul- 
lahs. Baghdad recruited lightly armed Baloch militias, headed by the traditional tribal 
leaders. The largest of these were the “Wahdat-e Baloch” (the Baloch Unity) headed 
by Mir Maoladad Sardarzai, a royalist sardar and the “Jonbesh-e Mojahideen-e Ba­
loch” headed by Mohammad Khan Mir-Lashari a member of the last Majlis (parlia­
ment) of Shah. The Wahdat-e Baloch had close links with the Iranian opposition 
groups supporting the return of the monarchy in Iran.200 According to Hosseinbor, in 
1984, the “Wahdat-e Baloch” stepped up its guerrilla campaign against the Islamic 
government to the extent that it forced Tehran to divert a large number of its Revolu­
tionary Guards from the war front with Iraq to Balochistan 201 In 1985, with the death 
of its leader Mir Maoladad, the Wahdad-e Baloch disintegrated. Supported by the 
Iraqi government, Jonbesh-e Mojahideen continued its activities up to the Iran-Iraq 
peace treaty in 1988. Relying on the outside powers these groups gave up their strug­
gle, as the outside support withdrew. Obviously, at present the Baloch nationalism in 
Iran has been defeated, and there are no prospects for self-autonomy under the Islamic
197 The Economist. February 13, 1982, p. 50.
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regime. The Baloch demand for self-rule constitutes a democratic pursuit that is in­
compatible with the despotism and the Persian ethnic-based nationalism of Iran.
However, in order to win the hearts of the Baloch, the Islamic Republic has of­
fered a number of concessions including material rewards. In Balochistan, for exam­
ple, investment has been made in the electrification of some villages and the construc­
tion of roads and bridges in rural areas, and urban development projects such as the 
expansion of streets and the construction of parks. It must be noted, however, that 
most of these projects have military significance, and the colossal network of army 
and gendarmerie outposts built throughout the region dwarfs them. Another example
of the concessions is the offering of limited quotas in institutions of higher education
202to high-school graduates. Moreover, Balochistan University has been expanded and 
branches of higher-education institutions, including the Free Islamic universities, have 
been established in some cities of Balochistan.
Baloch Nationalism and the Sistanis
The Baloch ethnic identity in Iranian Balochistan has gained further impor­
tance during the Iranian revolution, because of the competition for resources with the 
Persian-speaking Shiite Sistanis. As discussed in chapter five, like the Pashtun popu­
lated area in northern Pakistani Balochistan, there is a Shiite dominated Shahrestan 
(division), Shahrestan-e Zabol in the northern part of the province, historically known 
as Sistan. In 1865, as Ameer Ahmad Khan, the Baloch ruler of Lash-Jowein, was de­
feated and the Persians occupied Sistan, Baloch rule come to an end.204 Ibrahim Khan, 
the most powerful Sardar of the Sanjaranis, appealed to the Afghan King for assis­
tance but was refused. Frustrated by the failure of the Afghans to support him, the Ba­
loch Sardar turned to the British for assistance but to no avail.205 The arable lands of 
Sistan -  90,000 hectares in total -  were confiscated in 1865 and declared the same 
year to be Khaliseh (government owned).206 This was a measure of punishment in the 
mid-19th century against the Baloch Sardars who owned most of the lands in Sistan 
and refused to accept Persian rule.
202 Government o f Iran (Vazarat-e Farhang wa Amuzesh-e ‘Ali, Sazeman-e Sanjesh-e Amuzesh-e 
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In the beginning of the 20th century the political importance of Sistan further 
diminished. In 1894, the British officially divided Sistan between Iran, Afghanistan, 
and the British Balochistan. Thus, the politically divided Sistan, faced with water 
shortage and increasingly complicated land ownership, lost also its economic signifi­
cance as a result. Due to this geographical shrinking and the lack of importance in the 
later political and administrative arrangement of Iran the name of the “Iranian portion 
of Sistan” has been officially replaced by the name of its capital Zabol, and it consti­
tutes a shahrestan (division) in the larger province of Balochistan, whereas the name 
“Sistan” is added to the name of the Province of ”Sistan-wa-Balochistan”. The reason, 
according to the Baloch sources, is the Persian dominated government’s interest to 
play the Persian or Sistani minority card against Baloch nationalism.207 However, the 
Persian writer, Dr. Pirouz Moj tahed-Zadeh, believes that the reason of including the 
name to the larger Balochistan province was the large Baloch population living in Sis­
tan.208
Officially, Zabol was included in Balochistan in 1959.209 With an area of 
8,117 square kilometres210 Zabol is the smallest Shahrestan in the province, inhabited 
by a mixed ethnic population of Sistani (Persian) and Baloch.211 However, the dis­
crepancy between official census figures and nationalist claims in Iran is comparable 
to that in Pakistan. The 1978 official population estimate of 659,297 people in the 
province of Sistan and Balochistan includes some 217,000 ethnic Sistanis and ex­
cludes many Baloch living in gerrymandered districts attached to other provinces. 
Criticising the above figures, the Baloch nationalists in Iran claimed that they were 
more than two million 212 It is believed that more than half of ZaboPs population is 
comprised of Shiites. Because of these two factors (Persian and Shiism), its name is 
included in the official provincial designation "Sistan wa Balochistan". This reflects 
the prominence given to the Shiite Sistani segment in the key positions in the provin­
cial administration, despite a large portion of the district’s population being Baloch. 
Because of the Iranian state’s anti-nationality policy, there is no exact statistic about 
Zabol’s Baloch population, but even some Persian nationalist sources confirm the Ba-
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loch majority in Shahrestan-e Zabol.213 However, as earlier mentioned, the differ­
ences between the Snnni Baloch and the Shiite Sistanis culminated with the Iranian 
revolution in 1979. While the Baloch demanding greater autonomy boycotted the na­
tion-wide referendum held for approval of the Islamic Republic on April 1979, the 
Sistanis supported it openly.
Baloch Nationalism: The Role of the Great Powers
The Baloch case, according to Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, the most prominent au­
thority on the subject of the Baloch nationalism, is not a case of an ethnic minority in 
Pakistan or Iran but “is a sad and tragic story of a nation and independent state that 
has been occupied by its powerful neighbours with the assistance of British and 
American imperialism”.214 In the view of the Baloch nationalists, the Baloch suffered 
their unhappy fate simply because they happened to live in an area of vital military 
importance to the British, in contrast to the more fortunately situated Afghans 215 Con­
firming this view, the head of the Italian Historical-Anthropological and Archaeologi­
cal Mission in Makkoran (southern Balochistan), Valeria F. Piacentini wrote: 
Baluchistan lies in a central position, at the crossroads o f two “axes”, 
east-west and north-south, of three macro-regions: Asia, Africa and 
the Mediterranean basin. It is, in fact, at one and the same time (a) the 
hinge between the Indian sub-continent, Central Asia and the Euro- 
Asiatic steppes and the Iranian plateau; (b) the link between those re­
gions which give on to -  or gravitate towards -  the Indian Ocean and 
its two western “sea routes”, namely, the Persian Gulf and the Red 
Sea. For this reason, it is still o f vital importance from a geo-strategic 
and geo-economic point o f view.216
The whole question of Balochistan and its division as it exists today, is rooted 
in the famous “Great Game”, which, until the beginning of the twentieth centuiy, was 
to set Great Britain and the Czarist Empire against one another for supremacy in 
south-central Asia, including Balochistan. Concerning India’s defence, the differing 
political perceptions of British politicians and officials gave rise to two antithetical 
policies: the so-called “Close Border Policy” (or Masterly Inactivity Policy), and the 
“Forward Policy”. In 1860s, with the Russian advancement southwards, and the crea­
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tion of the Russian Province of Turkistan (1867), increased the British concern of a 
Czarist invasion of India. From then on, the second approach, the “Forward Policy” 
became dominant. According to the champions of the “Forward Policy”, the defence 
of India should be undertaken not from within her own frontiers, but by challenging 
the enemy in the Iranian plateau.217
The “Great Game”, thus, brought Balochistan under the hegemony of Britain 
as her forward base for securing Iran and Afghanistan as buffer states in order to pre­
vent further Russian advances toward the British Indian Empire.218 Under the Forward 
Policy the India’s best defence lay in its unique geographical setting -  bordered by 
towering mountainous ranges, mighty rivers, waterless deserts and warlike tribes 219 A 
Russian army, which reached India after overcoming all these obstacles, would be so 
weakened by then that it would be no match for a waiting British Army.
During the Cold War, the superpowers sought to expand their spheres of influ­
ence worldwide actively. This rivalry affected the Baloch question quite early when 
Pakistan and Iran entered into military pacts with the West in the mid-50s. In the post­
war world, the Americans replaced the British as the predominant players in the re­
gion’s politics, as shown by the American role in returning the Shah of Iran to power 
in 1953, and including Pakistan as a part of Western strategy of encircling the Soviet 
Union in the mid-1950s. To protect American interest abroad while reducing Ameri­
can commitments, president Richard Nixon developed the Nixon doctrine. The presi­
dent called for additional American financial and material support of its allies, rather 
than promising to send American troops to the world’s trouble spots. The allies, and 
not the United States, would then become the major actors in their respective regions 
of the world. Thus in building up the Shall of Iran as one of the United States’ major 
allies in the region, Nixon enmeshed America in Middle East politics.
The United States had no national security interests at stake in the Baloch 
question, other than a desire to maintain the territorial integrity of Iran and Pakistan. 
The U.S. support, however, for strengthening Iran and Pakistan, took a seemingly in­
different posture toward the Baloch issue. For instance, when in Pakistan on an offi­
cial visit in 1962, the former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, then a Harvard pro­
217 Riccardo Redaelli, The Father’s Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India (T9th -  20th Century), 
pp. 47-47.
218 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 200.
219 For more detail see, Reza Raees Toosi, “Isteratezhi-e Sarzaminha-e Sookhteh” (The Backward strat­
egy), in: Tarikh-e Ma’aser-e Iran (The Contemporary History of Iran), Tehran: M o’assesah-e Mo- 
tale’at-e Tarik-e Ma’aser-e Iran, Winter 1376/1997 (pp. 19-69).
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fessor, was asked by a reporter about the then growing Baloch insurgency in 
Balochistan. His reply was that “I would not recognise the Baluchistan problem...”220 
An arrogant response reflecting the overall United States attitude toward the small 
nationalities and their quest for self-rule. Similarly, the Soviet Union also did not 
show any direct interest at least publicly nor did it become involved directly in the 
issue of Baloch nationalism, in spite of the fact that the Baloch movement was always 
suspected by Iran and Pakistan of being supported by Moscow through her friends in 
Kabul and Baghdad.221
Having occupied the landmass of Balochistan, the two countries of Iran and 
Pakistan have viewed the Baloch quest for self-rule as a threat to their territorial integ­
rity. Thus they always dealt the Baloch issue with their joined forces. To suppress the 
Baloch nationalism, the emergence of Pakistan in 1947 was an event of great signifi­
cance for Iran.222 Both Iran and Pakistan treated Baloch nationalism as a “subversive” 
and “anti-status quo” force suspected of being part of an overall Soviet plot for gain­
ing access to the Indian Ocean and controlling the Persian Gulf through Balochistan.
Throughout the Cold War years, the Baloch would revolt against the govern­
ments in which they lived. Being fearful of Baloch separatism, the Iranian rulers and 
their Pakistani counterparts followed a common suppressive policy toward the Baloch 
national movement in the CENTO and other military pacts. The essence of their poli­
cies was best underlined by the Shah’s Foreign Minister, Khalat-bary, also an ex­
director-general of CENTO. During an interview with Selig Harrison in 1977, he 
bluntly stated that, “In Cento, we always assumed that the Baluch would attempt to 
create their own independent state some day, with Soviet support, so it was desirable 
to keep them as politically weak, disunited, and backward as possible”.223
During the U.S.-Iran-Pakistan alliance in CENTO (1954-1979), the Baloch na­
tionalists were highly critical of that Pact. The Baloch nationalists both in Pakistan 
and Iran opposed political and military support for the two countries because they 
feared that such help would serve to further strengthen the two countries in their at­
tempts to suppress the Baloch demand for self-rule.224 Of course, the U.S.-engineered 
CENTO military alliance was designed in accordance with her global strategy for
220 Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974, pp. 63-64.
221 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow. See, Chapter 7.
222 Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, p. 180. It should be remembered that the Shah of Iran was the 
first who recognised Pakistan as an independent sovereign state.
223 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 159.
224 Interview with Akbar Barakzai.
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containing the Soviet expansion in the region and, as such, it was not directed against 
the Baloch national movement per se. But in practice, it had the same effect because 
the U.S. supplied arms were repeatedly used by Iran and Pakistan to put down the Ba­
loch national movement in both countries, hi this regal'd, the most striking example 
was deployment of the sophisticated U.S. made weapons by the Shah’s regime against 
the Baloch insurgents in Pakistan from 1973 to 1977.225
Afghanistan was considered friendly. “Republican Afghanistan”, wrote Peo­
ple’s Front in its tenth issue in 1974, “is particularly dear to all Baluch and Pashtuns 
as it has with renewed vigour and persistence upheld the Baloch and Pashtun 
masses.” Thus no scenario envisaged the Afghans joining hands with Pakistan or 
Iran to crush the Baloch liberation movement in either country in the 1970s. The tradi­
tional good will between the Baloch and the Afghans seems to endure in spite of the 
chauvinistic claims on Baloch land by many Pashtun nationalists. According to the 
ex-chief-minister, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, territorial adjustment with Afghanistan 
should not pose a problem. He told a journalist in 1982 that territorial issues, which 
may arise when Balochistan gets its freedom, could be resolved amicably. He said:
As far as Afghanistan is concerned, we do not have territorial claims.
All that we can say is that the boundaries could be re-demarcated.
There is Afghan territoiy in Balochistan (the Pakhtu-speaking district 
of Zhob, Loralai and Pishin), which Afghanistan claims to be its terri­
tory. There are areas in Afghanistan, which the Baloch think to be 
theirs. So there could be an arrangement and a redemarcation in cer­
tain areas. Certain areas can go there and certain areas can come 
here.227
In 1973, during Bhutto’s visit to Tehran, the Shah declared in a public declara­
tion that what happens to Pakistan “is vitally important to us, and should another 
event befall that country we could not tolerate it. The reason for this is not only frater­
nal affection for you as a Muslim nation, but of Iranian interests; we would not be 
able to tolerate other changes or difficulties in Pakistan ... We will not close our eyes 
to any secessionist movement-God forbid-in your country”.228 Prime Minister Bhutto 
told the American author, Selig Harrison in 1977 that the Shah of Iran had been veiy 
insistent, even threatening and had promised Pakistan all sorts of economic and mili-
225 Rashed Rahman, “The Rise and Fall o f Baloch Nationalism”, p. 7.
226 People’s Front, vol. 1, No. 10-11, 1974, p. 2.
227 Interview o f Sardar Ataullah Mengal with Lawrence Lifschultz, cited in Janmahmad, Essay on Ba­
loch National Struggle in Pakistan, pp. 402-403.
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taiy help. He felt strongly that letting the Baloch have provincial self-government was 
not only dangerous in itself, for Pakistan, but would give his Baloch dangerous 
ideas.229
The Shah’s hard-line policies, as discussed earlier, did not completely succeed 
in crushing nationalist activity, which erupted in the 1957-1958 Dad Shah incident 
and in an Iraqi-assisted insurgency from 1968 to 1975 in Iranian Balochistan230. The 
Shah became concerned that his continuing troubles with the Baloch would be aggra­
vated by unrest in the Pakistani Baloch areas, especially after the secession of Bang­
ladesh. Moreover, he was obsessed with a geopolitical nightmare: that Moscow would 
solidify its foothold in Afghanistan and would then synchronise support for the al­
ready powerful Baloch nationalist forces in Pakistan with related attempts to intensify 
Baloch disaffection in Iran. Discussing with his court minister Asadollah Alam, on 
14th May 1972, the Shall said, “By seeking a weak and independent Baluchi state, 
they [the Russians] hope to get access to the Indian Ocean more easily than by going 
through Bangladesh, or through Iraq which has only a short coast-line at the far end of 
the Persian Gulf.231 The only way to be sure that his own Baloch problem would not 
get out of hand, the Shah concluded, was to treat Pakistani Balochistan as a virtual 
Iranian protectorate. Pressures from the Shah as mentioned earlier were largely re­
sponsible for Bhutto’s decision to oust the Baloch state government in 1973 and to 
use air power as well as ground forces in crashing the Baloch insurgency.232
Being frightened by the Baloch movement in Eastern Balochistan, the Shah, as 
earlier mentioned, concentrated more than 80 thousand troops in Iranian Balochistan 
in early 1973. As declared openly by the monarch himself, it was the fear of further 
dismemberment of Pakistan, which made the rulers in Tehran sit up and decide on a 
show of strength in Western Balochistan. While talking about the maintenance of law 
and order, the real aim of the Shah according to the nationalist paper, People’s Front 
was to take advantages of the depleted state of the state machinery of Islamabad, 
which had resulted from its defeat by Bangladesh freedom movement and the later 
developments in the Eastern Balochistan, to expand his empire eastwards.233
228 New York Times. 15th May 1973.
229 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 97.
230 Interview with Abdul Samad Amiri.
231 Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court (1969-19771 Lon­
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With the end of the Cold War and disappearance of the Soviet Union, the 
world is rapidly becoming accustomed to conflicts that are no longer encumbered 
with superpower rivalries. The ability of the successor states of the Soviet Union, 
primarily Russia, to work in cooperation with the United States has had a powerful 
impact on how America defines its national interests in the Third World. Local con­
flicts between client states of the Cold War protagonists are no longer seen as surro­
gate battles; the United States can choose to ignore outbreaks of violence in Africa, 
Latin America, or Asia if it so desires. After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from 
Afghanistan in 1988, and the subsequent fall of Dr. Najibullah’s government, Pakistan 
not only lost its generous Western economical support but also its geo-political impor­
tance.
In addition, the last quarter of the 20th century has been witnessing a world­
wide rise in the political awakening of sub-nationalities -  ethnic and regional commu­
nities -  who are demanding a greater say in the running of their own affairs. Today no 
serious analysts would contest the state of cultural and social deprivation in which the 
Baloch have been left since their forced integration into Iran (1928) and Pakistan 
(1948). But many of them question the effect of recent economic development of the 
province, the progressive breaking down of archaic structures and finally the potential 
viability of Baloch as a separate entity.
Summation
After the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, the political environment 
changed drastically. The democratic and ethnic movements in the former Western 
wing were deprived one of their main source of political strength: the cooperation 
with the Bengalis. With the independence of Bangladesh what was now left of Paki­
stan was able to shake off the dominance of the old bureaucracy, and even forced the 
army back to the barracks -  at least for a few years. But at the same time the precondi­
tions for Punjabi dominance were strengthened, by loosing the main potential coun­
terweight, Bengal.
The aftermath of the traumatic events in Bangladesh, however, obliged the 
remaining Western Wing of Pakistan to find some viable institutional accommodation 
if it hoped to survive. The National Awami Party and Jami’at-e Ulema-e Islam (NAP 
and JUI), which had won a majority in the two provinces of Baluchistan and the North 
Western Frontier Province (NWFP) were called by Z.A. Bhutto to sign a tripartite 
agreement in March 1972. This called for the lifting of martial law, the drafting of a
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new constitution, consultations between the majority parties and the Provinces to ap­
point governors, and possibilities for each province to form its own govermnent ac­
cording to a parliamentary majority.
When Bhutto took over as President of Pakistan on 20 December 1971, his 
party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), was securely in control of the Punjab and 
Sindh, but it had very little support in either the NWFP or Balochistan. In the General 
Elections of 1970, the PPP had won only a single seat in the National Assembly from 
the NWFP, where it polled less than 15 % of the popular vote, and none at all from 
Balochistan, where its share of the popular vote was about 2%. It had done just as 
poorly in the provincial assemblies, having captured only 4 of 40 seats in the NWFP 
and none of the 20 seats in Balochistan. Among the many opposition parties, the Na­
tional Awami Party (NAP) emerged in the strongest position, having won 3 seats in 
the National Assembly from each of the two provinces, and 8 and 13 seats, respec­
tively, in the provincial legislatures of Balochistan and the NWFP. Thus the Baloch 
and the Pashtuns formed their own govermnents in their provinces. Relation between 
the Centre and these two provincial governments were strained. Baloch nationalists 
accused Bhutto of carrying out a series of provocations in order to prepare the ground 
for dismissal of Chief Minister Sardar Ataullah Mengal’s ministry in Balochistan. The 
NAP-JUI government in NWFP resigned in protest. However, as expected, Bhutto 
dismissed the Baloch government in February 1973, which led to the third Baloch 
armed resistance against Pakistan.
The 1973-77 insurgency aroused unprecedented political awareness in Ba­
lochistan. With the dismissal of the NAP-JUI Government in Balochistan, federal 
troops were inducted in the province to help the provincial administration in "restoring 
law and order", but the situation kept on deteriorating. The radical elements in the 
NAP took to militant struggle and were joined by the Marri and Mengal tribes, who 
had taken the central government’s decision as an assault on their "national rights". A 
large number of those involved in the armed struggle formed the Baloch People's Lib­
eration Front (BPLF) under the leadership of Mir Hazar Ramkhani, who was formally 
made leader of its People's Revolutionary Command.
The third confrontation lasted four years (1973-77) and involved at its height 
more than 80,000 Pakistani troops and at least 55,000 Baloch guerrillas. It erupted 
when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dismissed the elected government of Balochistan on 12 Feb­
ruary 1973 under the pretext that it had been involved in a conspiracy to begin an
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armed rebellion. Bhutto obtained US$200 million in emergency military and financial 
aid from Iran to crush the rebels. Iran even dispatched 30 Huey Cobra helicopters to 
assist the Pakistani military.
The Baloch fighters found sanctuary in Afghanistan from where they launched 
surprise attacks on the Pakistani army. According to one estimate some 5300 Baloch 
were killed or wounded. The army casualties were 3300. While accounts of some ma­
jor battles, such as in Chamalang in September 1974, had reliable observers, it seems 
that in addition thousands of Baloch civilians were killed by bombardments and vari­
ous military actions. At the peak of the war 8,000 to 10,000 Baloch (mostly from the 
Marri tribe) fled to Afghanistan. Numerous reports have testified that torture was 
common practice.
In 1977, General Ziaul Haq overthrew the Bhutto Government. One of the first 
measures taken by the General was to declare a cease-fire to release the NAP leaders 
jailed in Hyderabad and to open negotiations. Several meetings were held in Islama­
bad in 1977 and 1978. Although some Pashtun leaders, such as Wali Khan, moved by 
their strong resentment of Bhutto, agreed to discuss with the generals, the Baloch 
leaders made it clear that they were not fighting individuals but the whole system. In 
1978, however, 6000 more Baloch prisoners were set free and a general amnesty for 
those who had fled to Afghanistan was announced. It should be noted that Ziaul Haq 
released Baloch leaders and offered terms that allowed Baloch leaders to call off the 
fighters without actually achieving anything more than a cease-fire. The Baloch in- 
surgence thereafter faded inside Pakistan. Nevertheless, after one year of negotiation, 
Khair Bakhsh Marri and Ataullah Mengal came to the conclusion that the possibility 
of resolving the Baloch national question within the framework of the Pakistani State 
was not viable, and left the country in 1980.
In 1978-1979, the Islamic Revolution transformed Iran from a monarchy to a 
republic. Dining this turbulent period, the Baloch nationalist struggle re-emerged. 
Among the major nationalist organisations which appeared dining or immediately af­
ter the revolution and demanded autonomy were “Sazeman Democratik Mardom Ba­
lochistan” (Balochistan People’s Democratic Organisation), Hezb-e ittehad al- 
Muslimin (Muslims’ Unity Party) formed by a group of Maulavis and religious- 
oriented intellectuals, and the Balochistan-e Raji Zrombesh (Balochistan National 
Movement), a guerrilla organisation formed in mid-1970s.
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The Baloch political life, however, was short-lived in Iran. The final draft of 
the new constitution adopted the idea of Valayat-e Faqih (the supreme religious 
leader) and rejected the political, cultural, and religious rights of the Baloch and other 
nationalities in Iran. It became a religious duty for all Shiites to support the central 
government, and to oppose regional nationalists. Being disappointed in the conversion 
of earlier promises into reality, some Baloch tribes engaged in new but badly organ­
ized insurgencies against the government. As a result, many Baloch were forced to 
leave the country during the 1980s. Karachi became a centre for them, and as a result 
a centre of activities of the Iranian secret service.
The Baloch of Afghanistan remained largely isolated from these events and 
from attempts by the Afghan government to exert administrative control over them. 
Consequently, unlike the Iranian and Pakistani Baloch, they have not mobilised to de­
mand greater cultural or political autonomy. Since Abdur Rehman's rule the insignifi­
cant minority of Sistani Baloch in the remote, barren deserts of south-west Afghani­
stan has not mobilised on the basis of broader economic or political interests, and the 
concerns of the large Baloch landholders have mainly been to maximise their personal 
profit.
While the developments of the last two decades, the martial law of the 1980s, 
and the co-called democracy of the 1990s, acted as dampener on political activism, 
the Baloch nationalism may lost its ardour, but as discussed above, it is not dead. Af­
ter the fall of Nawaz Sharif s government in late 1990, it seems that Baloch national­
ism is once again becoming active. The general belief among the Baloch nationalists 
is that the military government has either tried to sideline the major political forces in 
Balochistan or put itself in direct confrontation with them. In this context, the recent 
MQM’s (Muttaheda Qaumi Movement) alliance with Baloch nationalists has assumed 
great significance.
It is interesting to note that since the early 2000, a new militant group, calling 
itself the “Baloch Liberation Army” (BLA) has been claiming responsibility for a se­
ries of blasts and rocket-firings on government installations in Quetta, including Chief 
Secretary, Home Secretary, Commissioner offices, I.G. Police residence and various 
sensitive selected targets in Quetta Cantonment as well as the Sui gas installations and 
traffic on Chamalang coal mines area in Kohlu district. Thus, the new Baloch na-
234 Surat Khan Marri, "Baloch Liberation Movement, Romanticism, Fact or Fiction”, in: Daily Ba­
lochistan Express, Quetta, May 18, 2001.
292
tionalism, emerging from the ashes of post-Cold Ward, may pose a far greater chal­
lenge to the cohesion of already trouble spot states of Pakistan and Iran than the BPLF 
and BLF ever could. Much, however, depends on how the post-democratic period un­
der General Parvez Musharraf turns out.
293
CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion
The 20th century has been witness to the rise and development, of the politics 
of Baloch identity and nationalism. Nationalism may be defined in one of two ways -  
by ethnic or civic criteria. While ethnic nationalism is based on the consciousness of a 
shared identity, culture, belief in common ancestors and history, civic nationalism is 
encompassed within a geographically defined territory. In practice, ethnic nationalism 
has had an advantage over territorial or civic nationalism because the former appears 
as a natural continuation of a pre-existing ethnicity. The nationalists believe that their 
corporate interests are best protected by possession of their own state in the interna­
tional system.
A community has an identity when its members are able not only to distin­
guish it from other communities, but also to convey its distinctive character in words, 
gestures, and practices, so as to reassure them that it should exist and that they have 
reason to belong to it. Thus the emergence of a national identity involves a growing 
sense among people that they belong naturally together, that they share common in­
terests, a common history and a common destiny. To this extent the Baloch have un­
doubtedly an obvious claim to national identity, as demonstrated by perceptible politi­
cal, economic and social events peculiar to the Baloch.
As indicated in chapter three, historically, the period between the 13 th century 
and the end of the 15th was the most significant in the development of the Baloch 
ethno-linguistic community. With respect to this, the process was just as complex and 
fundamental. Internally, the Baloch society moved from the smaller unit of clan to the 
larger one of tribe and territorial differentiation. Externally, it began to assimilate vast 
segments of other ethnic groups: Iranians, Indo-Aryans of Punjab and Sindh, Arabs, 
Pashtuns, etc.
A nation may be divided amongst several states. Such a nation is a multi-state 
nation - or, more appropriately, a trans-state nation. The Baloch today are a trans-state 
nation. Since the 1920s, their ‘coherence and unity’ have been growing steadily, and it 
is directed to the establishment of an independent “Greater Balochistan”, which com­
prises mainly the Pakistani province of Balochistan, the Iranian province of Sistan- 
wa-Balochistan (Sistan and Balochistan), and the contiguous areas of southern Af­
ghanistan. Thus, as ties of histoiy, territory and ethnicity maintain a unified Baloch 
national identity that spans state frontiers, so does Baloch nationalism transcend the
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international boundaries, which cut across its linguo-ethnic homeland, Therefore, it is 
important to place the Baloch national struggle in Eastern Balochistan (within the 
state of Pakistan) in the context of the broader nationalist movement engulfing the Ba­
loch in Iran and Afghanistan.
Numbering over 10 million (1981), the Baloch are one of the largest trans­
state nations in southwest Asia. At present, their country is politically divided into 
two major parts: eastern Balochistan with Quetta as its capital has been administered 
by Pakistan since 1948; western Balochistan, officially known as “Sistan-wa- 
Balochistan” with Zahedan as its capital, has been under the control of Iran since 
1928. The greatest number of Baloch today still live in Balochistan, though a large 
Baloch diaspora has developed in this century, especially in Karachi and other cities 
of Sindh, Punjab, Oman, and in recent decades in the Gulf States as well.
However, it is Balochistan’s strategic location, with a long coastline on the 
Gulf and its function as one of the gate-ways from and to Central Asia and Afghani­
stan, and as the most important check point of the Gulfs oil, that has placed it in a 
pivotal position in the Subcontinent's, and since the post colonial years in Pakistan's 
and Iran’s, history.
Having its origin in the Balochs’ distinct geography, ecology, culture and his­
tory, Baloch nationalism emerged as an ideology in the early 1920s. Representing a 
popular* movement against alien domination, its principal goal is the Baloch national 
self-rule in their homeland, an aim sought to preserve their national and cultural iden­
tity, thus advocated and pursued universally by the Baloch of all classes and social 
strata.
The ethnic element (ethnicity) constitutes the salient feature of Baloch nation­
alism. The weakness of ethnicity, however, is its inability to maintain the terminal 
loyalty of the masses at the national level. Sub-national rivalry, based on tribal loyal­
ties, divides the Baloch national movement. These rivalries are then used by the cen­
tral govermnents to weaken the Baloch, in both Iran and Pakistan. Thus the Baloch 
movement, in contrast to many other national liberation movements, has experienced 
a persistent contradiction between its traditional leadership and the relatively devel­
oped society it seeks to liberate.
A strong sense of ethnicity has existed among the Baloch for a very long time. 
From the 17th century to the mid-19th century, much of Balochistan was under the 
rule of the independent Khanate of Balochistan, and the autonomous Baloch princi­
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palities (Western Balochistan) that produced a flourishing rural and urban life in the 
18th century. Although a people of mixed origin, the Baloch constitute an ethnicity 
which has proved its vigour throughout the ages. They have withstood the inroads of 
more numerous and developed peoples such as the Mughals, Turks and Persians, and 
despite certain affinities with the latter, they have succeeded in maintaining their sepa­
rate identity. Their vitality has been demonstrated by expansion into non-Baloch re­
gions as well as by the Balochization of neighbouring people.
The Baloch may be divided into two major groups. The largest and the most 
extensive of these are the Baloch who speak Balochi or any of its related dialects. 
This group represents the Baloch “par* excellence”. The second group consists of the 
various non-Balochi speaking groups, among them are the Baloch of Sindh and Pun­
jab and the Brahuis of eastern Balochistan who speak Sindhi, Seraiki and Brahui re­
spectively. Despite the fact that the latter group differs linguistically, they believe 
themselves to be Baloch, and this belief is not contested by their Balochi-speaking 
neighbours. Moreover, many prominent Baloch leaders have come from this second 
group. Thus, language plays a less important role in the Baloch nationalist movement 
in Eastern Balochistan, because, as indicated above, language ties do not unite the 
whole Baloch community.
Despite the heterogeneous composition of the Baloch, in some cases attested 
in traditions preserved by the tribes, they believe themselves to have a common ances­
try. Some scholars have claimed a Semitic ancestry for the Baloch, a claim which is 
also supported by the Baloch genealogy and traditions, and has found wide acceptance 
among the Baloch writers. Even though this belief may not necessarily agree with the 
facts (which, it should be pointed out, are very difficult to prove, either way), it is the 
concept universally held among members of the group that matters. In this connection 
Kurdish nationalism offers a good parallel. The fact is that there are many common 
ethnic factors which have contributed to the formation of the Kurdish nation; there are 
also factors which have led to divisions within the Kurds themselves. While the lan­
guages identified as Kurdish are not the same as the Persian, Arabic, or Turkish, they 
are mutually unintelligible. Geographically, the division between the Kurmanji- 
speaking areas and the Sorani-speaking areas correspond with the division between 
the Sunni and Shiite schools of Islam. Despite all these factors, the Kurds form one of 
the oldest nations in the Middle East, It is interesting to note that like the Kurdish rul­
ing tribes, various Baloch ruling tribes have also pretended to an Arab descent and
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proudly displayed Arab genealogy -  a fact no doubt due to the religious prestige 
which attaches to Arab descent among Islamic peoples. However, even those who 
have claimed such descent have never considered themselves anything but Baloch.
The Balochs’ ethnic background, social organisation, culture, history, and 
sense of territoriality are proof of an age-old Baloch qaum (nation). In many ways, 
this is a projection of modem concepts into the past. Nevertheless, the Baloch have 
undeniably had a pool of characteristics which encouraged the development of sepa­
rate identity well before the 20th century and gave rise to an assertive ideology of Ba­
loch nationalism during the national movements of 1920s and onward. Thus they are 
united by their belief in common ancestors, culture, history and Sunni Islam. While 
there is no one dialect or language common to all Baloches, the speakers of the vari­
ous dialects and languages regard themselves as Baloch and are so regarded by one 
another. A unity of tradition and culture complements this unity of languages. While it 
is true that Baloch are divided today between tribesmen (migratory or sedentary) and 
urban dwellers, their social mores were formed in the tribal cauldron.
Of the various elements that go into the making of the Baloch national iden­
tity, probably the most important is a common social and economic organisation. For 
while many racial strains have contributed to the making of the Baloch people, and 
while there are varying degrees of differences in language and dialect among the vari­
ous groups, a particular type of social and economic organisation, comprising what 
has been described as a “tribal culture”, is common to them all. This particular tribal 
culture is the product of environment, geographical, and historical forces, which have 
combined to shape the general configuration of Baloch life and institutions.
The above-mentioned characteristics of the Baloch not only unite them but 
also separate them from the dominant neighbouring cultures. This recognition of their 
ethnic separateness is reinforced by the separation of the Baloch from the Pakistani 
and Iranian national economies. Whether this non-participation is based on the differ­
ence between centre and periphery, urban vs. rural, industry vs. agriculture, or inten­
tional discrimination, Balochistan lacks modern factories and modern industries. It 
has shared in neither the development of these countries’ infrastructure nor in the re­
wards of their economic development.
The Baloch history, tradition, culture, language, sense of territoriality and their 
common ethnic background form the cohesive bases of Baloch nationalism, while ge­
ography has had both positive and negative effects on it. Geographical isolation, of
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course, did not give rise to nationalism, but there are few factors that strengthen the 
nationalism of a people more that the belief that they are culturally and historically 
unique in the world. To the extent that geography was responsible for the uniqueness 
of the Baloch character, culture, and history, it helped create a national particularism, 
which in turn served as a catalytic force for the growth of national sentiment in Ba­
lochistan.
The same climatic and geographical conditions that aided the growth of Ba­
loch nationalism, from another point of view hindered this growth. As the difficult 
mountain and desert terrain historically protected their independence, and made it dif­
ficult for invaders to annex the Baloch territory, on the other hand, the harsh climate 
and scarcity of water did not give the Baloch a chance to emerge as a feudal nation. 
The harsh climate and the scarcity of water forced the Baloch to live a nomadic or 
semi-nomadic life or to migrate to the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia, East Africa, 
or the Arab Middle East.
Balochistan can boast vast gas deposits as well as minerals like chromium, 
copper, iron and coal. Gas is found in commercially viable quantities in Sui and 
Pirkoh (Pakistan). This is an important factor in the attitudes of the various Central 
governments regarding the question of Baloch self-determination, and has strength­
ened the Balochs’ own feeling of being treated unfairly.
The historical experiences have played an important role to the formation of 
the Baloch national identity. In this connection the Swiss experience shows a remark­
able similarity. In the Swiss case strength of common historical experience and a 
common consensus of aspirations have been sufficient to weld into nationhood groups 
without a common linguistic or cultural background. It should be remembered that the 
history of the Baloch people over the past hundred years has been a history of evolu­
tion, from traditional society to a more modern one. (“More modern” is a comparative 
term, and does not imply a “modern” society, i.e. a culminating end-point to the evo­
lution.) As such, the reliance on tribal criteria is stronger in the earlier movements, 
and the reliance on nationalism stronger in the later ones. Similarly, the organizing 
elements in the early movements are the tribes; the political parties gradually replace 
the tribes as mass mobilisation is channelled into political institutions.
Therefore, as argued in this dissertation, the Baloch constitute a nation distinct 
from that of the Persians and Punjabis by every fundamental test of nationhood, firstly 
that of a separate historical past in the region at least as ancient as that of their
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neighbours, secondly by the fact of their being a cultural and linguistic entity entirely 
different from that of the Persians and Punjabis, with an unsurpassed classical heritage 
and a developed language which makes Baloch fully adequate for all present-day 
needs and finally by reason of their territorial habitation of definite areas.
The growing presence and power of the British East India Company along the 
coastal and eastern provinces of India and the simultaneous disintegration of the 
Mughal Uzbek and Safavid empires in India, Central Asia, and Persia respectively, 
ripened the conditions for the whole of Balochistan to unite within the framework of a 
single feudal state (Kalat State). The rulers of the mightiest of the khanate accom­
plished this unification. They came from the Kambarani or Ahmadzai dynasty (from 
the founder of the dynasty-Mir Ahmad who reigned in 1666-1695). However, it was 
the sixth Khan of this dynasty, Nasir Khan I, known as the Great, who drove the fron­
tiers of the Khanate of Kalat northward into Afghanistan, southward into the Mak- 
koran, westward deep into Persian territory, and eastward into Punjab and Sindh as far 
as Karachi.
The Baloch destinies, however, changed radically around the time, when the 
British and the Persians divided Balochistan into spheres of influence, agreeing on a 
border in the mid-19th century. As said above, up to the British advent, the Baloch had 
developed into a major power in the region. They were ruling not only Balochistan, 
but also the two richest provinces of the region, Sindh and Sistan. The British, whose 
occupation of the eastern part of Balochistan began in the 1840s, were interested in 
Balochistan for military and geopolitical reasons. In order to protect their colony (In­
dia) from the rival expansionist powers such as Russia, France, and Germany, the 
British used Balochistan as a base to protect their interests in their sphere of influence 
(Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf region).
To prevent Baloch unity and to suppress their nationalist tendencies the British 
exploited the Baloch tribal system. Sir Robert Sandeman advocated a new socio­
political system, called the "Sandeman System" or Sardari Nizam for developing the 
authority of the tribal chiefs. In 1854, the Khan of Kalat became a British protectorate. 
The treaty of 1876 gave birth to new political forces in Baloch society, the decline of 
the powerful feudal overlord (the Khan) and the rise of a new feudal elite (,Sardars). 
The Sandeman system granted complete autonomy to the tribal areas. The status of 
the Sardar (chief among equals) was changed into that of a feudal lord and the tribes­
men were declared subjects.
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The spread of the modem doctrines of nationalism among the Baloch, and the 
resulting active participation of the Baloch intellectuals in nationalist activities was in 
large measure a reaction against British and Persian supremacy. The First World War 
and its aftermath mark an important stage in the growth of Baloch nationalism. The 
extent and intensity of nationalist feeling among the Baloch was profoundly influ­
enced by the impact of the Russian Revolution, the defeat and break-up of the Otto­
man and the abolition of the Caliphate, the anti-imperialist movements of the Afghans 
and the Indians, and the revolutionary ideas set in motion by these events, as well as 
by the propagation of the Wilsonian principles of national self-determination.
Frequent internal divisions of tribe and social class have marked the develop­
ment of Baloch nationalism since its emergence in the 1920s. National boundaries 
have also fragmented Baloch nationalist groups and made it difficult to present a 
united front to governments. Governments too have become adept at exploiting Ba­
loch divisions. Their policies towards Baloch minorities have often shaped the goals 
of Baloch nationalist parties - which at various times have called for cultural and so­
cial rights, autonomy or independence.
The first apostle of the Baloch national movement was Yusuf Ali Magasi. In 
the early 1920s, Magasi and his friends established the “Anjuman-e Ittehad Balochan” 
(Organization for the Unity of Baloch), an underground political organization, for the 
liberation of Balochistan. From 1931, the Anjuman with Magasi as its president 
started to work openly. Having lived in his youth in cosmopolitan Lahore (British In­
dia), Magasi was familiar with the anti-imperialist struggle and the material advance­
ment of modern nations. Magasi’s definition of Baloch nationalism, and his under­
standing of who was a Baloch, was based on history, tradition, bloodline and religion.
Thus the material with which the early Baloch nationalist leaders began to 
build Baloch nationalism was the ethnic characteristics of the people of Balochistan 
and the surrounding area. As discussed in chapter three, the Baloch have a long his­
tory, going back at least 3000 years. They have creation myths, a written record, and a 
body of literary works (primarily oral). While the Persian and the Punjabi peoples 
share many of these earliest cultural markers, there are sufficient differences to mark 
the Baloch as a unique people. Being a colonial movement, the Baloch national 
movement picked up the language of European nationalism as early as the 1920s. 
Thus, concepts such as the modern nation, identified homeland, and the right of self- 
determination, were taken from European ethnic movements.
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The Baloch have consistently resisted all attempts at encroachment upon their 
independent status, whether by the British or the Iranian governments. Their various 
rebellions in the Eastern and Western Balochistan, besides being violent manifesta­
tions of Baloch nationalist sentiments, were also waged in defence of the Baloch way 
of life. The extension of the external authority of the British into the Baloch country, 
accompanied by the new and unfamiliar economic and technological process of mod­
ern civilization, roused the tribal resistance in the same manner that it had roused the 
resistance of the Pashtun tribes in the mid-19th century, and increased the vehemence 
of Baloch nationalism.
It appears that the British reversed their policy in respect to Balochistan after 
the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917. Thereafter, concerned with 
containing the spread of the October Revolution, they assisted Iran to incorporate 
western Balochistan in 1928 in order to strengthen the latter country as a barrier to 
Soviet expansion southward. The same concern also led later to the annexation of 
Eastern Balochistan to Pakistan in 1948. Henceforth, the Baloch and their homeland 
were divided against their will between three states, in order to enable one great 
power to enhance its strategic position against another big power.
Thus, as indicated above, the superimposed division, in turn, has provoked the 
rise of Baloch nationalism and their sense of irredentism, bringing them into conflict 
with their respective states, which are intent on preserving the inherited status quo 
from the big powers. It is the superimposition of this division that has served as the 
main cause of conflict between the Baloch and the states in which they were incorpo­
rated. Since then, the Baloch nation, with its distinctive society and culture has had to 
confront in both of the “host” states centralizing, ethnically-based nationalist regimes 
-  the Persians and the Punjabis -  with little or no tolerance for expressions of national 
autonomy within their borders.
Following the fall of Mir Dost Mohammad Khan in western Balochistan in 
1928, the aggressiveness of nascent Persian nationalism gave rise to new grievances 
and apprehensions, for besides wounding Baloch national pride; it threatened the Ba­
loch national identity with extinction. The Pahlavi regime was intent on building a 
Western-type secular nation -  based on the Persian national, linguistic and cultural 
identity. The Baloch response was a series of revolts throughout the 1930s, led by the 
tribal chiefs. However, by the end of 1937, the last of these was brutally repressed. 
Thousands of Baloch migrated to eastern Balochistan and Sindh. It should be noted
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that, while some of these revolts were well organised and had well-defined political 
aims, others were no more' than violent protest against some real or imagined injus­
tice. Whatever their cause, every fresh outbreak seemed to fill the cup of Baloch bit­
terness.
Obviously one of the main reasons for the failure of the early Baloch revolts 
was the local, feudal, tribal and patriarchal characteristics of revolts, which often cen­
tred around a local influential leader, followed by the members of his tribe. Even the 
Baranzais in Iranian Balochistan, although well organised at the higher levels, never 
penetrated to the broad masses of the Baloch people. Similarly the major cause of the 
failure of the 1930s and the 1940s national movements was the lack of a modem so­
cial basis for nation building. The Sardars opposed modern institutions and reforms. 
From 1929-1948 there were no colleges, universities or industries. There existed only 
the tribal elite and the oppressed class of nomads and peasants. The nationalists, 
mostly of lower middle-class background, were not in a position to mobilise the Ba­
loch people in the tribal areas because of the strong control of the chiefs as well as the 
opposition of the British. To weaken the tribal chiefs they looked for help outside the 
border of Balochistan. They entered into an alliance with the All India Congress 
(while the Muslim League refused support because of its alliance with the Khan and 
the Sardars).
In the twentieth century the formation of new nation-states following World 
War I and the partition of Indian sub-continent in 1947, had a profound impact on Ba­
loch society. Since then, Baloch history has been dominated by stmggles between 
communities, which became minorities in new nation-states and national governments 
which have sought to divide, to dominate and to suppress their aspirations. These con­
flicts have created large population movements. Many thousands have been forced to 
leave their homes and land and many more migrated to escape poverty and oppres­
sion. As discussed in chapter two, the Baloch regions of Iran, Pakistan and Afghani­
stan have remained among the least developed in those countries. Tribal ties remain 
strong in many areas, and tribal leaders are still influential at local level, especially in 
Eastern Balochistan (Pakistan). However, population movements to the cities and the 
process of urbanization in recent decades have created new forms of political and so­
cial organization.
In 1947, the nationalists faced a new situation in the politics of Balochistan 
due to the lapse of paramountcy. It is important to note that the disintegration of the
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British Empire gave the Baloch an opportunity to regain their freedom from the Brit­
ish. Following the end of the War, intense political activities developed among the 
Baloch nationalists in Balochistan. Thy obtained a parliamentary majority in the elec­
tions of 1947. In 1948, while the nationalists were struggling for independence, the 
Sardars, made an alliance with the Muslim League. In return, Jinnah promised to look 
after their interests. The reactionary tribal elite could not join the Khan who wanted to 
introduce modern institutions instead of protecting the tribal and feudal system. Thus, 
the annexation of Balochistan into Pakistan was a result of the old and dying tribal 
and feudal system, represented by the Baloch tribal chiefs. The Anjuman (1920- 
1933), and the Kalat State National Party (1937-1948) represented the Baloch people.
In March 1948, contrary to the agreement of August 1947, Pakistan forcefully 
annexed the Khanate of Balochistan. Thus, the Baloch state, which emerged with the 
first Baloch confederacy under Mir Jalal Han in 12* century, came to a tragic end in 
1948, one year after the partition of the Indian subcontinent to India and Pakistan in 
1947. For a brief period (1952-55), however, the Khanate was given semi- 
autonomous status as the Balochistan States Union. But this arrangement collapsed 
when West Pakistan was declared a single province in October 1955, In July 1970, 
Balochistan was restored to separate provincial status, its boundaries incorporating the 
former British Balochistan and the Balochistan States Union.
During the fifty years of the existence of Pakistan, three wars have been 
waged in Balochistan. Agha Abdul Karim’s rebellion was the first in a series of 
insurrections against the government of Pakistan. Under the pressure of the Pakistan 
government, the Khan of Kalat declared Agha Abdul Karim and the National Party to 
be rebels, on May 24, 1948. Because of its resistance to annexation and its co­
operation with the rebel prince, Agha Abdul Karim, the Government of Pakistan 
banned the Kalat National Party in June 1948. On May 26, 1948, Agha Abdul Karim 
with his rebel group had entered Afghanistan and set up his headquarters at Mazar 
Mohammad Karez in the Shorawak area, in the hope of acquiring support for a 
sustained war against Pakistan. But the Afghan Government did not approve of the 
presence of the prince and the National Party in its territory.
Agha Abdul Karim’s resources were limited and so was his area of operations. 
Karim started his movement in the Jhalawan area, backed by some nationalist leaders 
and with the secret approval of the Khan. His rebel followers were not more than 500 
to 700. Due to bad planning and the lack of the expected support from Afghanistan,
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the prince and his partisans were forced to surrender. Agha Abdul Karim’s adventure 
was clearly of little immediate importance because it lacked both unified Baloch 
political support and Afghan military support. But what did make it significant in the 
long run was the widespread Baloch belief that Pakistan had betrayed the safe conduct 
agreement. The Baloch regard this as the first of a series of “broken treaties” which 
have created an atmosphere of distrust over relations with Islamabad. Agha Abdul 
Karim and his followers were all sentenced to long prison terms and became rallying 
symbols for the Baloch nationalist movement.
The 1950s and 1960s were decades of political upheaval in Pakistan. In 
Balochistan tribal structures suffered major setbacks, largely due to detribalisation and 
the rise of urban population, and later to land reforms initiated by the central 
governments. Similarly, a visible change occurred in the cultural field. In the early 
1950s, the Baloch press was established. In the subsequent years of the 1960s and the 
1970s many books, periodicals, and newspapers proudly reported the evidence of the 
past. Thus to heighten national consciousness, new avenues were opened to learn 
about the past, about present culture, and about other national phenomena by means of 
written words. Since then, by the popularisation of Baloch history, Balochi classical 
poetry and the positive characterisation of Baloch personality and society, the Baloch 
press has played an important role for the imagination of the Baloch nation.
Following the fall of the Khanate, the Baloch leadership accepted the political 
reality of Pakistan. As for ideology the “Ustaman Gal” (People’s Party) marked the 
first time in Baloch history that the Baloch stopped asking for outright independence. 
They couched their demands in terms of autonomy. The Party, however, maintained 
that only elected democratic governments at the provincial and national levels would 
guarantee autonomy to the minority nationalities within the framework of constitu­
tional provisions.
The continued existence of military rule in Pakistan from 1958 to the early 
1970s obstructed a democratic solution to the Balochistan problem and exacerbated 
inter-regional tension. The prospect of a democratic political system was lost when 
the Pakistan army refused to accept the results of Pakistan’s first general election in 
1970, which led to the dismemberment of the eastern half of the country, now known 
as Bangladesh. Moreover, the sense of betrayal by Bhutto’s civilian regime, which 
had signed constitutional guarantees of Balochistan’s autonomous status, added to the 
growing nationalist sentiment, which fuelled the four-year rebellion in the 1970s.
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Throughout the period since the partition, Baloch have had an uncomfortable 
relationship with the central government of Pakistan: relations were poorest in 1973 
when they engaged three divisions of the Pakistan armed forces in a bitter and intense 
armed struggle. In 1973, the Pakistani security agencies discovered Soviet arms in the 
Iraqi Embassy at Islamabad. The government alleged that these arms were for the lib­
eration movement of Balochistan. The Baloch nationalists not only denied this allega­
tion, but also regarded it as a conspiracy by Bhutto and his allies to provide a cause 
for military intervention aiming at a take-over in the province.
However, despite a new constitution, which guaranteed a degree of provincial 
autonomy, in less than a year the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Bhutto, dis­
missed the Baloch government on 12th Februaiy 1973. In justifying the dismissal, the 
centre charged the provincial government with responsibility for several cases of law­
lessness in Balochistan and alleged its support, in collusion with foreign governments, 
for Baloch and Pashtun separatists. In practice, however, Bhutto acted against the 
NAP because having provincial governments led by a party other than his own limited 
his personal authority, and because of pressure from the Shah of Iran.
Thus, in the 1970s, open warfare between the Pakistan military and Baloch na­
tionalist guerrillas, whose demands ranged from self-rule to outright independence, 
racked Balochistan. Guerrilla war went on for more than four years and came to a 
stand still in 1977, when General Zia ul-Haq ousted Bhutto. However, the Baloch 
movement, which had come into being in the aftermath of Sardar Ataullah Mengal’s 
government, might have lost its ardour, but it did not die, as claimed by the Pakistani 
authorities. In fact, a case can be made that national feelings have grown in potential 
in the Baloch society and, given the right circumstances, could mount an even greater 
challenge to the Pakistani state. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo’s demand for the specific 
inclusion of the right of secession for the federating units in the event of military take 
over in violation of the constitution indicated a deep mistrust of the country’s political 
set-up by the Baloch in the 1980s.
The 1973-7 insurgency intensified the ever-widening gap of distrust and mis­
trust between the Baloch and the central government. This mistrust ultimately gave 
way to greater demands for a confederation of the four peoples of Pakistan. The lead­
ers of the sub-nationalities, in self-imposed exile, formed an organisation, the Sindhi, 
Baloch, Pakhtun Front (the SBPF), in April 1985 in London to demand a confedera­
tion in Pakistan, Similarly, the so-called democracy of the 1990s in Pakistan like that
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of its military rule led to further alienation of Baloch. Speaking on May 2001, in a 
PTV (Pakistan TV) programme on provincial autonomy, the former Chief Minister of 
Balochistan, Akhtar Mengal blamed the rulers of Pakistan for suppressing the will of 
the Baloch people and violating flagrantly all the previous accord, including the one 
made with the Khan of Kalat on August 4, 1947.1
By contrast, in Iranian Balochistan, Reza Shah and subsequently his son 
Mohammad Reza adopted an iron-fist policy towards the Baloch. For the past several 
decades the Persians have never hesitated to use their military might against the Ba­
loch to silence their voice. The official Iranian policy reflects their determination to 
suppress any nationalist movement in their country. It was due to this background that 
the Baloch national movement in Iran was less vocal than its counterpart in Pakistan 
in the 1960s and 1970s.
The Iranians used harsh methods to crush Baloch identity. It was forbidden to 
wear the traditional Baloch dress in public or to speak Balochi in schools, and it was a 
criminal offence to publish, distribute, or even possess Balochi language books, 
magazines, or newspapers. Balochistan was isolated from the outside world and 
closed to foreigners. The Iranian policy of destruction of the Baloch identity, or Per- 
sianization of the Baloch under the Pahlavis may truly be comparable to that of the 
Turkish government’s policy against the Kurds under Kemal Ataturk (1923-38). The 
Turkish government followed a policy of systematic extermination and Turcification 
of the Kurdish people in the Turkish controlled Kurdistan. Thousands of Kurds were 
deported to Western Anatolia, the Kurdish language was officially banned and Kurd­
ish books were confiscated and burned. Even the words “Kurd” and “Kurdistan” were 
to be omitted from all textbooks. The Kurds were to be called Turks -  “mountain 
Turks”. Consequently, this policy of Turcification fanned the Kurdish nationalism fur­
thermore and deepened their separatist aspirations. As the Turcification of the Kurds 
in Turkey provoked the Kurdish nationalism, so did the Persianization policy of the 
Iranian authority to the Baloch nationalism in Iran.
During the whole Pahlavi era the Persians continued their assimilation and 
Persianization policies in western Balochistan. In 1957-9 and again in 1969-73, the 
Pahlavi administration used military force to crush Baloch resistance to its attempts to 
enforce assimilation. Subsequently, more subtle 'pacification' methods were used. Ba­
loch tribal leaders were appointed as intermediaries and representatives of govern­
1 Daily Balochistan Express. Sunday, 6 May 2001.
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ment interests with the aim of bridling the economic and social development of Sis- 
tan-wa-Balochistan. In spite of the application of diverse means of subjugation, the 
Iranian Baloch maintained a perception of themselves as a culturally independent 
qaum (nation). This was demonstrated by insurgencies against the Khomeini regime, 
which initially raised the hopes of the Baloch for greater provincial autonomy.
The Shah of Iran gave much importance to the area, which he always consid­
ered very important for the security of his country. Since Iran had a Baloch minority 
problem, any uprising in eastern Balochistan was thought to directly influence Iran. 
The Iranian government under the Shah kept a close watch on developments in the 
Pakistani part of Balochistan. Iran and Pakistan collaborated, due to their joint fear of 
Baloch national aspirations. It was argued that one of the reasons Pakistan’s Prime 
Minister Z. A. Bhutto dismissed the nationalist government in the province was be­
cause the Iranian government thought the Baloch nationalists in eastern Balochistan, 
might encourage dissidents in western (Iranian) Balochistan.
With the collapse of the monarchical regime in 1979, the Baloch began their 
political activities openly. The “Sazeman Demokratik”, the “Ittehad ul-Muslimeen”, 
the “Zrombesh”, and many other political and cultural organisations were formed in 
Balochistan. This period, however, lasted months, not years. The pattern was repeated 
of Baloch nationalist aspirations reappearing whenever the central government 
showed weakness. The new regime pursued a policy of Persian ethnic supremacy to­
ward Balochistan, a continuation of the policies of the monarchy.
By comparison, however, like the Baloch political parties in Eastern Balochis­
tan (Pakistan), the major nationalist organisations, which came into existence during 
or after the Iranian revolution, concentrated their demand on self-autonomy for Ba­
lochistan within Iran. As earlier mentioned, the Baloch political life was short-lived in 
Iran. In the early 1980s, the clerical regime ordered the Baloch parties disbanded, to 
be replaced with Islamic komitehs (committees) and Revolutionary Guards controlled 
by the central government. Ayatollah Khomeini distrusted the Baloch not least be­
cause theirs was a purely secular agenda. Moreover, he was a Shiite Muslim and the 
Baloch were predominantly Sunni, While the Baloch could be acknowledged as Sun­
nis, no ethnic or “national” minorities were recognised in the new constitution of the 
Islamic Republic.
Since the end of the Second World War great changes have occurred for the 
Baloch throughout Balochistan -  gradually at first but accelerating since 1970 because
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of the changed political economy of the Persian Gulf. In Afghanistan major factors 
affecting the Baloch have been the Helmand river development schemes, the govern­
ment’s Pakhtunistan policy, and the Afghan Revolution in 1978. In Iran the succes­
sive Pahlavi governments attempted to neutralise the Sardars and at the same time 
suppress any activity among the Baloch that could lead to ethnic consciousness or 
solidarity.
Comparatively, the conditions of the Baloch in Pakistan are definitely better 
than those of Iran and Afghanistan. But they are still far from satisfactory, the Baloch 
of Pakistan have consistently fought to improve them economically, culturally and 
politically. In Pakistan too the Baloch have suffered much injustice. Consider, for ex­
ample, what happened to the Baloch in the 1973-1977 insurgency. Like their brethren 
in Pakistan, the Baloch in Iran also consistently resisted the reactionary Persian domi­
nation and have shown a fervent desire to live under an independent or autonomous 
Baloch State as their natural right.
Since the early 1970s, the growing modern intelligentsia has been displacing 
the traditional intelligentsia, mainly the sardars and the mollas, in the urban centres. 
In the 1993 elections, the BNM (Balochistan National Movement) a mainly middle 
class party, succeeded in winning two national assembly and six provincial assembly 
seats. In the provincial elections of 1993, the BNM secured over 60 percent from 
Makkoran.2 Another feature of changing social relations is the increasing access of 
urban women to education, and their participation in social, economic, political and 
cultural life outside their homes. These transformations left their impact on the na­
tionalistic movement, expanding its social bases and increasing political, ideological 
and organizational tension.
Moreover, the circulation of money during the Bhutto period, and the fruits of 
the Gulf syndrome gave strength to the Baloch middle class whose interest collided 
with its more powerful and well-established Pashtun counterpart. As a result, business 
sectors such as transport, which were previously monopolised by the Pashtuns, are 
now witnessing the entrance of a rising Baloch middle class. The change of ownership 
of some transport businesses like Chiltan Transport from Pashtun to Baloch hands in 
1992 was another testimony of this fact.3
2 Nek Buzdar, “Social Organization, Resource use, and Economic Development in Balochistan” in: 
Monthly Balochi Labzank. Hub (Balochistan), March-April 2000, p. 76.
3 Abbas Jalbani, “Can Balochistan Survive?” in: The Herald. March 1992.
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Baloch nationalism, as indicated in this dissertation, is the antithesis to the po­
litically and economically dominant and exploitative Iranian (Persian) and Pakistani 
(Punjabi) states’ nationalism, a pattern similar to the rise of the Kurdish nationalism in 
the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, and Turkey). In spite of more than 70 years of its exis­
tence, Baloch nationalism has not succeeded in achieving its goal, the right of self- 
determination for the Baloch nation. It is difficult to reach a single plausible explana­
tion, but judging from the finding of this study, one could cautiously conclude that by 
that time due to a dominant tribal social base, a sense of Balochness had not evolved 
which was sufficiently strong to force a different course of events.
Nevertheless, the Baloch nationalism has steadily developed. Every time, after 
being crushed, the national movement arose more forcefully than before. Compara­
tively, in 1948, Agha Abdul Karim and his rebel followers were about 500 to 700. In 
1958, Nauruz Khan fought in a wider area against the Pakistani army and around 1000 
to 5000 guerrillas were with him. By July 1963, the guerrilla activities under the 
command of Sher Mohammad Marri increased in the Jhalawan and Marri areas. The 
fighters had established a score of camps, where the people were given training in 
guerrilla warfare. It was estimated that there were nearly 400 hard-core hostiles in 
each area, apart from hundreds of loosely organised part-time reservists. Meanwhile, 
the last war (1973-77) involved more that 55,000 Baloch guerrillas at various stages 
of the fighting, and almost every section of the Baloch population was affected in cen­
tral and eastern Balochistan by this war. A similar evolutionary process seems to have 
happened in Iranian Balochistan, after the erosion of central authority in Iran follow­
ing the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, made the prospects for Baloch nationalism ap­
peal' more promising in Iran than in Pakistan.
The Cold War led indirectly to the weakening of the Baloch national move­
ments both in Iran and Pakistan. Because both the countries were to be America’s al­
lies against Soviet expansion in the Gulf region, the United States was prepared to 
support them in furthering her own foreign policy initiatives. Since the West sup­
ported Tehran and Islamabad, so the Baloch turned to Baghdad and Kabul. Thus the 
U.S. policies indirectly helped to strengthen the two countries in their attempts to sup­
press the Baloch movement for self-rule during the whole Cold War period. In this 
regai'd, the Iranians’ use of the U.S. supplied arms against the Baloch movement in 
1973-77 is the most striking example.
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The political situation of Baloch today reflects two contradictory tendencies. 
As the old warrior Sher Mohammad Marri in the early 1990s stated, “Baloch national­
ism has penetrated the masses and is not confined to the Nawabs and Sardars alone”.4 
The urbanization, detribalisation and the migration of the Baloch people to the cities 
of the region, have contributed to the development of mass national consciousness. 
Yet their political leaderships have often fallen prey to internal divisions on both ideo­
logical and tribal lines. Divisions between the Balochs’ political parties started with 
Zia’s party-less elections in 1985, and later it sharpened during the so-called 1990s 
democracy. The regional aspect of the Baloch issue, as well as the growing complexi­
ties of Baloch society have greatly complicated the task of the Baloch national 
movement in achieving unity and a coherent strategy to achieve their goals.
The material analysed in this dissertation warrants the conclusion that the 
Baloch form a distinct nation and that their national consciousness is strong enough to 
consider their national movement as having deep roots in the convictions and 
aspirations of that nation. The divisive factor of tribal loyalties will tend to play a 
constantly diminishing role because of the impact of modern civilization, which is 
changing the cultural patterns in the whole southwest Asia.
This study has attempted to connect the Baloch problem with the past policies 
not only of the Baloch inhabited states but also of the Great Powers in an effort to 
demonstrate that no Great Power interested in the region can afford to ignore the 
Baloch problem or avoid the formulation of a Baloch policy as part of an over-all 
Southwest Asian policy.
There are numerous implications from this study. It provides empirical support 
to the hypothesis that among the Baloch, ethnicity or ethnic nationalism is a stronger 
basis of legitimacy than the civic or territorial nationalism. It also provides an ex­
planatory model, which can be used to explain the current disputes in Turkey, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, and other areas of ethnic conflict. 
In addition, it provides predictive criteria for use in prognosticating the results of 
these conflicts.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the empirical evidence cited in this case 
study is taken from a single trans-state nation in Southwest Asia. Although these for­
mulas are broad enough to be applies to other ethnic nations elsewhere, they need fur­
ther testing before any definitive conclusion can be drawn in respect to the phenome­
4 The News International. 3-9 July 1992.
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non under investigation. To that end, it is suggested that more ethnic cases should be 
studied in all geographic areas of the Third World and then the result of these re­
searches should be compared and contrasted with the findings of studies done on the 
ethnic cases in the developed states.
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Glossary
This is a selected list of those important terms, which appeal's more than one, or twice 
in the text. Others Balochi, Sindhi, Urdu and Persian words are defined in parentheses 
within the text. Several terms have different meanings and expressions in different 
countries. We have given their translation and meanings as used in Baloch society.
A ilamiah the Declaration of Kalat Independence
alim Muslims learned in Islamic religious sciences
amir ruler, commander, chief
anjuman political organisation
azad free, independent
bahut asylum, refugee
balochiat Balochness
barnama manifesto
beiglar beigi chief of the chiefs
her revenge
bulak tribe district
darbar court of a ruler
dera camp
derajat several camps, the term is used for the Baloch areas of Dera Ghazi
Khan, Dera Fateh Khan and Dera Ismail Khan.
diwan parliament
farman royal order
farmandar governor
fatwa decree by a leaned religious figure
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Han the title of the heads of the first Baloch Confederacy
hijrat religiously motivated exodus
jagir land grant bestowed the government
jagirdar one who holds a jagir
jirga assembly
Kaum nation, tribe
khalifa spiritual guide
khan title for the ruler of Balochistan
lajj honour
lashkar army, tribal army
majlis parliament
maulana maulavi
maulavi Muslim scholar learned in the Koran
Mir title of respect, and the title of the Baloch rulers of Sindh
moreed disciple of a khalifa or pir.
muazam great
muhajir immigrant
mulla educated person, Muslim priest
naib agent, governor
namus honour
Nawab governor
niabat district, agency
ostan province
qabila tribe
qazi judge
salav general, commander
shariat Islamic law
shieh tribal-chief, ruler
tehsil largest administrative subdivision within a district
ulema plural of alim
ulus people
wait governor
watan homeland, fatherland
wazir Prime Minister
ziarat tomb of a holy man
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Interviews
In order to better understand the political situation of postcolonial era, the following
persons have been interviewed:
Ahmadzai, Agha Naseer Khan. Court minister of the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar 
Khan and a prominent historian. Interview made in Quetta in October 
1997, (on tape in Balochi)
Ahmadzai, Dawood Khan. Son of the late Khan of Kalat Mir Ahmad Yar Khan. Inter­
view made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi). Aslo 
many private conversations,
Alam, Khozeime Ameer Hossein. He was appointed as the governor-general of Ba­
lochistan in 1940.S by Reza Shah. Served as deputy of Agriculture un­
der post War period, was Majlis deputy for several duration, and then 
as Senator for Sistan wa Balochistan and the adjacent districts, ap­
pointed by the Shah in 1975-79. Interview made in London in June 
1999, (on tape in Persian).
Amiri, Abdul Samad. Ex-politician, poet and writer from Iranian Balochistan, sen­
tenced for life imprisonment in the time of Shah regime for his political 
activities, nowadays living in exile in United Arab Emirate. Interview 
made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Azad, Rahim Bakhsh. Journalist, general secretary of Zekri Association in Karachi.
Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Baloch, Abdul Hayee. Medical doctor, senator and president of Balochistan National 
Movement, BNM. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on 
tape in Balochi and English).
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Baloch, Abdul Majeed. Medical doctor, Director General Jinnah Hospital. Interview 
made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Baloch, Abdul Malik. Medical doctor, ex-education minister in Balochistan. Interview 
made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Baloch, Azizullah. Was member of Sazeman Demokratik. After the ban of Organisa­
tion, he became a supporter of Fedaeyan-e Khalq. Nowadays he is liv­
ing in Sweden as a political refugee. Interview made in Stockholm in 
April 1998, (on tape in Balochi).
Baloch, Bashir Ahmad. Eex-director of the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (Radio 
Pakistan), Quetta and the Chairman of the Balochi Academy. Interview 
made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Baloch, Chakar Khan. Editor of Monthly Balochi Donva. Multan. Interview made in 
Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Baloch, Mansoor. Writer on socio-political subjects. Ex-member of Pakistan National 
Party, PNP. Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in 
Balochi).
Baloch, Maulana Abdul Haq. Amir (president) of “Jamiat Islami” in Balochistan. In­
terview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Baloch, Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri. Ex-care-taker Governor of Balochistan, 
ex-Chief Justice in Balochistan High Court and a prominent historian. 
Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (not on tape, only writ­
ten notes).
Baloch, Mohammad Akram. Ex-speeker of Provincial Assembly of Balochistan, ex- 
minister of culture and sports in Zulfakar Ali Magasi’s Government, 
Voice General Secretary of BNM and the chief editor of Daily Rehbar. 
Hub, Balochistan. Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape 
in Balochi).
Baloch, Siddiq. He has been Personal Secretary of late Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo in 
NAP as well as in PNP, nowadays editor Daily Balochistan Express. 
Quetta. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Ba­
lochi).
Baluch, Muhammad Sardar Khan. Former Chairman of Balochistan Text Book Board, 
and former Chairman of the Balochi Academy, Quetta. Has written 
books in English on the political history of the Baloch. Interview made 
in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Barakzai, Akbar. Nationalist poet and politician, was a heading leader in the Baloch 
national movement of Iranian Balochistan based in Baghdad in early 
seventy’s. Since 1975 he is living in exile in London. Interview made 
in London in February 1998, (on tape in Balochi).
Bijarani, Mir Hazar Khan. Federal Minister for Minorities Affairs from August to 
October 1991, in the care-taker Cabinet. Federal Minister for defence 
in the care-taker Cabinet formed after the dissolution of the National 
Assembly on 18th April 1993. Now a Member of National Assembly
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sembly on 18th April 1993. Now a Member of National Assembly of 
Pakistan. Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in 
English).
Bugti, Aziz Mohammad. Professor of political science at the University of Balochis­
tan, Quetta and a historian. Interview made in Quetta in November
1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Bugti, Nawab Akbar Khan. Sardar of Bugti tribe, ex-Governor of Balochistan, ex­
chief minister of Provincial Cabinet, president of Jamhuri Watan Party, 
JWP and Member of National Assembly of Pakistan. Interview made 
in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in English).
Dehvari, Mohammad Ali. Was a member of Sazeman Demokratik. Later, he became a 
supporter of Fedai-e Khalq (Aqalliat). Nowadays living in Stockholm, 
Sweden as a political refugee. Interview made in Stockholm in April
1998, (on tape in Balochi).
Gichki, Amanullah. Ex-ambassador, Federal Minister in care-taker Cabinet before 
Nawaz Sharif. Interview made in Khozdar in October 1997, (on tape in 
Balochi).
Gichki, Munir Ahmad. PhD. in history. Professor of History at Balochistan Univer­
sity. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Hoseinbor, Ayub. Was a central committee member of the Sazeman Demokratik.
Later he joint the Sazeman-e Paykar. Nowadays as a political refugee 
living in London. Interview made in London in May 1998, (on tape in 
Balochi).
Hoseinbor, Gholam Reza. Was the last head of Rastakhiz Party of Iran in Balochistan.
Since Iranian revolution Living in London as a political refugee. Inter­
view made in London in January 1998, (on tape in Balochi).
Hout, Gul Mahmad. Originally from Iranian Balochistan, living in Karachi, was a 
prominent leader of NAP and a close friend of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Biz- 
enjo. Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Jamaldini, Abdullah Jan. Professor of the Balochi language at the University of Ba­
lochistan, Quetta. Leading political and literary figure since 1950’s. In­
terview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi). Also 
many private conversations.
Jamaldini, Jehan Zeb. Medical doctor, head of the Baloch Cultural Society in Karachi. 
Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Kalati, Abdul Rahim. Born in Mombassa, Kenya, student in London University 
(SOAS). Interview made in London in December 1998, (not on tape, 
only written notes).
Khanzai, Gholam Mohammad. Living in Dashtiari, Iranian Balochistan, educated 
from the Karachi University, was a candidate to the first Majlis (Na­
tional assembly) of Islamic Republic of Iran, but was rejected in the
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second run of election by the Shora-e Negahban (Guardian Council). 
Interview made in London in July 1998, (on tape in Balochi).
Kurd, Abdurahman. Living in Quetta, a leading Baloch nationalist figure and the Joint 
Secretary of Awami National Party. Interview made in Quetta in No­
vember 1997, (on tape in Urdo).
Kurd, Aid Mohammad. Bom in Quetta on 15 March 1930, living in London, was 
President of Word Baloch Organisation (WBO) in 1982-85. Interview 
made in London in July 1998, (on tape in Balochi).
Malik, Habibullah. Was one of the founder of the Hezb Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (Islamic 
Unity Party) in Iranian Balochistan. Became Director General of 
Health in Dr Danish Narui’s Administration after the Iranian revolution 
(1979). Nowadays living in England as political refugee. Interview 
made in Hasting, England in January 1998, (on tape in Balochi).
Marri, Shah Mohammad. Medical doctor, editor of the Monthly Sangat. writer of 
many articles on politics and social issues, translated books on political 
history. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Ba­
lochi).
Mazari, Sardar Sherbaz Khan. A Sardar of Mazari tribe, ex-president of National De­
mocratic Party, NDP, Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, 
(on tape in English).
Mir-Lashari, Mohammad Khan. Chief of Lashari tribe, member of the last parliament 
of Pahlavi regime, leader of Jonbish-e Mojahiddeen-e Baloch (The 
Movement of Baloch Mojahideen). Nowadays living in London as a 
political refugee. Interview made in London in February 1998, (on tape 
in Balochi).
Mumtaz, Ismail. Bom in Matrah, Oman. Nowadays living in Bahrain. Since 1989, 
president of “Balochi Adabi Johd-kar”, a literary association in Bah­
rain. Interview made in London in July 1998, (on tape in Balochi).
Nadeem, Abdul Ghaffar. Former editor of “Ulus”, ex-secretary of education in the 
Provincial Government of Balochistan. Interview made in Quetta in 
November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Nadvi, Maulana Khair Malimad. Active in educational and literary world since 
1950’s. Editor of the Monthly Oman and later the Monthly Sawghat. 
Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Narui, Danesh. PhD in mathematics. Was the Governor of Iranian Balochistan in 
1979, since 1982 living in London. Interview made in London in Au­
gust 1998, (on tape in Persian).
Narui, Sher Ali. Sardar of Narui tribe in Iranian Balochistan, Since 1992, living in 
London as refugee. Interview made in London in August 1998, (on 
tape in Balochi).
Naskanti, Yusuf. Born in Naskant, Iranshahr district, Iranian Balochistan, Living in 
Karachi, in the late sixties and early seventies participated in the Ba-
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loch Liberation Movement in Iranian Balochistan. Interview made in 
Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Nikkhah, Eisa. Born in Gyavan, the most southwestern part of Iranian Balochistan. He 
is the grandson of Sardar Barkat of Jask who was executed by Reza 
Shah Pahlavi, prisoned for his political activities under Khomeini, 
nowadays living in Sweden as political refugee. Interview made in 
Stockholm in June 1998, (on tape in Balochi).
Qambarani, Nadir. Professor of the Brahui language and former editor of Ulus.
Chairman, Brahvi Department, University of Balochistan, Quetta. In­
terview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Raheen, Rasul. Journalist, Librarian and Professor of the English language in Kabul 
University under the pro-Soviet regime of Afghanistan. Interview made 
in Stockholm in May 1999, (on tape in Persian).
Rind, Lalbakhsh. Leading political figure since 1950’s, a NAP leader, and head of the 
Aits Council in Balochistan under NAP government, and former presi­
dent of the Pakistan Communist Party. Interview made in Karachi in 
October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Rodini, Bahadur Khan. Professor, voice chancellor Balochistan University, Quetta. 
Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Salier, Morad. Editor of Monthly Balochi Labzank (Hab), an appreciated poet and 
writer of short stories since 1960’s. Interview made in Karachi in No­
vember 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Sajidi, Anwar. Editor of Daily Intekhab. published from Hub and Karachi. Interview 
made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
Shahbakhsh, Azim. Born in Bampur (1968). Lecturer at the University of Sistan-wa- 
Balochistan (history department). He is the biographer of Dad Shah. 
Nowadays a research student at London University (SOAS). Interview 
made in London in March 2000, (on tape in Balochi). Also many pri­
vate conversations.
Shaheen, Ali Mohammad. Living in Karachi, mother tongue Sarieeki. Professor of the 
Islamic history in Urdu College, Karachi, Interview made in Karachi in 
October 1997, (on tape in English and Persian).
Sher-Del, Mohammad. Born in Turkmenistan, teacher and writer of Balochi school 
books in Turkmenistan. Interview made in Ilatan, Turkmenistan, in 
February 1998, (on tape in Balochi).
Sistani, Mohammad Azam. Historian, has about fifteen works on history of Sistan, 
Khorasan and Afghanistan, was an academician in Kabul, Afghanistan. 
Since 1995, living in Gothenburg, Sweden. Interview made in Gothen­
burg in August 1998, (on tape in Persisn).
